THE GREAT WAR

Harold A. Scant
12/12/84

From the painting by Sir William Orpen, R.A.

MARSHAL FOCH.

Ferdinand Foch was born at Tarbes on October 4, 1851. When, nineteen years later, the Franco-Prussian War broke out he enlisted, and after peace was restored entered the engineering and artillery establishment at Fontainebleau. Foch's career in the French army was both long and distinguished. A profound student of the principles of war, Foch was well fitted to bear the heavy burden imposed upon him when, in 1918, he assumed supreme command of the Allied armies on the Western Front.

THE GREAT WAR

BY

THE RIGHT HON.
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, C.H., M.P.

:: Fully Illustrated with ::
Photographs, Drawings and Maps

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BY the middle of October the Munitions Council had completed a comprehensive study of the whole of our material resources to which I had directed their efforts. I was therefore able to frame the Munitions Budget for the coming year. The difficulties of this task far exceeded those of the budgets for which Chancellors of the Exchequer are usually responsible. The enormous variety of needs for which provision must be made could be surmounted by systematized collective study. But the fierce rivalry of so many authorities, and the dependence of our programmes upon the decisions of others, made the work complicated and baffling in the last degree.

Competing Needs and Rival Authorities.

In one quarter of our horizon stood the Shipping Controller, Sir Joseph Maclay, a most able Glasgow shipowner with deep knowledge, a charming personality and the unbounded confidence of Mr. Bonar Law. He estimated the maximum tonnage available for all purposes; and his figures, framed in a conservative and Caledonian spirit, were accepted by the War Cabinet.

In another quarter stood the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Bonar Law, one of the all-powerful Triumvirate. He also took, as was his duty, an extremely restrained view of the limits of dollar credits, both in the United States and Canada. To anything we could buy in Britain the Treasury interposed no obstacle; but we could not realize our programmes unless we were able to make very large purchases of steel from the United States, of unfilled shells from Canada and of nitrates from Chili.

Thirdly, there arose the Minister of National Service, Sir Auckland Geddes, whose duty it was—outside a large field over which the Ministry of Munitions reigned—to apportion all the available man power and to provide the recruits for the fighting services. Last, and not least of all, loomed the portentous figure of Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, charged with the paramount duties of maintaining the Fleet, of crushing the U-boats and of rebuilding the Mercantile Marine. For these purposes the Admiralty was armed not only with Absolute Priority, but possessed a monopoly control over all the firms with which they were accustomed to deal. This priority was interpreted so harshly that skilled men had to be found on one occasion for potato-peeling machines for the Grand Fleet, while they were actually being withdrawn from making range-finders for the anti-aircraft guns.[1]

The Priorities Committee.

The attitude of the War Office and the Air Ministry towards us was somewhat different. They lived by our

[1] This was of course corrected when discovered.

supplies, and to that extent were on our side. They not only demanded the supplies on an ever-increasing scale, but they also simultaneously demanded as recruits for the fighting forces the workmen, skilled and unskilled, without which these supplies could not be produced. Against all these potentates the Ministry of Munitions sallied out to do battle. Over everybody sate, as was proper, the War Cabinet, a final court of appeal. But the business of the court was heavily congested, and neither its time nor its temper was unlimited. There was therefore set up in the autumn of 1917 the "Priorities Committee," presided over by General Smuts. On this the Departments fought and tore for every ton of steel and freight. Never, I suspect, in all the vicissitudes of his career has General Smuts stood more in need of those qualities of tact and adroitness for which among his many virtues he is renowned.

One of my difficulties was in having to argue on so many fronts at once. Facts and reasoning used in one direction for one purpose could be quoted in resistance to another. Because I had thought it right on a general view of the situation to urge that strong efforts should be made to re-equip the Italian armies after Caporetto, I was forever confronted with the argument, "If you can spare all that for the Italians, you cannot be so badly off yourself." Or again, in the fight to secure a handful of steel plates for the tank programme, we encountered at first the odious statement: "But the Army doesn't want any more; General Headquarters does not rank them very high in their priorities; they have not done well at Paschendaele; they cannot cope with the mud, etc."

Resources and Demands.

The War Cabinet, and particularly the Prime Minister, always took a great interest in tanks. At the end of the year after the Battle of Cambrai this became accentuated. They recorded the most solemn adjurations upon the importance of tank construction with the utmost speed and in the largest numbers. But at the same time they ruled that the Admiralty demand for ship plates for the Mercantile Marine, which was several hundred times greater than would ever be needed for tanks, should retain their super-priority. Since we were unable to overcome Sir Eric Geddes by reason, it became necessary to gorge him with ship plates. This the Munitions Council and Sir John Hunter's steel department soon succeeded in doing. The Admiralty's merchant shipbuilding programme of three million tons in twelve months proved far beyond even their very great and splendid activities. We watched with unsleeping attention the accumulations which soon began of ship plates in every yard. Not until the moment was ripe did we unmask the guilty fact. The effect was decisive. The proud Department condescended to parley, and eventually the modest requirements of the tank programme were satisfied.

Surveying the whole process in retrospect, I have no doubt it was not —apart from the privileged position of the Admiralty—either unhealthy or inefficient. It would have been better, as I vehemently argued, to assign the whole sphere of man-power to the Ministry of National Service and the whole sphere of material to the Ministry of Munitions, and for the War Cabinet to have adjudicated upon the main distribution. The one great blot upon the high economy of the British war effort in the last year of the struggle was the undue and unwarrantable inroads upon the common fund made by the Admiralty. That they accomplished vital tasks cannot be denied. But when a nation is fighting for its life, the honour lies not in securing the lion's share, but in a just apportionment of limited resources.

Duplication and Waste of Effort.

DUPLICATION AND WASTE OF EFFORT.

To the War Cabinet.

November 6, 1917.

IF we are to realize the full war effort of this country in 1918 and in 1919, it is indispensable that the most

Photo: Baudouin.

A BESSEMER CONVERTER AT WORK.

The sights and sounds in works and factories devoted to the manufacture of munitions were not infrequently as awe-inspiring as the crash and thunder of the finished product at the front. Here is a Bessemer Converter, so called after Sir Henry Bessemer, the British scientist who invented the process, in full blast, changing iron into steel to be used in the manufacture of guns.

searching economy of men and material should be practised in every direction and by every Department; that no services should be duplicated; that no more should be taken for any service, however necessary, than is required; and that one central and superior view should regulate every portion of our defensive and offensive system. Unless we are to be confronted with a failure in munitions and shipbuilding, and with a very serious diminution in our potential war-making capacity, it is necessary that there should be a general stock-taking.

Those members of the War Cabinet or Government who were members of the Committee of Imperial Defence in the years before the war are of course familiar with every aspect of the "Invasion" argument. I will therefore content myself with drawing attention to a few simple facts.

During the early months of the war, especially at the beginning, when Germany had the greatest incentive to try to throw a raiding army across the North Sea, we had as our defence against invasion:—

1. The Fleet, with a margin of eight Dreadnoughts.
2. Our submarines and flotillas.
3. Two, and then one, and finally no regular divisions.
4. The Territorial Army, newly mobilized, with hardly any machine guns, with 15-pounder artillery and scarcely any reserves of ammunition, and gunners almost unskilled.
5. No coast fortifications and only a

Photo: L.N.A.

GUNS IN THE MAKING AT KRUPPS.

Not the least of Germany's assets at the outbreak of war was the finely-equipped works of Krupp. The experts employed by this famous firm had little to learn about guns and steel. Before the war Krupps employed some 80,000 workpeople. This small army of employees was distributed over a number of works, but mainly at Essen and at Kiel. By the end of the war Krupps' staff had risen to 115,000, including women and girls.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

NEARING COMPLETION.

A photograph which conveys not inadequately some idea of the immense output of shells necessary to keep the various fronts supplied, and achieved under the direction of the able men of the Munitions Council.

few guns in open batteries at the defended forts.

6. No mine-fields.
7. Practically no aircraft.

In these circumstances the Germans did not choose or did not venture to make an oversea attack.

We now have :—

1. The British Fleet, with a margin of about twenty Dreadnoughts.
2. The American Battle Fleet (the third strongest in the world) if we require it.
3. Enormous mine-fields, covering the German debouches and hampering the movement even of submarine craft.
4. Submarines and flotillas multiplied manifold.
5. The coast-line fortified from end to end with powerful batteries mounted at every port *and still being increased.* Powerful aeroplane forces and a perfect system of coastal watch.
6. A defence scheme devised by Lord French himself, according to the latest experience of this war.
7. A Home Army mostly in its actual battle stations, aggregating a quarter of a million men and supported by a powerful field artillery of upwards of 500 modern guns and howitzers, with boundless supplies of ammunition and enormous numbers of organized mobile or sited machine guns.
8. A million and a quarter other armed and uniformed men behind these.
9. The volunteers.

Over-insurance.

Security is no doubt vital, but it must be remembered that if the factor of

safety is exaggerated in any one part of our organization, other parts may be exposed to fatal peril; and that if our strength is dissipated in making sure three or four times over in one direction, we may fail to have the strength available for the general offensive war, and may consequently be compelled impotently to witness the defeat of our Allies one by one.

The very serious situation of the war and the impossibility on present lines of securing any effective numerical superiority or any sufficiently large mechanical superiority over the German armies in the field compel me to bring these aspects of our present arrangements to the notice of the War Cabinet.

* * * *

A few days earlier I had presented the "Munitions Budget" to the Cabinet. As it covers and explains so many aspects of our war plans and efforts, I reprint it almost in full.

Memorandum on the Munitions Budget —Tonnage : Iron Ore.

To the War Cabinet.

MUNITIONS BUDGET FOR 1918.
(Provisional.)

November 1, 1917.

1. THE foundation of the Munitions Budget is Tonnage; the ground floor is Steel; and the limiting factor in construction is Labour.

The period covered by this Budget is, broadly speaking, from now to the end of the 1918 offensive, and the figures relate precisely to the twelve months from the 15th November, 1917, to the 15th November, 1918.

2. The following are the principal demands made by the fighting departments upon the Ministry of Munitions for the campaign of 1918 compared with 1917 :—

(i) The demand of the War Office for the completion of their programme involving a 40 per cent. further increase in the striking power of the artillery, both in guns and ammunition.

(ii) The demand of the Admiralty for doubled shipbuilding materials.

(iii) The demand of the Air Board for tripled aeronautical supplies.

3. *Tonnage.*—The programmes as proposed require the delivery here of 1,100,000 tons per month for munitions alone (*i.e.*, apart from items for other departments included in our tonnage allocation). To secure this there should be assigned to us for all purposes 1,300,000 tons of shipping a month. I propose to place orders abroad somewhat in advance of this figure. If the shipping falls off, the material ordered will be received more slowly. It is better to have a moderate surplus of orders awaiting shipment than not to have the tonnage fully occupied with vitally needed materials.

4. *Iron Ore.*—More than half our total munitions imports consist of iron ore. The blast furnaces could deal with a monthly importation of 735,000 tons of Spanish and Swedish (mainly hematite) ore, and with a monthly home production of 1,500,000 tons of (mainly basic) ore. On the above tonnage basis I count only on getting 635,000 tons of ore, viz.: 550,000 tons from Spain, and 85,000 tons from Sweden. There is a good reserve of Swedish ore, which can be drawn upon in case of need. I estimate that the home production will average over 1,500,000 tons a month.

5. *Steel.*—On this basis we can produce in the year approximately 8,500,000 tons of finished steel product. Orders are being placed for 1,000,000 tons of steel from the United States (included in our tonnage requirements). Arrangements have also been made with the French and with the Shipping Controller to carry approximately 500,000 tons of French Shell Steel already purchased in America which we should otherwise have had to supply from home sources. Having regard to this rearrangement of supplies it may be said that our steel production in relation to our needs and our commitments to the Allies is equivalent to 10,000,000 tons. Out of this every requirement must be met, and if through shipping shrinkage the total production is reduced, all programmes will be affected.

Allocation of Steel.

6. *Allocation of Steel.*—Shipbuilding is the first charge on our steel resources. Orders have been given that the rolling mills are to be kept constantly fed to their full and increasing capacity, and that sections and other shipbuilding components shall be supplied in their proper proportion to the output of plates assigned to the Admiralty, until such time as the shipyards are provided with material to their full capacity. An agreement has been reached with the Admiralty after a full disclosure of figures whereby a portion of our rolling-mill production, varying from 7,000 to 8,500 tons a week, shall be reserved for all non-Admiralty services (including the War Office and the civilian needs of the country) and the whole of the rest of the production assigned to Admiralty needs. We have already succeeded in raising the Admiralty supply of plates from 16,000 tons a week in July to an average of 20,000 tons a week at the end of September, and subject to their capacity we shall still further raise them gradually up to at least 27,000 tons a week in October, 1918. This with other shipbuilding material to be supplied during the period under forecast is equivalent to a construction of from 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 tons of merchant shipping in addition to warship construction. The twelve months' Admiralty allocation of steel aggregates approximately 2,000,000 tons.

The next principal draft on our Steel Budget is shells. On the programme demanded by the War Office this requires approximately 2,500,000 tons for Great Britain.

The requirements of the Allies for steel of all classes have been cut down to about 700,000 tons in the year, chiefly by the arrangement to ship 500,000 tons of shell steel from the U.S.A. to France. The other direct munitions requirements, including aircraft, guns, military railways, tanks, steel-works extensions, etc., are approximately 2,200,000 tons. The War Office, the India Office, and certain other Departments require approximately 600,000 tons, leaving 1,500,000 tons for construction, machinery, and the so-called civilian services of the country, most of which are intimately related to munitions production.

These civilian requirements are mostly for the purpose of the maintenance and repair of plant and works in this country. Among these the upkeep of our railways and rolling-stock is the most important. For some considerable time the supplies to meet these demands have been cut down to the lowest possible figure, and if this is continued for much longer the position is likely to become serious. This, with the 500,000 tons of French steel shipped direct from America, balances a steel budget of 10,000,000 tons. . . .

Distribution of Labour.

7. *Labour.*—The prospective labour requirements resulting from the preceding Admiralty, War Office, and Aircraft programmes amount in the aggregate to—

Skilled men, 25,000 (10,000 for aircraft).

Unskilled men, 58,000 (40,000 for aircraft and 8,000 for steel works).

Women, 70,000 (50,000 for aircraft).

In addition to these demands the Admiralty are asking for 12,500 skilled men and 67,500 unskilled men; the War Office require 15,000 artificers, of whom about 8,000 can be met from among men already in the Army, leaving a balance of 7,000, of whom 5,000-6,000 have still to be supplied by the Ministry [of Munitions]. . . .

To meet the demand for skilled men, the Ministry has at its disposal a total of 210,000 transferable men, of whom over 50 per cent. are at present employed on important war work. Even the balance cannot be considered to be immediately available for transfer, inasmuch as a considerable proportion of them are engaged in sugar refineries, collieries, food production, and other indispensable occupations.

Nevertheless, the process of dilution is steadily, though slowly, extending, and as industries are accommodating themselves to the war conditions, the productivity of a given quantity of labour tends to rise. Since the March

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

SHELL SECTION (1).

Section of an 18-pdr. field-gun shell and cartridge. The shell is high explosive, and is filled with lyddite. The cartridge charge is cordite.

Agreement the Ministry of Munitions have, while continually increasing output, released 53,000 general service men for the army as against 700 released by the Admiralty and 700 from War Office contracts.

I am therefore advised that, so far as the demand for skilled labour for the purely munitions programme is concerned, the requirements can be met without serious dislocation. This is however subject to the three following conditions :—

(*a*) A modification of the Admiralty claim that no man can be transferred from the work on which he is at present engaged for the Admiralty.

This demand means in effect that the whole of the skilled labour required for the new shipbuilding programme must be drawn exclusively from Munitions work.

(*b*) A severe limitation on the demands of the Army for recruits for artificers corps from among skilled men working on munitions.

(*c*) The co-operation of the skilled engineering Unions in a more extensive dilution on war work. . . .

I do not anticipate any difficulty in finding the women required.

Explosives.

8. *Explosives.*—This is even more an explosives war than it is a steel war. Steel is the principal vehicle by which explosives are conveyed to the enemy. The requirements of propellants are limited by the production of shell, but there are other methods, besides those of artillery, of delivering high explosives to the enemy. The capacity of our existing high explosive plant is at present in excess of our shell programme for 1918. It has been arranged to supplement the present system of discharging high explosives by providing up to a maximum of 1,000 tons a week of bombs to be dropped from aeroplanes. The possibility of extending the Trench Mortar offensive power of our Army is also being examined. To utilize fully our existing high-explosive plants it is necessary that we should ship from Chili approximately 788,000 tons of nitrates; at present the tonnage for only 600,000 has provisionally been agreed upon.

New and very serious demands for T.N.T. are also being made by the Admiralty for mines.

Chemical Warfare.

9. *Chemical Warfare.*—G.H.Q. has asked that we should add an irritant gas to our lethal and lachrymatory gases. Development of this new branch of chemical warfare will take many months and cannot come fully into play until the end of next year's campaign. Using all possible resources of chemical shell with existing types of chemical, we could supply the army next year with 2½ times the quantity of gas shell supplied in the 1917 campaign.

If the present scheme for the new gas matures, the whole supply of chemical

shell would be four times as great by the end of 1918 as in 1917.

Guns and Ammunition.

10. *Guns and Ammunition.*—On the above basis of steel and explosives, together with importations of finished shells and components, it will be possible to meet the Commander-in-Chief's full demand both for guns and shells as set out in his letter of the 17th July. . . .

11. Before rejoicing at these facts it is necessary to compare the British, French, and German artilleries. During 1917 the French and ourselves have maintained about an equal number of combatants in the line in France, and we have done the harder fighting. The French had however on the 1st October, 10,000 guns to our 6,000 guns, ours, on the whole, being heavier and newer. The new French heavy artillery programme is now coming into bearing, and from now on they anticipate very large monthly deliveries. By April, 1918, the French will have 9,000 guns, all modern and steadily increasing. Our comparable figure in the field in France will be approaching 8,000, which is the maximum establishment that our army has at present arranged for. Our infantry will not therefore be quite so well supported with artillery as the French.

The War Office state that the Germans had in 1917—

	Guns.
On the French front . .	12,432
On the Russian front . .	5,176
Balkans and Italy . .	808
Total . .	18,416[1]

The balance on the Western Front was as follows:—

Franco-British . . .	15,969
German . . .	12,432

But though we had a superiority in numbers, the Germans had superior weight of metal. Deducting from each side field guns, in which we are greatly superior, the balance in heavier and more important weapons stood as follows:—

Franco-British .	6,654
German .	7,568

The Rival Artilleries on the Western Front.

If the new British and French programmes are carried out punctually we should have in the West by April, 1918, 17,000 modern and 2,000 older guns with steady increases in prospect.

The Germans will have their present 12,432 guns, plus:—

(*a*) Any new programme they are making.

(*b*) Any of the 5,176 guns they may choose to take from the Russian front.

(*c*) Any of the 2,000 or 3,000 guns recently captured from the Russians or Italians.

It is certain therefore that with our utmost efforts, and under the most favourable conditions,

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

SHELL SECTION (2).
A 3-inch high-explosive shell for high-angle anti-aircraft guns. The cartridge charge is cordite, and the shell itself is filled with amatol.

[1] General von Wrisberg, Head of the Principal Department of the Prussian War Ministry, in his book *Heer und Heimath* (Army and Home) published in 1924, p. 58, says: "The greatest number of [German] heavy guns on the front was in February, 1917: Heavy, 7,130. Field guns and field howitzers, 10,836. Total, 17,966."

This is a remarkable instance of the accuracy of the British War Office information.

we cannot expect any superiority in guns next year.

It does not follow however that the ammunition for all the German guns will be as abundant as ours.

Nor on the other hand, being on the defensive, need they use it so copiously or continuously.

All these facts appear to me to be worthy of profound consideration.

12. The most striking deficiency in the British artillery is found in very heavy long-range guns. On the 1st October the position was as follows :—

Very heavy guns (9·2-in. and 12-in.)—

German	180
French	175
British	6

There is only one source to which we can look to improve the long-range heavy battery at the disposal of our troops, viz. the Navy.

If we could receive from Naval sources and from our fortresses during the next six months 100 heavy guns (including 30 already promised), *i.e.* 14-inch, new 13·5-inch, or 12-inch of all marks, and 100 medium guns, *i.e.* 10-inch and 9·2-inch, it would be possible, without prejudice to the programmes, to make a very substantial addition to the British long-range heavy artillery.

I ask that this may be earnestly examined.

Aeroplanes.

13. *Aeroplanes.*—It is understood that the programme of the Royal Flying Corps provides for the equipment of the following :—

By December, 1917, 85 active squadrons.

By March, 1918, 106 active squadrons.

By June, 1918, 149 active squadrons.

By December, 1918, 200 active squadrons.

This programme, together with a total of 3,000 aeroplanes required by the R.N.A.S. by August, 1918, and 9,500 by the R.F.C. for training purposes, involves a total production by that date of between 27,000 and 28,000 machines

Photo : Imperial War Museum.

SHELL SECTION (3).

High-explosive shell filled with lyddite and with an exploding charge of trotyl. The nature of the war of 1914–1918 necessitated an extensive use of H.E. shell against trenches and concrete shelters.



Photo: Imperial War Museum.

SHELL SECTION (4).

An 18-pdr. field-gun shell filled with shrapnel. The bullets, set in resin, weigh 41 to the pound. Whilst an H.E. shell bursts into fragments, shrapnel shells are, in a sense, small guns in flight blowing out their charge of bullets like hail from a sporting gun.

of all kinds. In order to obtain this result our output in the summer of 1918 should be at the rate of 2,700 per month. . . .

Tanks.

14. *Tanks.*—Tanks have never yet been used in numbers under conditions favourable to their action. Nor have we ever yet had a sufficiently reliable kind of tank, nor nearly enough of them. If they have held their own in 1917 it has been under adverse circumstances, both in their production here and their use in France.

In consequence the army consider that they cannot allocate more than 18,500 men to the tank corps. This limits the number of fighting tanks required to an establishment of 1,080 with ample maintenance and a certain number of supply and gun-carrying tanks.

There will be no difficulty in supplying this requirement, but the new designs will not be available in full numbers until July, 1918. Thereafter considerable expansions would be possible. The demand made by tanks on steel and skilled labour is small and does not sensibly affect either shipbuilding or aeroplanes.

Dollars.

15. *Dollars.*—We have been forced by the shortage of Canadian and American dollars to reduce our orders in Canada and the United States to considerably lower figures than hitherto. Shell-producing and explosives plants have had to be demobilized in Canada almost as soon as they had been called into being, and thus we have had to do without most valuable additions to our resources for which labour and material were available. We cannot buy more than 8 millions sterling a month on the average in 1918 from the United States, instead of an average of 13 millions in the first half of 1917; nor more than 6 millions a month in Canada, compared to 9½ millions. This curtailment of our resources must be borne in mind.

16. To sum up, the present adverse

factors to munitions production are as follows :—

(i) The increasing demands of the Admiralty.

(ii) The general shortage of labour (especially skilled labour) and the risk of pressing labour hard at the present time.

(iii) The curtailment of our orders in Canada and the United States on financial grounds.

(iv) The low level to which we have been compelled to restrict our iron ore importations.

On the other hand, the immense new plants begun in the first year of the Ministry of Munitions are being utilized to their full advantage and are steadily developing their output of various munitions.

The power of massed production and the increasing efficiency of diluted and female labour, together with the accumulation of working stocks and adequate reserves and the progressive elimination of commercial work, render possible a large increase in the total output so long as the necessary tonnage and labour required are forthcoming.

Summary of Recommendations.

17. In spite therefore of the difficulties, it should still be possible, by taking the proper measures of organization, by enforcing the necessary economies, and by utilizing to the full the resources of every department without exception, to meet and satisfy the main demands that are made upon us.

There still remain as new objectives of effort within the bounds of possi-

Photo : Imperial War Museum.

SALVAGE AT THE FRONT.

At a time when metal was almost worth its weight in gold the task of salvage became of the utmost importance. The battlefields everywhere were strewn with discarded equipment, rifles, shell-cases and guns. Millions of pounds were saved by collecting this material and returning it to the base, whence it was sent back to be melted down for further use. In the photograph reproduced above a tank equipped with crane is employed on the work of dismantling another tank which has been disabled and abandoned.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

AT TANK CORPS CENTRAL WORKSHOP, TENEUR.

One of the hundreds of dumps of scrap metal obtained as a result of salvage. After the battle of the Somme one salvage officer and the men under his charge collected in a single month 111,000 rifles, 2,500,000 rounds of ammunition, and 8,000 steel helmets, in addition to a large assortment of miscellaneous stores.

bility and without undue prejudice to the above :—

(i) Increased long-range aeroplane bombing power.
(ii) Increased long-range mobile and semi-mobile heavy artillery.
(iii) Increased trench-mortar offensive.
(iv) Increased tank development late in the year.
(v) Increased chemical warfare supplies.

18. There are however four principles which must be accepted and resolutely applied :—

(i) The tonnage utilized for non-military imports of all kinds, including to some extent food, must be cut down.
(ii) The Admiralty must endeavour to find the bulk of its own skilled labour for shipbuilding from its own extensive resources, and it must subject every part of its immense organization to a loyal and searching scrutiny in the general interest.
(iii) The dormant man-power of the units of the Home army must be made effective as an aid to transport, industry, and agriculture.
(iv) The business of supply must be properly co-ordinated. We cannot afford the waste which arises from the independent and competitive action of individual departments.

An Unexpected Cut in Tonnage.

No sooner had we completed the Munitions Budget, with its innumerable apportionments and orders, than the startling news arrived that the Inter-

Allied Commission on Food Supplies, on which the War Cabinet was represented, had allocated, at the earnest request of the French Minister of Commerce, no less than two million tons of freight for the transport of additional food for France and Italy. Nearly the whole—1,550,000 tons—had to be cut off the munitions share. I reacted violently against this. The threat to France and Italy of drastic reductions in the steel we had promised them enlisted the active aid of the Munitions Ministers of both countries. A considerable portion of these self-indulgent importations were eventually cancelled. But heavy cuts had to be made in shell steel, and the Army was warned to expect a reduced programme.

The outlook and the immediate pressure led me, in my own sphere, to seek by every shift and from every quarter to increase our steel resources on which the British armies depended. No doubt from the higher position of the War Cabinet a more general view of relative requirements could be taken, and my appeals and protests imply no criticism of others. It was my duty above all to keep Sir Douglas Haig supplied with every requisite, and at this we slaved and struggled from daybreak to midnight. We were well ahead with shells of nearly every kind. We were well ahead with rifles and rifle ammunition. During all the autumn the armies had had all the shell they demanded, but the prolonged firing of Paschendaele and the destruction of battle had so seriously worn out our field and medium artillery that guns had become the limiting factor. Immense replacements and repairs had to be made in the brief interval between November and the spring.

Efforts to Retrieve the Loss.

To the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

November 25, 1917.

The position which has been created by the surrender of 2,000,000 tons of shipping to the food supply of France and the consequent reduction on munitions imports (almost exclusively steel and iron-ore) of upwards of 1,550,000 tons, is so disastrous in its consequences upon the offensive power of the British armies next year, and indeed upon our whole war-making capacity, that I cannot accept it without using every conceivable effort to minimize the disaster. If the *volume* of our tonnage is to be reduced, it is indispensable that the *value* of it should, as far as possible, be enhanced.

This raises the whole Canadian position. There is no more melancholy chapter in the history of British Munitions Supply than the laborious creation of large and vitally needed shell plants in Canada, only for them to be dispersed and destroyed at the moment they have come into bearing. . . . Shortage of dollars, and dollars only, was the cause of this misfortune. . . . Surely the truth ought to be known, and further efforts made to avert the loss which is impending. There could be no more short-sighted and even mad policy than to damp down and break up these Canadian plants at the very time when the increasing demands of the United States for their own armies threaten to exclude us very largely from that field.

I am now confronted both with American proposals for placing orders in Canadian Munition Factories, and with additional offers of shell and other essential munitions from Canada. Are you really going to be content to let this all go by the board? Here for instance are proposals from the Governor-General of Canada to utilize the Ross Rifle Factory for the manufacture of machine-gun barrels. This would be of the greatest service to us. Both the Colonial Office and the Governor-General are pressing for a reply. Again, there is an offer for 25,000 6-inch shells a week additional from Canada. These are the shells which are most needed by our troops at the present time, in regard to which I have just received a fresh demand for 2,000,000 from the Commander-in-Chief. The machinery in Canada is available, the labour is available, the material is available—the need is most

grave. Are we really to let the plant be scattered and the machines to drift over piecemeal into the United States and so cut ourselves off for ever from this source of highly portable munitions of the most necessary character?

I know how great your difficulties are and how strenuous have been the exertions which you have made to procure us larger credits, but I really cannot accept this decision departmentally from the Treasury and make myself the agent of its announcement. It seems to me that the responsibility in a matter of this kind could only be assumed by the War Cabinet, and I hope you will not mind my asking that the matter should definitely be brought before them. Neither in man-power nor in war material are we putting out our full energies, and having regard to the reserves which the Germans will be able to bring back in both troops and artillery next year from the Russian front, the position of our armies may be most serious. Perhaps in the first instance we could have a small private conference at the Treasury, to which I would bring various experts.

Letter to the Shipping Controller.

To Sir Joseph Maclay, (Controller of Shipping).

November 25, 1917.

You must pardon my anxiety about the importations of iron-ore. The decisions which have been taken without my being even informed, to give 2,000,000 tons of shipping to the French and Italian food supply, have shattered our means of furnishing the armies in the field with the ammunition they require for 1918. They will also force me to notify to the French and Italians an entire suspension of the allocation to them of steel products of all kinds, although used exclusively for military purposes. This will unquestionably create a serious diplomatic position. I was informed in Paris that the French were astonished at the liberality of our concessions to them in the matter of food.

It is scarcely possible to do justice to the disastrous position created by the cut of 1,550,000 tons on munition imports, and the lamentable crippling of our otherwise available resources in war power which that entails. Can you wonder therefore that I am exerting myself by every means to procure some amelioration of this state of things? I am advised by experts of unimpeachable authority that ferro-concrete barges of a seaworthy character could have been constructed many months ago and that they could have been so employed as to afford a direct relief to certain classes of tonnage. Even now I do not think they are being sufficiently developed. Only 70 I understand have been ordered, whereas at least double the number are required. A deficiency of British shipping and our liberality to our Allies may not be our business at the Ministry of Munitions, but it is undoubtedly our misfortune. As it is, the plans of the Commander-in-Chief are being vitiated and the offensive power of the British armies very seriously impaired. I say nothing of the economic difficulties which will be created in England through the failure to maintain the Railways and other essential Civil Services through the deficiency of steel.

Pressure on the French.

To Monsieur Loucheur (Minister of Armaments, France).

November 25, 1917.

I have referred your letter of the 20th of November to the study of the departments concerned, and I will communicate with you as soon as I have their observations on its detail. The whole steel situation in Great Britain has however been revolutionized by the decision to allocate 2,000,000 tons of British shipping to carry food supplies to France and Italy. The direct consequence of this has been to reduce the estimated importation for the Ministry of Munitions by 1,550,000 tons up to the present time, and practically the whole of this is taken from our importations of ore and of steel. It is therefore quite impossible for me to



Photo : Newspaper Illustrations.

GAUGING FOR THE DRIVING BANDS.

Another aspect of the important work performed by women during the war. Here a 9·2-inch shell is being prepared for the reception of the driving band. This band, situated near the base of the shell, is made of copper, and being slightly larger in diameter than the body of the shell, is gripped by the rifling of the gun, thus causing the shell to rotate. This rotation, maintained in flight, greatly adds to the accuracy of fire.

continue to supply the 40,000 tons of various steel products to France as previously agreed between us. I have to impose the most severe reductions on the supply of ammunition for the British Armies, reducing the weight of shell to be fired in 1918 by between half a million and 750,000 tons, and a further very severe reduction has to be imposed upon our already depleted railway and other vital domestic services.

In these circumstances, I can only supply France with steel products in 1918 to the extent to which tonnage is placed at my disposal in abatement of the 1,550,000 tons reduction. If, for instance, it is in your power to procure a retrocession of half a million or 300,000 tons of tonnage allocated to French food stuffs, I can continue my supplies of steel to that extent, as the liberated tonnage will be used to bring in the necessary quantities of ore and steel to us. But failing this or some similar arrangement, it is absolutely impossible for me, with the tonnage allocated at present, to continue supplies of steel for French purposes. I am of course making a similar communication to the Italian Government so far as next year is concerned, and apart from the immediate measures which are required to meet the emergency caused by their disaster.

I should add that if the position improves from any cause, and especially from a reduction in the net weekly loss by submarine sinkings, I shall of course be ready to contribute towards your programmes to the best of my ability.

While awaiting the results of this outcry, it was necessary to face the facts. I gave the following instructions :—

Secretary.
S.
M.
Clamping Committee.[1]

November 25, 1917.

The cut in the importations of iron-ore is so serious that every effort must be made to mitigate its consequences. There must be great masses of iron in one form and another scattered about the country. Take for instance all the park and area railings. I should suppose there were 20,000 tons of iron in the Hyde Park railings alone, while the weight of metal in the area railings of the London streets must be enormous. The same is true of many great towns throughout the country. Then there is the building material of unfinished buildings, girders, etc., which could be worked up into other urgently needed Works of Construction for military purposes. A few strands of barbed wire could be used to protect areas and enclosed parks. Drastic action will help to rouse people to a sense of the emergency and of the magnitude of the effort required. Thirdly, there are the battlefields. There must be 700,000 or 800,000 tons of shell-steel lying about on the Somme battlefields alone. The collection of this is vital. The proper machines must be constructed. A smelting plant should be set up on the battlefields.

Let me have definite recommendations for immediate action on all these points with the least possible delay, and advise me as to the composition of a suitable committee, not consisting of members of Council, which can carry out any policy decided on.

Recasting the Programme.

Clamping Committee.

November 26, 1917.

You should recast the Programme on the following assumptions :—

(1) That the armies in France only fire in 1918 the same weight of shell as they fired in 1917.

(2) That all additional shell that our iron and steel import permits of should be stored for a 1919 climax.

(3) That explosives needs will be reduced by the reduction on the Programme of artillery firing.

(4) That the Trench Mortar offensive will be limited to 25,000 tons additional.

[1] So called by me because it was charged with fitting the programme together.

Photo : Central News.

FIXING FUSES ON STOKES MORTAR SHELLS

The Stokes gun, a light trench mortar, invented by Sir Wilfrid Stokes, was another deadly addition to armaments produced during the Great War. The gun, briefly, consists of a steel barrel at the base of which is a pointed striker. The barrel is fixed at an angle of 45 degrees, and the shell, at the base of which a 12-bore sporting cartridge is contained within a perforated cylinder, is allowed to drop from the muzzle. The impact of the percussion cap of the cartridge and the striker explodes the cartridge and expels the shell. So simple is the operation that shells can be fired at the rate of forty a minute.

(5) That the Army do not want the semi-mobile mountings and that about 30 firing points on railway mountings will be sufficient to wear out all the guns we are likely to get from the Navy.

(6) That the manufacture of Tanks of various designs must be pushed to the extreme limit.

(7) That an additional programme of aeroplanes will be necessary.

(8) That the process of substitution and dilution must be continued to release at least 100,000 A1 men.

(9) That the manufacture of guns should be carried on at full blast during the whole of 1918.

(10) That the shell plant which will have been somewhat damped down in 1918 should be opened out to the full in 1919.

(11) That our Munitions Programme should be harmonized with those of France, Italy, and the United States, so as to secure the maximum production.

(12) That we cannot count on more than a minimum of 11,000,000 tons delivered here during the 12 months, and must not promise to other Departments anything based on a larger delivery. Probably we shall get more, in which case it will be easy to do better than our word.

A Note to the War Cabinet.

To the War Cabinet.

December 31, 1917.

I must draw the attention of the Cabinet to the serious character of the problems of steel supply now presented for their decision.

The revised Munitions Budget which has been circulated involves a heavy reduction upon the Ammunition Programme on which the Commander-in-Chief and the War Office have been counting, not less than 500,000 tons which we could have made into shells having been deducted from it. I had urged as a measure of precaution that we should be permitted to place orders in the United States for 1,000,000 tons of steel, of which 500,000 is needed this year for the reduced programme, and the other 500,000 would afford a reserve on which we could draw sooner or later according to tonnage conditions. We are now told that we cannot place these orders. If this decision is to stand, the Shell Programme of the armies must undergo further serious reduction. We are cut off from Spanish ore by [want of] tonnage and from American steel by [want of] dollars. In both cases food imports for ourselves or for our Allies are displacing ton for ton metal which could otherwise be fired at the enemy—for which, that is to say, shell factories, the fuses, the filling plants, the guns and the gunners are all available.

At the same time we have been forced to break up Canadian shell plants as soon as they have been laboriously called into being and had begun deliveries, on account of the failure of the Canadian Government or of the Treasury or of both to make the necessary financial arrangements. On top of this we are now confronted with the proposal to cut our Canadian allocation of dollars from 30,000,000 to 20,000,000 per month. . . .

Thirdly, the Admiralty demand for steel in all its forms is already enormous and continues to increase.

In these circumstances it is surely our duty to make vigorous and genuine efforts to sustain the artillery of the British Army with the necessary supplies of ammunition, and not to acquiesce in its being cut down whenever a difficulty of tonnage or dollars or food supply is involved.

To the War Cabinet.

November 11, 1917.

We ought to endeavour to gain and keep the control of the war to which our strength entitles us, using that strength to sustain our Allies without allowing them to lose their self-reliance. We should be careful not to dissipate our strength or melt it down to the average level of exhausted nations. It will be better used with design by us than weakly dispersed. *Resolute to expend everything for the common cause, we ought not to shrink from being taskmasters.* I deprecate most strongly our making any general agreement in regard to Munitions and raw

Photo: Copyright.

SAVE OUR STORES.

A notice typical of many seen on every sector of the British front. All ranks were ready and willing to co-operate in the work of salvage; timely reminders and readily accessible dumps were all that were required to crown this effort with success. At the time of the Armistice depôts and factories were dealing with 5,000 tons of salvage from the battlefields each week.

materials similar to that which has been made about food. On the contrary, I would continue to make *ad hoc* allocations when particular emergencies are shown, always exacting where possible some other services or accommodation in return. There must at any rate be one strong power to face Germany in 1918. To strike an average in these matters, to bind oneself in advance to some system of "share and share alike," and thus to deprive ourselves of all our power of giving when need arises, may be logic—it may even be equity—but it is not the way to win the war.

All Ends Well.

In the end all finished happily. The Shipping Controller proved better than his word. The U-boat pressure weakened and several million tons more freight became in fact available than his caution had allowed. We too were found to have somewhat larger resources than we had thought it right to parade. As will be seen as the account proceeds, the Ministry of Munitions were found capable not only of fulfilling their original programmes, but of meeting a gigantic emergency for which no formal provision had been made. "As regards material," wrote Sir Douglas Haig in his final despatch in 1919, "it was not until midsummer, 1916, that the artillery situation became even approximately adequate to the conduct of major operations. Throughout the Somme battle the expenditure of artillery ammunition had to be watched with the greatest care. During the battles of 1917 ammunition was plentiful, but the gun situation was a source of constant anxiety. Only in 1918 was it possible to conduct artillery operations independently of any limiting consideration other than that of transport."

CHAPTER LXVIII

THE AUTUMN STRUGGLE

The Eve of the Paschendaele Offensive—A Misleading Argument—The Prime Minister and the Offensive—My Letter to the Prime Minister—Allenby in Palestine—Brilliant and Frugal Operations—Unsound Strategy—The Battle of Paschendaele—Sir William Robertson and his Responsibilities—The Italian Disaster of Caporetto—Italian Fortitude—The Re-equipment of the Italian Army—First Ideas of the Use of Tanks—Their Long Misuse—Their First Chance—Ludendorff's Professional Blindness—The German Counter-stroke after Cambrai.

AT the time I rejoined the Government the British armies were on the eve of a new tremendous offensive. The long-prepared attack upon the Messines ridge had been executed with precision and success on June 7, and Sir Douglas Haig's further plan was to strike from the direction of Ypres towards Ostend. This was in fact a revival on a gigantic scale and by different methods of those ideas of clearing the sea flank by which Sir John French had been so much attracted in 1914.

The Eve of the Paschendaele Offensive.

Forty divisions had been assembled between Kemmel Hill and the Belgian front. Mountains of ammunition had been accumulated, and the strongest concentration of artillery ever yet developed was to sustain the attack. The British Headquarters were as usual confident of a decisive success, and as usual they were stoutly supported by Sir William Robertson and the General Staff at the War Office. On the other hand, the positions to be assaulted were immensely strong. The enemy was fully prepared. The frowning undulations of the Paschendaele-Klercken ridge had been fortified with every resource of German science and ingenuity. The ground was studded with ferro-concrete block-houses, "Pill Boxes" as they were soon called, crammed with machine guns, lapped in barbed wire, and impenetrable to the heaviest bombardment. The railway communications behind the enemy's front were at least as good as, if not indeed superior to, those which maintained the British offensive. A German army containing three times as many divisions as were required at any given moment to hold the ground had been assembled under Prince Rupprecht, and every facility for the relief and replacement of exhausted units had been carefully studied. The Dutch railways carried ceaseless supplies of gravel for the concrete, and the elaboration of the defences line behind line proceeded continually.

A Misleading Argument.

Apart from the hopes of decisive victory, which grew with every step away from the British front line and reached absolute conviction in the Intelligence Department, two reasons were adduced by General Headquarters to justify the renewed severe demand upon the troops. First, the alleged exhausted and quiescent condition of the French Army since the defeat of General Nivelle's April offensive; secondly, the importance of taking Ostend and Zeebrugge in order to paralyse or cripple the U-boat war. The first of these arguments was exaggerated. The French Army was no doubt saving its strength as much as possible; but the casualty tables show that during 1917 they inflicted nearly as many losses on the Germans as did our own troops. The U-boat argument was wholly fallacious. A grave responsibility rests

Photo: Bassano.

FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ALLENBY.

Commander of the Cavalry Division with the British Expeditionary Force in France in 1914, Sir Edmund Allenby was, in June, 1917, appointed to succeed Sir Archibald Murray in command of the expeditionary force in Egypt. He found there an army composed of fine material, but officers and men alike strained and despondent after two years of campaigning on Gallipoli and in the desert, during which time they had suffered too often from the effects of doubtful leadership and defeat. There is no space here to describe the steps taken by Sir Edmund Allenby to recondition this force. They proved him to be alike a born leader and a master of his profession. His preparations occupied some four months, at the close of which his army, its confidence fully restored, proved to be a weapon capable of carrying all before it.

upon the Admiralty for misleading Haig and his Staff about the value of Ostend and Zeebrugge to the submarine campaign. These two ports were convenient advanced bases for U-boats working in the English Channel, but they were in no way indispensable to the submarine war. Submarines able to go completely around the British Isles and to remain at sea a whole month at a time could work almost as easily from their own home bases in the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems, as from the advanced and much-battered harbours of Belgium.

The whole U-boat war was based on the main German naval harbours, and was never dependent on anything else. In fact in May, 1918, the month after both Ostend and Zeebrugge had been sealed up by the Navy, the U-boat sinkings actually showed an increase over the preceding month in which they were open and in full activity. Whatever influence this erroneous argument may have had upon the Haig-Robertson decision to launch a new offensive, it certainly contributed to baffle the objections of the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. It seemed to throw the army into the struggle against the submarines. It confused the issue, it darkened counsel, it numbed misgivings, overpowered the dictates of prudence, and cleared the way for a forlorn expenditure of valour and life without equal in futility.

In the war against Turkey in the south-eastern theatre the most costly and laborious policy was also pursued. The Turks, fortified between the desert and the sea at Gaza under Jemal Pasha, confronted successfully the British Army under Allenby, which had toiled forward by railway and water-pipe line from Egypt at extreme exertion and expense. This obstacle was surmounted or destroyed in the following year. Meanwhile however the obvious

Photo: Topical Press.

WIRE SAND SHOES.

A soldier of the 52nd (Lowland) Division equipped with detachable wire soles intended to ease marching over the soft sands of the Sinai desert. This device, which served its purpose fairly well, was for some inscrutable reason viewed with disfavour by the men. The breadth of the wire prevented the boots from sinking, and as the feet were lifted the sand filtered through the meshes. They were apt to trip the wearers, however, and were not persevered with.

Photo: By courtesy of Br.-General E. M. Paul.

LAYING THE WIRE ROAD.

Soon another device to facilitate marching across Sinai made its appearance. This was a track of wire netting made up of four strips of rabbit wire laid side by side and pegged down. It proved to be a complete success. Infantry could now march with reasonable comfort, and the track served also to carry Ford cars. Mounted troops could not use the road, however, as the shoes of the horses cut the wire.

manœuvre of landing an army behind the Turks was dismissed by Sir William Robertson as venturesome and impracticable.

The Prime Minister and the Offensive.

Even before I joined his Government the Prime Minister, as I have written, used to discuss the war situation with me freely. On my taking office he made me acquainted with everything. After his excursion with General Nivelle and its disillusionments, he had returned to those views against seeking offensives on the Western Front without the necessary superiority or method, with which the reader is familiar. The peak of the U-boat sinkings seemed to have been surmounted. If on land hopes had been dupes, fears at sea had also been liars. Mr. Lloyd George was now content to await in the main theatre the arrival of the American Armies. He wished Sir Douglas Haig to maintain an active defensive for the rest of the year and to nurse his strength.

Meanwhile activity in Palestine and the reinforcement of Italy by British and French divisions might produce important results against Turkey and Austria, and would in any case not be unduly costly in life. At first the majority of the War Cabinet shared these general opinions. But between right thought and right action there was a gulf. Sir William Robertson, and under his direction the General Staff at the War Office, pressed unceasingly for further immediate exertions. Their insistence gained several adherents in the Cabinet. All through June the

Photo: By courtesy of Br.-General E. M. Paul.

AT WORK ON THE PIPE-LINE.

Owing to the saline nature of the desert wells in Sinai the problem of water supply to the army advancing across the desert might have been acute. The difficulty was solved by means of a pipe-line laid alongside the newly constructed railway track and through which water from the Nile was forced by pump. This pipe-line, which consisted of 12-inch pipes from Kantara to El Arish, and smaller gauge pipes from there to the Wadi Ghazze in Palestine, carried some 600,000 gallons of water daily. Only about one-sixteenth of this amount reached Palestine, the balance being used on the line of communications.

Photo: By courtesy of Br.-General E. M. Paul.

WATER SUPPLY: FILLING FANATIS.

Water for the front-line troops was sent up in metal containers called fanatis (singular *fantasse*). The fanatis, each of which had a capacity of 12 gallons, were carried on camels, one on each side of the saddle.

Photo: By courtesy of Br.-General E. M. Paul.

AMBULANCE TRAIN ON THE DESERT RAILWAY.

The advance of the British forces across Sinai began early in 1916, and the route chosen was the northern caravan track hard by the sea. Simultaneously, in March of that year, a beginning was made upon the construction of a standard-gauge railway line, which a year later stretched to within a few miles of Gaza. The force covering the engineers and labourers consisted of a desert column composed of mounted troops and the 42nd and 52nd Divisions. The latter, sister to the 51st (Highland) Division, marched, fighting at intervals, the whole distance from the Suez Canal to within sight of Jerusalem.

Photo: By courtesy of Br.-General E M. Paul.

BAGGAGE CAMELS IN SINAI.

On page 570 is a photograph of Turkish transport camels in Gallipoli. In Sinai, where wheeled transport, unless fitted with wide sand tyres, was utterly unsuited to the conditions, camels in thousands followed the army wherever it went. They carried materials of all kinds.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF GAZA.

Taken from the summit of Ali Muntar, a prominence due east of Gaza, this photograph shows the town surrounded by its vineyards and cactus hedges. On the sky-line is the Mediterranean. The strong-growing cactus hedges, covered with sharp spines, proved at all times a difficult obstacle for attacking troops.

discussions were maintained. In the end the Prime Minister did not feel strong enough to face the Haig-Robertson combination. He submitted with resentful fatalism. The plan of sustaining Italy was dropped, and by the third week of July Robertson had extorted from the Cabinet and conveyed to Haig an assurance of "whole-hearted" support[1] for the Paschendaele attack. When I had the opportunity of learning the facts it was too late. The decision had already been taken. My only hope was to limit the consequences. On July 22 I gave my counsel as follows:—

My Letter to the Prime Minister.

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

Many thanks for letting me see these most interesting papers which I return herewith. Broadly speaking I agree with Smuts. But I deplore with you the necessity for giving way to the military wish for a renewed offensive in the West. The armies are equal. If anything, the Germans are the stronger. They have larger reserves and ample munitions. An endless series of fortified lines with all kinds of flooding possibilities and great natural difficulties of ground constitute insuperable obstacles. We already approach the end of July. Even if three or four battles as good as Messines are won, the situation in the West will not be appreciably altered by the end of the year.

It is clear however that no human power exists which can stop the attempt being made. The essential thing now is to arrive at a definition of success and "great results" which will enable a new decision to be taken after the first or second phases of this offensive have been fought. Such a definition must, it seems to me, involve three conditions, viz. objectives taken; casualties sustained; and thirdly (very important) the time taken or required between any one thrust and the next. Thus it should be possible, by reference to these forecasts, to settle definitely after (say) six weeks of fighting whether there really is any prospect of obtaining "great results" before winter sets in. Unless you can arrive at something definite on these points, your Italian project, with which I cordially agree, will simply be put off from day to day until

[1] Robertson, *Soldiers and Statesmen*, Vol. II, p. 249.

it is too late. Remember how Joffre behaved about the four divisions which were to go to the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles as soon as he knew whether he was going to achieve decisive results in the Champagne battle in 1915.

It is worth also remembering that the best of all feints, and the most deceptive, is a real attack which you subsequently decide not to carry through; the reserves for which are suddenly thrown into quite a different theatre.

With regard to the East, the truth is staring us in the face. An army of six divisions, British or Franco-British, should be taken from [the] Salonica [front] and put in behind Jemal's army. This will force that army to surrender, and all the Allied troops in Syria and Palestine, including Allenby's, would be free by the spring of next year for action in Italy or France. The mere concentration of five or six divisions in Salonica, as they were gradually replaced on the front by fresh [Greek] arrivals, would impart to the Salonica army a speculative value it has wholly lost. It would be crouched instead of sprawled. They could stay in Salonica training and recuperating until the season of a potential Russo-Roumanian offensive had passed, collecting aquatic transport meanwhile. All the time they would be threatening the enemy in a dozen places. It will be a thousand pities if this or something like it cannot be done.

Don't get torpedoed; for if I am left alone your colleagues will eat me.

Allenby in Palestine.

The Prime Minister went so far as to offer the command of the British armies in Palestine to General Smuts. After deliberation Smuts replied that he was willing to accept the task on one condition, namely that he should be allowed to land an adequate army to cut the

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

DUG-OUTS AT SHEIKH ABBAS, NEAR GAZA.

Sheikh Abbas, east of Gaza, was one of the objectives attained by the 52nd Division during the first phase of the second battle of Gaza. The photograph reproduced above was taken on September 17, 1917, about six weeks before the third battle. The position was held at this date by the 5th Battalion Devons of the 75th Division.

Turkish communications. As this project was not considered open, he declined the command. But in his place was found a leader whose personality and skill were equal to the task of dislodging and ultimately of destroying the Turkish armies in Syria without the aid of a great amphibious operation.

With the appointment of Allenby the whole situation in Palestine was rapidly transformed. Although he repeatedly demanded more reinforcements than could be spared, and prudently dwelt on the difficulties before him, Allenby by a series of masterly combinations succeeded with smaller forces both in outmanœuvring and in out-fighting the Turks under Jemal, advised by Falkenhayn.

Feinting at Gaza in the last week of October, he stormed Beersheba by a surprise attack of two infantry divisions and a wide turning movement of cavalry and camelry. Having thus gained the enemy's desert flank, he rolled up from the eastward in a succession of fierce actions the strongly fortified Turkish lines. Gaza was taken on November 6: 10,000 Turks had been made prisoners, and at least as many killed and wounded: and a vigorous pursuit opened the port of Jaffa to the further supply of the British forces. Thus possessed of the coastal region, a new base, and an alternative short line of communication, Allenby advanced north-westward upon Jerusalem, continuing to drive the Seventh and Eighth Turkish Armies before him and compromising the eventual retreat of the Fourth.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE SURRENDER OF JERUSALEM.

On December 9, 1917, a party of civilians from Jerusalem came out from the city under cover of a white flag. There followed one of the most dramatic incidents of the war. According to the official narrative the party first encountered two privates of the 2/20th London. These men felt unable to accept the surrender and returned to their battalion. Shortly afterwards two sergeants of the 2/19th London, F. G. Hurcome and J. Sedgewick, met the deputation, but they likewise were unable to assume the responsibility. Some time later artillery officers got into touch with the party and passed back information which led to the formal acceptance of the city's surrender by Major-General Shea. In the photograph given here the party is seen with the two sergeants referred to above.

On December 8, 1917, the Turkish abandoned Jerusalem after 400 years of blighting occupation, and the British Commander-in-Chief entered the city amid the acclamations of the inhabitants. Here he maintained himself in a situation of much delicacy throughout the winter, re-grouping his forces, wisely fostering the Arab revolt which

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

SIR EDMUND ALLENBY ENTERS JERUSALEM.

On December 11, 1917, Sir Edmund Allenby entered the Holy City by the Jaffa gate. The Commander-in-Chief drove to Jerusalem, but, leaving his car without the walls, passed through the gate on foot accompanied by several members of his staff. He was conducted to the steps of the Citadel, where a proclamation was read to the citizens in terms which had been decided upon by the British Government.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE CAVALRY RIDES INTO DAMASCUS.

On October 2, 1918, Lieut.-General Chauvel led a representative column of mounted troops into Damascus. Represented in the column were British Yeomen, Australian Light Horse, New Zealand Machine Gunners, Indian Cavalry, French Chasseurs d'Afrique and Spahis, and British Territorial Royal Horse Artillery. According to the official narrative the spectacle "had an extraordinary effect upon the excited and unruly populace." The citizens of Damascus settled down and returned to business.

grew around the astonishing personality of Lawrence, and preparing for even larger enterprises in the spring. With no more than 150,000 men he had expelled 170,000 German-led Turkish troops from fortified positions—Plevnas—on which years of labour had been spent, and had inflicted upon them most serious losses in men, guns and territory.

Brilliant and Frugal Operations.

No praise is too high for these brilliant and frugal operations, which will long serve as a model in theatres of war in which manœuvre is possible. Nevertheless their results did not simplify the general problem. On the contrary, by opening up a competing interest which could not influence the main decision, they even complicated it. The very serious drain of men, munitions and transport which flowed unceasingly to the Palestine Expedition ought to have been arrested by action far swifter in character and far larger in scale. Brevity and finality, not less at this period than throughout the war, were the true tests of any diversion against Turkey.

Unsound Strategy.

Prolonged and expanding operations in distant unrelated theatres, whether they languished as at Salonica, or crackled briskly and brightly forward under Allenby in Palestine, were not to be reconciled with a wise war policy. It would have been far safer and far cheaper in life and resources to run a greater risk for a shorter time. The advantage of the command of the sea should not have been neglected. If, while Allenby held the Turks at Gaza, a long-prepared descent had been made at Haifa or elsewhere on the sea coast behind them, and if the railway by which alone they could exist had been severed in September by a new army of six or eight divisions, the war in Syria would have been ended at a stroke. The eastern drain on our resources would have been stopped from February onwards; all the British troops in Pales-

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE EMIR FEISAL IN DAMASCUS.

The Emir Feisal, later King of Mesopotamia, who with Lieut.-Colonel T. E. Lawrence had led the Arab forces operating on Sir Edmund Allenby's right, is seen here in Damascus on October 3, 1918. He is leaving the Hotel Victoria after an interview with the Commander-in-Chief.

tine would have been available to meet the supreme peril in France. But in Palestine as formerly at Gallipoli, the clash of the western and eastern schools of thought produced incoherence and half-measures. Enough was sent east to be a dangerous dispersion, and never at one time enough to compel a prompt conclusion. It will be incredible to future generations that the strategists of an island people then blessed with the unique and sovereign attribute of sea power should, throughout the whole of the Great War, have failed so utterly to turn it to offensive profit.

In the actual event, as will be seen, Ludendorff's offensive of 1918 dissipated in a day all Allenby's careful plans for the spring campaign. Not less than sixty battalions with many batteries were incontinently snatched from Palestine to plug the shot hole of the twenty-first of March; and his depleted army remained till two Indian divisions arrived from Mesopotamia in August, in an extremely precarious position. That from such circumstances he should have contrived the captures of Deraa, Damascus and Aleppo, and the destruction of every vestige of Turkish power in Syria, military and civil before the armistice, is one of the most remarkable achievements of the war.

* * * *

The Battle of Paschendaele.

Meanwhile the British offensive against Paschendaele unrolled its sombre fate. The terrific artillery pulverized the ground, smashing simultaneously the German trenches and the ordinary drainage. By sublime devotion and frightful losses small indentations were made upon the German front. In six weeks at the farthest point we had advanced four miles. Soon the rain descended, and the vast crater fields became a sea of choking fetid mud in which men, animals and tanks floundered and perished hopelessly. The few tracks which alone could be preserved across the morass were swept with ceaseless shell fire, through which endless columns of transport marched with fortitude all night long. The impossibility of supplying the British field and medium batteries with ammunition at any distance from the only road maintained in being, led

to their being massed in line by its side. Thus there could be no concealment, and the German counter-fire caused very heavy losses in gunners and guns and killed nearly all the artillery horses.

The disappointing captures of ground were relieved by tales of prodigious German slaughter. The losses and anxieties inflicted upon the enemy must not be underrated. Ludendorff's admissions are upon record. These violent sustained thrusts shook the enemy to their foundations. But the German losses were always on a far smaller scale. They always had far fewer troops in the cauldron. They always took nearly two lives for one and sold every inch of ground with extortion.

Further efforts were made during October by the Prime Minister to bring the operations to an end. He went so far as to call Sir Henry Wilson and Lord French into counsel as "technical advisers" of the Cabinet, independent of the General Staff. We have the tale naïvely published by Robertson himself.[1] Lord French, we are told, after criticizing "in twenty pages out of twenty-six" the Haig-Robertson strategy and tactics, recommended that we should "stand everywhere on the defensive, only resorting to such offensive action as would make the defensive effective; await the development of the forces of the United States; and in the meantime rely upon a drastic economic war to weaken the enemy." In formally consulting outside advisers the Prime Minister obviously courted the resignation of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. It was not forthcoming. The Cabinet were not prepared to demand it; and nothing but mutual mistrust resulted.

Accordingly in Flanders the struggle went on. New divisions continued to replace those that were shattered. The rain descended and the mud sea spread. Still the will power of the Commander

[1] Robertson, *Soldiers and Statesmen*, Vol. II, pp. 256 *et seq.*

Photo: Copyright.

MESSINES: THE BOMBARDMENT.

The battle of Messines was fought June 7–15, 1917. The Messines ridge had for long dominated the British positions on the south flank of the Ypres salient. The capture of this high ground was of the greatest importance to the British Second Army, bringing, as it did, some relief to the divisions before Ypres. The attack was preceded by the explosion of nineteen mines which had been prepared under the German trenches. The moral effect of this upheaval greatly affected the defending garrison, and as a result the infantry advance, strongly supported by fighting tanks, was carried through with marked success.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

CONCRETE STRONGPOINT: MESSINES RIDGE.

The German position on the Messines Ridge was extremely strong. As in the case of Paschendaele the ridge was studded with ferro-concrete strongpoints or blockhouses, massive enough to withstand battering from the heaviest shells. Here is shown an example of this type of fortification. The name embossed over the entrance, *Sachsenfeste*, is in English *Saxon Fort.*

and the discipline of the Army remained invincible. By measureless sacrifices Paschendaele was won. But beyond, far beyond, still rose intact and unapproachable the fortifications of Klercken. August had passed away; September was gone; October was far spent. The full severity of a Flanders winter gripped the ghastly battlefield. Ceaselessly the Menin gate of Ypres disgorged its streams of manhood. Fast as the cannons fired, the ammunition behind them flowed in faster. Even in October the British Staff were planning and launching offensives and were confident of reaching the goal of decisive results. It was not until the end of November that final failure was accepted. "*Boche* is bad and *Boue* is bad," said Foch, then little more than an observer of events, "but *Boche* and *Boue* together. . . . Ah!" He held up warning hands.

Sir William Robertson and his Responsibilities.

It cannot be said that "the soldiers," that is to say the Staff, did not have their way. They tried their sombre experiment to its conclusion. They took all they required from Britain. They wore down alike the manhood and the guns of the British Army almost to destruction. They did it in the face of the plainest warnings, and of arguments which they could not answer. Sir Douglas Haig acted from conviction; but Sir William Robertson drifted ponderously. He has accepted the main responsibility. He could not well avoid it. "I was more than a mere adviser. I was the professional head of all the British Armies, as Haig was of those in France. They looked to me, as did the whole Empire, to see that they were not asked to do impossible things, and were not in any way placed at a disadvantage

Photo: Newspaper Illustrations.

BRINGING UP THE SHELLS: YPRES, 1917.

A road near the front line in October, 1917. Fighting under conditions such as are portrayed above demanded from the troops involved qualities of courage and endurance in the highest degree. The men and horses engaged in the work of supplying the line with rations and ammunition carried on in the face of every conceivable hardship. Danger and discomfort were their portion by day and by night. They did not fail.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

NEAR ZILLEBEKE: AUGUST 9, 1917.

The sufferings endured by the British troops taking part in the Third Battle of Ypres in 1917 were almost unprecedented. The weather was bad and the intense bombardment churned the ground into a mass of sticky slime. Such conditions greatly hindered and impeded all arms, the passage of guns being rendered difficult and sometimes impossible. Such photographs as that produced above afford ample proof of the difficulties under which the assaulting formations were forced to labour.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

PILCKEM RIDGE: JULY, 1917.

The conditions underfoot at this battle were appalling for friend and foe alike. Here German prisoners are seen slipping and slithering over the treacherous surface with a badly wounded man on a stretcher.

unnecessarily."[1] And again (June 23), "My own responsibility . . . is not small in urging the continuance of a plan regarding which he [the Prime Minister] has grave misgivings. . . ."[2] And lastly (Robertson to Haig, Sept. 27), "My own views are known to you. They have always been 'defensive' in all theatres but the West. But the difficulty is to *prove* the wisdom of this now that Russia is out. I confess I stick to it more because I see nothing better, and because my instinct prompts me to stick to it, than because of any good argument by which I can support it."[3] These are terrible words when used to sustain the sacrifices of nearly four hundred thousand men.

The Italian Disaster of Caporetto.

Meanwhile the results of neglecting Italy for the sake of Paschendaele exploded with a violence which no one could have foreseen. On October 24 began the Italian disaster of Caporetto. Six German divisions were brought swiftly to the Isonzo by night marches and concealed in deep valleys behind the front. These and the presence of General von Below animated the large Austrian armies. A skilful attack by mountain roads gained a key position. A sudden bombardment by heavy artillery and gas shells, followed by a general assault along the whole front led at the decisive points by German troops, aided by the effects of defeatist propaganda within the Italian lines, produced in twelve hours a complete and decisive defeat of General Cadorna's army. By nightfall more than a million Italians were in full retreat. A large portion of the army passed into dissolution. In three days 200,000 men and 1,800 guns were captured, and before the long retreat was finished and the Italian front

[1] Robertson, *Soldiers and Statesmen*, Vol. I, p. 188.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 247.
[3] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 255.

Photo: Russell.

FIELD-MARSHAL LORD PLUMER.

Herbert Charles Onslow Plumer was born in 1857, and was gazetted to the York and Lancaster Regiment nineteen years later. During a long and distinguished career in the service, Plumer took part in many campaigns and always with distinction. Of him it might be said with justice that he was one of the most able leaders ever to be produced by the British Army. In the Great War Plumer was appointed to command the Second Army in May, 1915, which, with the exception of a short period in 1917 and 1918, he led until the Armistice. Thorough and competent, he rarely, if ever, made a mistake.

had been reconstituted 80 miles to the westward along the Piave, upwards of 800,000 soldiers through death, wounds, sickness, capture, desertion, and above all disappearance, had been torn from the Italian standards. This astounding disaster required immediate exertions by Britain and France.

I was resting at my house in Kent when authentic news arrived. The Prime Minister telephoned to me to motor at once to Walton Heath. He showed me the telegrams, which even in their guarded form revealed a defeat of the first magnitude. At this moment when our army had been bled white at Paschendaele and when the French were still recovering from the Nivelle offensive and its disquieting consequences, the prospect of having to make a large detachment of force for Italy was uninviting. The Prime Minister reacted with his accustomed resiliency. He set off in a few days to Rapallo, where he had proposed a meeting with the French and Italian political and military chiefs. Meanwhile five French and five British divisions under General Fayolle and Sir Herbert Plumer, two of the most successful and experienced Commanders on the Western Front, were moved with the utmost rapidity through the tunnels under the Alps, and began to appear from the 10th of November onwards upon the Italian front. Had they been sent a few months earlier, it is certain, even if the Ally-Italian offensive had not yielded important results, that events would have followed an entirely different course.

Italian Fortitude.

The greatness of the Italian nation shone forth in an hour which recalled the morrow of Cannae. "Defeatism"

withered in the flame of national resolve. Immense as had been the Italian losses, the war effort of Italy was far greater from Caporetto onwards than in the earlier period of the war. Ruthless punishment restored the discipline of the armies: ardent reserves and volunteers refilled their ranks. But all this took time, and for several months the fate of Italy hung in the balance. It was necessary to contemplate a situation in which the north of Italy might be completely overrun by Teutonic armies; when Italy might be beaten out of the war, and when the development of a Swiss front might have been imposed upon France. Mercifully "the trees do not grow up to the sky," and offensives however successful lose their pristine force satiated with the ground they gain.

What would have happened had Germany prepared from the beginning to back her initial impulse with twelve or fourteen more divisions drawn from the vanished Russian front, is an inquiry which may well occupy and instruct the military student. But Ludendorff was nursing other plans, larger, more ambitious and as it turned out fatal to his country. Already the vast design of the German offensive in 1918 had gripped his mind. Italy was but a "side show," worth perhaps "the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier," but never to obstruct a classical theory and the supreme trial of strength against the strongest foe. Yet the falling away of Italy, a people of 40 millions, a first-class power, from the cause of the Allies at this time would have been an event more pregnant with consequences than all the triumphs of March 21, 1918. To

Photo: Copyright.

HANDLING A GUN IN THE ALPS.

The formidable character of the terrain over which the Italian army had to fight is exemplified by this striking photograph. On page 1058 is shown a gun in difficulties in the Flanders mud. Here a "75" is being hauled into a new position in the Italian Alps.

overwhelm Italy and to sue for a general peace afforded still the surest hope for the Central Empires.

It is a valid though inadequate claim on the part of the British High Command that the continuous pressure on Paschendaele played its part in influencing the German war mind. The almost inexhaustible resources of the British attack, its conquering of superhuman difficulties, its obstinate Commanders, its undaunted troops, the repeated destruction of the German front lines, the drain—half ours, but still frightful—on German resources, all riveted the eyes of Ludendorff on the Western Front. God forbid that such sacrifices, however needless, however disproportioned, should be vain!

From these deep matters I must recall the reader to the limited situation from which my tale is told.

The Re-equipment of the Italian Army.

It was imperative that Italy should be rearmed to the utmost possible exten by France and England. On November 18 I proceeded to Paris to meet in conclave with Loucheur and the Italian Minister of Armaments, General Dallolio. It was a cheerless experience; our margins were so small, our needs so exacting—and the Italian void gaped. In those hard days defeat was not leniently viewed by overstrained Allies. We all went through it in our turn—the politeness which veiled depreciation, the sympathy which scarcely surmounted resentment. And here I must pay my tribute to the dignity and quiet courage of the Italian Minister, and to the respect which in such circumstances he knew how to command from all.

Photo: Sport & General.

ITALIAN INFANTRY: JUNE, 1916.

Italy declared war against Austria on May 23, 1915, and upon Turkey and Bulgaria on August 20 and October 19 respectively. In the years that followed the Italian army knew both success and disaster. Lack of adequate defensive measures brought the country near to bitter defeat at Caporetto, but the situation, with the assistance of the Allies, was retrieved and Italy at length emerged victorious.

Mr. Churchill to Prime Minister and Lord Derby.

November 21, 1917.

General Furse and I have after consultation to-day met first Loucheur and secondly Loucheur and Dallolio. We have arranged as follows:—

(1) The French will send at once 150,000 rifles, complete transportation of which will begin to-night and take about eight days. We shall give an equal number beginning on the ninth day with possibility of some delay in the latter portion.

(2) The French will give 2,000 mitrailleuses and we 2,000 hotchkiss guns spread over next few weeks.

(3) Ammunition as re-

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

BRITISH DESPATCH RIDERS: ITALIAN FRONT.

A scene on the Italian front in which despatch riders are shown being held up at a wire barricade by an armed sentry. A gas shell has just burst a few yards away.

quested for all the above from both French and British sources.

(4) French will give immediately 300 field guns ("seventy-fives") with ammunition. We reserved our undertaking on this item on account of the difficulty, though Italians requested 300 field guns from us. The 15-pounders may afford a partial solution.

(5) French will give from 175 to 200 medium guns and howitzers with ammunition. We have promised to do our best to provide up to 175 of various medium natures, but we have warned the Italians that possibly the whole number cannot be found. It is understood that these deliveries will be spread over two months.

(6) French cannot give any heavy or very heavy pieces, but we have undertaken to give 40 heavy—probably 8-inch howitzers with ammunition—which is Italian total demand.

(7) We have refused very heavy natures.

(8) We have stated that we consider 40 tanks if sent at all should be complete with British personnel and as part of British force and that this is a matter for General Staff. Above appears to be upon the whole satisfactory arrangement to meet the emergency. In making it we have kept in view possibility that it may be better to supply the deficiency in field guns and medium natures by increasing the proportion of organized artillery batteries with British force rather than by sending unfamiliar equipments to the Italian army which we need ourselves. General Furse leaves for London to-night. I return the day after.

Secondly, Loucheur will endeavour to secure a rebate of 250,000 tons out of 2,000,000 allocated to France and Italy for food in aid of my promised deliveries of steel to him. If he fails I am free to review the position within these limits.

* * * *

The Paschendaele offensive had ended

SCOTTISH TROOPS CROSSING

The disaster at Caporetto resulted in a powerful force of British and French troops being sent to in an offensive launched by General Diaz against the weakening enemy. This movement was to them on

in mire and carnage, when suddenly there emerged from the British sector opposite Cambrai a battle totally different in character from any yet fought in the war.

For the first time the mechanical method of securing surprise was effectively used. Boraston's account points to this battle as a refutation of "the crude talk about the backward method of our leadership in France during 1916-17; its lack of genius or skill; its prodigious waste of life."[1] Here in his opinion was a superb example of scientific novelty and audacious tactics combined into a conception of military genius.

But this conception, not only its underlying idea but its methods and even its instruments, had been pressed upon the British High Command for almost exactly two years. The plan of attack at Cambrai was inherent in the original conception of the Tank. It was for this, and for this precisely, that Tanks had been devised.

[1] *Sir Douglas Haig's Command,* Vol. I, Chap. XV. p. 283.

First Ideas of the Use of Tanks.

In my first memorandum on armoured caterpillar vehicles, written for Sir John French on December 3, 1915, the following passages occurred :—

"The cutting of the enemy's wire and the general domination of his firing-line can be effected by engines of this character. About seventy are now nearing completion in England, and should be inspected. None should be used until all can be used at once. They should be disposed secretly along the whole attacking front two or three hundred yards apart. Ten or fifteen minutes before the assault these engines should move forward over the best line of advance open, passing through or across our trenches at prepared points. They are capable of traversing any ordinary obstacle, ditch, breastwork, or trench. They carry two or three Maxims each, and can be fitted with flame apparatus.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

PIAVE WITH PRISONERS.

aly to the support of the Italian army. In 1918 the British troops under Lord Cavan participated tirely successful. The resistance of the Austrians collapsed and an armistice was granted ovember 4, 1918.

Nothing but a direct hit from a field gun will stop them. On reaching the enemy's wire they turn to the left or right and run down parallel to the enemy's trench, sweeping his parapet with their fire, and crushing and cutting the barbed wire in lanes and in a slightly serpentine course. . . .

"If artillery is used to cut wire, the direction and imminence of the attack is proclaimed days beforehand. But by this method the assault follows the wire-cutting almost immediately, i.e. before any reinforcements can be brought up by the enemy, or any special defensive measure taken.

"The Caterpillars are capable of actually crossing the enemy's trench and advancing to cut his communication trenches; but into this aspect it is not necessary to go now. One step at a time. It will be easy, when the enemy's front line is in our hands, to find the best places for the Caterpillars to cross by for any further advance which may be required. They can climb any slope. They are, in short, movable machine-gun cupolas as well as wire-smashers. . . .

"Surprise consists in novelty and suddenness. Secrecy is vital, and it would be possible, over a period of three or four weeks, to work routine conditions into such a state that very little extraordinary preparation would be required. The weak man-power available in the enemy's front line can easily be overwhelmed by forces which might appear to be assembled in the ordinary course."

These words in a paper printed by the Committee of Imperial Defence had been read by Sir Douglas Haig before the end of 1915.[1] Tanks in considerable and growing numbers had been in action on the British front since their conception had been improvidently exposed to the enemy on the Somme in 1916. At the Headquarters of the Tank Corps the original tactical ideas inspiring their

[1] See also my reference to Tank tactics in the Memorandum of Oct. 21, 1917, of which a print had been sent to G.H.Q.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

NEAR BOURLON WOOD: NOVEMBER 23, 1917.

At Cambrai, during the closing days of November, 1917, the tanks were given their first real chance. Here, as at the Dardanelles in 1915, a brilliant operation was carried to success, and as was the case with the Gallipoli landing, the lack of reserve striking power robbed the assaulting troops of the fruits of victory. The tank seen moving forward in this photograph is passing captured German guns on its way to the attack upon Bourlon Wood. In this phase of the battle the tanks were largely instrumental in driving the enemy out of their positions.

conception had been earnestly and thoroughly developed. The Tank Corps had never yet been allowed to put them into practice. These engines had been used in small numbers as mere ancillaries to infantry and artillery battles. They had been condemned to wallow in the crater fields under the full blast of massed German artillery, or to founder in the mud of Paschendaele. Never had they been allowed to have their own chance in a battle made for them, adapted to their special capacities, and in which they could render the inestimable service for which they had been specially designed.

Their Long Misuse.

The success of a few Tanks in a minor operation at Paschendaele, where in the Army Corps of General Maxse they were correctly employed, was probably the means of rescuing the Tank Corps from the increasing disfavour into which their engines had fallen through being so long mishandled by the British Headquarters. Whatever may have been the reason, the fact remains that "a project which had been constantly in the mind of the General Staff of the Tank Corps for nearly three months and in anticipation of which preparations had already been undertaken, was approved, and its date fixed for November 20."[1] All the requisite conditions were at last accorded. The Tanks were to operate on ground not yet ploughed up by artillery, against a front not yet prepared to meet an offensive. Above all, Surprise! The Tanks were themselves to open the attack. With a daring acceptance of responsibility Sir Julian Byng, who commanded the Army, ordered that not a shot was to be fired by the British artillery, not even for registration, until the Tanks were actually launched. The Artillery schemes which for the first time rendered this feat practicable without mishap to the troops reflect the highest credit on their authors.

[1] Colonel Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War*, Chapter XIX, p. 140.

Their First Chance.

The minutely prepared scheme of the Tank Corps had the following aim:—"To effect the penetration of four systems of trenches in a few hours without any type of artillery preparation."[1] Nearly 500 Tanks were available. "Tomorrow," wrote General Elles, Commander of the Tank Corps, in his Special Order to his men, "the Tank Corps will have the chance for which it has been waiting for many months—to operate on good going in the van of the battle."

"The attack," says the historian of the Tank Corps (Colonel Fuller), "was a stupendous success. As the Tanks moved forward with the infantry following close behind, the enemy completely lost his balance, and those who did not fly panic-stricken from the field surrendered with little or no resistance. . . . By 4 p.m. on November 20 one of the most astonishing battles in all history had been won and, as far as the Tank Corps was concerned, tactically finished, for no reserves existing it was not possible to do more."[1] In the brief life of a November day the whole German trench system had been penetrated on a front of six miles, and 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns captured, without the loss of more than 1,500 British soldiers. "It is a question," declares the Staff Officer, "whether any stroke of the allied army on the Western Front was more fruitful ultimately of ground and result than this battle of Cambrai, despite its limited design."[2]

But if this was so, why not have done it before? Why not have done it on a far larger scale? If British and French war leaders had possessed—not more genius, for the possibilities had by this time been obvious to all who were studying the Tank problem—but the vision and comprehension which is expected from the honoured chiefs of great armies, there was no reason why a battle

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 141.

[1] Colonel Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War*, pp. 148, 150.

[2] *Sir Douglas Haig's Command*, p. 392.



CAMBRAI: NOVEMBER 20–DECEMBER 6, 1917.

Sketch map showing the varied fortunes which attended the British Third Army during its brilliant movement against Cambrai.

like Cambrai could not have been fought a year before, or better still, why three or four concerted battles like Cambrai could not have been fought simultaneously in the spring of 1917. Then indeed the enemy's front line pierced at once in three or four places might have been completely overwhelmed on a front of 50 miles. Then indeed the roll forward of the whole army might have been achieved and the hideous deadlock broken.

Ludendorff's Professional Blindness.

But, it will be said, such assertions take insufficient account of the practical difficulties, of the slowly gathered experience, of the immense refinements of study, discipline and organization required. Could, for instance, 3,000 Tanks have been manufactured by the spring of 1917? Could the men to handle them have been spared from the front? Could their tactical training have been perfected behind the line and out of contact with the enemy? Could the secret have been kept? Would not preparation on so large a scale, even behind the line, have become apparent to the enemy?

To all these questions we will answer that one-tenth of the mental effort expended by the Headquarters Staff on preparing the old-fashioned offensives of which the war had consisted, one-twentieth of the influence they used to compel reluctant Governments to sanction these offensives, one-hundredth of the men lost in them, would have solved all the problems easily and overwhelmingly before the spring of 1917. As for the Germans getting to hear of it, learning, for instance, that the British were practising with Caterpillar armoured cars at dummy trenches behind their lines on a large scale—what use would they have made of their knowledge? What use did Ludendorff make of the awful disclosure, not as a mere rumour or questionable Intelligence report, but of the actual apparition of the Tanks in September, 1916? There is a melancholy comfort in reflecting that if the British and French commands were short-sighted, the ablest soldier in Germany was blind. In truth, these high military experts all belong to the same school. Haig at least moved faster and farther along the new path, and in consequence, doubtingly and tardily, he reaped in the end a generous reward.

It has been necessary to the whole argument of this account to dwell insistently upon these aspects of the Battle of Cambrai. Accusing as I do without exception all the great ally offensives of 1915, 1916 and 1917, as needless and wrongly conceived operations of infinite cost, I am bound to reply to the question, What else could be done? And I answer it, pointing to the Battle of Cambrai, "*This* could have been done." This in many variants, this in larger and better forms ought to have been done, and would have been done if only the Generals had not been content to fight machine-gun bullets with the breasts of gallant men, and think that that was waging war.

The German Counter-stroke after Cambrai.

It remains only to be said of the Battle of Cambrai that the initial success so far exceeded the expectations of the Third Army Staff that no suitable preparations had been made to exploit it. The cavalry who scampered forward were naturally soon held up by snipers and machine guns, and no important advance beyond the first day's gains was achieved. The railways at this part of the German front favoured a rapid hostile concentration, and ten days after the victory the Germans delivered a most powerful counterstroke in which they recaptured a large portion of the conquered ground and took in their turn 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns. In this counter-attack the enemy used for the first time those tactics of "infiltration" by small highly competent parties of machine-gunners or trench-mortar men, which they were soon to employ on a larger scale. The bells which had been rung for Cambrai were therefore judged premature, and the year 1917 closed on the Allied fronts, British, French, Italian, Russian and Balkan, in a gloom relieved only by Allenby's sword-flash at Jerusalem.

CHAPTER LXIX

BRITAIN CONQUERS THE U-BOATS

" Depend upon it, Sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully."

DR. JOHNSON

Britain's Seafaring Resources and the U-Boat Attack—The Fatal Puzzle—The Anatomy of the Submarine—Surface or Submerged Attack—Arming of the Mercantile Marine—The Q-ships—The Episode of the *Dunraven*—The German Dilemma—Depth Charges and Destroyers—Detector Nets—The Prelude to Unrestricted War—The Crisis of the Struggle—Admiralty Counter-measures—The Question of Convoy: Pros and Cons—My March Memorandum—Carson's Anxious Tenure—Triumph of the Convoy System—The Dover Barrage—Admiral Keyes in Command—The Giant Anglo-American Barrage—The Hunters Hunted—Total Defeat of the U-Boat—The Price.

IT is commonly said that the German drive on Paris in 1914 and the unlimited U-boat warfare both "nearly succeeded." But this expression requires analysis, and also differentiation between the issues on land and sea.

Britain's Seafaring Resources and the U-Boat Attack.

A partisan watching an evenly contested football match, an engineer watching a vehicle whose weight he does not know exactly, crossing a bridge whose strength he has never been able to measure, experience no doubt similar sensations of anxiety or excitement. The processes however are different. A football match like a great battle on land is in a continual state of flux and chance. But whether the vehicle will break down the bridge does not depend on chance. It depends on the weight of the vehicle and the strength of the bridge. When both these are unknown beforehand, anxiety is natural. But once it is known that the bridge will bear at least ten tons and the vehicle at the most weighs no more than eight, all misgivings are proved to have been unfounded. To say that the vehicle "nearly" broke down the bridge is untrue. There was never any chance of it. Whereas any one of a score of alternative accidents would have given the German Army Paris in 1914, the seafaring resources of Great Britain were in fact and in the circumstances always superior to the U-boat attack. Moreover, that attack was inherently of a character so gradual that these superior resources could certainly obtain their full development.

Nevertheless, the struggle between the British sailormen, Royal and Mercantile —for both played an equally indispensable part—and the German U-boats stands among the most heart-shaking episodes of history, and its declared result will for generations be regarded as a turning point in the destiny of nations. It was in scale and in stake the greatest conflict ever decided at sea. It was almost entirely a duel between Britain and Germany. Austrian submarines assisted the Germans. Allied navies, United States and Japanese destroyers, helped Great Britain to the best of their power. But three-quarters of the tonnage sunk was British, and 175 U-boats out of a total German war loss of 182 were destroyed by British agency.

The Fatal Puzzle.

The shortcomings in the higher command of the British Navy, afloat and at home, which had led to Admiral de Robeck's failure to force the Dardanelles, to the abortive conclusion of

Jutland, and to the neglect to carry the fighting into the German Bight, had given to the enemy during 1915 and 1916 the means of developing an entirely novel form of sea attack upon a scale the potential intensity of which no one could measure beforehand, and which if successful would be fatal. At first sight all seemed to favour the challengers. Two hundred U-boats each possessing between three and four weeks' radius of action, each capable of sinking with torpedo, gun fire or bomb four or five vessels in a single day, beset the approaches to an island along which there passed in and out every week several thousand merchant vessels. The submarine, with only a periscope showing momentarily like a broomstick above the waves, could discharge its torpedo unseen. It could rise to the surface and fire its gun to sink, burn or induce the surrender of a defenceless vessel, and disappear into the invisible depths of the vast waste of water without leaving a trace behind. Of all the tasks ever set to a Navy none could have appeared more baffling than that of sheltering this enormous traffic and groping deep below the surface of the sea for the deadly elusive foe. It was in fact a game of blind man's buff in an unlimited space of three dimensions.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

SHATTERED HULL OF U 62.

As the war progressed and the U-boat menace became daily more severe the Admiralty intensified its campaign against this threat by every means in its power. The measure of success which attended its efforts may best be gauged by a consideration of the losses inflicted upon the German submarines. During the years 1914–15 the total number of U-boats destroyed was 24; in 1916 another 25 were accounted for. In 1917 and 1918 the German losses were 62 and 88 respectively. 1917 was the peak year of sinkings of allied and neutral shipping, some 2,639 vessels being sent to the bottom, but in 1918 the number had fallen to 1,103.

Had the problem been surveyed in cold blood beforehand it might well have seemed insoluble. But in the event as the danger grew, so grew also the will power of the threatened State and the courage, endurance and ingenuity of its servants. At the summit through the authority of the Prime Minister all misgivings were suppressed, all croakers silenced, and all doubters banished from executive responsibility. But strict inquiry was made into facts, and no official grimace passed long for argument. The qualities of audacity, initiative and seamanship inbred in the sailors and younger officers of the Navy found in this new warfare their highest opportunity. But without the unquenchable spirit of the Merchant Service nothing would have availed. The foundation of all defence lay in the fact that merchant-seamen three or four times "submarined" returned unfalteringly to the perilous seas, and even in the awful month when one ship out of every four that left the United Kingdom never came home, no voyage was delayed for lack of resolute civilian volunteers.

The Anatomy of the Submarine.

To realize the issues of this strange form of warfare hitherto unknown to human experience, the reader must understand the general anatomy of the submarine. This delicate vessel is driven when on the surface by powerful oil engines which in those days yielded speeds up to sixteen or seventeen knots an hour. Submerged she depended upon electric accumulators which she could recharge by her oil engines when on the surface. These accumulators produced a maximum speed under water of about eight knots, and would last about one hour at full and twenty at economical speed.

In order to dive, a submarine does not give herself negative buoyancy, i.e. make herself heavier than the water. She fills enough tanks to have about a ton of buoyancy in hand and then, by depressing her horizontal rudders and going ahead on her electric motors, swims down to the desired depth. A submarine is strong enough to resist the ever-increasing water-pressures down to about two hundred and fifty feet below the surface. Beyond that depth there is increasing risk of leakage through the joints of her hull. Any serious penetration by salt water may liberate chlorine gas from the electric accumulators and choke the crew in tortures. Beyond a depth of three or four hundred feet a submarine would certainly be destroyed by the water pressure and would swiftly sink bilged to the ocean floor. In deep water therefore a submarine could only remain submerged while in motion, and could only keep in motion as long as her accumulators lasted. When these were exhausted, she must come to the surface and float defenceless during several hours while they were being recharged.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

DAMAGE TO U 22.

This photograph affords evidence of the destructive power of a mine. The U 22, seen here in dry dock, struck a mine on April 6, 1917. Her stern was blown away, and one propeller shaft torn out of alignment.

On the other hand, where the sea was not more than two hundred and fifty feet deep, a submarine need not fear to give herself negative buoyancy. She could sink and sit on the bottom without using up her accumulators as long as the air and oxygen tubes she carried enabled the crew to breathe. This allowed her to remain below water for at least forty-eight hours, during which time she could also move perhaps sixty miles. The power to remain submerged for more than twenty hours was thus limited to the shallow seas. On the other hand, depths of less than fifty feet raised

difficulties of another kind which prevented submerged attacks.

Surface or Submerged Attack.

The prime weapon of all submarines was the torpedo; and as long as they fought warships, no other weapon was of any service. Thin-skinned submersible vessels could only engage in an artillery duel with armoured surface ships at a fatal disparity in risk. The penetration of a U-boat's hull by a single shot deprived her of the power of diving, even if it did not sink her outright. But when the Germans decided to use their U-boats to attack merchant ships, another set of arguments arose. The merchant ships were so numerous that the torpedo was an unsuitable weapon for procuring decisive results. It was expensive, difficult and lengthy to manufacture; the supply could only gradually be broadened out; and only from eight to twenty torpedoes could be carried in submarines according to their classes. As a large proportion of torpedoes missed their target for one fault or another, the destructive power of a U-boat against commerce during a single cruise was severely limited. Therefore the first move of the Germans was to arm their U-boats with guns to attack merchant ships on the surface of the water, sinking them either by gun-fire or, after surrender, by bombs placed on board.

This method also enabled the U-boats to use their much superior surface speed, and allowed them to discriminate between different classes of merchant ships and between enemy and neutral ships; to observe their own Prize Law by visit and search; and finally to give time for the merchant crews, if they chose to surrender their vessel, to escape in open boats.

Arming of the Mercantile Marine.

The first British counter-move made on my responsibility in 1915, was to arm British merchantmen to the greatest possible extent with guns of sufficient power to deter the U-boat from surface attack. When this was achieved, the reduction of the assailant's speed and the limited torpedo supply increased the merchant ship's chance of escape proportionately. The argument was overwhelming. Unhappily there were at first hardly any guns either for merchant ships or for the coastal patrols. We searched every quarter of the globe and all the recesses of the Admiralty for guns, no matter how obsolete or various in pattern. A hundred coastal vessels by the spring of 1915 were provided with one 12-pounder gun apiece. The more important seagoing vessels were also armed. The scarcity was such that their guns had to be transferred from outward- to inward-bound vessels at ports outside the submarine zone, so as to make them go further. Despite every effort made by my successor, Mr. Balfour, the supply of guns expanded slowly; and it was not until the autumn of 1916 that he was in a position to undertake the arming of the whole Mercantile Marine. Good progress had however been made before the submarine danger renewed itself in its gravest form.

The Q-ships.

As the U-boats were forced by the progressive arming of the British Mercantile Marine to rely increasingly on underwater attacks, they encountered a new set of dangers. The submerged U-boat with its defective vision ran the greatest risk of mistaking neutral for British vessels and of drowning neutral crews, and thus of embroiling Germany with other great Powers. We also resorted to the well-known *ruse de guerre* of hoisting false colours in order further to baffle and confuse the enemy. Thus from a very early stage the U-boats were forced to choose between all the practical inconveniences and far-reaching diplomatic consequences of under-water attack with the torpedo, or on the other hand facing the disproportionate hazards of the gun duel on the surface.

It was at this stage that we developed the stratagem of the Q-ship. A number of merchant vessels were specially equipped with torpedo tubes and with concealed guns firing from behind trap-door bulwarks, and sent along the trade routes to offer themselves to the hostile submarines. When the U-boat, wishing to economize torpedoes, attacked the Q-ship

by gun-fire on the surface, a portion of the British crew took to the boats and by every device endeavoured to entice the Germans to close quarters. Once the enemy was within decisive range, the White Ensign was hoisted, the trap-doors fell and a deadly fire by trained gunners was opened upon them. By these means in 1915 and 1916 eleven U-boats were destroyed, and the rest, rendered far more nervous of attacking by gun-fire, were thrown back more and more upon their torpedoes. By the end of 1917 this process was complete. The German submarine commanders would not face the unequal gun-fire combat. The stratagem of the Q-ship was thus exhausted, and its last victim, U 88, perished in September, 1917.

* * * *

The Episode of the *Dunraven*.

The action between the Q-ship *Dunraven* and U 61 affords a vivid example of this strange form of war. On the morning of August 8, 1917, H.M.S. *Dunraven,* disguised as an armed British merchant ship, was zigzagging towards the Bristol Channel, offering herself to submarine attack. At 10.58 a U-boat was sighted on the horizon two points before the starboard beam. The *Dunraven* continued to zigzag; and the U-boat, having approached submerged, broke surface at 11.43 on the starboard quarter and opened fire at about 5,000 yards. The *Dunraven,* playing her part as an armed merchantman, at once opened fire with her after gun (a 2½-pounder). Her Captain, Commander Gordon Campbell, ordered much smoke to be made from the funnels, but at the same time reduced speed to seven knots with an occasional zigzag to give the enemy a chance of closing. This the enemy did, and by 12.25 was scarcely a half-mile away.

Meanwhile the *Dunraven's* unconcealed stern gun was intentionally firing short, and her Commander made *en clair* signals to deceive the U-boat, such as: "Submarine chasing and shelling me"; "Submarine overtaking me. Help. Come quickly"; "Submarine (position). Am abandoning ship." At 12.40, when the U-boat shells were falling near, Commander Campbell made a cloud of steam to pretend boiler trouble, and gave the order "Abandon ship." The *Dunraven* stopped, blowing off steam, and turned her broadside so that the enemy could see the panic on board. The crew tumbled into the boats, one of which purposely was left hanging by her after davit.

Thus encouraged, U 61 closed warily and continued firing. A shell went through the poop, exploding a depth charge and blowing up a lieutenant. Two more shells crashed into the poop, setting it on fire. Clouds of dense smoke poured from the burning vessel, partially hiding from view the now swiftly approaching U-boat. The magazine and also the store of depth charges of the *Dunraven* being in the poop, it was obvious that an explosion must soon take place. The crew of the secret 4-inch gun immediately above the magazine stood to their post, waiting in grim anxiety for an opportunity which they were not destined to see. U 61 was now "coming along nicely from port to starboard to pass 400 or 500 yards off." In a few minutes the attacker would be on the weather side and a perfect target. Commander Campbell therefore had the option of opening fire under difficult conditions or of waiting longer for a far better chance. He waited.

At 12.58, when the U-boat was passing close astern of the *Dunraven,* two depth charges and some cordite exploded. The 4-inch gun and the gun's crew were blown into the air. The gun itself was hurled on to the well deck, and the crew fell in various places—one man in the water amid a shower of scattered 4-inch ammunition. The "open fire" buzzers of all the concealed guns were started by the explosion, and the gun on the after bridge (the only one bearing) opened fire. Had this misfortune been delayed for two minutes more, three guns could have fired on U 61 at 400 yards range. U 61, warned from the size of the explosion that it had a Q-ship to deal with, dived instantly. Commander Campbell, realizing that he was now about to be torpedoed, ordered the doctor to remove all the wounded and lock them up in the cabins, "so as not

Photo: White, St. Catherines.

REAR-ADMIRAL GORDON CAMPBELL.

Commander Gordon Campbell, as he then was, served throughout the Great War with marked distinction. He was at one time referred to in the Press as "The Mystery V.C." He rendered valuable services in connection with Q-ships, the award of the Victoria Cross being made in recognition of the indomitable courage and resource displayed by him when in command of the *Dunraven*.

to spoil the next part." The fire hoses were turned on to the poop, which was a mass of flames. Although the deck was red hot, the magazine itself had not yet exploded. Meanwhile a warship had answered the *Dunraven's en clair* appeals for assistance, and fearing lest the action should be prematurely ended by her arrival, Commander Campbell signalled to her to keep away.

At 1.20 a torpedo was seen approaching from the starboard side. It struck abaft the engine room. The ruse of abandoning ship had already been exhausted so far as "an armed merchant ship" was concerned. But the desperate condition of the *Dunraven* favoured the hope that it might succeed in another form. There is a moment when even a warship must be abandoned. The order was therefore given, "Q abandon ship." The two secret guns which had been exposed were left visible, and an additional party of men were ordered to escape by a raft and a damaged boat.

U 61 was now in great doubt. Was the ship finally abandoned or not? For nearly an hour, showing only his periscope, the submarine circled round the heeling, burning ship at various ranges. During this period boxes of cordite and 4-inch shells were continually exploding in the flames. At 2.30 U 61 broke surface directly astern, where no gun was bearing, and at a few hundred yards shelled the stricken ship. Nearly all the shells either hit the *Dunraven* or fell close to the boats, on which U 61 also fired with a Maxim. Two shells burst on the bridge with serious effects. All this time Commander Campbell still waited for a favourable chance.

At 2.50, U 61 ceased shelling, submerged, and steamed past the *Dunraven's* port side at about 150 yards distance. Only a small part of the periscope was showing, but this revealed both depth and position. The long-awaited moment had now come. The *Dunraven* was armed not only with guns but with under-water torpedo tubes. Unfortunately she was heeling over so far that accurate aiming was spoiled. At 2.55 Commander Campbell fired a torpedo. The bubbles passed just ahead of the periscope; and the U-boat, unaware that destruction had missed her by a few inches, came slowly round on to the starboard side. This gave the *Dunraven* a second chance, and at 3.20 another torpedo was fired. Again the bubbles passed close to the periscope, and the deadly weapon can only have missed its mark by the narrowest margin. This time U 61 saw the peril and dived deep. Commander Campbell, having exhausted every device and with his ship in a sinking condition, signalled for assistance. Men-of-war, headed by the United States destroyer *Noma*, arrived from all quarters. The U-boat, whose periscope had again been seen, was hunted; and the *Dunraven*, after her crew had been rescued, foundered in the great approach route she had so faithfully defended. For his tireless perseverance in this action Commander Campbell received the Victoria Cross.

* * * *

The German Dilemma.

By all these manœuvres and pressures the Germans were confronted during 1916 with the dilemma either of losing a great many U-boats in gun duels or Q-ship ambuscades, or of resorting almost entirely to the torpedo with a vastly increased risk of offending neutrals. This complicated and nicely balanced discussion produced great stresses and cross-purposes between the German naval and civil authorities. The Naval Staff, headed by Tirpitz and Scheer, demanded that the authorities should sink at sight all vessels in the war zone. The Emperor and the Chancellor in their fear of offending neutrals insisted that the custom of visit and search should be complied with in the case of unarmed ships. But—protested the Naval Staff—which were the unarmed ships, and what would happen to the U-boat while she was making her inquiries? They declared moreover that unrestricted warfare would increase the sinkings to such an extent that Britain would be forced within six months to sue for peace.

The relative vulnerability of armed and unarmed ships can be judged from the following summary of U-boat attacks on British vessels between January 1, 1916, and January 25, 1917.

	Defensively armed ships.	Unarmed ships.
Number attacked - -	310	302
Sunk by torpedoes without warning - - -	62	30
Sunk by gun fire or bombs	12	205
Escaped - - - -	236	67
Percentage escaped - -	76	22

These figures are illuminating and conclusive. They show that the U-boat was scarcely ever willing to face the gun duel with an armed vessel; and in consequence that with equal numbers of ships attacked the armed ship had nearly four times the unarmed ship's chance of escape. So much for the first great measure of defence.

* * * *

Depth Charges and Destroyers.

The principal means of *attacking* submarines under water was by dropping overboard charges which exploded at a certain depth. The shock of these explosions seriously jarred the submarine, and if near enough, deranged her mechanism or opened her joints. These depth charges were our earliest anti-submarine device. Gradually the methods of dropping them improved, and their size and number were multiplied many times.

The arch-enemy of the submarine was the destroyer. She had the fastest speed, the greatest number of depth charges, and was herself cheaper than the quarry she hunted. When the periscope of a U-boat was seen in deep water all the available destroyers and motor launches and other fast small craft spread in an organized network over the surface so as to keep her down and force her to exhaust her accumulators; and alike in deep water or in shallow, the slightest indication of her whereabouts—an air bubble, an oil stain on the surface—drew the dreaded

Photo: Copyright.

Among the many fine exploits of Q-ships during the struggle to overcome the U-boat peril, nothing finer is recorded than the fight put up by Commander Gordon Campbell on board the *Dunraven* in his encounter with the German U 61. The *Dunraven* is seen here on fire during the course of the action. An account of this epic fight is given in the text, and another will be found in Rear-Admiral Campbell's book, "Number Thirteen," published by Hodder & Stoughton.

depth charges in a searching shower. As the struggle progressed the skill and methods of the hunting vessel perpetually improved. Wonderful instruments were devised for detecting the beat of a submarine propellor; and with this and other indications a U-boat was sometimes pursued to death after an intermittent but unrelenting chase of more than thirty-six hours, during which the U-boat had perhaps replenished her electric batteries on the surface unseen two or three times.

Detector Nets.

The second anti-submarine weapon was the thin wire net hung in long strips across straits or narrow channels. These nets, buoyed on the surface with glass balls, were intended to foul the propellor of the U-boat and to cling about the hull. A U-boat thus enveloped, even if her motive power was not affected, would unconsciously be trailing a fatal tell-tale buoy about upon the surface, thus guiding her pursuers. To these light nets there were added in particular channels elaborately devised necklaces of mines joined with nets and watched by large numbers of trawlers with destroyers at ready call. Collision was another danger for this slow-moving, half-blind creature; and the ram of battleship, cruiser, destroyer or merchant ship on frequent occasions exacted the final forfeit.

Lastly, submarines stalked one another, and a U-boat while attacking a merchant ship or recharging its batteries upon the surface was on more than one occasion blown to pieces by the torpedo of a submerged pursuer of whose approach she was unconscious. The brutal features inseparable from the submarine attack on merchant vessels, and the miserable fate which so often overtook the passengers and civilian crew, inspired this warfare with exceptional fierceness. The attack upon warships, however grievous in loss of life, was considered fair war by the Royal Navy. The sinking of merchant vessels or neutral ships or hospital ships seemed to be a barbarous, treacherous and piratical act deserving every conceivable means of extermination. When we consider that nearly thirteen thousand British lives were destroyed by the German U-boats and that many were civilians, and the cruel and shocking incidents—to some extent inevitable—which characterized this warfare, and when we remember further the awful character of the stakes, the fact that several hundred German officers and men were rescued from the sea or allowed to surrender after scuttling their vessels is a tribute to the restraint of the deeply injured conqueror.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

MAKING A DETECTOR NET.

The detector net, one of the devices adopted to combat the submarine peril, was employed in narrow channels or straits. Made of thin but strong wire, and buoyed on the surface with glass balls, the net was designed to foul propellers of the U-boat and to cling about the hull. The detector net was frequently used in conjunction with mines.

The Prelude to Unrestricted War.

The Germans had originally

Photo : Imperial War Museum.

LAYING NETS FROM A DRIFTER.

Here a drifter is seen with the hold laden with wire detector net and the glass floats designed to give evidence of disturbance below the surface. The net and floats are being paid out over the side.

decided to begin unrestricted submarine war on April 1, 1916. The threat of the United States to break off relations after the attack on the *Sussex* led at the end of the month to the permission being withdrawn. When Admiral Scheer, an ardent advocate of unrestricted warfare, received this order he intemperately recalled the High Sea Fleet U-boats, refusing to permit them to work on the basis of visit and search. From May to October therefore the campaign was practically confined to the Mediterranean and to the mine-layers of the Flanders flotilla.

The relief thus afforded to Great Britain in northern waters was however both fleeting and illusory. The Mediterranean U-boats, working in accordance with German prize procedure, succeeded in sinking a large number of ships, and the German Naval Staff on October 6 ordered Scheer to resume restricted warfare with the North Sea flotillas. In the interval the number of U-boats available for active service had risen from 47 in March to 93 in November. The sinkings consequently increased rapidly when operations were resumed. The average monthly loss for the period April to September had been 131,000 tons; that from November to February rose to 276,000 tons. By the end of 1916 it was evident that the development of anti-submarine measures had not kept pace with the increasing intensity of the attack. The defensive measures instituted during 1915 had increased the number of armed merchantmen and auxiliary patrol vessels, but the problem of actually attacking and destroying U-boats was still in a rudimentary stage.

On February 1 the unrestricted attack began in full vigour, and the numbers of the U-boats continually increased. The

losses of British, Allied and neutral vessels increased from 181 in January to 259 in February, 325 in March, and 423 in April; the corresponding figures in gross tonnage being 298,000 in January, 468,000 in February, 500,000 in March, and 849,000 in April.

We now know that the German Naval Staff estimated that British shipping could be reduced at a rate of 600,000 tons a month, and that in five months at this rate Britain would be forced to her knees. In April alone the total world tonnage lost reached the appalling figure of 849,000 tons. The average monthly loss of British shipping during April, May and June from U-boats amounted to 409,300 tons, corresponding to a rate of nearly five million tons a year. By the end of May, apart from vessels employed on naval and military services or essential trade in distant waters, and undergoing repairs, there was less than six million tons of shipping available for all the supplies and trade with the United Kingdom. If losses continued at this rate and were equally divided among the services exposed to attack, the tonnage available for trade at the beginning of 1918 would be reduced to under five million tons, that is to say, an amount almost exactly equal to the gross sinkings in 1917. It seemed that Time, hitherto counted as an incorruptible ally, was about to change sides.

The Crisis of the Struggle.

Nor did the entry of the United States into the war shed any beam of hope on these dark waters. The longed-for American resources required a vast array of British tonnage to transport them to the front. The patrol system in the approaches to the English Channel and south of Ireland had completely broken down. Not only were the limited numbers of the patrol vessels unable to protect the shipping, but their mere presence assisted the submarines to find the traffic routes. In April the great approach route to the south-west of Ireland was becoming a veritable cemetery of British shipping, in which large vessels were sunk regularly day by day about 200 miles from land. During this month it was calculated that one in four merchant ships leaving the United Kingdom never returned. The U-boat was rapidly undermining not only the life of the British islands, but the foundations of the Allies' strength; and the danger of their collapse in 1918 began to loom black and imminent.

The stern pressure of events reacted upon Admiralty organization. In May the Naval Staff was given an appropriate position on the Board by the merging of the office of First Sea Lord and Chief of Staff, while the addition of a Deputy and Assistant who could each act with Board authority accelerated business and relieved the Chief of Staff of a mass of work. The Operations Division, hitherto troubled like Martha over many things, had not been able to think far enough ahead. In May a small planning section was instituted, charged with the study of policy and preparation of plans; and this was later in the year expanded into a separate Division. Younger officers were called to the Admiralty and more responsibility was given to them. Without this reorganization of the Staff, the measures that defeated the U-boat, even if conceived, could not have been executed. These measures took a threefold form: first, the preparation and launching of extensive mining plans; secondly, the further development of research and supply in the technical fields of mines, depth charges and hydrophones; and thirdly, the decisive step, the institution of a convoy system which involved the escort and control of all merchant shipping.

Admiralty Counter-measures.

I had instituted the convoy system for troopships crossing the oceans at the beginning of the war. Then the attack by faster German light cruisers was the danger. The guns of an obsolete battleship or heavy cruiser could certainly drive away any hostile raiders then loose upon the surface of the seas. We had also from the beginning used destroyer escorts to convoy troopships in and out through the submarine zone. In no case did any mishap occur. It did not how-

ever seem reasonable to expect similar results from the convoy system in the case of attack by submarines upon merchant ships. On the contrary it seemed obvious that hostile submarines would work more damage in the midst of a crowd of merchantmen than against isolated vessels; and it was further evident that the escorting warships would themselves be among the targets of the enemy torpedoes. The U-boat attacks on trade in 1915 and the early part of 1916 seemed to have been confined within tolerable limits by the numbers of merchant vessels at sea, by the variety of their routes and ports, by the uncertainty of their times of arrival, and above all by the size of the sea. The system of watching and patrolling in the greatest strength possible the confluences of trade had worked well against the German raiding cruisers, and for the first two years of the war the Admiralty relied upon it against the U-boats without serious misadventure.


COMPARISON BETWEEN NUMBERS OF GERMAN SUBMARINES DESTROYED BY DIFFERENT TYPES OF SHIPS.
AUXILIARY PATROL. (Trawlers, Drifters etc.) 37
DESTROYERS. 31
SUBMARINES. 17
"Q" SHIPS. 11
AIRCRAFT. 7
MERCHANT SHIPS. 5
CRUISERS. 3
BATTLESHIPS. 1
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL WEAPONS OF DESTRUCTION.
MINES. 42
DEPTH CHARGES. 31
GUNFIRE. 30
RAM. 19
TORPEDO. 17
BLOWN UP BY GERMANS. (To avoid capture) 14
WRECKS AND ACCIDENTS. 10
MINE NETS. 7
INTERNED. 7
SWEEPS ETC. 3
COMPARISON BETWEEN NUMBERS OF GERMAN SUBMARINES DESTROYED BY GREAT BRITAIN AND HER ALLIES.
TOTAL GERMAN SUBMARINE LOSSES 199
TOTAL DESTROYED BY THE BRITISH NAVY 175
(Including number blown up to avoid capture)
TOTAL DESTROYED BY THE FRENCH NAVY 3
" " " " U.S.A. " 2
" " " " RUSSIAN " 2
Data compiled From British and German sources

U-BOAT LOSSES.

Data compiled from British and German sources giving details of U-boat losses, and comparisons between the different weapons of destruction employed.

The Question of Convoy: Pros and Cons.

When under pressure of ever-increasing losses the remedy of convoys was again advocated by the younger officers of the Admiralty War Staff, it encountered opposition from practically every quarter. Every squadron and every naval base was clamant for destroyers, and convoy meant taking from them even those that they had. There would be delays due to assembling. There must be reduction of speed of the faster vessels and congestion of ships in port. The scale and difficulties of the task were exaggerated, and it was argued that the larger the number of ships in company, the greater the risk from submarines. This convincing logic could only be refuted by the proof of facts. In January, 1917, the official Admiralty opinion was expressed as follows:

"A system of several ships sailing in company as a convoy is not recommended in any area where submarine attack is a possibility. It is evident that

the larger the number of ships forming a convoy, the greater the chance of a submarine being able to attack successfully and the greater the difficulty of the escort in preventing such an attack."

The French and United States naval authorities were also opposed to the convoy system, and at a Conference held in February, 1917, representative Masters of merchant ships took the same view.

Now let us see what was overlooked in this high, keen and earnest consensus. The size of the sea is so vast that the difference between the size of a convoy and the size of a single ship shrinks in comparison almost to insignificance. There was in fact very nearly as good a chance of a convoy of forty ships in close order slipping unperceived between the patrolling U-boats as there was for a single ship; and each time this happened, forty ships escaped instead of one. Here then was the key to the success of the convoy system against U-boats. The concentration of ships greatly reduced the number of targets in a given area and thus made it more difficult for the submarines to locate their prey. Moreover, the convoys were easily controlled and could be quickly deflected by wireless from areas known to be dangerous at any given moment. Finally the destroyers, instead of being dissipated on patrol over wide areas, were concentrated at the point of the hostile attack, and opportunities of offensive action frequently arose. Thirteen U-boats were actually destroyed while endeavouring to molest convoys. This fear of instant retaliation from convoy escorts had a demoralizing effect upon the enemy, and consequently U-boat attacks were not always pressed home.

Most of this was still unproved in the early days of 1917. There stood only the fact that troopship convoys had always been escorted through the submarine zones during 1915 and 1916 and had enjoyed complete immunity from attack. The highest professional opinion remained opposed to convoy as a defence against U-boats, and personally I rested under that impression. I had no official position at that time, but I had confidential relations with Ministers and was informed both upon the discussion and the facts. I therefore wrote in March for the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Edward Carson, the following note. It was intended to offer an alternative means of gaining the advantages claimed by its advocates for the convoy system without running counter to the solid objections of the naval authorities. I print it because it throws a contemporary light upon the problem and because, although the method proposed was rejected in favour of a simpler and more practical plan, the reasonings are sound.

My March Memorandum.

March, 1917.

It is assumed for the purposes of this argument that the Germans use about fifty submarines at a time in three reliefs; that every submarine remains out about a month and takes (except in the case of the Zeebrugge boats) from two to three days to get to its beat.

The number of enemy submarines actually on the watch is not large enough to allow of any great concentration: they must be widely dispersed to cover the whole extended approaches to these islands. There cannot be any large number in any one station. The amount of damage which a submarine can do is limited by its store of torpedoes, and also by the hours of the day. Tackling even a single ship involves a considerable time. What a submarine wants in order to make its best bag is a steady trickle of shipping day after day more or less evenly dispersed along all the routes approaching these islands. It is arguable that *a greater concentration both of shipping and of the means of protection*, now here, now there, along particular routes and at particular times, would sensibly reduce the proportion of losses.

The measures suggested are as follows:—

Tell all ships which have wireless who are approaching our shores and expect to enter the area of submarine activity by nightfall—say Monday night—to steam

back on their course for thirty-six hours and then to resume their voyage. Tell all ships who would similarly arrive on Tuesday night to steam back on their course for twenty-four hours; and all ships that would similarly arrive on Wednesday night to steam back on their course for twelve hours—and then in all cases resume their voyage. The result of this would be to create four blank days and to quadruple the volume of shipping arriving in the danger zone on the fourth day. For three days therefore the German submarines would be useless and would find no prey. On the fourth day they would be confronted with a crowd of shipping out of which it is possible, owing to their limited numbers, that they could not take a proportionate toll.

It is clear that you could afford to lose four times as much shipping on the fourth day as on any one of the four days without being worse off. If the number of submarines remains few and constant —their activity being in many respects a limited factor—while the volume of traffic is quadrupled, there is a very fair prospect of the proportion of losses not increasing in anything like the same ratio as the proportion of shipping. One knows that if you want a big bag of pheasants you beat them out of the covers in twos and threes, whereas if it is intended to shoot the cover over again the whole lot should be driven out as quickly as possible in the largest numbers. If rabbits run across a ride past a limited number of guns, their best chance is to run unexpectedly and all at once. It is quite possible that these simple analogies have a wider application. . . .

There is no reason to believe that losses are proportionate to the volume of traffic; the variations from day to day effectively prove this. There is every reason to believe that losses are limited by increased protection. The ships fitted with wireless are the most important and the largest; they are the ones that raise the tonnage totals. The experiment applied to them alone, as it necessarily must be, would be well worth while attempting. But if it were successful, the universal adoption of wireless in our merchant service would follow as a matter of course. . . .

The intermittence and uncertainty which may be imparted to the movements of our shipping by the regulation of *time* can be supplemented by the variation of *routes*. After one accumulation of shipping has been released upon (say) the Bristol Channel, the next might be directed on Liverpool or the Clyde—all the available protection being meanwhile concentrated so far as possible upon the route about to be used.

Carson's Anxious Tenure.

It fell to Sir Edward Carson's lot during his tenure as First Lord to face the most anxious and trying period of the naval war. During those eight months the U-boat sinkings of merchantmen reached their terrible climax. It was under his administration that the peak was surmounted and most of the important decisions of principle were taken by which the peril was ultimately overcome. The trial of the convoy system was urged upon the naval authorities by the Cabinet, and in this the Prime Minister took a decisive part.

At the end of April, 1917, the Director of the Anti-Submarine Division definitely advocated the introduction of convoys, and the first one left Gibraltar on May 10. It was entirely successful, and regular convoys commenced from the United States on June 4. Instructions were issued on June 22 to extend the system to Canadian ports, and on July 31 similar orders were issued for the South Atlantic trade. The entry of the United States facilitated convoys by opening her harbours as ports of assembly and by the precious aid of a number of her destroyers for escort work. More than a quarter of the whole of the escorts across the Atlantic were provided by American destroyers, and the comradeship of this hard service forms an ineffaceable tradition for the two navies.

The convoy organization will for ever stand as a monument to the constancy and courage of the Royal Navy and Mercantile Marine. No credit is too high for the officers and men who without

Photo: Cribb.

H.M. KING ALBERT AND CAPTAIN CARPENTER, V.C.

This photograph, taken at Zeebrugge after its evacuation by the Germans, shows H.M. King Albert in conversation with Captain (now Rear-Admiral) A. F. B. Carpenter, V.C., who commanded the *Vindictive* in the epic raid on St. George's Day, 1918. Captain Carpenter was awarded the Victoria Cross for his leadership and the great gallantry displayed by him on that occasion.

previous training navigated these fleets of forty or fifty ships in close formation through all the winds that blew. No service ever carried out by the Navy was of greater value to the State than that of the escort vessels. Those who have served in small ships will realize the skill, faithfulness and hardihood required to carry out this duty day after day, month after month, in wild weather and wintry seas without breakdown or failure. The control and arrangements of the Admiralty and the Ministry of Shipping became more thorough and perfect with every week that passed.

Triumph of the Convoy System.

The convoy system was at first confined to homeward-bound vessels. The percentage of sinkings in the outward sailings at once began to rise. In August, 1917, convoy was extended to outward-bound vessels. A diagram reveals at a glance the triumph of convoy.[1] By the end of October, 1917, 99 homeward convoys, comprising over 1,500 steamers of a deadweight capacity of 10,656,000 tons, had been brought in with the loss of only 10 ships torpedoed while actually in convoy, and of 14 which had become separated.

While convoy was vastly improving the protection of trade, all methods of attacking the U-boats were progressively developed, and the rate of destruction steadily rose. In April, 1917, British submarine flotillas were based upon Scapa Flow, Lough Swilly on the north, and Killybegs on the west coast of Ireland, and began to lie in wait for U-boats passing north about to attack the great trade route. At the same time in the southern part of the North Sea the small British "C" Class submarines were released from harbour defence for the same duties. This method by which submarine vessels preyed on each other yielded substantial results. Seven U-boats were destroyed by it in 1917 and six in 1918. The threat of submarine attack also forced the U-boats to submerge much more frequently and for longer periods on their passage, with consequent delays in reaching their beats.

The mine, however, proved to be the most effective killing weapon. The Admiralty, before the war, had not expected the mine to play an important

[1] See Appendix for this and other graphs relating to U-boat war.

part. In a war on the surface of the sea the weaker navy would no doubt use such a weapon to hamper the movements of its superior antagonist: but for the stronger fleet, the fewer minefields the better. These conclusions, which at the time were not ill-founded, were upset by the changes for which the prolongation of the war gave time. At the outset the British mines were few and inefficient. It was even stated in a German Order that "British mines generally do not explode." This was an exaggeration: but we were certainly at fault in the matter.

The Dover Barrage.

At the end of April, 1916, an attempt was made by the Dover Force, under Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, to blockade the Flanders U-boats by a long and extensive barrage off the Belgian coast. This was completed on May 7. It consisted of 18 miles of moored mines and nets guarded from May to October by day patrols. U.B. 13 was destroyed by one of its mines the day after the barrage was laid, and an immediate diminution of U-boat activity in the North Sea and the Channel followed. This was not unnaturally attributed to the new barrage and gave the Dover Command an exaggerated idea of its value. We now know that it was to Admiral Scheer's impulsive recall of the High Sea Fleet U-boat flotillas, and not to the Dover barrage that the marked improvement of these months was due, for only one U-boat was destroyed by its mines; nor did it seriously impede their movements in and out.

Efforts to improve the quality of the British mines had been unceasing since the beginning of the war. It was not until the autumn of 1917 that the new "horned" mines became available in

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE GAP IN THE VIADUCT, ZEEBRUGGE.

The rôle allotted to Lieut. Sandford, Commander of the British submarine C 3, was the destruction of a portion of the viaduct leading to the Mole. This dangerous mission was carried out with complete success. The submarine, loaded with 7½ tons of amatol, rammed the viaduct and was shortly afterwards blown up, wrecking a section of the viaduct at the same time. The crew of the C 3 escaped in a collapsible boat, and were picked up by a naval steam launch.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

H.M.S. *VINDICTIVE* AT OSTEND.

The first attempt to block the Ostend entrance to the Bruges canal was launched simultaneously with the attack upon Zeebrugge. Owing to the shifting of a buoy which had been relied upon as a signpost, the blockships grounded three-quarters of a mile east of the entrance. A second attempt, made on the night of May 9–10, resulted in the old *Vindictive* making the canal entrance, where she was sunk. The casualties incurred in the Zeebrugge and Ostend operations were heavy, amounting in all to 637 officers and men, of which 197 were killed and 27 reported missing.

large quantities. The improvement of the new type upon the old cannot be better measured than by the fact that out of forty-one U-boats destroyed by mines only five were prior to September, 1917. No less than 15,700 mines were laid in the Heligoland Bight during 1917 and 21,000 more in 1918, mainly by the 20th Destroyer Flotilla working from the Humber.

This attempt to block in the U-boats developed into a protracted struggle between British mine-layers and German mine-sweepers. The enemy was forced to escort the U-boats both on their inward and outward journey with a whole array of mine-sweepers, of specially constructed ships with concrete-filled bows called "barrier-breakers," and torpedo boats. These escorts had to be protected, and from 1917 onwards the main occupation of the High Sea Fleet was the support of its sweeping forces working far afield on the submarine routes. As time went on the difficulties of egress and ingress increased. The "ways" or swept channels in the Bight were frequently closed, and in October, 1917, homeward-bound submarines began to be sent round by the Kattegat. Early in 1918 about 1,400 deep mines were laid in the Kattegat but could not be patrolled. The intensive mining of the Bight failed to achieve success because of the difficulties of attacking the German sweeping craft and the lack of destroyers for the patrol of the Kattegat. The effort however destroyed several U-boats, and increased their time on passage to and from the trade routes.

Admiral Keyes in Command.

During 1917 the failure of the 1916

Photo: Cribb.

INTREPID AND *IPHIGENIA.*

The two old cruisers which, filled with cement, were sunk in the Bruges canal during the Zeebrugge action. The two blockships, under cover of the general confusion, were manœuvred into suitable positions and sent to the bottom by their crews.

barrage across the Dover Straits had been total. From February to November U-boats continued to pass through it at the rate of about twenty-four a month. The Dover passage saved a small Flanders U-boat nearly eight days on its fourteen-days' cruise, and a larger boat from the Bight six days out of twenty-five. It was decided to make a fresh attempt with all the improved appliances now at hand.

On November 21 a new deep minefield was laid between the Varne and Gris Nez. When no fewer than twenty-one U-boats passed through this in the first fortnight, a sharp controversy arose at the Admiralty. Some authorities supported the contentions of the Dover Command that the barrage was largely successful and that additional patrolling was impracticable. Others held that an intensive patrol and the use of searchlights and flares at night to make the U-boats dive into the mines would achieve great results. About this time and partly in connection with this discussion, Sir John Jellicoe was replaced as First Sea Lord by Admiral Wemyss, and Admiral Bacon was succeeded in the Dover Command by Admiral Keyes.

Keyes revolutionized the situation. He redoubled the patrols, and by night the barrage from end to end became as bright as Piccadilly. The German destroyers from Ostend and Zeebrugge attempted to break down the patrols by sudden raids. They were repulsed in fierce night actions and the watch maintained with ever-increasing efficiency. Nine U-boats perished in the Dover area between January and May, 1918, and four more by September. As early as February the Bight boats ceased to use the Straits, and by April the Flanders boats had largely abandoned it. In September only two boats passed through, one of which was destroyed on its return.

The famous story of the blocking of Zeebrugge on St. George's Day by

Admiral Keyes and the Dover Force cannot be repeated here. It may well rank as the finest feat of arms in the Great War, and certainly as an episode unsurpassed in the history of the Royal Navy. The harbour was completely blocked for about three weeks and was dangerous to U-boats for a period of two months. Although the Germans by strenuous efforts partially cleared the entrance after some weeks for U-boats, no operations of any importance were ever again carried out by the Flanders destroyers. The results of Admiral Keyes' command at Dover reduced the Allied losses in the English Channel from about twenty to six a month, and the minefields laid by the Flanders boats fell from thirty-three a month in 1917 to six a month in 1918. These results, which constitute a recognizable part of the general victory, were achieved notwithstanding the fact that the numbers of U-boats in commission were maintained by new building at about two hundred.

The Giant Anglo-American Barrage.

The attempts to mine in the Heligoland Bight had been frustrated by the German sweeping operations, closely supported by the High Sea Fleet. It was thought that a more distant barrage, under the direct watch and ward of the Grand Fleet, might succeed. In 1918 an ambitious scheme for establishing a line of guarded minefields across the 180 miles of water between Norway and the Orkney Islands was developed by the British and American Navies. Enormous quantities of materials, regardless of cost or diversion of effort, were employed upon this supreme manifestation of defensive warfare. The large centre section was laid entirely by Americans, the Orkney section by the British, and the Norway section by the two Navies in combination.

The Americans used a special type of mine with antennæ that exploded the charge on coming into contact with the metal hull. They laid no less than 57,000 mines, a large number of which exploded prematurely shortly after being laid. The British contribution was about 13,000 mines, but some of these were not laid deep enough for surface craft to pass over and had in consequence to be swept up. The efficiency of this enormous material effort cannot be judged, for the minefield was barely completed when the Armistice was signed. It is known however that two U-boats were damaged on the centre section, and four may possibly have been destroyed on the Orkney section.

The ever-increasing efficiency of the Anti-Submarine Organization during 1918 also mastered the mine-laying tactics of the U-boats. Closer co-operation between the British Intelligence and Mine Sweeping Divisions, the rapid distribution of news, the firmer control of shipping and the use of the "Otter"[1] all played their part. One hundred and twenty-three British merchant ships had been sunk by German mines in 1917. In 1918 this number was reduced to 10.

All other anti-submarine devices were developed with ceaseless ingenuity. Aircraft, hydrophones and special types of mines levied an increasing toll upon the U-boats. During 1918 high hopes were based on systematic hunting tactics, and trawler flotillas equipped with ingenious listening devices were assembled in the northern area for this purpose. Several contacts were made, but the U-boats escaped by going dead slow so that their movements could not be detected by the instruments; and we could not provide enough destroyers over such wide areas to exhaust their accumulators.

The Hunters Hunted.

The final phase of the U-boat war saw the rôles of the combatants reversed. It was the U-boat and not the merchant ship that was hunted. The experiences of U.B. 110 on her first cruise may serve as an example. She sailed from Zeebrugge on July 5, 1918. Even before she had joined the Flanders Flotilla she had been attacked by two aeroplanes. Every day from July 7 onwards her log records the dropping of depth charges around her in ever-increasing numbers

[1] A species of submerged wire cutter towed on both bows for cutting the mooring ropes of mines.

Photo: Cribb.

THE RAISING OF H.M.S. *IPHIGENIA*.

H.M.S. *Iphigenia*, one of the two blockships sunk in the fairway of the Bruges canal during the naval operations at Zeebrugge. A third blockship, *Thetis*, came in contact with an obstruction at the entrance and had to be sunk at that point. *Iphigenia* was later, as shown here, refloated by the salvage staff.

Photo: Cribb.

AFTER ZEEBRUGGE.

A photograph showing some of the damage inflicted upon H.M.S. *Vindictive* in the course of her brilliant exploit alongside the Zeebrugge Mole. The old ship was raked by shell fire, and her upper works converted into little more than a mass of twisted steel.

until the 18th, when twenty-six exploded close at hand. She was only able to fire two torpedoes during the cruise, The first one damaged an oil ship, but she could not see the result of the second owing to an immediate and violent counter-attack by destroyers. On the 19th, when attempting to attack a convoy, her diving rudders were damaged by a depth charge dropped from a motor launch; and while endeavouring to submerge she was rammed and sunk by a destroyer.

In these latter days a Flanders U-boat could hope for only six voyages before meeting its dark doom. The unceasing presentiment of a sudden and frightful death beyond human sight or succour, the shuddering concussions of the depth charges, the continual attacks of escort vessels, the fear of annihilation at any moment from mines, the repeated hair-breadth escapes, produced a state of nervous tension in the U-boat crews. Their original high morale declined rapidly during 1918 under an intolerable strain. The surrender of more than one undamaged submarine and numerous cases of boats putting back for small repairs a few days after leaving harbour showed that even in this valiant age the limits of human endurance had been reached.

Total Defeat of the U-Boat—The Price.

The various stages of the U-boat war and its strange conditions have now been examined. No sooner had the German war leaders taken their irrevocable decision to begin the unlimited attack on commerce than the Russian Revolution, by rendering their situation less desperate, removed the principal impulsion. No sooner had the unlimited U-boat warfare forced the United States into the field against Germany than the effectiveness of the U-boats began to decline. The month that saw President Wilson jingling among his cavalrymen to the Senate to cast the life energy of a nation of a hundred and twenty millions into the adverse scales marked also the zenith of the U-boat attack.

Never again did Germany equal the April sinkings. Many months of grievous losses and haunting anxiety lay before the Islanders and their Allies, and immense diversions—some needless—of straitened resources hampered their military effort. But with every month the sense of increasing mastery grew stronger. At one time the plotted curves of sinkings and replacements which our graphs revealed seemed a veritable "writing on the wall." But the awful characters faded steadily. The autumn of 1917, which was to have seen the fulfilment of German dreams, came, passed, and left us safer. By the end of the year it was certain we should not succumb. It was certain moreover that the war could be carried on until the power of the United States could if necessary be fully exerted on the battlefields of Europe. By the middle of 1918 the submarine campaign had been definitely defeated; and though new U-boats replaced those destroyed, every month added to their perils, to the restriction of their depredations and to the demoralization of their crews. The weapon purchased so dearly by the German war leaders had first been blunted and then broken in their hands. It remained for them only to pay the price, and meet the fury of the world in arms. But from this they did not shrink.

CHAPTER LXX

THE GERMAN CONCENTRATION IN THE WEST

The Man-Power Crisis—The Gathering Storm—Cabinet and G.H.Q.—My Memorandum of December 8—Man-Power and Strategy—Proposals for Increasing the Supply—Further Resources—General Summary of British Resources—My Speech at Bedford—The Policy of the War Cabinet—Extension of the British Front—The General Allied Reserve—The Versailles Committee—Sir William Robertson Dismissed—A Visit to the Canadians—The New Defensive Tactics—Sir Henry Wilson—His Qualities and Services—A Favourable Atmosphere—My Survey of March 5—How to Obtain a Decision—Means of Continuous Forward Progression—The Four New Arms—A Different Distribution—Mechanical Developments—The Mechanical Battle—The Reduced Scale and Intensity of the War—The Agonizing Deadlock—The 300-Kilometre Battle.

AN acute crisis in man-power followed the prodigal campaign of 1917, and a prolonged and searching examination of our remaining resources was made by the War Cabinet.

The Man-Power Crisis.

The British Infantry, on whom the brunt of the slaughter had fallen, were woefully depleted. The battalions were far below their proper strength, and even so, largely composed of new drafts. The losses of the artillery both in men and guns destroyed were also most severe. The loss in officers was out of all proportion even to the great losses of the rank and file. The task had throughout demanded an unprecedented degree of sacrifice from regimental officers. More than five thousand had been killed outright and over fifteen thousand had been wounded in the Paschendaele offensive. This loss was especially difficult to replace; could never in fact be fully replaced.

We had every reason to expect that the main fighting of 1918 in France would fall upon Great Britain. The French, who had begun with the unequalled slaughter of 1914 and had ever since been engaged on a scale of nearly one hundred and twenty divisions, must necessarily and naturally be expected to reserve their remaining strength—grand it proved to be—for supreme emergencies. It was now certain that the United States, in spite of their utmost efforts and passionate desire to share the suffering, could not play more than a minor part in the actual battles. Only eight or nine American divisions were in fact due to enter the line before the summer was far spent. Substantial help had been sent perforce from the Western Front to Italy, and none could be expected in return. We had also almost the whole burden of the war against Turkey on our hands; and Allenby, so far from being able to release divisions, was continually pressing not only for drafts but for reinforcements. Additional forces, both British and Indian, were required for the Army in Mesopotamia; and finally the Salonica Front, on which we bore our share, was a constant drain. It was in these grave circumstances that we had to anticipate a German onslaught far exceeding in power and fury anything that had yet been experienced.

The Gathering Storm.

The final collapse of Russia had liberated enormous masses of German and Austrian troops. During the whole of the winter the movement of divisions and guns from the Eastern to the Western Front, and to a lesser extent against Italy, was unceasing. How great this movement actually was we

could not measure exactly, but the Intelligence reports with which I endeavoured to saturate myself, revealed week after week an unending flow of men and material to the west. Surveying the forces on both sides in the main theatre, it could not be doubted that by the spring Germany would have for the first time in the war, not even excepting the original invasion, a large numerical preponderance on the Western Front. Moreover, the divisions coming from Russia would, by the opening of the new campaign, have had nearly a year without serious fighting in which to recuperate and train. All our fighting units, on the other hand, had been decimated fivefold in the last six months of 1917. Finally, in addition to the masses of German and Austrian artillery released from the Russian Front, the enemy had captured at least four thousand guns from Russia and two thousand from Italy, together with immense supplies of war material of all kinds.

Cabinet and G.H.Q.

Sir Douglas Haig vehemently and naturally called for all the officers and men required to bring his divisions up to full strength at the earliest possible moment. Robertson supported him, and was evidently seriously alarmed. From my central position between the Army and the War Cabinet, with, I believe, the whole information available in my possession and with constant intimate access to the Prime Minister, I never ceased to press for the immediate reinforcement of Sir Douglas Haig. Mr. Lloyd George viewed with horror the task imposed on him of driving to the shambles by stern laws the remaining manhood of the nation. Lads of eighteen and nineteen, elderly men up to forty-five, the last surviving brother, the only son of his mother (and she a widow), the father the sole support of the family, the weak, the consumptive, the thrice wounded—all must now prepare themselves for the scythe. To meet the German onslaught when it came —if it came—everything must be thrown in: but the Prime Minister feared lest our last resources should be expended in another Paschendaele.

It was in December that the shadow fell darkly upon the military mind. Up till then the Cabinet had been assured that all was going well in the west, and that—granted the drafts—the New Year could be faced with confidence. At the Ministry of Munitions we had long been instructed to prepare for a renewed thirty weeks' offensive beginning in the earliest spring. With the end of Paschendaele came the end of illusions. A sudden sinister impression was sustained by the General Staff. The cry for a fresh offensive died away. The mood swung round to pure defence—and against heavy odds. It was a revolution at once silent and complete. I responded to it with instant relief. The War Cabinet however continued for some time to rest themselves upon the confident declarations of the Generals made in September in advocacy of perseverance at Paschendaele. They did not readily conform to the military *volte-face* and were sceptical of tales so utterly at variance with those of a few weeks before.

I urged that the Cabinet should send all the men that were needed to reconstitute the Army, and should at the same time forbid absolutely any resumption of the offensive. The Prime Minister however did not feel that, if the troops were once in France, he would be strong enough to resist those military pressures for an offensive which had so often overborne the wiser judgment of statesmen. He therefore held, with all his potent influence, to a different policy. He sanctioned only a moderate reinforcement of the Army, while at the same time gathering in England the largest possible numbers of reserves. In this way he believed he would be able alike to prevent a British offensive and to feed the armies during the whole course of the fearful year which was approaching. This was in fact achieved. But I held, and hold still, that the War Cabinet should have been resolute, as I believe it would have been found strong enough, at once to support and to restrain the High Command in France. I set forth

From the painting by G. H. Davis.

PUTTING OUT HIS EYES.

The work of the Royal Flying Corps, the title prior to 1918 of the British Air Service, was worthy of the highest praise. The quality of the machines available fell far short of the standard in use to-day, and time for the training of pilots was necessarily short. Notwithstanding this, by the year 1918 the R.F.C. had established a definite superiority over the enemy. In the above picture of an aerial battle in France four British machines are attacking a German two-seater. Three are engaging its attention from above, whilst a fourth is approaching it from underneath.

Photo : Imperial War Museum.

HANDLEY-PAGE BOMBER.

The Handley-Page was the first type of aeroplane built to carry a heavy load of passengers or bombs. The above machine belonged to No. 14 Squadron, and it is shown undergoing final tests by the pilot and observer before taking off from the Dunkirk aerodrome. The photograph was obtained on June 1, 1918, by which time the Handley-Page machines had reached a high standard of efficiency.

in the following secret Memorandum my views in detail.

My Memorandum of December 8.

MAN-POWER AND THE SITUATION.

To the War Cabinet.

December 8, 1917.

1. IT is not possible to settle the question of man-power without a clear idea of the plan of campaign. The Ministry of National Service is naturally bound to tabulate the demands of the various Departments, set their existing resources against them, and show the resulting deficit. But these demands are a mere aggregate of separate and independent departmental requirements and not, as they should be, the expression of a general scheme of war. If a plan of campaign suited to the actual facts of next year, as far as we can foresee them, were made out, it seems certain to me that the total demand could be substantially reduced.

Man-Power and Strategy.

2. For instance, the calculations of military requirements have been based upon a continuance of the kind of offensive action which we have pursued during the last two years, whereas the balance of forces next year will clearly not permit a continuance of that policy on the same scale nor to the same degree. It is vital to us to have in the field at the opening of the spring campaign a British army stronger and better equipped than we have ever had before, because the burden thrown upon it is going to be greater than before. On the other hand, this army, once raised and restored to its full efficiency and strength, must be husbanded and not consumed. It must be an army crouched and not sprawled; an army with a large proportion of divisions in reserve at full strength, resting and training; an army sustained by every form of mechanical equipment, including, especially, tanks and aeroplanes, and possessing the greatest possible lateral mobility. What is required therefore is an immediate large draft of men to raise the army to its fullest strength and to give it the greatest possible springing power and striking power. At the same time this power, when gained, must be

scrupulously and jealously guarded, and even hoarded, and not reduced or impaired except to meet vital emergencies.

These two aspects must be kept simultaneously in mind—

(*a*) An immediate raising of the army to the highest possible strength; and
(*b*) Its jealous conservation when raised.

Our rôle and only chance of escaping defeat is to bridge the long intervening months before the Americans can become a decisive factor; and as we cannot tell what emergencies we may have to meet in the meanwhile, we must not only mobilize our greatest possible strength, but keep it in hand to guard against unforeseeable contingencies.

3. To say that we should raise our army to the highest possible offensive power by no means implies that it should be immediately launched upon a general offensive. To say, on the other hand, that the general rôle of the British armies will be "an active defensive" by no means precludes the striking of sudden heavy blows on our own initiative, nor the power of vehement counter-attack. There is therefore great scope for generalship in a campaign of this character, and a possibility of a certain number of brilliant military episodes of first-rate importance.

The dominant principle, however, from which there must be no swerving, is that we shall be a holding force, endeavouring to maintain, with the least possible loss, a situation which cannot be improved decisively except by the arrival of a great American army. . . .

5. A Commander-in-Chief in the field is entitled to know from his Government—

(*a*) What his general rôle is to be.
(*b*) What are to be his monthly incomes of men and shell tonnage.
(*c*) What condition the army is to be left in at the end of the campaign in point of numbers and efficiency.

Within these limits, his discretion should be unfettered.

6. The Ministry of National Service assumes that the demand of the navy for 90,000 additional men should have priority above army needs, and he makes apparently no provision for combing or

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

NOSE OF A HANDLEY-PAGE BOMBER.

This photograph, taken in France on September 25, 1918, of an observer and pilot in the nose of a Handley-Page Bomber, conveys a clear impression of the armament under the control of the observer. In the observer's cock-pit is the Lewis gun on a Scarff ring, and extending from the nose, on a bracket, is the bomb-sight.

dilution, either in the navy or in its civil establishments. Again, it is to be observed that the naval demands for men cannot be considered except in reference to the general plan of war. If the navy had plans for offensive or amphibious action which might be expected to cause the enemy to withdraw large numbers of men from the existing battle fronts, justification for a substantial increase in the man-power at their disposal would be provided. But, if, as may well be, it is considered that there are no prudent and practicable means of using the navy in this manner, then it is difficult to see what good reasons there can be to increase the number of men at the disposal of the Admiralty. We are far stronger in proportion to the German fleet than we were at the beginning of the war, when they did not venture to attack us. We are probably employing, apart from shipbuilding, three or four times as many men for naval purposes as they are, and in addition to this, besides the navies of the European Allies, there is the American fleet—the third strongest in the world.

There are many more detailed aspects of the use of naval personnel which demand instructed and critical examination. In a crisis like this every man counts, and no department or branch of our fighting forces has a right to special privileges.

The construction of warships other than for anti-submarine warfare also makes a heavy demand on labour and valuable materials.

Proposals for Increasing the Supply.

7. There are at present employed on shipbuilding and munitions work over 3,000,000 men and women. A plan can be submitted for providing from this total 100,000 category A men for the army. The plan would include the "clean cut" for category A men below the age of 24, who are estimated at about 55,000, in munitions and shipbuilding. The loss on shipbuilding and marine engineering would have to be made good by transferring older men from other munitions work. This would be practicable. . .

9. The next great resource of man-power which should now be drawn upon is the army at home. This at present comprises upwards of 1,400,000 men who are explained or excused in various ways. In order that this resource shall be rendered effective for the armies on the Western front, we must face the institution of defensive battalions for holding quiet and non-significant sectors of the line. The actual military arrangements obviously require careful but not necessarily prolonged study. 150 battalions of 1,000 men each should certainly be obtained from this source and woven into our scheme for maintaining the Western front and the efficiency of our armies next year.

Further Resources.

10. I have already drawn attention to the extraordinary increase in the standards of home defence against invasion which has taken place since the early periods of the war. The continental military crisis now is as intense as it was in the days of the Marne and the Yser. There is no reason to assume that invasion is less impossible now than it was then. There are in fact a wealth of reasons to the contrary which could easily be stated if desired. It is a fair proposition that, apart from any men taken in the shape of garrison battalions from the troops at home not included in the home defence forces, there should also be at least 50,000 men taken, say, in brigades from the existing home defence forces, and used for holding quiet sectors of the front in France.

The garrison of Ireland requires to be reconsidered from the point of view of the actual work it might have to do; that is to say, not the conduct of military operations in the ordinary sense but the suppression of sporadic disorders and local rebellions. Armoured motor-cars, machine-gun cyclists, the older pattern of aeroplanes, and a few tanks for street fighting seem to be features which require special development. It is for consideration whether 10,000 serviceable men could not be found from this source for service in ordinary or in garrison battalions abroad.

The total available from the military forces in Great Britain and Ireland should not be estimated at less than 210,000 men.

11. Mechanical engines afford an important means of multiplying man-power. The tanks have proved themselves in appropriate circumstances not only to be a substitute for bombardment but an indispensable adjunct to infantry. In the attack in Flanders we gained 54 square miles with an expenditure of 465,000 tons of ammunition costing 84,000,000*l.*, and probably over 300,000 casualties. The offensive at Cambrai, depending as it did entirely upon the surprise use of tanks on a large scale, gained 42 square miles with an expenditure of 36,000 tons of shell, costing 6,600,000*l.* and with a loss of life which, had the operation been confined to its early and fruitful stage, would have not exceeded 10,000 casualties.[1]

There is much to be said in modification of crude figures and comparisons of this kind. But when everything has been said the conclusion presented is overwhelming.

Powerful as the tanks have proved themselves in surprise offensives on suitable ground, they are still more valuable in counter-attack. In this case they would be moving over ground with which they were familiar, and against an enemy necessarily unprepared with any special arrangements to receive them. They are immune from panic, and in their advance must carry forward with them the infantry counter-attack. It would be lamentable if, for want of men at this stage of the war, and with its lessons so cruelly written, we should not be allowed to develop these weapons to our highest manufacturing capacity. Are we really to keep in being, at a time when every man is precious, when every ton of stores counts, 30,000 or 40,000 cavalry with their horses, when these admirable cavalrymen would supply the personnel for the greatest development of mechanical warfare both for offence and defence in tanks, in armoured cars, and on motor-cycles that has ever yet been conceived? . . .

[1] It was actually much less

General Summary of British Resources.

12. To sum up, the following proposals are put forward as a basis for examination. Sir Auckland Geddes' figures show that without recourse to fresh legislation there is a deficit on existing naval and military demands of approximately 645,000 men. It is suggested that this should be met as follows :—

(a) Reduction of monthly wastage through the adoption of an active defensive in the place of the continuous offensive of this year. Six months at 30,000 a month instead of 50,000 . . .	120,000
(*b*) The Navy "living on its own" and through American resources. Reduced demand . . .	90,000
(*c*) Munitions and shipbuilding (no diminution in total shipbuilding)	100,000
(*d*) Garrison battalions of soldiers serving at home . . .	150,000
(e) Garrison or sedentary brigades or divisions from home defence and Ireland	60,000
(*f*) Coal mines, agriculture, railways, balance of men as proposed by Sir Auckland Geddes . .	80,000
Total . . .	600,000

13. It is worth while considering other resources of man-power to which we should look; not merely as alternatives but as supplements and additions, viz. :—

(*a*) Raising the age to 50, as has long been done in Germany, Austria, and France (apart from larger numbers available for defensive units	110,000
(*b*) Extending compulsion to Ireland .	200,000
(*c*) American troops training, first in platoons, then in companies, and next in battalions, with the British army (200 battalions) -	200,000
(*d*) Developments of mechanical warfare and lateral mobility multiply men but cannot be numerically appraised.	

14. It is clear that with these extensive and varied resources at our disposal, we have the means of meeting the prime need of the situation, viz.: to meet the Spring campaign with the British army stronger in every respect than any we have previously put in the field; all its units full; a large proportion of divisions resting and training. thus giving us a strategic reserve, in the

Prime Minister's phrase "an Army of Manœuvre"; an unprecedented development of mechanical and aeronautical warfare; and very large labour forces for defensive works, communications, and services behind the line. This can certainly be done if action is taken now in the same spirit as it would be undoubtedly taken and has in most cases been already taken by the enemy with whom we are fighting. Moreover, it can be done without interfering in any serious degree with our war against the submarines, with our defence against invasion, or with our production of munitions.

Nearly all these specific measures, which were at this time contrary to the views of the War Cabinet, were taken or resolved on after the catastrophe of March 21. Taken in January, they would have prevented it.

I also made, under all proper guard, a speech at Bedford on December 11 in the same sense.

My Speech at Bedford.

"Two months ago I stated in London that the war was entering upon its sternest phase, but I must admit that the situation at this moment is more serious than it was reasonable two months ago to expect. The country is in danger as it has not been since the battle of the Marne saved Paris, and the battles of Ypres and of the Yser saved the Channel ports. The cause of the Allies is now in danger. The future of the British Empire, and of democracy, and of civilization hang, and will continue to hang for a considerable period in a balance and an anxious suspense. It is impossible, even if it were desirable, to conceal these facts from our enemies. It would be folly not to face them boldly ourselves. . . .

"Anyone can see for himself

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

RICHTHOFEN'S ROOM.

Baron von Richthofen, the famous German war ace, was credited with eighty victories in aerial combat. Above is a corner of his apartment, the walls of which are decorated with relics of his combats, such as number plates and other articles taken from enemy aeroplanes.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

BARON VON RICHTHOFEN.

A pilot of Baron von Richthofen's circus is seen here shortly before taking off. In conversation with him is General von Hoeppner, commanding the German Air Force. Immediately behind the General is von Richthofen himself. A magnificent airman and a chivalrous foe, von Richthofen was shot down behind the British lines on the Somme on April 21, 1918. He was buried with full military honours. In his Memoirs he stated that the British airman, Captain Ball, V.C., was his most dangerous adversary.

what has happened in Russia. Russia has been thoroughly beaten by the Germans. Her great heart has been broken, not only by German might, but by German intrigue; not only by German steel, but by German gold. Russia has fallen on the ground prostrate in exhaustion and in agony. No one can tell what fearful vicissitudes will come to Russia, or how or when she will arise, but arise she will. It is this melancholy event which has prolonged the war, that has robbed the French, the British and the Italian armies of the prize that was perhaps almost within their reach this summer; it is this event, and this event alone, that has exposed us to perils and sorrows and sufferings which we have not deserved, which we cannot avoid, but under which we shall not bend.

"There never was a moment in this war when the practical steps which we ought to take showed themselves more plainly, or when the choice presented to us was so brutally clear as it is to-night, or when there was less excuse for patriotic men to make the mistake of being misled by sophistries and dangerous counsels. . . .

"What is the one great practical step we must take without a day's delay? We must raise the strength of our army to its highest point. A heavier strain will be thrown upon this army than it has ever had to bear before. We must see that it is stronger than it has ever been before. Do not put too heavy a burden on those heroic men by whose valiant efforts we exist from day to day. Husband their lives, conserve and accumulate their force. Every division of our army must be raised to full strength; every service—the most scientific, the most complex—must be thoroughly provided; we must make sure that in the months to come a large proportion of our army is resting, refreshing and training behind the front

From the painting by E. Newling.

CAPTAIN ALBERT BALL.

A native of Nottingham, Albert Ball was eighteen years of age at the outbreak of war in 1914. He enlisted in a Territorial battalion of the Sherwood Foresters, and shortly after taking a commission in October, 1914, was transferred to the Royal Flying Corps. Ball became one of the most intrepid of British aces, accounting in all for thirty-eight hostile machines. He was decorated with the V.C., the D.S.O., and the M.C. He was killed on May 7, 1917.

line ready to spring like leopards upon the German hordes. Masses of guns, mountains of shells, clouds of aeroplanes—all must be ready, all must be there; we have only to act together, and we have only to act at once."

The Policy of the War Cabinet.

These official or public arguments were reinforced by the strongest personal appeals. Nothing however had the slightest effect. The Prime Minister and his colleagues in the War Cabinet were adamant. Their policy was not decided without full deliberation. They were definitely opposed to any renewal of the British offensive in France. They wished the British and French armies to observe during 1918 a holding and defensive attitude. They wished to keep a tight control over their remaining manpower until the arrival of the American millions offered the prospect of decisive success. In the meantime action in Palestine, with forces almost inappreciable in the scale of the Western Front, might drive Turkey out of the war, and cheer the public mind during a long and grievous vigil. They were fully informed of the growing German concentration against Haig, and repeatedly discussed it. But they believed that the Germans if they attacked would encounter the same difficulties as had so long baffled us, and that our armies were amply strong enough for defence. Haig was accordingly left to face the spring with an army whose 56 infantry divisions were reduced from a thirteen to a ten-battalion basis,[1] and with three instead of five cavalry divisions,[2] which in the absence of alternative methods were at last to render valuable service.

Extension of the British Front.

But this was not the end of his trials. The French, also living in a world of illusions, now came forward with a vehement demand that the British should take over a larger part of the front. A cursory glance at a map shows that the French with 100 divisions comprising 700,000 rifles held 480 kilometres of front, whereas 56 British divisions comprising 504,000 rifles only held 200 kilometres. In other words, the British with more than two-thirds of the French rifle strength held less than one-third of the front. But this was a very superficial test. Large

[1] Or from twelve to nine, if the Pioneer Battalion is excluded.

[2] Two Indian cavalry divisions were sent from France to Palestine.

portions of the French front were in continual quiescence, and the weak railway communications opposite them excluded the possibility of a serious hostile offensive.

The British, on the other hand, held nearly all the most active front, and had opposite to them, even in January, a larger proportion of German divisions than were marshalled against the French Army. Against the long French front were arrayed 79 German divisions, while no fewer than 69 stood before the short British sector. Moreover, the German concentration against the British front was growing week by week, and it was already extremely probable that the first and main thrust would be delivered upon them. Further, the French had not fought a heavy battle since April and May, 1917, while the British had maintained an almost continuous offensive, suffering, as we have seen, calamitous losses. Finally, the French soldier enjoyed nearly three times as much leave to visit his home as his British comrade; that is to say, there were in proportion three times as many French rifles absent from the line at any given moment as there were British.

From the painting by Sir William Orpen, R.A.

MAJOR J. B. McCUDDEN.

Another great pilot was James Byford McCudden. He went to the front in the early days of the war as a mechanic attached to the Royal Flying Corps. Whilst still an N.C.O. McCudden received the Military Medal for destroying an enemy machine and driving down two others. During the next twenty-two months McCudden accounted for some fifty enemy aircraft and, like Captain Ball, received the V.C., the D.S.O., the M.C., and other decorations. He was accidentally killed on July 8, 1918, when flying to France.

Under pressure both from the French and the British Governments, Haig had agreed in December to extend his front by fourteen miles as far south as Barisis; and this relief was effected in February. A further demand by the French that the British front should be extended to Berry-au-Bac, thirty miles farther south-east, though backed with the threatened resignation of Monsieur Clémenceau, was successfully resisted under a similar threat by the British Commander-in-Chief.

The continued friction and want of confidence between Sir William Robertson and Mr. Lloyd George came to a head at the beginning of February. The Prime Minister was moving cautiously but tirelessly towards the conception of a unified command. He did not yet feel strong enough to disclose his purpose. A proposal which obviously involved placing the British armies under a French Commander was one which he judged as yet beyond his strength to carry. It was a hazardous issue on which to challenge the joint resignations both of Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig. It is probable that the War Cabinet would not have been united in its support; and that the Liberal opposition would have been unanimous against it. The Prime Minister had therefore so far suspended his

wishes that speaking of an independent generalissimo he told the House of Commons in November: "I am utterly opposed to that suggestion. It would not work. It would produce real friction, and might produce not merely friction between the armies, but friction between the nations and the Governments."

The General Allied Reserve.

Nevertheless, Mr. Lloyd George continued by a series of extremely laborious and mystifying manœuvres to move steadily forward towards his solution. On January 30, at the meeting of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, he secured a decision to create a general reserve of thirty divisions and to entrust it to a Committee representing Britain, Italy, the United States and France, with General Foch at its head. This proposal constitutes his answer and that of the War Cabinet to the charge of imprudently lowering the strength of the British Army in France in the face of the growing German concentration. There is no doubt that had this plan been put immediately into execution, and had Foch been armed with thirty divisions specifically assigned to the support of whatever part of the front was attacked, larger resources would have been secured to Haig in his approaching hour of supreme need. Haig did not however welcome the proposal. He declared that he had no divisions to spare for the general reserve, and that there were not even enough for the various army fronts. In such circumstances the earmarking of particular British divisions for service elsewhere could have been little more than a formality. None could have been taken from him unless the attack fell elsewhere.

Photo: Newspaper Illustrations.

OBSERVATION KITE-BALLOON.

The eyes of the heavy artillery, the function of the observer in the car of a kite-balloon is to "spot" for the gunners, give the ranges and check the results of the fire. He is in telephonic communication with the battery-commander. Kite-balloons could be seen at many points along the Western Front anchored to the ground by a mooring-cable. Aeroplanes were generally kept available, as in the event of hostile machines approaching the observer was helpless and had no alternative but to trust to his parachute and jump.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

FIGHTER OF THE 52ND SQUADRON, R.F.C.

An R.E. 8 about to start out from Bray-Dunes on August 6, 1917. Bray-Dunes was an air station established on the French coast as a base for planes employed on the duty of intercepting enemy raiders proceeding to or returning from England.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

CRASH OF A SOPWITH "CAMEL."

This photograph, taken at Clapham Junction, in front of Zillebeke, on September 26, 1917, shows a British 'plane with its nose buried in the ground after having been forced down. Incidents of this kind were an everday occurrence on the Western Front. The exceptional risks airmen must take in war explain the very severe training imposed upon the Royal Air Force pilots in times of peace.

The decision, like many others of the Supreme War Council, remained a dead letter; and events moved forward without the British Army receiving either the reinforcements for which Haig had pleaded or the reserves which Lloyd George had laboured to supply.

**The Versailles Committee—
Sir William Robertson Dismissed.**

Although the thirty divisions were lacking, the Executive Committee to control them at Versailles was created. Sir William Robertson claimed that he, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, should alone represent Great Britain upon it. This raised an issue upon which the Prime Minister felt himself strong enough to engage. He declared it a matter of fundamental principle that the two posts could not be held by one man. It was his undoubted intention to arm the Cabinet with an alternative set of military advisers whose opinions could be used to curb and correct the Robertson-Haig view, and so prevent a repetition of offensives like Paschendaele. No doubt he would also have used the new body to promote schemes of war outside the Western Front. The arrangement was indefensible in principle, but in the aftermath of Paschendaele its objects were worthy.

Into the complications of the dispute and its manœuvres it is not necessary to enter here. On February 11, Robertson, returning to London, which he had somewhat imprudently quitted for a few days, was confronted by the Secretary of State for War with a note signed on February 9 by the Prime Minister. This reduced the functions of the C.I.G.S. to the limits which had existed before the Kitchener breakdown, and it prescribed the independent functions of the British Military Representative on the Versailles Committee. Thirdly, it nominated Sir William Robertson Military Representative, and Sir Henry Wilson Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Robertson, astonished at his supersession, declined the appointment to Versailles on the ground that the arrangement was unsound. The post of C.I.G.S., although originally designed for Wilson, was then incontinently offered to Sir Herbert Plumer, who with equal promptitude refused it. Finally, it was offered again to Robertson on the reduced basis of the Prime Minister's Note. On February 16 Robertson recorded his refusal to agree to the conditions prescribed, and that same evening the Official Press Bureau announced that the Government had "accepted his resignation." He had in fact been dismissed. Lord Derby, who did his best to compose the differences, also proffered his resignation, which was not accepted.

The principles of military duty on which Sir Douglas Haig invariably proceeded prevented him, even at this time of tension with the Government, from adding his own resignation to the dismissal of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. On questions which in his view involved the safety of the British armies under his command, Sir Douglas Haig—right or wrong—was, whenever necessary, ready to resign. But these constituted the sole exceptions which he allowed himself to make in his obedience. Had any motive of personal intrigue been present in his mind, the crisis between the High Command and the Civil Power would have been gravely aggravated. The position of the Government at this time was strong and the issue one on which they could rely on public support. The Prime Minister did not flinch. Nevertheless Haig's retention, without comment, of his post was received with relief by the anxious War Cabinet; and Sir Henry Wilson was speedily appointed to the vacant chair in Whitehall.

It would certainly not be just to assume in these transactions that any of the parties were influenced otherwise than by public duty. But beneath the bald record of events the clash is plain. Both the Prime Minister and Sir William Robertson were in deadly earnest, both measured forces, and both knew the risks they ran. It was impossible for the two men to work together any longer. The situation at the centre of power had become intolerable. Action

was long overdue. It was a pity it could not have taken a simpler form.

Sir William Robertson was an outstanding military personality. His vision as a strategist was not profound, but his outlook was clear, well-drilled and practical. During his tenure he had reintroduced orderly methods of dealing with War Office problems, and had revivified the General Staff system. He had no ideas of his own, but a sensible judgment negative in bias. He represented professional formalism expressed in the plainest terms. He held a conception of war policy wholly opposed to the views set out in this narrative but honestly and consistently maintained. I was glad, as Secretary of State for War, when after the victory he eventually retired from the Army, to submit a recommendation to the King which enabled his long and honourable career from the rank of a private soldier to end with the baton of a Field-Marshal.

A Visit to the Canadians.

In the stresses of this internal disturbance I took no part. I was on the front during the whole week busily occupied, and it was only on my return that I learned the inner facts from various actors in the drama. The view which I took of my own work made it necessary for me to keep continually in touch with the actual conditions of the fighting line. The Commander-in-Chief accorded me the fullest liberty of movement in the British zone, and placed every facility at my disposal. I was most anxious to understand by personal observation the latest methods of holding the line which were involved in the preparations for a great defensive battle. I stayed with General Lipsett, commanding the 3rd Canadian Division, and under his deeply instructed guidance examined minutely from front to rear the whole of the sector which he occupied opposite to Lens.

The New Defensive Tactics.

Very different was the state of the line from what I had known it to be when serving with the Guards in 1915 or as a Battalion Commander in 1916. The system of continuous trenches with their barbed-wide networks, their parapets, firing-steps, traverses and dug-outs, the first line of which was manned in great strength and often constituted the strongest lines of resistance, had vanished. Contact with the enemy was maintained only by a fringe of outposts, some of which were fortified, while others trusted merely to concealment. Behind these over a distance of two or three thousand yards were sited intricate systems of machine-gun nests, nearly all operating by flank fire and mutually supporting each other. Slender communication trenches enabled these to be approached and relieved by night. The barbed-wire networks, instead of being drawn laterally in a continuous belt across the front, lay obliquely with intervals so as to draw the attacker into avenues mercilessly swept by machine-gun fire. Open spaces between important points were reserved for the full fury of the protecting barrages. This was the Battle Zone.

Two thousand yards or so farther in the rear were the field battery positions. Strong works to which the long disused word "redoubt" was applied, and deep grids of trenches and deeper dugouts elaborately camouflaged, provided for the assembling and maintenance of the supporting troops. Behind these again in modest and obscure recesses lay the Brigade Headquarters; behind which again the groups of heavy and medium batteries were disposed in studied irregular array. Favoured by beautiful weather and a quiet day, we were able by taking care to make our way into the ruins of Avion village, in which in twos and threes the keen-eyed Canadian sharpshooters maintained their ceaseless bickering against the German outposts fifty or a hundred yards away.

I must frankly admit that all that I saw, both in the line and of the minutely perfected organization far to the rear, inspired me with confidence in the strength of the defensive system which had gradually developed as the war proceeded. Holding the convictions which

this account describes of the relative power of offence and defence under modern conditions, I looked forward, at least so far as this sector was concerned, to the day when the Germans would taste a measure of that bitter draught our armies had been made to drink so long. Alas, the conditions here were by no means representative of the general state of the line.

* * * *

Photo: Beresford.

SIR HENRY WILSON.

Henry Hughes Wilson entered the Army in 1884, in which year he was gazetted to the Royal Irish Regiment. He transferred during the same year to the Rifle Brigade. Before and during the Great War Wilson was recognised as an authority on strategy, and his views carried much weight in the councils of the Allies. He was a firm advocate of unity of command on the Western Front. In 1919 Sir Henry Wilson was appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but three years later, in June, 1922, as a consequence of his views on the Irish situation, this great servant of his country was shot dead on the steps of his London house.

Sir Henry Wilson.

It is no disparagement of the qualities of Sir William Robertson to record the very great pleasure with which I learned of the appointment of Sir Henry Wilson to be Chief of the Staff. We had known each other for many years. I had met him first by the banks of the Tugela in February, 1900, and my first picture of him is a haggard but jocular Major emerging from a bloody night's work in the Pieter's Hill fighting.

It was in discussion with him from 1910 onwards that I had studied the problem of a war between France and Germany. Though I recorded at the time somewhat different conclusions about the opening phase from those on which he proceeded, my debt to him was very great. Never shall I forget the memorable forecast which in August, 1911, during the Agadir crisis, he had given to the Committee of Imperial Defence. At this period we were close confederates. The crisis passed away, and the Irish quarrel sundered our personal relations. A devoted son of Ulster, he resented with a passion which knew no bounds the Home Rule policy of the Liberal Government.

During the intense days which preceded the British declaration of war upon Germany we were forced to meet on several occasions, but on a purely official basis. The mobilization of the Fleet and the final decision to join France, in which I had played my part, carried all before them in Wilson's heart. But this I did not know, and it was with surprise that one August

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE KAISER'S ACCESSION.

An interesting photograph taken at Spa on June 15, 1918, on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Kaiser's accession. The Kaiser is seen on the left in conversation with an officer. Marshal Hindenburg and the German Crown Prince are together on the right. The whole atmosphere of the picture seems particularly care-free when it is remembered that when the photograph was taken the power of the German army was already on the wane and the future of the German Empire in jeopardy.

morning I received at the Admiralty a visit of ceremony from him on the eve of his departure for France. He had come to say that all past differences were obliterated and that we were friends again. He was opposed later on to the Dardanelles expedition. At that time he saw the war only in the light of the struggle in France. Had he commanded the central point of view, he would perhaps have had a different opinion. At any rate his policy as Chief of the Staff was far wider in its scope than the Western Front.

But these disagreements did not, so far as I am aware, impair our personal relations; and when later on I served in France as a Battalion Commander, he showed me every courtesy and often discussed the whole situation, military and political, with the freedom we had practised at Whitehall in days when my position was superior. His appointment as Chief of the Staff led immediately to the closest harmony between the spheres of Strategy and Material. The conceptions of war which I held, and which these pages record, received from him a keen and pregnant welcome. Almost his first act was to raise the War Office demand for the Tank Corps from 18,000 to 46,000 men.

His Qualities and Services.

In Sir Henry Wilson the War Cabinet found for the first time an expert adviser of superior intellect, who could explain lucidly and forcefully the whole situation and give reasons for the adoption or rejection of any course. Such gifts are, whether rightly or wrongly,

the object of habitual distrust in England. But they are certainly a very great comfort in the transaction of public business. Sir Henry Wilson constantly corrected the clarity of his mind by whimsical mannerisms and modes of expression. He spoke in parables, used curious images and cryptic phrases. He had a vocabulary of his own. The politicians were "frocks"; Clémenceau, always the "Tiger." He even addressed him as Tiger. His faithful Aide-de-Camp, Duncannon, was "the Lord." He wantonly pronounced grotesquely the names of French towns and Generals. In discussing the gravest matters he used the modes of levity.

"Prime Minister," he began one day to the War Cabinet, at a meeting which I attended, "to-day I am Boche." Then followed a penetrating description of the situation from the standpoint of the German Headquarters. On another day he would be France or Bulgaria, and always out of this affectation there emerged, to my mind, the root of the matter in hand. But some Ministers were irritated. He did not go so far as Marshal Foch, who sometimes gave a military description in pantomime; but their methods of displaying a war proposition had much in common.

I can see him so clearly as I write, standing before the map in the Cabinet Room giving one of his terse telegraphese appreciations. "This morning, Sir, a new battle." (The reader will recognize it when it comes.) "This time it is we who have attacked. We have attacked with two armies—one British, one French. Sir Haig is in his train, Prime Minister, very uncomfortable, near the good city of Amiens. And Rawly[1] is in his left hand and Debeney in his right. Rawly is using five hundred tanks. It is a big battle, and we thought you would not like us to tell you about it beforehand." I cannot vouch for the actual words, but this was the sense and manner of it.

We should be thankful that the future is veiled. I was to be present at another scene in this room. There was no Henry Wilson. The Prime Minister and I faced each other, and on the table between us lay the pistols which an hour before had drunk this loyal man's blood.

I have strayed alike from narrative and chronology to make in deep respect this reference to the most comprehending military mind of our day in Britain and to a soldier who, although he commanded no armies, exerted on occasion a profound and fortunate influence over the greatest events.

[1] General Rawlinson.

A Favourable Atmosphere.

With Sir Henry Wilson, as his deputy, came the brilliant Harington, who at Plumer's side had won for the Second Army its unequalled reputation. I think I may say that in all that concerned the making of the weapons for a campaign in 1919, with their inevitable profound reactions upon its plans, we thought as one. He supported me in all my principal projects for the supply of the armies, and used, under Sir Henry Wilson, the whole power of the General Staff to carry forward the plans for the great mechanical battle which we trusted, however late in the day, would bring finality.

I had also in the War Office at this time a friend in General Furse, the Master-General of the Ordnance. He had commanded the division in which I had served during the few months I was at the front, and we had many times argued out the kind of projects I was now in a position to put forward. To ensure the closest contact in the vast Artillery sphere I appointed him with Lord Milner's approval[1] to be an actual member of the Munitions Council. Thus all these far-reaching and, though subordinate, yet vital controls pulled together from this time forward, and we had to worry only about the enemy.

In this favourable atmosphere at the beginning of March I completed a general survey of the War ostensibly from the munitions standpoint, and unfolded the argument for the mechanical battle.

[1] Lord Milner had now succeeded Lord Derby at the War Office.

Photo: Copyright.

REHEARSAL FOR BATTLE.

A modern battle is so complex in character and the confusion created by bombardment and barrage so great that if the operation is to be on a major scale the units detailed to take part in the action must be carefully instructed in every detail. It was customary in preparing troops for an important operation to lay out an exact plan in miniature of the proposed field of battle. Every road and ground feature was modelled in miniature in order that the dangers of loss of direction should, as far as possible, be eliminated. Ground plans, such as that shown above, were prepared far behind the lines, and the troops mainly concerned were given every facility to familiarise themselves with the sector on which the attack was to be launched.

My Survey of March 5.

To the War Cabinet.

March 5, 1918.

MUNITIONS PROGRAMME, 1919.

1. So far as munitions are concerned, the year 1918 is settled for good or for ill. No decisive changes in our modes of warfare can be produced in time to influence the campaign now opening. But it is imperative to decide quite soon what the character of the campaign of 1919 is to be. It is no use considering such a question in October or November. Practically a whole year's notice is required for any great development in material. We ought to have made up our minds by the beginning of April what the main principles and general outlines of our munitions programme for 1919 are to be. I would ask that this task may be undertaken at once.

2. We are immediately confronted with the fundamental question "How are we going to win the war in 1919?" It seems to me a reasonable expectation, if every effort is made and unity prevails, that by the end of this year we shall have established three very substantial facts which are now disputed: (i) either the German will have attacked in the west and been repulsed, or he will have exposed himself incapable of delivering an offensive on a great scale; (ii) the submarine warfare will have entered upon a phase in which our tonnage will be greater at the end of every month, and not less as at present; (iii) the growing American army will be becoming a real and great military factor. It is possible we may add a (iv) to this, viz. a definite and unmistakable ascendancy in the air both as regards numbers and quality. All these aims have of course to be fought for and worked for during the ensuing months. They are reasonable objects of endeavour. Failure to attain any of them would be disastrous to us. Our success, on the other hand, in attaining all of them will not necessarily be fatal to the enemy.

3. (*a*) we must further assume that a new front will be made against the enemy in the East by Japanese armies being brought as deeply as possible into Russia, and by every conceivable inducement being offered to Japan to come directly into collision and contact with the German forces. It will further be necessary to stop the spread of German influence towards India through Persia. This can only be done by sending without delay sufficient troops to dominate the Persian situation, as was done by the Grand Duke in 1915 with such successful results. (*b*) We must assume that while Germany is absorbing and dragooning Russia, Great Britain will continue to break up and devour Turkey as an offset, albeit unequal. (*c*) We may balance the chances of an internal collapse in Italy against those of an internal collapse in Austria, it being assumed however that we shall do as much to help Italy as Germany has done since the beginning of the war for her allies.

How to Obtain a Decision.

4. All these perilous matters being accomplished will bring us to the campaign of 1919, and if we get so far the question repeats itself, "How are we going to win then?" If there is no method of winning then which military men can discover, it will certainly be argued by many that it would be better to make peace at the least unfavourable moment in the present year, abandoning altogether the hope of a decisive victory in the war. It therefore becomes of the very highest consequence to discover what is the best plan for 1919, and whether there is any plan or use we can make of our resources which will give us a reasonable hope of a military victory.

5. It is clear that a military victory (apart from internal collapse) can only be reached by offensive action, and that offensive action can only be based on overwhelming superiority in one form or another. Even if all the favourable assumptions made in the earlier paragraphs of this paper are borne out, it is clear that no overwhelming superiority will be available for us in several of the main elements of war. For instance, we cannot expect any sufficient preponderance in man-power in 1919, even with the American armies, to enable us to overwhelm by numbers the German

front in the West. The best it is reasonable to hope is that the two sides will be of about the same relative strength as in 1917 before the Russian collapse. Even this is highly disputable. On the other hand, we may fairly reckon on a good superiority in quality, which, added to the improvement in numbers, will give us once again in the West undoubtedly the stronger armies. Still, the margin will not be enough to offer any prospect of a military victory by man-power.

6. There does not either seem to be any good prospect of winning a military victory through an overwhelming superiority in guns and shells. We are already at the limit of our shell production. We cannot expect that the tonnage of 1919 will at the very best do more than enable us, having regard to our depleting stocks, to maintain our 1918 standards. These give us no marked superiority over the enemy. Further, the limits of what can be effected by gun power have been coming very clearly into view. We see that after a certain point it tends to defeat its own purposes as an offensive weapon, for the ground is so ploughed up by the necessary artillery preparation that it is impossible for troops to advance over it. It is a very practical and pregnant question at the moment whether artillery has not been overdone, and whether in the disposition of our resources for 1919 both personnel and material should not be liberated from artillery for other forms of warfare. I will return to this later.

7. Again, it is clear that our policy of blockade on which the Navy have hitherto relied can no longer be counted upon to produce decisive results now that the Germans have got enormous portions of Russia at their disposal. Indeed we are likely during the period under survey to suffer nearly as much inconvenience and political instability through lack of supplies as are our enemies.

Means of Continuous Forward Progression.

I therefore return to the fundamental question. If you cannot starve out your enemy, if you cannot bear him down by numbers or blast him from your path by artillery, how are you going to win?

8. I wish to avow however at this stage in the argument a firm conviction that the method and the means do exist by which in 1919 the German armies in the West could be decisively defeated and their front effectively broken up. No proposition of this kind can be stated in terms of certainty, because there are no certainties in war; but I believe that if the right decisions are taken now, it should be possible to impart to the British armies in particular, and to the Allied armies in general, *a means of continuous forward progression* in 1919 which if successful would yield decisive results, and that the chances of success are good enough to justify the prolongation of the struggle in the meanwhile. I will proceed to indicate in general terms the lines of thought to which attention should be directed in order to realize the result.

II

The Four New Arms.

9. Wars have hitherto been conducted by infantry, cavalry and artillery, and these are the three recognized arms of the service. It has also been observed with some truth that "the infantry is the army, and uses the other arms as its adjuncts." Whichever way the question is viewed, it is clear that there are no means of obtaining an overwhelming superiority sufficient to enable a continuous advance to be made by any developments which it is in our power to make in the infantry, cavalry, and artillery in 1919. However, in the present war at least four new arms of the highest consequence have come into being, viz.:—

Aeroplanes.	Gas, and
Tanks.	Machine guns.

If we are to obtain the necessary superiority and the means of effective progression against the enemy, it can only be by developments of a far-reaching character in these new methods of warfare.

10. And let it here be observed that every one of these four new arms has already played or showed itself capable

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

GERMAN ANTI-TANK RIFLE.

As time went on and the powers of the tanks became increasingly apparent to the German High Command various defensive measures were employed in an endeavour to counter this new menace. None were of much avail. The anti-tank rifle, shown above alongside a British Service rifle, fired a heavy bullet capable of penetrating the armour plates of the tanks, but it was difficult to handle owing to the heavy recoil, and as an anti-tank measure was a failure.

of playing a decisive part in the present war, in spite of the fact that they have only been tardily and partially and doubtingly developed. For instance, it is the machine gun which has made the defensive hitherto invincible. Again, if either side possessed the power to drop not five tons but five hundred tons of bombs each night on the cities and manufacturing establishments of its opponent, the result would be decisive. If the Germans had used poison gas on a sufficiently large scale the first time they used it at all and before we were provided with effective masks, they could undoubtedly have broken up our whole front in the West. Similarly, if we had developed tanks in secret or at any rate in mystery till we had about 2,000, and then had used them as they were used at the battle of Cambrai, only on a much larger scale and with carefully husbanded reserves of infantry to follow them up, we in turn might have broken up the German front and driven their armies into a continuous retreat. We are clearly in the presence of new factors, all of which possess decisive qualities.

11. It must however be remembered that the total quantity of our resources is limited, and that the decision which has to be taken is one which involves the development of these new arms, both in men and material, to a very large extent at the expense of the old. Still, it is contended that this should be boldly faced, that we should create in order to attack the enemy in 1919 an army essentially different in its composition and methods of warfare from any that have yet been employed on either side. This would only be in accordance with the obvious principle that if you cannot get a sufficient superiority over your opponent in the same methods as he employs, you should break away and develop different and unexpected variants. Thus we may contemplate (*a*) relieving the want of man-power in the infantry, especially on defensive sectors of the front, by great increases of machine guns, automatic rifles, and the like; or (*b*) putting most of the cavalry into tanks or other mechanical vehicles; or (*c*) drawing upon the artillery and the material which supplies it, as far as may be needed, to raise chemical warfare to its proper proportionate position in our organization.

It is unnecessary to speak of the air, for this is already accepted. We have undoubtedly the power at the present time of making such decisions fully effective for 1919 if we act without delay and upon a carefully thought out and ruthlessly pursued plan. The question is essentially one of proportion, but it is not capable of being solved unless the old proportions are definitely put aside and revolutionary changes in the composition of the armies and in their methods of warfare are unhesitatingly faced.

A Different Distribution.

12. On the other hand, we need not exaggerate the extent of the changes which would be necessary. Let us assume—the figures are of course only tokens—that at the present time our military effort in men and material combined is expressed as follows:—

Infantry, 40 per cent.
Artillery, 40 per cent.
Air, 10 per cent.
Cavalry, 3½ per cent.
Machine guns, 4 per cent.
Tanks, 2 per cent.
Gas, ½ per cent.

The kind of change that is suggested might be expressed as follows:—

Infantry, 35 per cent.
Artillery, 30 per cent.
Air, 15 per cent.
Cavalry, ½ per cent.
Machine guns, 7 per cent.
Tanks, 8 per cent.
Gas, 4½ per cent.

This would give us an army substantially different in its composition from that of its opponents, and capable of confronting him with offensive propositions fundamentally different in character from those which he has hitherto disposed of.

As stated above, the Air expansion is already practically conceded. The development of machine guns and automatic rifles is also to a great extent assured; but the two most vital of the new arms, namely tanks and gas, are at present only used in a miniature and experimental scale.

Mechanical Developments.

13. Yet in both of these we have immense advantages, inherent or acquired, over the enemy. Incomparably the most effective method of discharging gas

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

AMMUNITION FOR THE ANTI-TANK RIFLE.

This comparison between a British ·303 cartridge and that for a German anti-tank rifle should afford sufficient evidence of the kicking power likely to be imparted to any rifle by a cartridge of such dimensions. A more valuable weapon was a heavy machine-gun firing a 13 mm. bullet evolved by the Germans in 1918. But it was then too late. The Armistice intervened before any supplies of this weapon could be made available.

is by liberating it from cylinders to form a gas cloud when the wind is favourable. In no other way can results on the largest scale be achieved. Although for some time we and the Germans have relied instead upon firing gas shells from guns or mortars, there is no doubt that the original method in spite of its difficulty and danger is by far the most formidable. It is undoubtedly possible if the wind is favourable to discharge gas over a wide front which, if the discharge is sufficiently prolonged or intense, will render all existing masks ineffectual. The supreme fact is that the wind is at least six times, and some say nine times, as favourable to us as it is to the enemy. We are mad not to avail ourselves of this overwhelming advantage. But with our present pitifully small gas service of perhaps 6,000 or 7,000 men we are only trifling with the problem.

14. Again, take tanks. Here our advantage is due to our having started far in advance of the enemy and having with painful slowness but extreme thoroughness explored the difficulties, tactical and manufacturing, of this highly complicated arm. The element of novelty has now been thrown away, but numbers, quality, organization, and training still afford us opportunities of the first order if we only had the wisdom and resolution to profit by them.

The year 1919 is still at our disposal. It is undoubtedly within our power to construct in very large numbers armoured vehicles of various types, some to fight, some to pursue, some to cut wire and trample trenches, some to carry forward men or machine-gun parties, or artillery, or supplies, to such an extent and on such a scale that 150,000 to 200,000 fighting men can be carried forward certainly and irresistibly on a broad front and

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

GERMAN MOTOR TRANSPORT.

It is the custom of our race to be severely critical of our efforts in every field. It has been said on many occasions that in the Great War Britain bungled her way through to victory. Nothing could be further from the truth. Many mistakes were undoubtedly made, but the fact remains that by November 11, 1918, the British Army, both in morale and equipment, was the finest in the world. In 1918 the transport of both the Germans and the French lagged far behind that of the British Army. The British horse-drawn vehicles in particular, thanks to Divisional Horse Shows, were as spick and span as they would have been on parade at Aldershot.

Photo : Imperial War Museum.

MOTOR MACHINE-GUN COMPANY.

Prior to 1914 perhaps the most serious defect in the organization of the British Army was due to failure to appreciate the importance in war of the machine-gun. In the use of the rifle the British Expeditionary Force was supreme, but this marked superiority was largely discounted by the German confidence in the possibilities of machine-gun fire. As the conflict developed and the efficiency of this modern weapon became more and more apparent, every effort was made to equip the British fighting forces with machine guns, both heavy and light. By the formation of a special Machine-Gun Corps, and by the employment of the weapon mounted on aeroplanes, on armoured cars and on motor cycles, the army of 1918 was equipped for offence and defence on a scale which, had it been available on a sufficient level for the original British Expeditionary Force, might have seriously embarrassed the southward sweep of the German Army in 1914.

to a depth of 8 or 10 miles in the course of a single day. The resources are available, the knowledge is available, the time is available, the result is certain: nothing is lacking except the will. We have never been able to get out of the rut of traditional and conventional methods. We have never been able to plan on a sufficiently large scale, long in advance, and with the necessary force and authority to drive the policy through. We have instead only carried out a series of costly experiments, each of which has shown us the chance we have lost and exposed our thought to the enemy.

15. It surely lies with those who shake their heads to say on what alternative method of attack or on what alternative form of superiority they can rely to win a military victory in 1919. Where are they going to get the numerical superiority which they had in the autumn of 1916 and the spring of 1917, and which was then found not to be sufficient? What more can artillery do in offence than it has already done in the great battles of this year and last? What grounds are there for supposing that we possess more staying power or more national discipline than the Germans? What more is to be looked for from the blockade? If there is an alternative plan let us have it. If not, let this one have its fair chance. Let it be backed with as good an effort as was given to the creation of the British artillery in 1915 and 1916. Let other interests be made to concede and conform to its essential requirements. Surely we ought to have a plan for which we can strive, and not simply go carrying on from day to day and from hand to mouth in the hopes of something

turning up before we reach the final abyss of general anarchy and world famine.

The Mechanical Battle.

16. There is a short way of ending this war: it is to defeat the German armies in the West. For this purpose two conditions are necessary: first, we must have stronger and better armies ourselves: that is the foundation on which everything rests, and there is no reason why we should not have it in 1919. Secondly, we must discover a method of the offensive which enables these stronger armies to advance at a certain moderate rate of progression along their selected strategical lines. The problem is therefore definite and precise. Indeed it is mainly mechanical. Discover a method by which a stronger army can regain its rightful power of continuous advance, and decisive victory is won. It is mechanical methods which are preventing that advance. Overcome these by mechanical agency, and courage and quality will once again receive their due.

III

17. There is one other aspect of the problem to which I referred in my paper of the 21st October last, namely the scale and intensity of a decisive conflict. War between equals in power is not an affair which can be carried to a result merely by quasi business and administrative processes flowing smoothly out month after month and year after year. It should be a succession of climaxes on which everything is staked, toward which everything tends, and from which permanent decisions are obtained. These climaxes have usually been called battles. A battle means that the whole resources on either side that can be brought to bear are during the course of a single episode concentrated upon the enemy. There has not been a battle in this war since the battle of the Marne of which this could be said. We in England particularly are misled by the increasing scale of our casualties, due to the increasing size of our armies, into thinking that the intensity of the conflict is greater now than in the opening stages of the war.

The battle of the Somme in the period of its greatest fury involved no more than the engagement simultaneously of about twenty British and French divisions against probably half that number of Germans; and the battle of Verdun ceased when the battle of the Somme had begun. All the great operations of 1916 and 1917, although so prolonged as to cause very heavy losses, have involved the simultaneous employment only of comparatively small forces on comparatively small fronts. The armies have been fighting in instalments; they have engaged perhaps 8 or 10 per cent. of their total strength.

The Reduced Scale and Intensity of the War.

18. The reasons which have led to this are well known. The power of the defensive is such that practically the whole spare artillery of an army has to be collected to support a single attack in which there is no room for more than a tenth of the available troops. There has never been, and there will never be, enough artillery to enable, say, six battles of Messines to be fought at one and the same moment. And thus the war in the West has dwindled down to siege operations on a gigantic scale which, however bloody and prolonged, cannot yield a decisive result. Thus, when a great battle is raging on the British front, six or eight British divisions are fighting desperately, half a dozen others are waiting to sustain them, the rest of the front is calm; twenty British divisions are remaining quietly in their trenches doing their daily routine, another twenty are training behind the lines; 20,000 men are at school, 10,000 are playing football, 100,000 are on leave. It is the same with the enemy. Obviously we have passed out of the region where the scale and intensity of the operations can be decisive on the great armies which are in presence of each other. Still less can they be decisive on the great belligerent nations.

The idea of ending the war by "killing Germans" is a delusion. You

have got to kill or totally incapacitate at least 700,000 Germans in every year, i.e. a number equal to the annual increment, before the slightest progress is made towards wearing down their manhood. And it takes at least one man's life to kill a German. We have to be, in short, merely exchanging lives, and exchanging lives upon a scale at once more frightful than anything that has been witnessed before in the world, and too modest to produce a decision.

The Agonizing Deadlock.

19. Contrast this with the first two shocks of the war in the West, namely the first collision on the frontiers or the supreme struggle at the Marne. In the first three weeks of the war, between the 20th August and the 10th or 12th September, the whole of the French and German armies, every division, every available man, were simultaneously, continuously, or repeatedly engaged in open and moving warfare. The battle of the Marne, for instance, comprised not only those operations near Paris of which we have read, but a general battle on a front beginning 50 kilometres west of Paris right up to Verdun, and then round the corner far down past Nancy into Alsace, a total of certainly not less than 350 kilometres, along the whole of which the armies were at death grips, hurling their last reserves at each other. The French, although ultimately victorious, lost more men in the first twenty days of fighting than in the whole of the year 1917. The *tempo* of the war has progressively languished. It has steadily declined into a deadlock more perilous and more agonizing, more disintegrating in its effects upon the world, than any decision of armies, however sharp.

20. Until the arrival of the Americans in force, that is to say during the whole of this year, we are not in a position, without running a desperate risk, to seek a general battle; but next year, in 1919, we may again be unmistakably superior in strength. It will then be right to fight a battle; that is to say, to seek a military decision for which the whole strength of the armies is employed—every man, every gun, every resource—within an exceedingly limited number of days. But how? By what means can we overcome the physical and mechanical difficulties that have hitherto imposed such severe limitations upon our actions? Possibly three times as many men as the enemy would be one way: we shall never have them. Three or four times as much artillery as we have at present might be another way: we shall never get it. There only remain these novel methods, good in themselves, better still in combination with the older methods.

If on the British front we can only afford the concentrated artillery necessary to sustain say two great simultaneous attacks, and the French an equal number, must we not look for substitutes which will enable other attacks, supported only by the local artillery, to be delivered at the same time? Gas will certainly give you one of these. Tanks, if we develop them, could give us at least two of the highest order. Possibly trench mortars might offer another means. If the French and American armies followed similar methods, there is no reason why we should not once more see a general battle on a 300-kilometre front, applying in its brief course the whole strength of our stronger attacking armies, and yet with each attack supported by some scientific method which overcame the wire and machine guns of the defence.

That would be war proceeding by design through crisis to decision—not mere waste and slaughter sagging slowly downwards into general collapse.

The 300-Kilometre Battle.

The fury of the storm was now about to break upon us, and these arguments were soon to be illustrated and corrected by flaming events. Ludendorff, reintroducing the great Battle period and consuming the German strength in desperate offensives without the necessary mechanical weapons and vehicles, was destined to bring about the Allied "general battle on a 300-kilometre front" which ended the war; and to bring it about after periods of awful peril one year earlier than our best plans could have achieved.

CHAPTER LXXI

THE TWENTY-FIRST OF MARCH

The German Peace Opportunity—Ludendorff's Power—"Michael" and "Mars"—Hindenburg's Order—At the British Headquarters—The Commander-in-Chief's Anxieties—With the 9th Division—The Barrage Falls—The Scale of the Battle—The First Day—The Battle Zone—Stubborn Resistance of the British Infantry—The Germans Cross the Somme—"Mars"—French Assistance—The Last Phase—Ludendorff's Strategic Failure—Where the Blame Lies—In Whitehall—The Doullens Meeting—General Gough—His Supersession—The Munition Workers' Achievement—The Guns Replaced.

AS the Paschendaele struggle died away in the storms and mud of winter, the military rulers of Germany addressed themselves to a new situation. The collapse of Russia had enabled them to transport 1,000,000 men and 3,000 guns from the Eastern to the Western Front. For the first time therefore since the invasion they found themselves possessed of a definite superiority over the Allies in France. But this superiority was fleeting. The United States had declared war and was arming, but had not yet arrived. Once the great masses of American manhood could be trained, equipped, transported and brought into the line of battle, all the numerical advantage Germany had gained from the destruction of Russia would be more than counterbalanced. At the same time the German Main Headquarters knew the grave losses the British Army had suffered at Paschendaele, and felt themselves entitled to count upon a marked decline in its strength and fighting quality. Lastly, the amazing character of the German-Austrian victory over the Italians at Caporetto glittered temptingly.

The German Peace Opportunity.

This was undoubtedly a favourable opportunity for peace negotiations. Russia down, Italy gasping, France exhausted, the British armies bled white, the U-boats not yet defeated, and the United States 3,000 miles away, constituted cumulatively a position where German statesmanship might well have intervened decisively. The immense conquests which Germany had made in Russia, and the hatred and scorn with which the Bolsheviks were regarded by the Allies, might well have made it possible for Germany to make important territorial concessions to France, and to offer Britain the complete restoration of Belgium. The desertion by Soviet Russia of the Allied cause, and the consequent elimination of all Russian claims, created a similar easement in negotiations for both Austria and Turkey. Such were the elements of this great opportunity. It was the last.

Ludendorff's Power.

But Ludendorff cared for none of these things. We must regard him at this juncture as the dominating will. Since the fall of Bethmann-Hollweg, he and Hindenburg, at the head of the German General Staff machine, had usurped, or at least acquired, the main control over policy. The Emperor, inwardly appalled by the tide of events, suspected of being pacifist at heart, failed increasingly to play his part. Thus on definite trials of strength the military power proved repeatedly to be predominant. It stood on the specialized basis of military opinion, not capable of measuring justly many of the most important forces which were at work internally and abroad. It was all the

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

MARCH 21, 1918.

The German offensive of March, 1918, was the largest, the most violent and the most carefully prepared advance the world had ever seen. It went contrary to all the previous lessons of the war. Infiltration by storm troops, favoured by fog natural and artificial, was a new method of attack. To this was added the most tremendous bombardment witnessed on the Western Front up to that time. The attacking Germans were fortunate in that officers and men were not lacking who were familiar with the ground features, and this local knowledge was to them of the greatest advantage. In the above photograph German troops are seen advancing on the great day over shell-swept ground. It will be observed that, as stated in the text, the attacking troops are in small bodies, no attempt being made to advance in any set formation.

more dangerous because it was not complete. Ludendorff and Hindenburg by threatening resignation could obtain the crucial decisions they desired. These decisions governed the fate of Germany. But they were only acquainted with a portion of the problem, and they could only carry out such parts of the indispensable resultant policy as fell within their own military sphere. There was altogether lacking that supreme combination of the King-Warrior-Statesman which is apparent in the persons of the great conquerors of history.

Ludendorff was bent on keeping Courland, Lithuania and Poland in the east. Had his own fame not been gained in these regions? He was also determined to keep a part of Belgium, including Liège, where he had also distinguished himself. This he felt was imperative if the German armies were to obtain a good strategic starting-point for a future war. So far from ceding any portion of Alsace and Lorraine, he and the General Staff regarded the acquisition of a protective zone west of Metz, including the Briey Basin, as a bare measure of prudence. These postulates and the possession of the new armies regathered from the Russian front settled the course of events.

"Michael" and "Mars."

On November 11, 1917, a day in the calendar afterwards celebrated for other reasons, Ludendorff, von Kuhl and von der Schulenberg met at Mons. The nominal masters of these great Staff Officers — Hindenburg, Prince Rupprecht and the Crown Prince—were not troubled to attend. The basis of the conference was that there should be a supreme offensive in the west; that there would only be enough troops for one such offensive without any diversion

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

RETREAT ON THE SOMME.

The German advance against the British Fifth Army was carried out according to the usual thorough German methods of waging war. The preliminary bombardment was prodigious. To quote from the text, "there rose in less than one minute the most tremendous cannonade I shall ever hear." Such a storm of shell-fire could hardly fail to destroy, if not utterly to annihilate, everything on the zone upon which it was directed. On all sides were burning houses, hutments and stores. One such conflagration is shown above, and gun teams are seen going forward to pull out their guns.

elsewhere; that the offensive must be made in February or the beginning of March before the Americans could develop their strength; and finally, that it was the British Army which must be beaten. Various alternative schemes were discussed and orders given for their detailed preparation. Each received its code name. Von Kuhl's plan of an attack against the front La Bassée-Armentières was "St. George I"; an attack on the Ypres salient, "St. George II"; one on Arras-Notre Dame de Lorette, "Mars." Lastly, there were the "Michaels" I, II and III. It was not until January 24, after profound detailed study, that the choice was finally made in favour of the "Michaels."

The objective of this attack was to break through the Allied front and reach the Somme from Ham to Péronne. The date originally fixed was March 20. The battle was to be extended by the attack "Mars South" a few days later, and a subsidiary attack, called "Archangel," by the Seventh Army south of the Oise, was to be used as a diversion. Preparations for both the "St. Georges" were also to be completed by the beginning of April. Sixty-two divisions were available for the three "Michaels" and "Mars South," viz. Seventeenth Army: fifteen attack divisions, two ordinary divisions; Second Army: fifteen attack divisions, three ordinary divisions; Eighteenth Army: nineteen attack divisions, five ordinary divisions; Reserve: three attack divisions.

In spite of some differences of opinion with von der Schulenberg and with von Hutier as to the direction and emphasis of the offensive in its various stages,

Ludendorff adhered to his own conception: "The British must be beaten." They could best be beaten by the attack on either side of St. Quentin biting off the Cambrai salient. The Eighteenth Army would thereafter form a defensive flank along the Somme to hold off the French, and all the rest of the available German forces, wheeling as they advanced, were to attack the British in a north-west direction and drive them towards the coast. The two "St. George" operations remained in hand as further and potentially final blows. On these foundations all the German armies concerned perfected their arrangements.

Finally, on March 10 the Emperor approved the following order:—

Hindenburg's Order.

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF.

Great Headquarters, 10.3, issued 12.3.

His Majesty commands:

(1) That the Michael Attack take place on 21st March. First penetration of the hostile position 9.40 a.m.

(2) The first great tactical objective of Crown Prince Rupprecht's Group of Armies will be to cut off the British in the Cambrai salient and, north of the river Omignon and as far as the junction of that river with the Somme, to capture the line Croisilles-Bapaume-Péronne. . . . Should the progress of the attack by the right wing be very favourable it will push on beyond Croisilles. The subsequent task of the Group of Armies will be to push on towards Arras-Albert, left wing fixed on the Somme near Péronne, and with the main weight of the attack on the right flank to shake the English Front opposite Sixth Army and to liberate further German forces from their stationary warfare for the advance. All divisions in rear of Fourth and Sixth Armies are to be brought forward forthwith in case of such an event.

(3) The German Crown Prince's



THE TWENTY-FIRST OF MARCH.

Sketch map showing the depth of the German advance on the Somme between March 21 and April 9, 1918.

Group of Armies is first of all to capture the Somme and Crozat Canal south of river Omignon. By advancing rapidly the Eighteenth Army must seize the crossings over the Somme and over the Canal. It must also be prepared to extend its right flank as far as Péronne. The Group of Armies will study the question of reinforcing the left wing of the Army by divisions from Seventh, First and Third Armies.

(4) O.H.L.[1] keeps control of 2nd Guard, 26th Württemberg and 12th Divisions.

(5) O.H.L. reserves its decision as regards Mars and Archangel, and will be guided by the course of events. Preparations for these are to be carried on uninterruptedly.

(6) The remaining Armies are to act in accordance with C.G.S. Operation Order 6925, dated 4th March. Rupprecht's Group of Armies will protect the right wing of the Mars-Michael operation against an English counter-attack. The German Crown Prince's Group of Armies will withdraw before any big attack by the French against Seventh (exclusive of Archangel front), Third and First Armies.

O.H.L. reserves its decision as regards the Groups of Armies of Gallwitz and Duke Albrecht concerning the strategic measures to be taken in the event of a big attack by the French or concerning the further withdrawal of divisions for the battle zone

VON HINDENBERG.

[1] Main Headquarters.

At the British Headquarters.

Accompanied by the Master-General of the Ordnance, on March 19 I held a conference in the Armoury at Montreuil with the Chief of the Staff, the head of the Tank Corps, and a number of officers and experts, to settle the scheme of the Tank programme for 1919, and to time and organize the deliveries of tanks in 1918. I stayed with the Commander-in-Chief. After luncheon Sir Douglas Haig took me into his private room and explained on his map the situation as he viewed it. The enormous German concentration on the British front, and particularly opposite the

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

GERMAN INFANTRY DURING THE ADVANCE.

For the purpose of the March offensive the Germans launched simultaneously thirty-seven divisions of infantry, covered by nearly 6,000 guns. Nearly thirty divisions more were held in close support. A German infantry battalion is shown above passing through a street on its way forward to take part in the operations.

Fifth Army was obvious. Though nothing was certain, the Commander-in-Chief was daily expecting an attack of the first magnitude. The enemy masses in the north made it possible that the British front from Ypres to Messines would be assaulted. But the main developments were clearly to be expected on the sectors of the front from Arras to Péronne and even farther south.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

GERMAN RAILWAY TROOPS AT WORK.

As the incoming tide of the German invaders swept once more over the desolate Somme country it was followed by technical branches of the army whose job it was to organise and prepare the captured territory in anticipation of a further advance. Railway troops are seen here laying sleepers for a section of broad-gauge railway. The German military authorities rightly set great store upon an efficient net-work of railways, and the areas behind their front were invariably well served in this respect.

All these possibilities had already been amplified to me the day before by General Birch, the Chief of Artillery. His map showed very clearly the areas which the Germans were infecting with mustard gas (presumably to forbid them as manœuvring ground to both sides for some days) and the wide gaps between these areas over which no doubt the hostile offensive would be launched. There were also heavy enemy concentrations, though less pronounced, against the French in the sector of the Aisne. Speaking generally, more than half the German divisions in the west were ranged against the front of the British armies; and over broad stretches, the estimated enemy rifle power, the most significant index, was four times what it was against the French.

The Commander-in-Chief's Anxieties.

The Commander-in-Chief viewed the coming shock with an anxious but resolute eye. He dwelt with insistence on the undue strain put upon his armies by the arrangement made by the War Cabinet with the French, in which he had reluctantly acquiesced, for the extension of the British front so far to the south as Barisis. He also complained of the pressure put upon him in such a situation to assign a large portion of his limited forces to the general reserve. His forces were inadequate for even sectional and G.H.Q. Reserves. How could he then find troops for a General Reserve?

I suggested that if, as he believed, the enemy's main weight were to be thrown against the British, he would get the benefit of the whole of this reserve; and if not, *caderet quæstio*. To this he said he preferred the arrangements he had made with General Pétain, by which seven or eight British or

French divisions were to be held ready to move laterally north or south according as the French or British should be found to be the object of the attack. From a general survey of the front it appeared that 110 German divisions faced 57 British, of which at least 40 German divisions faced our Fifth Army; that 85 German divisions faced 95 French; and that 4 German divisions faced the first 3 American divisions, equal in strength to about seven French divisions, which had entered the line at various points, but particularly in the neighbourhood of St. Mihiel.

Our conversation ended about three o'clock. When I came out, the Master-General of the Ordnance suggested to me that as I had two days to spare before beginning the Chemical Warfare Conference at St. Omer, we should pay a flying visit to our old division, the 9th, which I had served in while it was in his charge, and which was now commanded by General Tudor, a friend of mine since subaltern days in India. We set off forthwith. General Tudor's headquarters were at Nurlu, in the devastated region ten miles to the north of Péronne, near the salient of the British line and in the centre of the threatened front. We received a hearty welcome when we arrived after dark upon a tranquil front lit rarely by a gun-flash.

With the 9th Division.

General Tudor was in high expectation. Everything was in readiness. "When do you think it will come?" we asked. "Perhaps to-morrow morning. Perhaps the day after. Perhaps the week after." We spent the whole of the next day in the trenches. A deathly and suspicious silence brooded over the front. For hours not a cannon shot was fired. Yet the sunlit fields were instinct with foreboding. The 9th Division were holding what they called "The Disaster Front," i.e. where the line had been stabilized after the successful German counter-stroke following the Battle of Cambrai.

We examined every part of the defences from Gauche Wood, held by the gallant South Africans, the "Springboks" as they were called, to the medium artillery positions on the slopes behind Havrincourt village. Certainly nothing that human thought and effort could accomplish had been neglected. For four miles in depth the front was a labyrinth of wire and scientifically sited machine-gun nests. The troops, though thin on the ground, were disposed so as to secure full value from every man. Rumours and reasonable expectations that the Germans would employ large numbers of tanks had led to the construction of broad minefields studded with buried shells and sensitive fuses amid wire entanglements. Through the narrow paths across these areas we picked our way gingerly. The sun was setting as we left Gauche Wood and took our leave of the South Africans. I see them now, serene as the Spartans of Leonidas on the eve of Thermopylæ.

The Barrage Falls.

Before I went to my bed in the ruins of Nurlu, Tudor said to me: "It is certainly coming now. Trench raids this evening have identified no less than eight enemy battalions on a single half-mile of the front." The night was quiet except for a rumble of artillery fire, mostly distant, and the thudding explosions of occasional aeroplane raids. I woke up in a complete silence at a few minutes past four and lay musing. Suddenly, after what seemed about half an hour, the silence was broken by six or seven very loud and very heavy explosions several miles away. I thought they were our 12-inch guns, but they were probably mines. And then, exactly as a pianist runs his hands across the keyboard from treble to bass, there rose in less than one minute the most tremendous cannonade I shall ever hear. "At 4.30 a.m.," says Ludendorff in his account, "our barrage came down with a crash." Far away, both to the north and to the south, the intense roar and reverberation rolled upwards to us, while through the chinks in the carefully papered window the flame of the bombardment lit like flickering firelight my tiny cabin.

I dressed and went out. On the duckboards outside the mess I met Tudor.

"This is *it*," he said. "I have ordered all our batteries to open. You will hear them in a minute." But the crash of the German shells bursting on our trench lines eight thousand yards away was so overpowering that the accession to the tumult of nearly two hundred guns firing from much nearer to us could not be even distinguished. From the Divisional Headquarters on the high ground of Nurlu one could see the front line for many miles. It swept around us in a wide curve of red leaping flame stretching to the north far along the front of the Third Army, as well as of the Fifth Army on the south, and quite unending in either direction. There were still two hours to daylight, and the enormous explosions of the shells upon our trenches seemed almost to touch each other, with hardly an interval in space or time. Among the bursting shells there rose at intervals, but almost continually, the much larger flames of exploding magazines. The weight and intensity of the bombardment surpassed anything which anyone had ever known before.

Only one gun was firing at the Headquarters. He belonged to the variety called "Percy," and all his shells fell harmlessly a hundred yards away. A quarter of a mile to the south along the Péronne road a much heavier gun was demolishing the divisional canteen. Daylight supervened on pandemonium, and the flame picture pulsated under a pall of smoke from which great fountains of the exploding "dumps" rose mushroom-headed. It was my duty to leave these scenes; and at ten o'clock, with mingled emotions, I bade my friends farewell and motored without misadventure along the road to Péronne. The impression I had of Tudor was of an iron peg hammered into the frozen ground, immovable. And so indeed it proved. The 9th Division held not only its Battle but its Forward Zone at the junction of the Third and Fifth Armies against every assault, and only retired when ordered to do so in consequence of the general movement of the line.

* * * *

The Scale of the Battle.

It is possible here to give only the barest outline of the battle. Many full and excellent accounts exist. Many more will be written. Taking its scale and intensity together, quantity and quality combined, "Michael" must be regarded without exception as the greatest onslaught in the history of the world. From the Sensée River to the Oise on a front of forty miles, the Germans launched simultaneously thirty-seven divisions of infantry, covered by nearly 6,000 guns. They held in close support nearly thirty divisions more. On the same front the British line of battle was held by seventeen divisions and 2,500 guns, with five divisions in support. In all, the Germans had marshalled and set in motion rather more than three-quarters of a million men against 300,000 British. Over the two ten-mile sectors lying to the north and the south of the salient in which the 9th Division stood, the density of the enemy's formation provided an assaulting division for every thousand yards of ground, and attained the superiority of four to one.

The British troops involved constituted the whole of the Fifth and nearly half the Third Army under the command of General Gough and General Byng respectively. The system of defence comprised a Forward Zone intended to delay the enemy and to break his formations, and a Battle Zone in which the main struggle was to be fought. The average depth of the defensive system was about four miles; behind which again lay a Reserve Zone which there had not been time or labour to fortify, except for the defences of the medium and heavy batteries. Indeed, on the whole of the Fifth Army front, but especially in the newly-transferred sector from the Omignon to Barisis, many of the entrenched lines and points existed only in a rudimentary form. The rear zone, for instance, had a mere line a few inches deep cut in the turf, and communications in the shape of good roads and light railways were still lacking.

The method of defence consisted in an intricate arrangement of small posts, machine-gun nests, and redoubts,

mutually supporting each other, communicating with each other where necessary by trenches and tunnels, and covered or sustained by an exact organization of artillery barrages. Behind the front of the British lay the wilderness of the Somme battlefield. Their left hand rested in a strategic sense upon the massive buttress of the Vimy Ridge; their right was in touch with comparatively weak French forces.

There was no surprise about the time or general direction of the attack. The surprise consisted in its weight, scale and power.

The First Day—The Battle Zone.

After a bombardment of incredible fury for not more than two to four hours, accompanied at certain points by heavy discharges of poison gas, the German infantry began to advance. The whole of this region had been in their possession during 1915 and the greater part of 1916, and there was no lack in any unit of officers and men who knew every inch of the ground. The form of attack which they adopted was an extension of the method of "infiltration" first tried by them in their counter-stroke after the Battle of Cambrai. A low-lying fog, which was in some places dense, favoured their plan at any rate in the initial stages. The system of detached posts on which the British relied, and which their comparatively small numbers had made necessarily rather open in character, depended to a very large extent upon clear vision, both for the machine gunners themselves and to a lesser extent for their protecting artillery.

Aided by the mist, the German infantry freely entered the Forward Zone in small parties of shock troops, carrying with them machine guns and trench mortars. They were followed by large bodies, and even by noon had at many points penetrated the Battle Zone. The British posts, blasted, stunned or stifled by the bombardment or the gas, mystified and baffled by the fog, isolated and often taken in the rear, defended themselves stubbornly and with varying fortunes. Over the whole of the battlefield, which comprised approximately 160 square miles, a vast number of bloody struggles ensued. But the Germans, guided by their excellent organization and their local knowledge, and backed by their immense superiority in numbers, continued during the day to make inroads upon the Battle Zone, and even to pierce it at several points. When darkness fell, nearly all the British divisions had been forced from their original fighting line, and were intermingled at many points with the enemy in the Battle Zone.

Stubborn Resistance of the British Infantry.

The devoted resistance of the isolated British posts levied a heavy toll upon the enemy and played a recognizable part in the final result. From the outset the Germans learned that they had to deal with troops who would fight as long as they had ammunition, irrespective of what happened in any other quarter of the field or whether any hope of success or escape remained. A few instances of these forlorn struggles may record the glories of a hundred.

A platoon of the 2nd London (58th Division) holding Travecy Keep, north of La Fère, was entirely cut off in the morning and constantly attacked. All through the 21st they maintained themselves. They repulsed three heavy attacks at dusk on the 21st, at dawn on the 22nd and at midday on the 22nd. It was not until 5.30 p.m. on the 22nd that this handful of men, alone in the midst of the hostile army and with their ammunition running short, were compelled to surrender.

A company of the 7th Buffs (18th Division) garrisoned Vendeuil Fort in the same neighbourhood. They were first attacked about 9.45 a.m. on the 21st. The Germans advanced in close formation, and their attack was repulsed with great loss and the capture of some prisoners. The enemy then advanced past the fort in the fog, and its defenders knew they were cut off. Both in the evening of the 21st and after bombardment with field guns at dawn on the 22nd, the German attacks were again repulsed. During the 22nd this

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

REFUGEES IN THE MARCH OFFENSIVE.

In March and April, 1918, the scenes of 1914 were repeated in the Somme district and farther north in such localities as Hazebrouck. War touched towns and villages which had hitherto been in the back areas, and once more the melancholy stream of homeless men, women and children streamed westwards.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

BRITISH PRISONERS, MARCH, 1918.

Photographs of German and Turkish prisoners in British cages are common. The reverse side of the medal is more rarely seen. The gallant men of the Fifth Army did all that brave soldiers could do. That many of them were captured is no reflection upon their fighting ability. Rather does it prove that they fought their posts to the last moment and beyond it. Surrounded and cut off, and with the invading tide already far to their rear, further resistance was useless. There remained for them surrender and captivity.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

H.M. THE KING AT DOULLENS.

The King is seen here in conversation with Captain E. Jordan of the Worcestershire Regiment at Doullens Station on March 29, 1918. This battalion, the 10th, had lost 18 officers and 500 men. The state of Captain Jordan's boots and uniform affords some slight evidence of the hardships which this battalion had endured.

company was able to fire on long columns of cavalry, guns and transport passing their fort, and to drive them from the line of march. Not until 4.30 p.m. on the 22nd, when food and ammunition were both exhausted and there was no hope of relief, did they surrender.

On March 22nd Ricardo Redoubt, near Fontaine-les-Clercs (8 miles north-east of Ham), was held by the remains of the 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (36th Division), in all 275 officers and men. During the morning the place was surrounded and repeatedly attacked. About 2 p.m. the Germans brought up field artillery and bombarded the redoubt at close range. About an hour later the enemy gained a footing in the redoubt, and the struggle was continued inside. The Commanding Officer was now wounded, but it was not until 4.40 p.m. that the garrison was crushed after what the history of the German 3rd Guard Regiment describes as "a most gallant resistance."

On the 21st the headquarters and two companies of the 8th Queen's (24th Division) held the village of Le Verguier, seven miles north-west of St. Quentin, in the Battle Zone. During the day heavy frontal and flank attacks were made by the enemy, but all were repulsed. Greatly superior numbers of the enemy lay dead in the wire entanglements. No progress could be made by the Germans in this quarter. At 6.30 a.m. on the 22nd, aided by the morning mist, the enemy renewed his attack. The attack from the east by the German 185th Regiment failed. But the 5th German Guards, attacking from the north, succeeded in penetrating the side of the village and took in rear the defenders of the east face. The eastern part of the village was thus lost; but Fort Greathead and Fort Lees, as these small posts were called, on the western outskirts still held out. All men who could retire from the other posts reinforced these two, and thus strengthened they continued to repulse repeated attacks. The battalion headquarters in a sunken road south of the village was then discovered and attacked by the enemy. Orderlies, servants and cooks

were quickly collected, and a spirited fight at close quarters ensued. The Germans were driven off.

About 9.30 a.m. the Commanding Officer went towards Fort Lees, the more northerly of the two posts and found it had been lost. The remainder of the battalion was now nearly surrounded, and orders were given to retire. The defenders of Fort Greathead and of the battalion headquarters assembled in the sunken road leading south-westward from the village, and under cover of the mist marched off and rejoined their division with only one further casualty. They had defended Le Verguier for twenty-four hours, and its ruins with their last defenders were taken by converging attacks made by five German battalions from north, east and south, supported by all the available artillery of two divisions.

On the 22nd one company of the 11th Royal Scots (9th Division) was holding Revelon Farm, near Heudicourt (nine miles north-east of Péronne). During the afternoon Heudicourt Station, to the south of Revelon Farm, was taken by the enemy. This enabled him to advance on the farm from the south as well as from the east. The British record can carry the tale no further than that the company of the Royal Scots were last seen fighting hard for their farm at 5 p.m. German accounts however testify to their defence. Bombarded at close range by artillery and trench mortars, bombed by aeroplanes, and kept under ceaseless streams of machine-gun bullets, the survivors resisted to the uttermost; and it was nearly 6 o'clock when parts of three different German regiments stormed the farm. In the soldierly words of the history of the German 123rd Regiment, "they covered the retreat of the main body to the extent of being destroyed themselves."

The Germans Cross the Somme.

The conflict was continuous. Fresh German troops poured ceaselessly into action. By the evening of the 22nd the British Fifth Army had been driven completely beyond its battle zone and half the Army was beyond its last prescribed defensive line. The British Third Army still fought in and around the battle zone. The German penetration

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

BLINDED BY TEAR GAS.

A pitiful line of helpless men at an advanced dressing-station near Bethune on April 10, 1918. Their eyes have been affected by tear gas and for the time being they are blinded. Each man rests his hand upon the shoulder of the man in front for guidance as the procession moves slowly towards the doctors.

south of the Oise had made serious progress. The British losses by death, wounds or capture exceeded 100,000 men; and nearly 500 guns were already lost. An immense slaughter was also wrought upon the German side. At every step they paid the price of the offensive, but their great numbers rendered their losses inappreciable during the crisis. Overwhelming reserves were close at hand.

The British on the other hand had only eight divisions in general reserve; of which five were readily available; and the French were too slowly moved or too far away to give effective assistance for several days. Therefore on the night of the 22nd, Sir Hubert Gough ordered a general retreat of the Fifth Army behind the Somme. His orders had been "to protect at all costs the important centre of Péronne and the River Somme to the South" of it. He was fully justified in retiring in a general rear-guard action up to this line. But once the retreat of so thin a line on such a wide front had begun, it was very difficult to stop as long as the enemy pressure continued. The circumstances of each corps or division were so various that those who made a stand found their flanks exposed by others falling back. A great many of the bridges across the Somme were blown up; but enough were left—and among them the most important bridges, confided to the railway authorities and not to the troops—to enable the Germans to pass artillery rapidly across. Moreover, the river was easily fordable at this time.

Backward then across the hideous desolation of the old crater-fields rolled the British front for five days in succession. The Cavalry Corps filled the gaps in the line, and the Air Force, concentrating all its strength upon the battle, flying low, inflicted heavy losses on the endless marching columns. Meanwhile reserves drawn from other parts of the line, and improvised forces from the schools and technical establishments, continually reached the scene. At the same time, with every day's advance, the strength and momentum of the German thrust abated. The actual fighting gave place to the painful toiling westward of two weary armies; and when the retreating British were sufficiently reinforced to come to a general halt, their pursuers found themselves not less exhausted, and far in front of their own artillery and supplies. By the evening of the 27th the first crisis of the great battle was over.

"Mars."

All the "Michaels" had struck their blow. But where was "Mars"? The Sixth Army and the right of the Seventeenth were to have entered the battle towards Arras and the Vimy Ridge on the 23rd. That they did not attack till the 28th was due to a deeply significant cause. General Byng had secretly withdrawn his troops from the line at Monchy, and already occupied a position four miles in the rear. The Germans bombarded the empty trenches of a false front. It took them four days and nights to bring their artillery forward and mount the assault against the new position. Thus the second great wave did not synchronize with the full surge of the first. The second great battle did not contribute to the intensity of the first, but came as a separate event after the climax of the first was over. Moreover, the progress made by the Second and the Seventeenth German Armies in the original attack had not fulfilled Ludendorff's expectations.

At 9.30 on the morning of the 23rd he was led to abandon his prime strategic hope, namely the general defeat, and driving to the coast of the British armies in France, and to content himself with the extremely valuable definite objective of dividing the British from the French through the capture of Amiens toward which the Eighteenth and Second Armies were progressing. His order given at noon was: "A considerable portion of the British Army has now been beaten. . . . The objective of the operation is now to separate the French and British by a rapid advance on both sides of the Somme." This was already a remarkable contraction of aim.

On the morning of the 28th the delayed attack against the Arras position

(Mars) began. It was delivered on a twenty-mile front by twenty German divisions against eight British divisions. The methods of both sides were the same as on March 21. But the weather was clear, and the machine guns and artillery of the defence could reach their highest concert. Everywhere the attack was repulsed with tremendous slaughter. Even the Forward Zone was held at many points. Nowhere was the Battle Zone seriously affected. No outside reserves were required by the defending divisions. The Germans, who advanced with the utmost bravery, were mown down in heaps.[1] As the result of the eight days' struggle the British Army, virtually unaided by the French, had stemmed or broken the greatest offensive ever launched.

French Assistance.

The French had been coming fitfully and feebly into action on the southern portion of the battlefield from the morning of the 23rd. At dawn that day one division (the 125th) came into action. A French dismounted cavalry division entered the line in the evening. The 9th, 10th, 62nd, and 22nd French Divisions were in line on the afternoon of the 24th, though two of them had no artillery and none of them had "cookers" or more than fifty rounds of rifle ammunition per man. On the morning of the 25th General Fayolle assumed responsibility for the whole of the Fifth Army front south of the Somme. But up till the 27th the main weight of the fighting, even in this area, still continued to be borne by the exhausted British troops. At no time up till the end of the 28th, when both the first and the second crises of the battle were over, did the French have simultaneously in action more than six divisions, and none of these were seriously engaged. The struggle up till its turning point on the 28th was between the British and Germans alone.

[1] "It would almost seem," says Sir Douglas Haig's Staff Officer, "as if the only difference numbers in the attack make to a properly located machine-gun defence, when there is light and time to see, is to provide a better target." No one can quarrel with such a conclusion.

The Last Phase.

Its last phase was now at hand, and in this the ever-gathering strength of the French on those portions of the front still involved played an equal part with the British. The Eighteenth German Army, brushing back weak French resistance, had actually taken Montdidier on the 27th. But this was the farthest point of the German advance. Says Ludendorff: "The enemy's line was now becoming denser, and in places they were even attacking themselves; while our armies were no longer strong enough to overcome them unaided. The ammunition was not sufficient, and supply became difficult. The repair of roads and railways was taking too long, in spite of all our preparations. After thoroughly replenishing ammunition, the Eighteenth Army attacked between Montdidier and Noyon on March 30. On April 4 the Second Army and the right wing of the Eighteenth attacked at Albert, south of the Somme towards Amiens. These actions were *indecisive*.[1] It was an established fact that the enemy's resistance was beyond our strength. . . . The battle was over by April 4."

Ludendorff's Strategic Failure.

Let us focus what had actually happened. With whom lay the victory? Contrary to the generally accepted verdict, I hold that the Germans, judged by the hard test of gains and losses, were decisively defeated. Ludendorff failed to achieve a single strategic object. By the morning of the 23rd he had been forced to resign his dream of overwhelming and crumpling back upon the sea the main strength of the British armies, and to content himself with the hope of capturing Amiens and perhaps dividing the British from the French. After April 4 he abandoned both these most important but to him secondary aims.

"Strategically," he says, "we had not achieved what the events of the 23rd, 24th and 25th had encouraged us to hope for. That we had also failed to take Amiens . . . was specially disappointing."

[1] My italics.

What then had been gained? The Germans had reoccupied their old battlefields and the regions they had so cruelly devastated and ruined a year before. Once again they entered into possession of those grisly trophies. No fertile province, no wealthy cities, no river or mountain barrier, no new untapped resources were their reward. Only the crater-fields extending abominably wherever the eye could turn, the old trenches, the vast graveyards, the skeletons, the blasted trees and the pulverized villages—these, from Arras to Montdidier and from St. Quentin to Villers-Bretonneux, were the Dead Sea fruits of the mightiest military conception and the most terrific onslaught which the annals of war record. The price they paid was heavy. They lost for the first time in the war, or at any rate since Ypres in 1914, two soldiers killed for every one British, and three officers killed for every two British.

They made 60,000 prisoners and captured over a thousand guns, together with great stores of ammunition and material. But their advantage in prisoners was more than offset by their greater loss in wounded. Their consumption of material exceeded their captures. If the German loss of men was serious, the loss of time was fatal. The great effort had been made and had not succeeded. The German Army was no longer crouched, but sprawled. A great part of its reserves had been exposed and involved. The stress of peril on the other hand wrung from the Allies exertions and sacrifices which, as will be seen, far more than made good their losses.

The recriminations upon this battle left a lasting imprint on British political history. In April, General Maurice, the Director at the War Office of Military Operations, indignant at the failure to reinforce the Army in the winter, accused Mr. Lloyd George of incorrectly stating to the House of Commons the facts and figures of the case. Tension and uncertainty arose not only in the Opposition, but among the Government supporters, and even in its own ranks. When a formal challenge in debate was made by Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister convinced the House that his statement had

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

PREPARING A REPORT.

A scene which will revive memories of many an anxious moment on the Western Front. Orders and reports were perforce at times written under circumstances of difficulty, discomfort or danger, frequently all three combined. The photograph reproduced above was taken near Meteren on April 16, 1918, the writer being a captain in command of the 1st Battalion The Middlesex Regiment during the battle for Bailleul.

Photo : Imperial War Museum.

FIXING A DEMOLITION CHARGE.

Retreat means difficult and dangerous work for the Royal Engineers. Roads must be mined, bridges prepared for demolition, and anything that will delay or embarrass the advancing enemy thought out and carried into execution. The R.E. officer in this photograph is carrying out the delicate operation of fixing a demolition charge in readiness for blowing up a bridge over the La Bassée Canal at Bethune on April 11, 1918.

been founded on information supplied in writing by General Maurice's Deputy. This was decisive on the issue, and the actual merits of the controversy were scarcely discussed. The division which followed was accepted by Mr. Lloyd George as marking the cleavage between his Liberal followers and those of Mr. Asquith. When, eight months later, in the hour of victory, the General Election took place, all who had voted against the Government on this occasion were opposed by the triumphant Coalition, and scarcely any escaped political exclusion. The reverberations of the quarrel continue to this day.

Where the Blame Lies.

We may however attempt a provisional judgment. If Haig had not consumed his armies at Paschendaele, or if at least he had been content to stop that offensive in September, he would have commanded (without any addition to the drafts actually sent him from England, in the winter) sufficient reserves on March 21 to enable him to sustain the threatened front. But for the horror which Paschendaele inspired in the minds of the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet, he would no doubt have been supplied with very much larger reinforcements. He would thus have gained both in economy of life and also in larger reinforcements. If, notwithstanding Paschendaele, the War Cabinet had reinforced him as they should have done, the front could still have been held on March 21.

The responsibility for the causes which led to the British inadequacy of numbers is shared between General Headquarters and the War Cabinet. By constitutional doctrine the greatest responsibility unquestionably rests upon the War Cabinet, who failed to make their Commander conform to their convictions on a question which far transcended the military or technical sphere, and who

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

CHEERFUL IN ADVERSITY

Men of a Highland regiment going forward in support during the Somme battle of March, 1918. Scottish troops, particularly such divisions as the 9th and 51st, stood high in the list of formations considered by the Germans to be specially worthy of respect. The Australians also, with their unorthodox methods of waging war, were regarded by the enemy as being particularly formidable adversaries.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE GUARDS NEAR ARRAS.

The Guards, as might have been expected, fought magnificently throughout the war. A battalion is shown here moving forward by motor lorry near Arras on March 22, 1918. The sergeant seen in the foreground is a fair sample of the fine physical type always associated with the Guards. The 4th Brigade of Guards, with other formations mentioned in the text, fought before Hazebrouck with indomitable courage during the April, 1918, offensive, and there on the fringes of Nieppe Forest the furious German onslaught was brought to a standstill.

also failed to do full justice to the Army because of their disagreement with the Commander-in-Chief. In view however of the preponderance of military influence in time of war, and the serious dangers of a collision between the "soldiers" and the politicians, a very considerable burden must be borne by the British Headquarters.

* * * *

In Whitehall.

My work at the Chemical Warfare School near St. Omer occupied the whole of the 23rd, and I did not reach London till midday on the 24th. No information of any value about the progress of the battle had been available at the Chemical School. I therefore went immediately to the War Office to learn the news from France. Sir Henry Wilson, with the gravest face, showed me the telegrams and his own map. We both walked across to Downing Street, where the Prime Minister was expecting him.

It was a bright crisp day, and Mr. Lloyd George was seated in the garden with Lord French. He seemed to think that I had news at first hand, and turned towards me. I explained that I knew nothing beyond what he had already read in his telegrams, and had seen nothing but the first few hours of the bombardment in a single sector. After some general conversation he took me aside and posed the following question: If we could not hold the line we had fortified so carefully, why should we be able to hold any positions farther back with troops already defeated? I answered that every offensive lost its force as it proceeded. It was like throwing a bucket of water over the floor. It first rushed forward, then soaked forward, and finally stopped altogether until another bucket could be brought. After thirty or forty miles there would certainly come a considerable breathing space, when the front could be reconstituted if every effort were made.

It appeared that he had already despatched Lord Milner to France, though I was not aware of this. The Chief of the Staff said that he himself intended to go over that night. We arranged to dine together at my house in Eccleston Square before he left. Only my wife was present. I never remember in the whole course of the war a more anxious evening. One of the great qualities in Mr. Lloyd George was his power of obliterating the past and concentrating his whole being upon meeting the new situation. There were 200,000 troops in England that could be swiftly sent. What about munitions and equipment? Wilson said, "We might well lose a thousand guns," and that mountains of ammunition and stores of every kind must have been abandoned. I was thankful to be in a position to say that about these at least there need be no worry. Everything could be replaced at once from our margins without affecting the regular supply. Presently the Chief of the General Staff went to catch his train, and we were left alone together. The resolution of the Prime Minister was unshaken under his truly awful responsibilities.

Meanwhile an event had occurred which, though it did not influence the course of the battle, was nevertheless of capital importance. On the night of the 24th, when the battle was at its worst, General Pétain, whose weak and tardy assistance was causing grave concern, met Haig and his Chief of Staff at Dury near Amiens. Although sixty-two German divisions had already been identified in the battle, of which forty-eight were fresh from the Reserve, Pétain asserted that the main blow was yet to fall, and that it would fall on the French in Champagne. He informed Haig that if the Germans continued to press on to Amiens, the French troops then concentrating about Montdidier would be withdrawn upon Beauvais to cover Paris in accordance with the orders of the French Government. He indicated that action in this sense had already been taken. Haig's original orders, given him personally by Lord Kitchener more than two years before, were in brief to "keep united with the French Army at all costs." But here at the crisis was a complete abandonment of the basic principle of unity.

The Doullens Meeting.

On learning this fatal intention, Sir Douglas Haig telegraphed to the Secretary of State for War and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to come over immediately. But both, as we have seen, had already started independently. Milner, acting with the necessary energy, after seeing Haig's Chief of Staff at St. Omer, motored straight through to Paris and collected the President of the Republic, Clémenceau and Foch. Together they all proceeded to Compiègne on the 25th, examined Pétain as to his intentions, and finally, bringing Pétain with them at noon on the 26th, met Haig at Doullens, where Henry Wilson had already arrived. The magnitude of the danger had melted all prejudices and oppositions, personal and national alike. Only one name was in every mind. Foch, a week ago described as a "dotard," was the indispensable man. He alone possessed the size and the combative energy to prevent the severance of the French and British armies.

Milner proposed that Foch should have control of the forces in front of Amiens. Haig declared that this was insufficient and that Foch must be given actual command of the French and British armies as a whole "from the Alps to the North Sea." At a conference in London a month before, the old "Tiger" had dealt abruptly with the outspoken misgivings of Foch. "Taisez-vous. I am the representative of France." Now it was Foch's turn to speak. "It is a hard task you offer me now: a compromised situation, a crumbling front, an adverse battle in full progress. Nevertheless, I accept." Thus there was established for the first time on the Western Front that unity of command to-

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

A 6-INCH GUN IN ACTION.

The bigger guns in a retreat are a particularly heavy responsibility. They must come into action, but as this photograph demonstrates, they are difficult to move in a hurry, and are particularly liable to be captured if the enemy advance is rapid. The gun shown here is a 6-inch Mark VII, and when the photograph was taken was going into action near Hedauville on March 26, 1918.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

DIRECT HIT ON AN 18-PDR.

A British field gun put out of action by a direct hit on the Somme in March, 1918. Men can be seen in the trench in the middle distance.

wards which Mr. Lloyd George had long directed his cautious, devious but persevering steps, and to which, whatever may be said to the contrary (and it is not little) history will ascribe an inestimable advantage for the cause of the Allies.

The emergency arrangements were confirmed and elaborated a few weeks later in the so-called "Beauvais Agreement," under which the Commander-in-Chief of a National Army was secured right of appeal to his own Government if he claimed that an order of the Generalissimo endangered the safety of his troops.

General Gough.

Hard measure was meted out to General Gough. The Fifth Army from the 28th onwards ceased to exist. Its shattered divisions were painfully reorganized behind the line. The gap was filled by the now rapidly arriving French, by the cavalry, by the improvised forces collected from the Schools, and by General Rawlinson who began, from scanty and diverse materials, to constitute a "Fourth Army" and to maintain the tottering and fluctuating line of battle.

His Supersession.

Gough never received another fighting command. The Cabinet insisted on his removal on the ground, probably valid, that he had lost the confidence of his troops. This officer had fought his way upwards through the whole war from a Cavalry Brigade to the command of an Army. He was held to have greatly distinguished himself on the Ancre at the close of 1916. With Plumer he bore the brunt of Paschendaele while it continued, and its blame when it ended rested upon him.

He was a typical cavalry officer, with a strong personality and a gay and boyish charm of manner. A man who never spared himself or his troops, the instrument of costly and forlorn attacks, he emerged from the Paschendaele tragedy pursued by many fierce resentments among his high subordinates, rumours of which had even reached the rank and file. For over a year his reputation had been such that troops and leaders alike disliked inclusion in the Fifth Army. There was a conviction that in that Army supplies were awkward and attacks not sufficiently

studied. In these circumstances Gough was not in a position to surmount the impression of a great disaster. The sternest critic has however been unable to find ground for censuring his general conduct of the battle of March 21. It appears that he took every measure, both before and during the battle, which experience and energy could devise and of which his utterly inadequate resources admitted; that his composure never faltered, that his activity was inexhaustible, that his main decisions were prudent and resolute, and that no episode in his career was more honourable than the disaster which entailed his fall.

* * * *

It was my responsibility to make good the assurance I had given that all losses in material would be immediately replaced; and for this the Munitions Council, its eighty departments and its two and a half million workers, men and women, toiled with a cold passion that knew no rest. Everywhere the long-strained factories rejected the Easter breathing space which health required. One thought dominated the whole gigantic organization—to make everything good within a month. Guns, shells, rifles, ammunition, Maxim guns, Lewis guns, tanks, aeroplanes and a thousand ancillaries were all gathered from our jealously hoarded reserves. Risks are relative, and I decided, without subsequent misadventure, to secure an earlier month's supply of guns by omitting the usual firing tests.

On the 26th I issued the following notice:—

"A special effort must be made to replace promptly the serious losses in munitions which are resulting from the great battle now in progress. It should be our part in the struggle to maintain the armament and equipment of the fighting troops at the highest level. Our resources are fortunately sufficient to accomplish this up to the present in every class of munitions. But it is necessary to speed up the completion and despatch of important parts of the work in hand. I rely upon every one concerned in the manufacture of tanks to put forward their best efforts. There should therefore be no cessation of this work during the Easter holidays. Please notify your essential sub-contractors to this effect.

"I acknowledge with gratitude the spontaneous assurances already received from the men in many districts that there will be no loss of output. Now is the time to show the fighting army what the industrial army can achieve."

The Munition Workers' Achievement.

The response was so complete that explanations had to be offered a few days later to those who felt their work slighted because they had not been called upon to sacrifice their hard-earned holidays.

"The Minister of Munitions desires to acknowledge in the warmest terms the widespread and indeed general response which has been made from all parts of the country to the appeal to the munition workers to give up their Easter holidays. He would like to accept all the offers that have been made. But military and railway exigencies at this juncture make it necessary to confine acceptance to those classes of work particularly referred to in the Minister's appeal. All firms whose work must be specially accelerated have now been notified individually by official telegram that they should work through Easter. Those who have not been notified should take their holidays now. This will allow the railway facilities to be used to the highest advantage for the most urgent needs. It in no way implies that one class of munitions work is more important than another, and it is vital that all munition outputs should be increased to the maximum which material allows."

The Guns Replaced.

Before the end of the month I was able to assure the War Cabinet and General Headquarters that nearly two thousand new guns of every nature, with their complete equipments, could be supplied by April 6 as fast as they could be handled by the receiving department of the Army.

In fact, however, twelve hundred met the need.

CHAPTER LXXII

THE CLIMAX

The Battle of the Lys, April 9—The Portuguese Gap—The Second Wave—The Buttresses Stand—The Battle is Prolonged—The "Backs-to-the-Wall" Order—April 12, the Climax—Haig's Appeals to Foch—Reasons for Foch's Obduracy—Munitions and Tanks—The King's Message to the Munition Workers—Two Bleak Hypotheses—My Note of April 18—Tragic Contingencies—United Armies—The Loss at Kemmel Hill—The False Alarm—Ludendorff Flinches—Defeat and Losses of the Germans.

ON Tuesday, April 9, the third great battle effort of the Germans against the British began. In order to stem the German advance upon Amiens, Sir Douglas Haig had been forced to thin his line elsewhere. Instead of doing this evenly, he had exercised a wise process of selection. He held in strength the great central bastion from Arras to the La Bassée Canal at Givenchy. This comprised the highly defensible and important area of the Lens coalfields, as well as the mass of commanding ground which included the key positions of the Vimy and Lorette Heights. To the north of this it was inevitable that the line should be dangerously weak.

The Battle of the Lys, April 9.

Out of fifty-eight British infantry divisions, forty-six had already been engaged on the Somme. The Fifth Army divisions were reorganizing and unfit to enter the line. To hold the front of 40,000 yards between the La Bassée Canal and the Ypres Canal, Haig could only provide six divisions. Each of these divisions must be stretched to cover over 7,000 yards—stretched wider, that is to say, than the Fifth Army divisions before March 21; and almost all the troops had fought with most severe losses in the preceding fortnight on the Somme. Since even these precarious dispositions could not be completed in the pressure of events before the German blow fell, nearly 10,000 yards of front by Neuve Chapelle were at the moment held by a Portuguese division of four brigades.

The Portuguese Gap.

It was upon this denuded front, the day before the Portuguese were to have been relieved by two British divisions, that Ludendorff struck. By April 3, seventeen divisions had been added to the German Sixth and four to the German Fourth Army. The Sixth Army was to attack towards Hazebrouck and the heights beyond Kemmel, and the Fourth was to support it and exploit success. The town of Armentières, having been smothered with gas shells by a bombardment beginning on the evening of the 7th, constituted an impassable area; and with their northern flank thus protected, ten German divisions in an eleven-miles line marched against the 2nd Portuguese Division and the 40th and 55th British Divisions on each side of it. No less than seven German divisions fell upon the four Portuguese brigades, and immediately swept them out of existence as a military force. The 40th Division, its flank opened by the Portuguese disaster, was also speedily overwhelmed.

A thick mist blanketed the British machine-gun nests arranged in depth behind the line. Within two hours of the advance of the German infantry a gap of over 15,000 yards had been opened in the front, through which the

German masses were pouring. The 50th and 51st Divisions, who formed the British reserves, moved to their appointed stations in the second line of defence at the crossings of the Lys and the Lawe Rivers as soon as the battle began; but the unexampled suddenness of the break-through, the vehemence of the German advance, the streams of retreating Portuguese, and the general confusion prevented them from fully occupying their prepared positions. They were rapidly absorbed in a moving battle against vastly superior numbers. After a day of violent fighting the Germans had reached the outskirts of Estaires, five kilometres behind the original line, and around this pocket of assault the remains of five British divisions struggled to create and maintain a front against sixteen German divisions all fully engaged.

The Second Wave.

At daylight on the morning of the 10th a second wave of German assault was launched by the German Fourth Army to the north of Armentières on a four-mile front. This phase of the offensive had been timed to begin twenty-four hours after the main attack, in the well-founded expectation that the British reserves in this sector would by then have been drawn into the first battle. Four brigades had in fact been diverted, and the whole weight of five German divisions fell upon five brigades of the 19th and 25th Divisions, who had behind them in reserve only the remaining brigade of the 29th Division. The assault was successful. The front was broken. "Plugstreet" village, the greater part of Messines and the crest of the Wytschaete Ridge fell into the hands of the enemy by noon. The 34th Division was in the greatest danger of being cut off around Armentières, and by the evening of the 10th the Germans were actual or potential masters of the whole British defensive system from Wytschaete to Givenchy.

During the day both Lestrem and Estaires had been taken, and night found the survivors of eight British divisions holding an improvised front of thirty miles at death grips with twenty-seven German divisions, of which twenty-one had actually been involved in the battle. The 34th Division extricated itself from Armentières during the night, and only by skill escaped the fast closing pincers.

The Buttresses Stand.

But while this formidable inroad had been made upon the greater part of the front assailed, the line on either flank held firm. A Lancashire division, the 55th, perfectly fortified and organized in Givenchy and Festubert, continued to repulse for seven successive days every attack, losing 3,000 men and taking 900 prisoners. On the northern flank of the offensive lay the 9th Scottish Division whom we left unshakable at Nurlu on the morning of March 21. After fighting with the utmost distinction and success in that great battle and losing over 5,000 officers and men, it had been hastily filled with drafts and brought to rest and recuperate in what was believed to be a quiet station. The whole front to the southward having been beaten in, its right flank was turned back, and the resurrected South African brigade, at four in the afternoon of the 10th, drove the Germans from the Messines crest. All efforts to oust this division from the position into which it had clawed itself failed. Thus the buttresses stood immovable, although the wall between them was completely battered in. Upon this fact the safety of the whole front and the final result of the battle unquestionably depended.

On the 11th the enemy, his Sixth and Fourth Army fronts united, extended his inroads in every direction except the flanks which he could not widen. Villages and townships, which had for more than three years been the home of the British armies or whose names were associated with hard-won victories, fell into his hands. Merville, Nieppe and the rest of Messines were lost. As his front extended the enemy was able to deploy additional divisions and simultaneously to increase the weight of the attack and stretch the thin-drawn fluctuating line of the defence. The 50th and 51st Divisions maintained during the

whole of April 10 and 11 a desperate struggle with seven or more German divisions along an oscillating but receding front of 20,000 yards.

By the end of this day the German line formed a salient or bulge fifteen kilometres deep and sixty-four wide in the original British positions. Meanwhile reinforcements were hurrying to the scene by march, bus and train. The rest of the 29th Division began to arrive on the northern front of attack, and the 4th, 5th, 31st (including the 4th Guards Brigade), 33rd, 61st and 1st Australian Divisions were all moving to the southern sector. Every yard of the ground was disputed, and in the close fierce fighting which never ceased night or day the German losses, like their numbers, were at least double those of the British. Here at last, though perilous, agonizing and unrecognized, was the real battle of attrition.

LYS AND KEMMEL OFFENSIVES: APRIL, 1918.

Sketch map showing the progress of the German armies in the sectors south of Ypres between April 9 and 29, 1918.

The Battle is Prolonged.

The initial success of the German thrust had exceeded Ludendorff's expectations, and during the first forty-eight hours of the battle he formed the resolve to extend the scale of the attack and strike with all his strength for the Channel ports. From April 12 onwards the German reserves were thrown profusely into the conflict, and both the German Army Commanders, Quast and Sixt von Armin, were encouraged to draw freely from the main concentrations in the north. Begun as a diversion to draw Allied reserves from the Amiens front, the Battle of the Lys had now become a primary operation.

* * * *

To/All ranks of the British Forces in France

Three weeks ago today the Enemy began his terrific attacks against us on a 50 mile front. His objects are to separate us from the French, & take the Channel ports and destroy the British Army.

Despite throwing already 106 Divisions into the battle and ~~suffering~~ enduring the most reckless sacrifice of human life, he has as yet made little progress towards his goals.

We owe this to the determined fighting & self sacrifice of our troops. Words fail me to express the admiration which I feel for the splendid resistance offered by all ranks of our Army under the most trying circumstances.

Many amongst us now are ~~wearied~~ tired. To those I would say that Victory will belong to the side which holds out the longest. The French army is moving rapidly & in great force to our support. . . . .

There is no other course open to us but to fight it out! Every position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause each one of you must fight on to the end. The safety of our Homes and the Freedom of mankind alike depend upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment. ~~But I have~~ full confidence, the British Empire ~~must win in the End~~.

D. Haig. F.M.

Thursday
11 April 1918

FACSIMILE OF "BACKS TO THE WALL" ORDER.

Sir Douglas Haig's famous order of April 12, 1918, is reproduced above in facsimile. This order, which is likely to rank in history with Nelson's inspiring signal at Trafalgar, had the effect of inspiring weary men and hardening their resolution for one last supreme effort. The Commander-in-Chief's appeal was not in vain. The line held fast, and, as was the case with the French at Verdun, the attacking German waves exhausted their fury upon a breakwater of dour and determined men.

From the general not less than from the British point of view, April 12 is probably, after the Marne, the climax of the war. It looked as if the Germans had resolved to stake their fate and their regathered superiority on battering the life out of the British Army. During twenty days they had hurled nearly ninety divisions in three great battles upon an Army which counted no more than fifty-eight, and of these nearly half were fastened to fronts not under attack. With a superiority of numbers in the areas of assault of three and often four

to one, with their brilliantly trained shock troops, with their extraordinary skill and enterprise in manœuvring with machine guns and trench mortars, with their new infiltration scheme, with their corroding mustard gas, with their terrific artillery and great science of war, they might well succeed.

The French seemed to the British Headquarters sunk in stupor and passivity. Since the Nivelle disaster they had been grappling with mutiny and nursing their remaining resources. With the exception of the "set piece" battle of Malmaison in the winter, and the stinted and tardy divisions which had been involved south of the Somme in the later stages of March 21, they had only fought in ordinary trench warfare for nearly nine months. During that time the much smaller British Army had fought almost unceasingly, and wisely or unwisely had sacrificed in the common cause, apart from the prolonged Arras-Messines offensive of 1917, more than 400,000 men in the Paschendaele tragedy, and had now lost nearly 300,000 more under Ludendorff's terrible hammer.

It was upon an army bled white by frightful losses, its regimental officers shorn away by scores of thousands, its batteries and battalions filled and refilled with young soldiers plunged into battle before they knew their officers or each other, that the massed might of the desperate German Empire now fell.

The "Backs-to-the-Wall" Order.

Moreover, the shock could not be deadened nor breathing space gained by ceding ground. No large retirement like the "*Alberich*" manœuvre was open to Sir Douglas Haig. A few kilometres might be yielded here and there. The dearly bought ground of Paschendaele could be given up and some relief obtained thereby. Ypres could in the last resource be let go. But in front of Amiens, in front of Arras, in front of Béthune, in front of Hazebrouck he must stand or fall. Therefore on the morning of the 12th the Commander, usually so restrained and, as it had seemed, unresponsive, published to his troops the order of the day which is printed in facsimile on the opposite page: "There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight on to the end." All units and all ranks of the British Expeditionary Force therefore prepared themselves to conquer or die.

April 12, the Climax.

The convulsion continued. The reinforcements closed the gaps that were hourly torn in the struggling line. Companies, battalions, even whole brigades were obliterated where they stood. Ludendorff, resolute, ruthless, hazard-loving, raised his stakes. More and more of the German reserves were committed to the onset. The roar of the cannonade resounded through Flanders and reverberated across the Channel. But nothing could move the 55th Division on the right nor the 9th on the left. The Australians were coming, but their trains were late; and the 4th Guards Brigade all through the 12th and 13th may be discerned, where all was valour, barring the path to Hazebrouck. So intermingled were the units and formations in the fighting line, that across the Bailleul-Armentières road, Freyberg, V.C., four years before a Sub-Lieutenant, found himself holding a front of 4,000 yards with elements of four different divisions, and covered by the remnants of two divisional artilleries that had drifted back with the line. Neuve Eglise was lost, and Bailleul and Méteren; and under the intense pressure the front bent backwards. But it did not break. When on the 17th eight German divisions—seven of them fresh—were violently repulsed in their attack on the famous hill of Kemmel, the crisis of the Battle of the Lys was over. The orders of the Commander had been strictly and faithfully fulfilled.

* * * *

Haig's Appeals to Foch.

Even before the beginning of the Battle of the Lys, Sir Douglas Haig

had convinced himself that Ludendorff meant to make a dead-set at the British Army. He accordingly appealed to Foch for aid.

He asked the Generalissimo to take without delay one of the three following courses, viz. :—

"(1) To open an offensive in the next five or six days with the French armies on a scale sufficient to attract the enemy's reserves, or

"(2) To relieve the British troops south of the Somme (a total of four divisions), or

"(3) To place a group of four French divisions in the neighbourhood of St. Pol as a reserve to the British front."

He wrote again on the 10th after the battle had begun that the

"enemy would without a doubt continue to strike against his troops until they were exhausted. It was vital that the French Army should take immediate steps to relieve some part of the British front and take an active share in the battle."

He renewed his solicitations on the 11th and on the 14th. Finally on the 15th he recorded his—

"opinion that the arrangements made by the Generalissimo were insufficient to meet the military situation."

In order to press his demands with greater insistency, and withal to maintain good relations with the Supreme Commander, Haig, as early as April 10, had taken General Du Cane, who was actually commanding the XVth British Corps in full battle on the Lys, and sent him to reside at Foch's headquarters as a High "Go-between" or Liaison Officer.

These requests were intensely painful to Foch. His primary endeavour was to gather and husband his reserves. The control exercised over the reserves was, he considered, the main function of a Commander on the defensive. Ten British divisions had already on account of their losses had to be reduced to cadre, and their survivors used as reinforcements for the rest. When could these divisions, he asked, be reconstituted? Could not the British when the crisis of the battle was over start a "roulement" of tired British divisions to quiet parts of the French front? These counter-requests ill accorded with the desperate struggle in which the British were involved. Painful differences developed at a conference held at Abbeville on April 14 between Foch and Haig at which Lord Milner was present. Foch took the

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE LYS.

Outpost of the Warwicks in a ruined barn near Marquois on April 13, 1918. The Lys sector, embracing Armentières and Plugstreet Wood, was the scene of severe fighting at various times throughout the war. A shell-torn and desolate region, the Germans overran it during their advance to Bailleul. Rather more than five months later they were forced to give up all their gains and retire across the Lys.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

ROLL CALL OF THE 1ST BLACK WATCH.

The 1st Battalion Royal Highlanders (The Black Watch) paraded for roll call outside their billets on April 10, 1918. As was the case with nearly every other unit, the Black Watch suffered heavily in the German 1918 offensive. During the Great War this famous regiment raised many battalions, the majority of which served overseas in France, Flanders, Macedonia and Palestine.

view that "la bataille du Nord," as he called it, was dying down, and that his reserves were suitably placed to intervene either in the Flanders battle or in the Battle of Arras-Amiens-Montdidier, which he expected would be renewed at any moment. His attitude excited the resentment of the British representatives, and no agreement was reached. He had seen the 1st British Army Corps fight at Ypres in 1914; and the impression that British troops would stand any test if resolutely called upon was indelible.

Reasons for Foch's Obduracy.

It was no doubt the duty of Foch to hoard his reserves and to extort the fullest effort from every part of the Allied armies; but he was at least premature in his judgment that "the battle in the North was dying down," nor had he any right to count upon the intense resistance which was in the event forthcoming from the desperately pressed British troops. Foch's doctrine of never relieving troops during a battle may apply to a battle of two or three days; but struggles prolonged over weeks do not admit of such rules. Divisions after a certain point, if not relieved, simply disappear through slaughter and intermingling with the reinforcements who are sent to sustain them; and the individual survivors of many days of ceaseless peril, horror and concussion become numb and lifeless, even though unscathed by steel.

The British Government and Headquarters alike, upon whose initiative Foch had just been raised to the supreme control, were already distrustful of the use he would make of his power. It must be conceded however that Foch

was vindicated by the event, for the British Armies weathered the storm practically unaided and the German impulsion gradually died away.

Slowly and reluctantly Foch was compelled to part with a small portion of his reserves, and on April 18 a detachment from the French Army of the North (D.A.N.) consisting of five infantry and three cavalry divisions was formed to take over the front Bailleul-Wytschaete. These troops however, even after they had arrived on the scene, only gradually came into the line. In the end this French force was raised to nine infantry divisions. But before then the crisis had passed.

* * * *

We must descend from the immortal events of the battlefield to the thread of personal narrative which binds together this account. To many in the official circle the series of great battles which had filled these weeks presented the impression of one long frenzy. Men bent to their daily tasks for comfort. But my work kept me so closely in touch with the Army and its Chiefs that I could not fail to comprehend to some extent the meaning and proportion of individual events. For all the criticisms I had made and all the convictions I held about the Somme and Paschendaele, my heart went out to the Commander-in-Chief as he bore the trial with superb and invincible determination. On the night of the 12th I telegraphed: "I cannot resist sending you a message of sympathy and sincere admiration for the magnificent defence which you are making day after day, and of profound confidence in the result." To which he replied: "Heartiest thanks for your friendly telegram. Army is in a most determined mood and good spirits. Your old division under Tudor has been doing wonders. Many thanks for the splendid assistance given by your Department."

Munitions and Tanks.

Certainly everything in the Munitions sphere was moving forward with smooth celerity. Our organization passed the guns, ammunition, tanks and stores of all kinds to the Chief of the Artillery (General Birch), the Quartermaster-General (General Travers-Clarke), the Tanks Corps and other authorities at Headquarters; and I was myself in personal touch with each of them. Through the united effort of all engaged in the supply of the Army it can truthfully be said they lacked nothing. Indeed the incredible efforts of all classes serving under the Ministry more than met the extraordinary strain. The faster material was lost, destroyed or expended, the faster it was replaced and the larger grew the surpluses in the workshops. In our main Tank factory in Birmingham the workers had achieved outputs in excess of all promises and also of the immediate reception capacity of the Tank Headquarters. Seeing the precious weapons multiplying in the yards, the men began to ask questions; and on April 17 I telegraphed to Mr. Dudley Docker:

"Express again to all hands my satisfaction at the admirable deliveries. Tell them confidentially, not for publication, that the losses of Tanks have been larger than previously reported, but that they have exacted a heavy toll from the Germans in many cases and helped our Infantry notably. Explain to them that during the uncertainty of the battle and its intense fierceness, it is not possible for the Tank Corps to take deliveries regularly. The roads are congested, depôts are moving, everyone is involved in the fight. When the lull comes, there will be a general refitting; and that is the moment for which we must have ready the largest possible numbers. I am watching for this moment very carefully. They must not be put off their efforts if Tanks accumulate temporarily. The Army is fighting for its life, and we are standing by to put new weapons in their hands the very instant they turn to us. Let there be no misunderstanding therefore, but only confidence and full steam ahead."

We had by this time completed the replacement of the material lost in the retreat of the Fifth Army without arresting the ascending scale of our cur-

rent deliveries; and at the end of April His Majesty was pleased to authorize the following message to our two and a half million workers:

The King's Message to the Munition Workers.

"The Minister of Munitions has received the King's commands to convey to the officials of the Ministry, to the employers and to the munition workers throughout the country, both men and women, His Majesty's high approval of the exertions made during this critical time and his satisfaction at the remarkable results achieved. The King has learned from the Military Authorities that practically all the losses and expenditure of munitions during the battle have already been made good without any undue depletion of normal reserves, out of the resources which had been held in readiness, and by the additional effort which has been made. There are now actually more serviceable guns, machine guns, and aeroplanes with the British Armies in the field than there were on the eve of the German attack. The other supplies of all kinds are forthcoming in abundance.

"The King has commanded the Minister of Munitions to express his great pleasure to the workers and all engaged in this vital task. Travelling constantly about the country with the Queen from one munition centre to another, the King has had ample opportunity of witnessing the strenuous efforts which are being made by the men, and certainly not less by the women, to keep the soldiers who are fighting supplied with all they need, and also of admiring the organizing ability displayed in so many ways and on so great a scale. The King is deeply impressed by the fact that much-needed holidays should have been cheerfully given up, and additional exertions made, at a time when many severe food restrictions had come into force, and that in spite of large numbers of munition workers having left the workshops for the Army during the last six months, the outputs of every kind should not only have been maintained but steadily increased. Accordingly the King has directed the Minister to convey His Majesty's thanks to all concerned."

* * * *

Two Bleak Hypotheses.

But the continuance of the battle, the power of the enemy and the obvious jeopardy in which our Army stood forced most grave reflections. Suppose the Germans continued tearing at our throats with all their might, suppose they shook the life out of our Army, suppose the straining front broke or was swept back by an inexorable tide! There were at any rate "the water lines." The advanced line ran from Dunkirk back to the second or main line. This ran along the stream of the Aa from Gravelines through St. Omer to St. Venant. A vast amount of work had been done upon it. It was called "the water line" on account of the great part which inundations could be made to play in its defence. This line would shorten the front and be a substantial relief, but it meant the loss of Dunkirk and the continuous bombardment of Calais. Both these ports played a notable part in the reception of our supplies, and far-reaching checks and complications would follow on their loss.

Even darker possibilities were afoot. Suppose we had to choose between giving up the Channel ports or being separated from the mass of the French armies! In the former case all our best and closest communications would be destroyed. We should have to rely entirely on Havre till other bases could be developed. All our programmes would vanish at a stroke. I was deeply concerned that this issue should be calmly probed before it actually came upon us. I therefore examined it in the following note which I sent to Sir Henry Wilson and the War Cabinet:

My Note of April 18.

To the War Cabinet.

Very Secret.

A Note on Certain Hypothetical Contingencies.

April 18, 1918.

1. If the German offensive continues to prosper, a vital question will be raised,

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

ARMENTIÈRES: THE MAIN STREET.

This photograph, taken in February, 1918, of the main street in Armentières, shows the havoc brought about by nearly four years of war. Armentières was to pass through yet fiercer fires before the invader was finally driven out. As is described in the text, the town and its neighbourhood was smothered with gas shells before the German attack in April, 1918, and formations on this sector withdrew from their positions with difficulty.

viz. *whether we should let go our left hand or our right.* All the movements of stores, munitions, and depots which are now taking place are affected and ought to be governed by this decision. It is imperative therefore to face the situation in advance and have a clear and profoundly considered view.

2. It is possible that we shall not have a free choice. The course of the German offensive may decide the issue irrespective of our wishes. If they succeeded in an attack along the coast, which made us let go our left hand from the Channel ports one after another, we should be forced to pivot by our right, and would finish up with our left near Abbeville and our right hand clasping the French. If, on the other hand, the enemy succeeded in cutting the British army from the French by an attack through Amiens towards Abbeville, we should find ourselves in a Torres Vedras position covering Calais and Boulogne. Now, which of these two do we dislike most? It is very important to decide, because by our dispositions and exertions we shall be able to influence, and may be able to determine, how the matter shall be settled.

3. To form a reasonable opinion, the first thing to do is to look—not at the map of the existing battleground, but at the map of France as a whole. It then immediately appears what a very small portion of France is involved in the present and threatened invasion. It is evident that however important the Channel ports and Flanders may be, they and all the ground we hold are only a fragment of the country and nation we are defending, and on whose continued resistance the future of the land war depends.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE REMAINS OF BAILLEUL.

Another town to suffer severely from the ravages of war was Bailleul. The Germans finally withdrew from this place on August 30, 1918. On the afternoon of August 29 the 12th Battalion The Royal Scots Fusiliers, who were holding the front line at Meteren, a short distance from Bailleul, were suddenly subjected to a hurricane bombardment which lasted for about two hours. Every type of shell came hurtling over, and the battalion stood to arms anticipating an attack. The bombardment stopped as suddenly as it began ; nothing happened, and by the next morning the Germans had gone.

4. The next thing is to consider what strategic developments would best suit the enemy. I say "*strategic*" as apart from the fortune of the battlefield. Of course the break-up of a whole army on the battleground is a short cut to strategic success—is indeed the end at which all strategy aims. But assuming —which is reasonable—there is no such collapse of our army, and that at the worst we make an orderly retirement, presenting a steady front and continuing to fight, what is the best strategy for the Germans to pursue? Which hand would they like us to let go—our right or our left?

Tragic Contingencies.

5. If the Germans could succeed in sweeping us from the Channel ports and capturing Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, they would gain all those very great advantages which have so often been explained. They can command the Straits of Dover, close the Port of London to all except northabout traffic, render Dover Harbour uncomfortable, bombard a large part of Kent and Sussex, and deprive our armies of their nearest and most convenient bases. But they would remain confronted by the mass of the still unbeaten British and French armies along a line from the neighbourhood of Abbeville so much shortened that, even with greatly reduced forces, it could be solidly held. And behind these armies would be the whole of France open for dilatory retirement or manœuvre. Until those armies were forced to lay down their arms the

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

ARTILLERY OBSERVATION OFFICER AT KEMMEL.

The battle for the Kemmel ridge was contested with fury. The artillery officer in the photograph reproduced here is forward with the infantry, and is signalling back to his battery the results of the fire. Taken at Kemmel on April 22, 1918.

land war would not be ended. If France wished to make peace, the facilities of retreat open to the British in several directions to the sea or to neutral territory would afford bargaining power to make a military convention providing for the repatriation of that army; and France would be bound to insist on that, even at territorial loss to herself. Therefore, great as are the advantages which Germany would gain by the conquest of the Channel ports, there would be no reason why the war could not be indefinitely prolonged after their loss, provided the French and British armies remained united.

6. If on the other hand the Germans divide the British and French armies from each other at Abbeville, forcing us to let go our right hand and shut ourselves up in a Torres Vedras, they will have the following choice open to them, viz.: whether to wire in and so mask the British and throw their whole force against the French and Paris, or alternatively to hold the French in check while they drive the British into the sea. What would their choice be? What was it at the beginning of the war? Did they not absolutely disdain the Channel ports while there was a chance of taking Paris and smashing the main army? Had we any difficulty in deciding, when it came to the pinch in those days, whether our—then little—army should cover the Channel ports, or hold on firmly to the French and fight the main battle out in their company?

7. Although the British army thrown back on the Channel ports might be seriously weakened, yet to drive it into the sea, or to destroy it in its entrenchments, would require an enormous effort. For the Germans to lay siege to such an army, with the almost intact French army striking at their backs, would seem to be an unwise proceeding. "*Frappez la masse*" is a maxim to which the Germans have always given an understanding allegiance. And that would be their shortest road to end the

war. It therefore seems probable that they would leave the weakened and exhausted British army cooped up in its lines around the Channel ports, and try the main conclusion with the French army. On the morrow of such a victory over the French the British army would be at their disposal. They could deal with it at their convenience.

All this appears to follow the elementary lines: Divide the enemy's forces into two parts: hold off the weaker part while you beat the stronger: the weaker then is at your mercy.

8. Do not all these considerations go to show that the vital and supreme need is for us to keep connection with the French? Does not experience generally show that armies which get separated from the main army are disposed of at leisure? Is not the sound rule to stand together, retire together, turn together, and strike together, as we did at the Marne? What would have been the position of a British army which, after Mons, had retreated on the Channel ports, if in its absence the battle of the Marne had been lost by the French? How long would the Belgian army have held out if they had been cut off in Antwerp? What happened to the Roumanian army once it was isolated?

9. To sum up: the choice in the hypothetical circumstances now being examined presents itself as follows: (1) To let go the left hand, lose the Channel ports, keep contact with the French, save our army, and continue the land war indefinitely; or (2) to let go the right hand, lose contact with the French, watch them being defeated, then be driven into the sea ourselves, and lose the Channel ports after all.

10. Happily these bleak alternatives are not yet before us, and there are good hopes they will never be. But it is necessary that the question should be promptly examined with the fullest knowledge of the capacities of the various French ports and of the strength of the armies which could be based on each of them.

United Armies.

Wilson replied: "I agree, as you know, and have asked the Admiralty to get out a paper on their side of the question."

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

KEMMEL HILL.

The scene of severe and costly fighting, Kemmel Hill was taken by the Germans in April, 1918. The French troops holding the position were gassed and blown off the hill by a veritable hail of shells. This position was an important one, but the tide was about to turn. No longer was the German army in a condition to exploit those hard-won gains, and in the autumn of 1918 Plumer's Second Army recovered all the lost territory with trifling loss.

This issue was put to Foch at the meeting of the Supreme War Council which met at Abbeville on May 1 and 2. Both Wilson and Haig felt that a decision from the Supreme Commander was necessary in order that precautionary preparations could be made. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff persuaded the representatives of the British Government to press insistently for an answer. The utmost that Foch could be induced to admit was that it was more important to retain touch between the two armies than to retain possession of the Channel Ports. But he returned resolutely to his main contention: "I mean to fight for both. The question, therefore, cannot arise until I am beaten. I will never give up either. 'Ni l'un ni l'autre. Cramponnez partout.'" He hazarded a great deal upon the endurance of the British Army. But he was not disappointed.

The Loss at Kemmel Hill.

On the 25th an unlucky event occurred. The French divisions which from the 18th onwards had deployed behind our front, had taken over a portion of the line, which they held in strength with divisional fronts of no more than 3,000 yards. Included in this sector, the French 28th Division held the invaluable height of Scherpenberg and Kemmel, the latter defended by one battalion of the 99th regiment.

At dawn the Germans concentrated upon the hill and the trenches round its foot a most astonishing storm of high explosive and gas shells from cannon and *minenwerfer*. It is said that the French masks were only partially proof against the gas. Whatever the cause, the French troops on either side of the hill, after repulsing three infantry attacks, and sustaining heavy losses, gave way and were streaming back by seven o'clock in the morning. Their retirement left the troops on the summit, including some of our own trench mortar batteries, to be cut off. A similar fate overwhelmed the British brigade who were holding the trenches on the French left. They were rolled up from the flank, and none escaped death or captivity. The disaster might have taken a still worse turn but for the promptitude with which the Highland Brigade next in succession threw back its right and formed a defensive flank.

There is no doubt that the relations between the French and British commands during the battle period which began on March 21 were not remarkable for a high appreciation of each other's military qualities. The French staff considered that the British had failed and caused a great disaster on the common front, and they openly expressed the opinion that the quality of the British troops at this time was mediocre. The British, on the other hand, felt that the help given under a terrific strain had been both thin and slow, and that the entry of French relieving divisions into the battle was nearly always followed by further retirements. Instances are given by Colonel Boraston of joint attacks which miscarried through the French divisions not being set in motion although their British comrades were already committed.

The False Alarm.

He also records a curious incident of which I was myself a witness. At about ten o'clock on April 29 I was breakfasting with Sir Douglas Haig. Sir Herbert Lawrence, his Chief of the Staff, and two or three Aides-de-Camp were present. The Commander-in-Chief had just sat down to his coffee when the following message was put in his hand: "G.O.C. 39th French Division reports that there is no doubt but that the enemy holds Mont Rouge and Mont Vidaigne. Troops on right of Scherpenberg badly cut up. . . . Enemy reported to be pushing between the Scherpenberg and Mont Rouge." Simultaneously there arrived from Plumer a confirmatory message requesting the Chief of the Staff to come at once to the Headquarters of the Second Army. No reserves of any kind were available and the news if true involved the grim issue discussed in my Memorandum of the 18th. The room was rapidly emptied. Haig disappeared into his office observing, "The situation

is never so bad or so good as first reports indicate": and Lawrence vanished in a motor-car.

I thought I would go and see for myself what was happening, and accordingly I motored to the area of Sir Alexander Godley's Corps, which was the nearest to the reported break-through. A violent cannonade loaded the air; but at the Corps Headquarters faces were beaming. The French Commander had telephoned that it was all a mistake and that nothing of importance was occurring. Such accidents from time to time are inevitable. But this is an illustration of the tension under which both the French and British leaders were living in these very hard times.

Ludendorff Flinches.

However, the worst was over for the British Headquarters though they did not know it, and the rest of the war with all its slaughters and exertions contained for them only hopes and triumphs.

The capture of Mount Kemmel was the last effort of the Germans in this battle. It is astounding that after having gained so great a prize at so high a cost they did not use it. The decision was Ludendorff's. The war diaries and archives of the German Fourth Army for the period April 9-30, captured by the French, show that so far from urging the Army Staff to press on to victory, it was Ludendorff who suggested that they stand fast and prepare to meet a British counterstroke.

"In view of the solidarity of the defence," he wrote, "it should be considered whether the attack should be interrupted or continued." To this General von Lossberg, Chief of the Fourth Army Staff, replied that "our troops encountered everywhere in the field of attack a very solid defence, well distributed in depth and particularly difficult to overcome on account of the numerous machine-gun nests. . . . With the forces at present at our disposal the operation offers no chance of success. Better interrupt it." And Ludendorff approved. The stubborn defence had succeeded at the moment when it had sustained its most dangerous wound.

Defeat and Losses of the Germans.

So ended the most fierce and intense grapple of the British and Germans. For forty days, from March 21 to the end of April, the main strength of Germany had been ceaselessly devoted to the battery and destruction of the British Army. One hundred and twenty German divisions had repeatedly assaulted 58 British, piercing the front, gaining great successes and capturing more than a thousand cannon, and seventy or eighty thousand prisoners.

During these forty days the British Army had lost in officers 2,161 killed, 8,619 wounded, and 4,023 missing or prisoners: and of other ranks 25,967 killed, 172,719 wounded, and 89,380 missing or prisoners: a total loss of 14,803 officers and 288,066 men.[1] This was more than one-quarter of the whole number of British fighting troops under Sir Douglas Haig's command on March 21.

But these terrible losses concentrated in so short a period on a relatively small military organism had not quenched its life-force. No vital position had been wrested from its grip. No despondency had overwhelmed the troops or their leaders. The machine continued to function, and the men continued to fight.

Doggedly and dauntlessly they fought without a doubt that whatever their own fate, Britain would come victoriously through as she had always done before. By their stubborn and skilful resistance at every point, by numberless small parties fighting unchronicled till they were blotted out, the British inflicted upon the Germans losses even greater than those they themselves endured, losses irreparable at this period in the war, losses which broke the supreme German effort for victory at the outset, and rang the knell of doom in the ears of the overwrought German people.

There fell of the Germans against the British in these same forty days, 3,075 officers killed, 9,305 wounded, and 427

[1] *Military Effort*, p. 362.

missing or prisoners; and 53,564 other ranks killed, 242,881 wounded and 39,517 missing or prisoners; a total of 12,807 officers and 335,962 men. An advancing army always gathers the prisoners and missing on a scale far exceeding its retreating opponent. These cut-off units are the heavy price of retirement, and they are a permanent loss to the defenders. But if—under these reserves—the missing and prisoners are deducted from each side, the fact emerges that the British shot 308,825 Germans during these battles at a cost of 209,466; or briefly three Germans shot for every two British.

It was now to be the turn of our Ally. The flail under which we had suffered was soon to be uplifted against the French. If we had known beforehand what their ordeal was to be, we should have been thankful they had nursed and guarded their remaining strength to face it.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE MEN OF MARCH, 1918.

A singularly happy photograph taken in the front line on the La Bassée sector on March 15, 1918. The men holding the trench belonged to the 1/7th King's Liverpool Regiment. They were typical of those who defended the line against the most furious onslaught delivered in war up to that date.

CHAPTER LXXIII

THE SURPRISE OF THE CHEMIN DES DAMES

Dwindling German Objectives—Foch and Strategic Proportion—Disposition of the Allied Reserve—The Chemin des Dames—The First Warning—Battle of May 27—The American Arrival—Relations between British and French—Paris and its Workshops—Improved Defence System—The Battle of Noyon—Alteration of the Strategic and Numerical Balances—Foch's Personal Position—A General Survey—The Past—The Present—The Future—The Question.

AT the end of April when the battle in the north died down Ludendorff, finding too many troops in front of him, looked elsewhere.

Dwindling German Objectives.

"The most favourable operation in itself," he writes,[1] "was to continue the attack on the English Army at Ypres and Bailleul.... Before we could attack here again, the enemy must become weaker and our communications must be improved." He had thus resigned all the decisive strategic objects for which the German armies had been fighting since March 21. He had first abandoned the great roll-up of the British line from Arras northwards and the general destruction of the British armies, in favour of the more definite but still vital aim of taking Amiens and dividing the British from the French armies. Arrested in this, he had struck in the north to draw British reserves from the Amiens battlefield. But the Battle of the Lys, begun as a diversion, had offered the lesser yet still enormous prize of the northern Channel ports. Now he must abandon that; and his strategic ambition, already thrice contracted, must henceforward sink to an altogether lower plane. The fourth German offensive battle of 1918 was to a large extent a mere bid for a local victory, and apart from its usefulness in diverting Allied troops from the fateful fronts, offered no direct deadly strategic possibilities.

[1] *My War Memories*, p. 615.

Foch and Strategic Proportion.

Marshal Foch saw with unerring eye the grand and simple proportion of events. Not deceived by the vast mass of frightfully important but irrelevant considerations which obscured the primary issues, he ranged the strategic necessities of the Allied armies in their true order. Of these the first beyond compare was the union of the French and British armies; second, the preservation of the Channel ports; and third, though in a less decisive sphere, the defence of Paris.

Pétain on the other hand showed on more than one occasion that his valuations were different. His attitude on the night of March 24, which precipitated the Doullens Conference, proves that he would have rated the loss of Paris as a greater misfortune than the severing of the connection between the French and British armies. We shall see later a still more glaring example of this error, which in so accomplished a soldier can only be attributed to the intrusion of sentiment. Paris could have been occupied by the Germans in June, 1918, without preventing the collapse of the Central Empires in November. But the loss of the Channel ports and the consequent halving of the British military effort would have meant another year of war; and the severance of the British and

French armies might easily have led to their total and final defeat. Mercifully the good sense of Foch pierced through the fog of false appearances. From the moment when he obtained the supreme command, he steadily massed the reserves, in full harmony with the British view, to safeguard the junction of the British and French armies. And behind him, with equal comprehension, Clémenceau, when the need came declared: "I shall fight in front of Paris. I shall fight in Paris. I shall fight behind Paris." Thus these great men were able to exalt their minds above the dearest temptations of their hearts, and thus we found the path to safety by discerning the beacons of truth.

* * * *

Disposition of the Allied Reserve.

It followed from Foch's decision to gather the reserves in Flanders and between Compiègne and Amiens that dangerous denudations must be accepted on other important parts of the front. The movement northwards of so many French divisions was viewed with deep anxiety by Pétain and the French Army Headquarters. Pétain indeed made a strenuous effort to retain the last instalment. But Foch insisted. Thus Ludendorff found, when the Battle of the Lys ended in deadlock, that it was not open to him to renew the battle of Amiens.

He was already committed to two great bulges which he had conquered at the cost of heavy drafts upon the superior reserves he had gathered for the campaign. In neither could he advance in face of the strength against him, and from both he was unwilling to retire lest he should shatter the glittering but, as he knew well, already brittle confidence of Germany. Each of these bulges had its special disadvantages for the German troops. In the Somme region they were condemned to dwell amid their own devastations, and with communications which, although improved, made the mounting of a first-class offensive impossible. In the Bailleul salient the conditions were far worse. The scale was smaller, but for this very reason the discomfort was more intense. The whole of the conquered ground was commanded by the encircling British artillery. And this artillery, fed with unlimited ammunition and fresh guns, raked and swept the German salient night and day from three quarters of the compass. In this cauldron nearly twenty German divisions must be constantly maintained at a cost which melted the reserves apace.

It must have been with darkening misgivings that Ludendorff selected the point of his next attack. Outwardly all seemed to be going well. Actually all had miscarried. But the consolation of spectacular vengeance yet remained. Immense resources were still in hand. A dazzling victory could yet be won which, though barren in consequences, would still preserve the illusion of increasing success. As early as April 17 the Crown Prince's Army group was ordered urgently to prepare an offensive on the Chemin des Dames, with the object of breaking through between Soissons and Rheims. The arrangements were made with the customary thoroughness and science and with unexampled secrecy. The Seventh and First German Armies assembled twenty-nine divisions for the battle. No less than 1,158 batteries were deployed, and the moment was fixed for 2 a.m. on May 27.

The Chemin des Dames.

Foch knew as well as Pétain the forfeits to which his wise dispositions exposed the French armies, and both Generals were during the whole of May unable to divine where the blow would fall. Blame has been attributed to the staff of the French Sixth Army. The choleric temperament of its Commander, General Duchêne, had discouraged and estranged his subordinates, and the machine worked with friction.[1] At this time above all others efforts should have been made, without regard to losses, to pierce the enemy's screen by sudden raids, now here now there, and gain the indispensable information. But nothing

[1] Une humeur de dogue, un grondement perpétuel, un orage de rebuffades, tout de suite les gros mots à la bouche, sans raison.—Pierrefeu, *G.Q.G. Secteur I*, Vol. II, p. 178.

National Portrait Gallery, London.

SOME STATESMEN OF THE GREAT WAR.

Left to right, standing, etc.: Maharajah of Bikaner, India; General Botha, South Africa; Mr. G. N. Barnes; Sir R. Borden, Canada; Lord Balfour; Sir Eric Geddes; Mr. Bonar Law; Lord Morris, Newfoundland; Lord Kitchener. Seated at table: Sir J. Cook, Australia; Mr. W. M. Hughes, Australia; Mr. Lloyd George; Lord Milner; Mr. W. M. Massey, New Zealand; Mr. Winston Churchill; Lord Grey; Lord Oxford and Asquith. (From the painting by Sir James Guthrie, P.R.S.A., presented to the National Portrait Gallery by Sir Abe Bailey, Bart., K.C., M.G.)

of this kind was done successfully either by the Sixth Army or elsewhere along the French front.

Four French divisions were in line on the Chemin des Dames, with four more in reserve behind the Aisne. On their right was the Ninth British Army Corps under Sir Alexander Hamilton Gordon, comprising three divisions in the line (the 21st, 8th and 50th), also the 25th Division in reserve, all shockingly mutilated in the northern battle, and sent at Foch's earnest desire to what was stated by the French to be the quietest sector of the front in order to refit and train their recruits. In reply to formal warnings from the British General Headquarters that an attack had been

THE SURPRISE OF THE CHEMIN DES DAMES.

Sketch map outlining the successive positions attained by the German armies in the course of their attack on May 27, 1918, and on the days that followed. In spite of a most stubborn resistance offered by British divisions sent to this part of the line for rest, and by the French troops in the sector, the Germans overran the position, advancing some twenty kilometres in one day.

mounted against the Aisne front, the French Sixth Army Staff stated on the morning of May 25: "In our opinion there are no indications that the enemy has made preparations that would enable him to attack to-morrow."

The First Warning.

What followed is exciting. At daybreak on the 26th two German prisoners were taken by the French. One was a private and the other an *officier-aspirant*, belonging to different regiments of Jäger. On the way to Divisional Headquarters their captors entered into conversation with them. The private said there was going to be an attack; the officer contradicted him. Arrived at the Army Corps Intelligence centre the prisoners were examined separately. The officer, questioned first, was voluble, and declared that the Germans had no intention of making an offensive on this front. The interrogation of the private followed. He said that the soldiers believed that they would attack that night or the following night. He was not sure of the date. Pressed, he said that cartridges and grenades had already been distributed, but not the field-rations. He had seen the previous day near his billet soldiers belonging to Guards regiments. He knew no more.

The officer was then recalled. He was told that the laws of war had in no way forced him to speak, but that he had volunteered statements for which he would be held responsible. To give false information was the act of a spy. On this he became visibly perturbed, and under pressure gave in the end the most complete details of the attack which impended the next day. It was already three o'clock in the afternoon of the 26th. The alarm was given, and the troops available took up their battle positions.

Pierrefeu has described the terrible hours which Pétain and the French Headquarters Staff now endured far away at Provins.[1] They knew that an immense disaster was certain. They knew that no reinforcements could reach the scene for several days, and thereafter for a still longer period only at the rate of two divisions a day. Meanwhile there was nothing in human power that could be done. All through the night they sat in their silent offices, bowed under the blow about to fall and suffering another form of the tortures to which the troops were doomed. At one o'clock next morning the German barrage descended on a thirty-kilometre front, and three hours later eighteen divisions advanced upon the four French and three refitting British divisions. Although the troops on the ground were alert, the strategic surprise was complete and overwhelming.

[1] G.Q.G. Section I, Vol. II, p. 187.

Battle of May 27.

"After three-and-a-half hours' artillery and trench-mortar preparation," says the Crown Prince,[1] "the divisions surged forward against the Chemin des Dames. . . . The small enemy force holding the position, six French and three English trench divisions, were over-run and the Chemin des Dames and the Aisne-Marne Canal reached in one swoop. As early as the afternoon our leading units were over the Aisne.

[1] *My War Experiences*, p. 318.

From the drawing by F. Matania.

INTERROGATION: A BRITISH PRISONER IN GERMAN HANDS.

This drawing, by F. Matania, is perhaps appropriate in connection with the incident described in the text on page 1156. At a first glance the spectacle of a solitary private soldier undergoing severe cross-examination at the hands of a group of German officers is one calculated to arouse sympathy. It will be borne in mind, however, that under the laws of war such proceedings are of everyday occurrence in all armies. Scraps of information wrung from prisoners are frequently of the greatest possible value, and in many cases such seemingly trivial articles as regimental badges or numerals found on prisoners' uniforms enable the Intelligence Staff to locate the whereabouts in the line of enemy formations. Such information is of the greatest possible value, and many trench raids are carried out for no other reason than to obtain possession of a prisoner for identification purposes.

By the evening the centre of the Third Army had already reached the Vesle on both sides of Fismes. A break-through with a depth of twenty kilometres had been attained in one day. The Aisne-Marne Canal was also crossed by the left wing of the Seventh Army."

A most stubborn defence was made by the three British divisions which were in the line, and by the 25th Division almost immediately involved. On their right stood the 45th French-Algerian Division which, not being itself attacked, gave energetic assistance. Hinging on this, the British line swung back under immense pressure on its front and with its left continually compromised. The retiring British found behind them fortunately the hilly and wooded country to the west of Rheims, which helped the defence in a receding battle. The 19th British Division had also luckily arrived at Chalons for rest and recuperation, and on the fourth day they sustained the British line. The 21st Division was by then practically destroyed, and by June 1 the whole five British divisions were hardly equal to the full strength of one. All the troops bore themselves as on the Lys a month earlier. Battalions were completely exterminated, and a large portion of the artillery perished with their guns upon the field. The French villagers in their ignorance and terror assailed the retreating troops with hostile demonstrations.

Meanwhile upon the British left the German punch had smashed right through. General Duchêne's staff delayed too long the destruction of the bridges across the Aisne, and most of them fell intact into the hands of the invaders. By June 2 Soissons had fallen and the Germans had reached the Marne at Château-Thierry.

The American Arrival.

Pierrefeu has described in a moving passage the next event. Now suddenly the roads between Provins and the front towards Meaux and towards Coulommiers began to be filled with endless streams of Americans. The impression made upon the hard-pressed French by this seemingly inexhaustible flood of gleaming youth in its first maturity of health and vigour was prodigious. None were under twenty, and few were over thirty. As crammed in their lorries they clattered along the roads, singing the songs of a new world at the tops of their voices, burning to reach the bloody field, the French Headquarters were thrilled with the impulse of new life. "All felt," he says, "that they were present at the magical operation of the transfusion of blood. Life arrived in floods to reanimate the mangled body of a France bled white by the innumerable wounds of four years." Indeed the reflection conformed with singular exactness to the fact. Half trained, half organized, with only their courage, their numbers and their magnificent youth behind their weapons, they were to buy their experience at a bitter price. But this they were quite ready to do.

* * * *

Relations between British and French.

The misfortunes of the Battle of the Chemins des Dames had the remarkable effect of improving the relations between the British and French armies. After a surprise so glaring and a retreat of twenty kilometres in a single day—the record for all battles on the Western Front—the French were in no position to maintain the airs of superiority which they had been unable to conceal from the Italians after Caporetto or altogether from the British after the 21st of March.

Up till the moment when they in their turn felt the force of a Ludendorff offensive, they had complacently assumed that the French Army contained the only troops who could really hold a front under modern conditions. These illusions had been swept away by the German scythe. The intensity of their common tribulations united the Allies more closely than ever. Moreover, the French command were deeply grieved at the destructive losses suffered by the five British divisions committed to their care for a period of recuperation. They paid their tribute in generous and soldierly terms to the fighting achievements of these troops. The words of General Maistre, the Comman-

der of the Group of Armies concerned, may be here transcribed: "With a doggedness, permit me to say thoroughly English, submerged by the hostile flood, you have reconstituted without failing new units to carry on the struggle which have at last enabled us to form the dyke by which this deluge has been mastered. That achievement no Frenchman who was a witness will forget."[1] The 2nd Devons and the 5th Battery of the Forty-fifth British Field Artillery Brigade were awarded the Croix de Guerre in consequence of their having fought until only the memory remained.

* * * *

Paris and its Workshops.

The advance of the Germans to Château-Thierry, barely a hundred kilometres from Paris, confronted me with problems almost as serious and quite as imminent as those which had glared at us during the Battle of the Lys. I was responsible among other things for the whole supply of aeroplanes and aviation material of all kinds. The Ministry of Munitions was a gigantic shop from which the Air Ministry ordered all they wanted. Under the incredible activities of Sir William Weir, then Secretary of State, the Air Force demands became staggering. We discovered that the French had a large surplus manufacturing capacity. I had therefore, in agreement with Loucheur, directed Sir Arthur Duckham to place enormous orders with them.

The French factories on which we depended for an essential part of our programme were mostly grouped around Paris. The danger to the capital required elaborate plans for moving these establishments southwards in case of need, and at the same time a very nice decision whether and when to put them into operation. If we moved without cause, we interrupted production. If we tarried too long, we should not be able to get our machinery away. Paris was calm and even pleasant in these days of uncertainty. The long-range German cannon, which threw its shells about every half-hour, had effectually cleared away nearly all those who were not too busy nor too poor. The city was empty and agreeable by day, while by night there was nearly always the diversion of an air raid. The spirit of Clémenceau reigned throughout the capital. "We are now giving ground, but we shall never surrender. We shall be victorious if the Public Authorities are equal to their task."

Improved Defence System.

Ludendorff had now made a third bulge in the Allied front. In all three the German troops were uncomfortable, their communications extremely inferior, and their general strategic position delicate. It seemed probable that they would try to bite off or beat in the French salient which jutted out between Montdidier and Château-Thierry as far as Noyon. The deep forest region about Villers-Cotterets and the fact that there was only a single line of railway for all the Germans in the Château-Thierry bulge, made an attack from an eastern direction unlikely. The front before Compiègne from Montdidier to Noyon was clearly the most interesting.

M. Clémenceau had authorised and even urged me to go everywhere, see everywhere, and "tell Lloyd George what we are doing." Accordingly as the work of the Inter-Allied Munitions Conference which was then proceeding permitted, I visited the armies of Generals Humbert and Debeny, who awaited the expected shock. I knew both these Generals personally, and was still better acquainted with General Fayolle who commanded the Army Group. One could reach the front line from Paris in less than three hours, and I followed with the closest attention the improved methods of defence which the French were adopting.

Nothing of consequence was now offered to the German opening bombardment. A strong picquet line of detached machine-gun nests, carefully concealed, was alone in contact with the enemy. Behind these devoted troops, for whom an assault could only mean destruction, was a zone three or four thousand yards deep, in which only strong points were

[1] *Sir Douglas Haig's Command*, Vol. II.



THE BATTLE OF NOYON, JUNE, 1918.

The sketch map reproduced above of the country around Noyon shows the extent of the German advance in the offensive known as the Battle of Noyon. This attack lasted for two days and resulted in German penetration to a depth at one point of fifteen kilometres.

held by comparatively small forces. It was not until at least 7,000 yards separated them from the hostile batteries that the real resistance of the French infantry and artillery was prepared. When one saw all the fortifications and devices, the masses of batteries and machine guns, with which the main line of defence bristled, and knew that this could not be subjected to heavy bombardment until the stubborn picquets far in front had been exterminated, it seemed difficult to believe that any troops in the world could carry the whole position from front to rear in a single day.

On the evening of June 8 I walked over the centre of the French line in front of Compiègne. The presage of battle was in the air. All the warnings had been given, and everyone was at his post. The day had been quiet, and the sweetness of the summer evening was undisturbed even by a cannon shot. Very calm and gallant, and even gay, were the French soldiers who awaited the new stroke of fate. By the next evening all the ground over which they had led me was in German hands, and most of those with whom I had talked were dead or prisoners.

The Battle of Noyon.

Early on the morning of the 9th the Eighteenth German Army began what they have called the Battle of Noyon, and at the same time the Seventh German Army attacked south-west of Soissons. The whole of the threatened front was thus on fire. The severity of this onslaught lasted for two days only. The Germans penetrated to a depth of fifteen kilometres, and set their feet on the heights before Compiègne. But the methods of defence exacted a heavy toll, and a wise elasticity in the use of ground enabled the French to economize losses. From the 11th onwards Fayolle began to launch carefully prepared counter-attacks in great force, particularly in the direction of Méry. These continued throughout the 12th and 13th; but already on the 11th Ludendorff had felt the task beyond his power. "In consequence," he says,[1] "of the great accumulation of enemy troops G.H.Q. directed the Eighteenth Army to break off the attack on the 11th, in order to avoid casualties. It was quite evident that the attack commenced in the meantime by the Seventh Army south-west of Soissons would not get through. The action of the Eighteenth Army had not altered the strategical situation . . . nor had it provided any fresh tactical data."

[1] *My War Memories*, p. 634.

So far in all this year the Allies had experienced nothing but recoil. The martial might of Germany lay heavy on all. The sense of grappling with a monster of seemingly unfathomable resources and tireless strength, invulnerable—since slaughter even on the greatest scale was no deterrent—could not be excluded from the mind. No one hoped for a swift result. But the idea that the war could reach any end other than the total defeat of Germany was strictly excluded even from private conversation. All the dominant personalities were resolved to fight on to victory, and the soldiers with simple faith took this for granted.

Says Ludendorff[1]: "It was certainly discouraging that our two great attacks had not forced a decision. That they had been victories was obvious. . . . The evil effect of disillusionment was doubled by the fact that we could not overcome it in our then state of mind." But they were not victories: they were only placards. Of the five great battles which had been fought, the first three against the British had failed to achieve any one of the progressively diminishing strategic results at which they had aimed. The fourth against the French was a local victory, very spectacular but without strategic consequence; and the last, the Battle of Noyon, was a very decided arrest. The supreme offensive was in slack water. The 11th of June on the French front had marked just such a milestone in the war as had the 12th of April with the British Army. On the German side, in spite of sensational triumphs, all was "disillusionment." Behind the Allied front, with all their bitter experiences, the foundation of confidence was solid.

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 642.

Photo: E.N.A.

FRENCH CAVALRY NEAR THE CHEMIN DES DAMES.

Cavalry, as such, had but a small share in the long campaign on the Western Front, although on many occasions as dismounted troops they fought alongside the infantry. In the later stages of the war cavalry, both French and British, was held in readiness for the break-through, and, in the words of the Commander-in-Chief, "performed work of the highest value."

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

CHEMIN DES DAMES: GERMAN INFANTRY GOING OVER.

A photograph taken at the beginning of the German advance. Steel-helmeted German infantry are seen threading their way through their own barbed wire preparatory to moving against the French positions.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

RESERVES ADVANCING.

Another battle picture of the formidable German attack upon the Chemin des Dames. The leading waves of the infantry have already passed over the ground shown in the photograph; the troops going forward are following close upon their heels. In the centre of the farther line a French prisoner can be seen being escorted to the rear.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE PICTURE.

On the opposite page the attacking Germans are shown at the beginning of their successful drive. Here are men of a British division extended over open country awaiting the opening of the attack.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

USING ENTRENCHING TOOLS.

On another part of the line French infantry are seen preparing head cover with the aid of their entrenching tools. The shallow, shelter trenches and improvised cover employed on the Western Front in 1918 afforded little in the way of real protection, but, on the other hand, it offered a poor target to the enemy gunners.

Alteration of the Strategic and Numerical Balances.

These three months of ceaseless battle had indeed witnessed a profound alteration of the strategic balance. The main forces of Germany were now deeply committed. The sovereign element of surprise, without which no great offensive was possible, depended upon the power to have simultaneously in readiness on different parts of the front four or five attacks of the first magnitude. This had been the baffling factor to the Allies before the 21st of March. But most of these had now already been let off. The remaining possibilities open to Ludendorff were restricted and to a large extent defined. His reservoirs were low; ours were filling full.

The balance of numbers had turned heavily. The British had actually killed and wounded or captured nearly four hundred thousand Germans in the five weeks' grapple, while all their own losses in men and material had by the activities of their Government been more than replaced. Indeed our Army at the end of June was somewhat stronger than on the eve of the 21st of March. Divisions had been drawn from Italy, from Salonica and from Egypt. Masses of troops had been released from home by the War Office rising superior at long last to the absurd fear of invasion. Sedentary divisions of older men had been formed to hold the trench lines. When the time came they proved they could march as well as stand. Sir Douglas Haig was conscious of a continued accretion of strength; and as the event was to prove, he was able to measure it better than anyone else.

The resources of France, so prodigally spent at the beginning, so jealously husbanded in the later years, were sufficient for a final effort. And behind them the Americans gathered in tens of thousands day by day. By this date the British Marine alone, military and merchant, had carried and convoyed to France with scarcely any loss of life from enemy action, nearly three-quarters of a million American troops. All these facts justified confidence in the successful termination of the year's campaign, and that the next year would be decisive.

Foch's Personal Position.

The personal position of Marshal Foch after the 27th of May was not however entirely unshaken. On him France fixed the prime responsibility of having diverted the French reserves to cover the juncture of the British and French armies. The appointment of a Generalissimo had only been carried in the face of serious and natural oppositions. The first fruits of "unity of command" and of Foch's personal direction of the front had been a blazing disaster. Strong undercurrents ran of complaint and reproach. The British did not think they had been well treated in their intense trial. Moreover, there were reasonable grounds for misgiving.

Unlike Haig or Pétain, Marshal Foch had not at his disposal the great machinery of a General Staff. He acted only through what he has pleasingly described as "ma famile militaire,"—a small band of devoted officers who had throughout the war shared his varied fortunes. At their head stood a certain young General Weygand, alert, discreet and silent in manner, afterwards to become better known. Whether this extremely restricted circle would be able to inform their Chief upon the vast and innumerable masses of technical detail which must be mastered before the operations of great modern armies can be weighed and selected from among alternatives, was a question at that time without an answer. On this account also many doubts were entertained. Nevertheless Marshal Foch, building his house on the rock of strategic truth, possessed his soul in patience.

* * * *

During this period of hard tension the Imperial War Cabinet comprising the Prime Ministers of the Dominions was frequently in Session in London. Sir Henry Wilson one day in presenting to them an appreciation of the whole position went back to the beginning, and took occasion to refer to my work with him in the years before the war. This led me to prepare for the Do-

minion Ministers a short general survey of past, present and future as I saw them then. I print it as I wrote it. It is a record of that darkest hour which we are told precedes the dawn.

A General Survey.

A Note on the War.

To the Imperial War Cabinet.

June 22, 1918.

1. Before the war the British military authorities forecasted with accuracy what the German plan of campaign would be, and Sir Henry Wilson in particular, as early as August, 1911, unfolded to the Committee of Imperial Defence a completely true picture of the German attack in the West, through Belgium towards Paris, and also of the Russian weakness and tardy mobilization in the East. On the other hand, our military advisers took a far too sanguine view of the relative strength and efficiency of the French and German armies. On the outbreak of war, the overpowering need was to stem the German rush, first on Paris, and secondly on the Channel Ports, and no one could think of anything else on land till this was done. By the end of November, as the Chief of the Staff has explained, Paris and the Channel Ports were saved, and the German onslaught brought to a standstill. The first phase of the war, which may be called "stemming the rush," thus came to an end.

2. The second phase covered a period of 18 to 20 months, viz., from the end of 1914 to the Battle of the Somme in July, 1916. During the whole of this period the position in the West was that the Anglo-French armies were strong enough to hold the Germans, but not strong enough to attack them with any chance of piercing their fortified lines. The main theatre, i.e., the theatre where the main forces are gathered, ceased to be for the time being the decisive theatre, i.e., the theatre where an important decision can be obtained. These conditions were clearly recognized in the British Cabinet. They were disputed by both the British and French military authorities. The divergence of view arising from different estimates of forces and values led to the loss of opportunities which will never recur.

The Past.

3. The politicians were in the main generally convinced that the deadlock in the West would continue until a great British Army could be called into being, and equipped with a powerful artillery and plentiful munitions. They therefore immediately looked for other theatres in which our forces could gain decisive results in the interval. Two great operations, each involving the concerted action of our naval, military and diplomatic resources, presented themselves: first, the rallying of the group of small States at the north-western corner of Europe, thus turning the enemy's right flank, obtaining command of the Baltic, and forming contact with Russia in the north; or secondly, rallying the group of small States at the south-eastern corner of Europe, striking down Turkey before Germany could organise her, and establishing contact with Russia from the south.

Of these two policies, the first was clearly the more difficult, and was never perhaps possible, having regard to our resources. The second however was not only possible but easy of accomplishment if the proper measures had been taken. Turkey was isolated from Germany by the Balkan States. She was ill-organized and ill-prepared. She was menaced by Russia. We held better cards than the Germans in regard to every single one of the Balkan States. The partition of the Turkish Empire offered the means of satisfying every appetite.

Lastly, the naval situation was entirely favourable. Our margins in the North Sea had been greatly increased since the declaration of war. The German submarines had not become formidable, and the destruction of Von Spee had completed the clearance of the German warships from the surface of the oceans. An amphibious operation to strike down Turkey before she could raise her head, and to unite the Balkan States against their natural foes, the Turkish and Austrian Empires, was well within the scope of the naval and military resources at our

disposal, after providing an ample superiority over the Germans in the North Sea and sufficient forces to defend actively the front in France and Flanders. It was therefore towards the southern flank of the enemy's line, to Turkey and to the Balkans, that our operations were directed—but alas half-heartedly.

4. The natural tendency of the naval and military point of view is to confuse the main and the decisive theatres. Wherever the main part of the army or the main part of the fleet is assembled, always claims their partisanship.[1] Accordingly, the professional opinion of the navy grudged and resisted the employment at the Dardanelles of every unit, even the most worthless; and the professional opinion of the army delayed, grudged, and stinted the employment of every soldier and of every shell required for the Eastern campaign. These tendencies, which would have been overborne by success, became at the first check overpowering. The Eastern enterprise was therefore cast away, with consequences of measureless disaster.

Bulgaria, always the key of the Balkans, remained undecided while the fate of the Dardanelles hung in the balance. Her course was determined by the loss of the Battle of Suvla Bay. The destruction of Serbia followed immediately, and the destruction of Roumania a year later. Turkey was gripped and organized by the Germans, entailing great diversions of our forces to Egypt and Mesopotamia. Adding the loss involved by these diversions to the loss arising from the destruction of Serbia and Roumania, the paralysis of Greece, and the hostility of Bulgaria, our failure to prosecute the Eastern enterprise successfully may well have equalled the addition of two million soldiers to the ranks of our enemies. Besides this we lost the means to succour and animate Russia by direct contact.

5. The third phase of the war supervenes upon the second. After the year 1915, there were no hopes of gaining any good results in Turkey or the Balkans. The Germans were everywhere in complete communication and control. In consequence, Allied armies large enough to achieve success in those theatres were too large for the carrying capacity of our seaborne tonnage. Moreover, the submarine had become formidable in the Mediterranean, and the military weakness of Russia was plainly apparent. Half the soldiers lost and half the shells fired in Artois in May, and at Loos and in Champagne in September, 1915, resolutely used, would have achieved for us the whole south-eastern theatre of war in that year; but in 1916 four times their number could not have retrieved the position. The extinction of other possibilities left France therefore the only theatre open to us.[1]

Meanwhile however a great British army had come into being, abundantly supplied with munitions. The third or as it may be called "The Slogging Phase" then began. This lasted from the beginning of the Battle of the Somme, the 1st July, 1916, to the end of the Paschendaele attacks in November, 1917. During the whole of this period the British armies, sometimes alone and sometimes assisted by the French, were hurled almost continuously, or with the briefest intervals for recovery, in assaults upon the fortified German lines. I have personally always held the view that at no time in this period were we strong enough, in the absence of some entirely novel method of attack applied on a gigantic scale, e.g. tanks or gas, to break through the skilful German defence, reinforced as it always was, and still is, by the power of giving ground wherever necessary without serious consequence. Still, such was the heroic gallantry of the armies and the determination of their leaders, so powerful was the artillery of which they disposed, that the hope of victory and the sense of mastery were never quenched in the hearts of our

[1] I have not corrected this war-time grammar, as the sense is clear.

[1] I did not think it useful to discuss in this paper a surprise attack in 1916 by all the forces in the Mediterranean theatre upon the Gallipoli Peninsula. No one would have weighed it seriously at this time.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE SPIRIT OF THE CHEMIN DES DAMES.

The Battle of the Chemin des Dames, in which French and British troops bore together the brunt of Ludendorff's latest bid for victory, had the effect of greatly improving the relations existing between the two armies. The fighting qualities displayed by the British divisions sent to this area for rest and recuperation made a deep impression upon the French, who, hurled back themselves, were the better able to assess the merit of the British performance. In this photograph two soldiers, one French and the other British, are seen during the retreat. The Frenchman is a casualty.

troops until the mud deluge of Paschendaele.

The most hopeful climax of these operations was however probably reached at the end of the year 1916 in the later phases of the Battle of the Somme. At this time the enemy were at their greatest strain. They were weakened by their folly at Verdun. They were attacked simultaneously by the British and French armies astride of the Somme. Brusilov gained his greatest victories on the Austrian front, and Roumania plunged into the war. The exertions which the Germans made in this emergency should make us realize the strength of our foe. By dint of them they managed to reach the winter, striking down Roumania meanwhile.

6. The Germans did not feel themselves strong enough in the spring of 1917 to withstand the renewed onslaught of the British and French armies. They therefore ruptured the Anglo-French plans for combined action by suddenly withdrawing their line from the Somme battlefields almost to St. Quentin and Cambrai. They thus placed a broad belt of devastated country between them and their would-be assailants, and also between the British and French armies. By this manœuvre they avoided the kind of long-prepared accumulated blow they have struck at us this year, and only had to face through the rest of 1917 disconnected attacks by the British, and occasionally by the French. The campaign of 1917 therefore became very disastrous to us. Although each military episode, taken by itself, wore the aspect of a fine success, with captures of ground and guns and prisoners, in reality we were consuming our strength without any adequate result.

Photo: E.N.A.

WAR UNDERGROUND.

An interesting photograph taken in a German mine gallery in the Chemin des Dames area. The war underground was carried on unceasingly by both sides wherever conditions were suitable. Difficult and dangerous work, it called for men with some mining experience. The work had to be conducted as silently as possible, as the enemy were generally equally enterprising. Not infrequently galleries were being driven by friend and foe within a few feet of each other.

7. Late in the year a false naval argument played its part in swaying military policy. The harbours of Zeebrugge and Ostend were represented as being the source of the submarine warfare, and their capture or suppression was alleged to be vital. As a matter of fact, these harbours of course have never been and could never be the main base of submarine warfare. That has only been directed and can only be directed from the permanent naval bases of Germany in the estuaries of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems. Ostend and Zeebrugge were serious annoyances, but as subjectives they were utterly inadequate to the sacrifices demanded of the army in order to secure the Flanders Coast. Moreover, the

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

IN RUINED CHÂTEAU-THIERRY.

Château-Thierry, a French town in the department of Aisne, suffered severely in the German offensive of 1918. The attack upon the Chemin des Dames forced the Allied line back to this point, and it was not until July of 1918 that an attack by Franco-American forces drove the Germans back. On July 18, 1920, the Cross of the Legion of Honour was awarded to the town in recognition of its sufferings.

season of the year was advanced. The Russian collapse had taken place; nobody else was fighting; the numbers of the enemy on the front attacked were almost equal to our own; the direction of the attack was perceived and thoroughly prepared against by elaborate semi-permanent fortifications. In these circumstances the amazing efforts of the British armies could have no other result than to weaken themselves.

The incidental disaster which happened to Italy was not so harmful as it looked. Her renewed effort more than made up for the heavy losses sustained.

The Present.

8. While our commanders were intent upon the battle and in hopes of gaining successes in the nick of time, they do not seem to have realized the awful consequences of the collapse of Russia. But in November and December this apprehension grew with politicians and generals, both British and French. The flow of German divisions and batteries from Russia to the West was unceasing for many months until finally a power had been accumulated which, after marking down every division of which we could dispose, left the enemy with a punching force of nearly fifty divisions.

The enemy's military methods differ from our own. In attack the German uses Surprise, in defence he uses Concrete. Our defensive problem this year is far more difficult than that which the Germans solved successfully in 1917. On every occasion in 1917 (except at Cambrai) the Germans knew where the attack would fall. Every attack (except Cambrai) was indicated by several days' bombardment, apart from every evidence of ill-camouflaged preparation. Every German position was defended by lines



Photo: Imperial War Museum.

GERMAN AND BRITISH WOUNDED.

The R.A.M.C. at work. A snapshot taken near Bapaume in 1918, showing only a small section of rows of wounded men waiting to be evacuated.

of solid shell-proof structures sheltering machine guns, and ample reserves were held in rear to arrest a successful advance beyond the limits of our offensive barrage. Lastly, the Germans could always afford to give up some of the territory they overran so easily at the beginning of the war.

Our position this year has been very different. The initiative has passed completely to the enemy. His attack is mounted actually or in dummy over practically the whole battle-front, and besides we can never exclude his irruption at some quite unexpected point. We, on the other hand, have at least four places—Calais, Amiens, Paris, Verdun—which we regard as capital. The enemy can therefore ring the changes on a succession of vital points, before each one of which we have little or no ground to spare. Meanwhile the use of gas and smoke has given new facilities to the offensive, and our methods of fortifications are still primitive compared with those of the Germans.

In this dire situation nothing has saved us except the stamina of our armies and the physical difficulties of persevering in an offensive after a certain distance. The stubborn resistance which the enemy has encountered, the bloody repulses which in spite of his successes he has sustained on the greatest scale, and the resources in men and material which the threat of utter ruin has extorted from the Allies, have gone far to equalize the struggle. It is even probable that we shall end this campaign of agony and disaster in far better posture than we began it. But what are we going to do then?

The Future.

9. This is the question to which I have been leading up. If I have tried to pick out as I see them the salient points in the past, it is with the object of showing that there are now and in the immediate future just as vital decisions to be taken if we can only secure the necessary vision and command. It may be that the Imperial War Cabinet will be able to impart to the Allied conduct of the war that general design and true selection of vital objectives which we have never yet been able to obtain.

10. There are two perfectly simple things to do. They have long been staring us in the face. Everybody sees them, but they see so much else at the same time that nothing effective has yet been done: (1) Above all things reconstitute the fighting front in the East; (2) make a plan for an offensive battle

in France in 1919, choosing the period of climax and subordinating, as far as pressure of circumstances will allow, every intervening event to that supreme purpose.

If we cannot reconstitute the fighting front against Germany in the East, no end can be discerned to the war. Vain will be all the sacrifices of the peoples and the armies. They will only tend to prolong the conflict into depths which cannot be plumbed. We must not take "No" for an answer either from America or from Japan. We must compel events instead of acquiescing in their drift. Surely now when Czech divisions are in possession of large sections of the Siberian Railway and in danger of being done to death by the treacherous Bolsheviks, some effort to rescue them can be made?[1] Every man should ask himself each day whether he is not too readily accepting negative solutions. May we not assume that President Wilson will regard the rescue of the Czechs as an obligation of honour? Who can rescue them except the Japanese? . . .

[1] Some of the Bohemian prisoners taken by Brusilov in 1916 had been formed into a Czech Army Corps which fought with resolution against the Austrian Empire. The Russian revolution and the Bolshevik desertion of the Allied cause left these soldiers in a forlorn position, from which their discipline and firm political convictions ultimately extricated them.

The Question.

11. Secondly, we must organize the offensive battle for 1919. It will be no use thinking about this in the winter when we may hope our present anxieties will be at an end. It will be too late then. Unless while we are fighting for our lives all this summer we can look ahead and plan for 1919, we shall be in the same melancholy position next year as we are this. In this war the initiative can only be seized as the result of plans made nearly a year ahead and through the successful overcoming of some great difficulty. Is it not possible at the present time to conceive and visualize a victorious offensive battle in the summer of 1919, to manufacture all the apparatus necessary to that battle, and to subordinate intervening arrangements, as far as daily needs will let us, to bringing about a situation favourable to that battle? Do the means of beating the German armies in the West in 1919 exist? Can the men be procured? If so, the mechanisms can be prepared. We still have the time. Have we the will-power and the command?

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

FRENCH AND BRITISH TRANSPORT.

Taken during the Battle of the Aisne in May, 1918, the photograph reproduced above shows French and British transport waggons passing on the road during a relief.

CHAPTER LXXIV

THE UNFOUGHT CAMPAIGN

" The God of the Bees is the future."
MAETERLINCK.

Two Practical Steps to Finality—Need of American Troops—General Pershing's Fine Decision—My Mission to Clémenceau—President Wilson's Valiant Response—Equipment of the American Armies: Mr. Stettinius: Mr. Baruch—Nitrates and Diplomacy—The American Artillery Problem—Its Solution—Cordial Co-operation—A " Gentleman's Agreement "—Munition Workers' Unrest—The Coventry Strike—Château Verchocq—The Mechanical Battle—My Letter to General Harington—The Man-Power Problem 1918 and 1919—July and August Memoranda—The 10,000 Caterpillars—Foch's Endorsement—Future Hopes.

DURING these tremendous struggles, while the fate of the Channel ports and even of the union between the British and French armies hung in the balance, by far the greater part of my duties and thoughts lay in the future. Throughout the summer the Munitions Council worked for a campaign which, in God's mercy, was never fought. To make sure of victory in 1919 was an aim at once possible and imperative.

Two Practical Steps to Finality.

Dominated by this conviction, I concentrated all time and thought that could be spared from day-to-day emergencies upon the task. I had neither the responsibility nor the power; but with such influence as I possessed I tried to turn British and Allied policy to two great practical steps: first, to bring American manhood into Europe on the largest scale as fast as possible; secondly, to devise the plan and prepare the apparatus of a mechanical battle of decisive magnitude. In this chapter, between the stemming of the German onslaught and the beginning of the brilliant period which all unknown was now approaching, I shall endeavour to give the reader some account of both these measures.

I had long been disappointed at the slow rate at which American troops were being transported across the Atlantic.[1] I did not believe that the resources either of the Admiralty or of the British Mercantile Marine were being used to the full. I always held that first importance should be assigned to the transportation of American soldiers, and that all the formidable difficulties of their training, equipment and supply could be surmounted later in their turn. A week before Ludendorff struck his first blow I had minuted to the War Cabinet as follows:—

[1] See page 1020. Memorandum of Oct. 21, 1917.

Need of American Troops.

AMERICA AND SHIPPING.

March 14, 1918.

I trust that the War Cabinet will not allow themselves to be deflected by the serious difficulties which no doubt exist from their resolve to transport the additional American divisions in British ships to Europe. The infantry of the British Army has been reduced by 25%, or approximately 170 battalions. The addition of 72 American battalions will still leave that Army substantially smaller than it was last year, and therefore well within the compass of our cross-channel transportation and railway system on the British Front.

The immense political and military advantages of drawing American manhood into the war, and of thus partially filling the gap caused by the diminution



Photo: Vandyk.

GEORGES CLÉMENCEAU.

The influence upon the course of the Great War of 1914–18 wielded by this great Frenchman and patriot was almost incalculable. A man of the strongest character and of indomitable will, France owed much to him in her hours of greatest need and peril. Georges Eugène Benjamin Clémenceau was born at Fesle, in La Vendée, on September 28, 1841. No adequate description of his subsequent and very distinguished career can be given in the space available here, but it may be said that throughout the war and later at the Peace Conference "The Tiger" was a tower of strength to France. A bill passed by the French Senate in November, 1918, provided that on the walls of every *mairie* in France there should be engraved a statement that together with the Armies of France and Marshal Foch "Citizen Georges Clémenceau had deserved well of his country."

of our own forces, ought to outweigh all other considerations and make us ready to submit to the further reduction in food, civil imports and munitions rather than lose the benefit which should now be reached. It is emphatically a case where the difficulties ought to be surmounted and mastered, and not recoiled from as soon as they present themselves. A true sense of relative values at the present time would assign supreme priority to the rapid augmentation by every conceivable means of the numbers of American soldiers in France.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

AMERICAN INFANTRYMAN.

A photograph taken at Rennes Barracks, Tours, on May 30, 1918, showing an infantry soldier of the American Army in marching order with pack. The Americans, though many of them on arrival in France had not completed their training, were a fine body of men, and whatever some of them may have lacked in experience was made up for in eagerness to bear their share of the common burden.

Quite apart from the imperious military need, the intermingling of British and American units on the field of battle and their endurance of losses and suffering together may exert an immeasurable effect upon the future destiny of the English-speaking peoples, and will afford us perhaps the only guarantee of safety if Germany emerges stronger from the War than she entered it.

General Pershing's Fine Decision.

The Prime Minister had from the beginning formed these general views independently. He used all his powers at every stage to give effect to them. He had already arranged for 72 American battalions to be attached in the first instance to British units. The intense peril in which we seemed to stand after the twenty-first of March spurred him to renewed exertions, and at the same time rendered those exertions fruitful. Confronted with the extreme crisis, General Pershing and General Bliss presented themselves to General Foch on March 28 and spontaneously, in the finest manner, placed the whole of their resources in France for the time being at his disposal. Their plans for the development of the great American Army would be subordinated to the emergency wherever necessary. The American divisions, or battalions if need be, would enter the line forthwith in spite of their training and organization being incomplete. This decision was at the true height of circumstances, and in itself went far to repair the injuries of Ludendorff's inroad.

My Mission to Clémenceau.

As soon as I was able to report that all measures to make good the losses of material had been taken and would be immediately effective, the Prime Minister sent me again to France upon a somewhat delicate mission. On the morning of March 28 I started for Paris with instructions to see Clémenceau and if possible Foch, and find out whether the French were willing to make a vigorous attack on the southern flank of the battlefields to take some of the pressure off our armies. Such a direct but

irregular inquiry might well have encountered a rebuff. Arrived in Paris, I therefore asked our Liaison Officer, General Sackville-West, to explain matters to Clémenceau. But the Tiger brushed all formalities aside. We would start together for the front, he said, at 8 o'clock the next morning. We would visit Foch at Beauvais, Rawlinson at Dury, and all the French Headquarters within reach. We would learn for ourselves on the spot and through all the responsible persons exactly what the effort of the French army would be.

Photo: E.N.A.

GENERAL PERSHING.

John Joseph Pershing entered the American Army from West Point in 1886, and during the earlier years of his service took part in operations against the Apache and Sioux Indians. He served in the Spanish-American War, and as military attaché was in Manchuria with the Japanese Army during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. On the entry of the United States into the Great War Pershing came to France as Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Force, retaining his command throughout the war. He was promoted to the rank of general in 1919.

President Wilson's Valiant Response.

We spent the whole of the 30th at the front, saw all the commanders, got sufficiently near the shells to satisfy the President of the Council, dined with Pétain in his Headquarters train, and returned to Paris after midnight. Tired out, I was about to go to bed when a long cipher telegram from the Prime Minister arrived. Mr. Lloyd George repeated the message he had that day sent to President Wilson appealing for the despatch of American troops on the largest possible scale, whether formed in divisions or in the smallest formations, or even as drafts to British units. He directed me to see Clémenceau at once and to urge him in a separate telegram to support this appeal in the strongest manner.

The Tiger received me at 9 a.m., quite unaffected by the fatigue of the previous day, and wrote while I waited a most vigorous and moving appeal. The action which President Wilson took in response to these requests was courageous in the last degree. Henceforward the main effort of the United States was to send men to France up to the fullest limit of ocean transport. In large formations or in small, trained or half-trained, without regard to armament, equipment or supplies, American manhood was to proceed to the war. The use to be made of all these great numbers of men, their organization, their training, their ammunition, their food and clothing—all were questions to be solved later on. This was an act of faith of the highest merit. No one who did not possess that intense form of power which comes from

expressing the will of a free people could have dared to decree a policy in appearance so improvident and even reckless. A hundred valid arguments existed against it, but all were relegated to a lower plane.

From this moment the United States poured men into France, and by this action more than any other which it was in their power to take helped to bring the war to a speedy termination.

To fight in defence of his native land is the first duty of the citizen. But to fight in defence of someone else's native land is a different proposition. It may also be a sacred obligation, but it involves a higher conception. Willingly to cross the ocean and fight for strangers, far from home, upon an issue in the making of which one has had no say, requires a wide outlook upon human affairs and a sense of world responsibility. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, drawn by common citizenship under the Crown, had from the outset revealed this noble power of comprehension, and had made their decision good across broader spaces on the battlefields of three years. They had endured slaughters which no American army was destined to know, and their achievements are upon record. But the decision which in the emergency President Wilson took to remedy the consequences of previous long delay involved personal deprivations of a peculiar kind for the soldiers of the United States.

To serve in one's national army, under one's own leader, amid a great mass of men animated by a common spirit is one ordeal. To serve in isolated divisions or brigades or even regiments under the orders of foreign Generals, flanked on either side by troops of different race and language and of unknown comradeship or quality, is another. Amid the hardships and terrors of war the soldier is accustomed to find his last remaining comfort of mind in being with his own friends and fellow-countrymen, sustained by the esprit de corps at least of "The Battalion." But in the dire need of the great struggle and in a loyal desire to share the tribulations of their allies, American soldiers by scores of thousands readily obeyed orders from their Government to serve, albeit under the general supervision of Pershing, as isolated companies or even platoons in British or French units in order that the largest number might come under the fire of the enemy at an earlier period.

Equipment of the American Armies : Mr. Stettinius : Mr. Baruch.

Such conduct required from the Allies the utmost loyal exertions to equip the forces so trustfully sent. At this I laboured incessantly. My duties brought me into intimate and constant contact with the leading representatives in Europe of the United States Supply Services, as well as with General Bliss and upon occasion with General Pershing.

From the first we worked together without a single misunderstanding or disagreement. No Government could have found a more able servant than Mr. Stettinius, the representative of the American War Department. To business aptitudes of the highest order, he added a delightful simplicity and directness of character. He was already experienced in the munitions sphere, having handled the bulk of the great affairs which the British Government transacted through Messrs. Morgan before the American declaration of war.

This event changed fundamentally our arrangements for buying American supplies. Morgans ceased to be our agents, and in August, 1917, an agreement was signed under which all our requirements from the United States were to be undertaken by an official Purchasing Commission. This consisted of three members of the War Industries Board, Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, Mr. Robert S. Lovett and Mr. Robert S. Bookings. The War Industries Board, of which Mr. Baruch was Chairman, had exceptional powers as a final executive authority in the determination of priority between competing military and other claims, in the allocation of materials and manufacturing resources, and also in the fixing of prices and the control of capital issues. Sir Charles Gordon and Mr. Brand acted in Wash-

ington as my principal representatives in dealing with this body.

The arrangements worked excellently. We " carried on the war in common " in every sense of the expression. We transferred masses of every kind of material, in every stage of production, from one ledger to the other in accordance with our very different needs as easily as two friends might share a luncheon-basket There was no rigmarole or formalism in our affairs. We ransacked our cupboards to find anything the American troops in France required, and the Americans on the other hand, once the case was clearly explained in conversation, drew without hesitation from their own remoter programmes for our more urgent needs. We built common factories for tanks and aviation material. The Americans offered us their earliest supply of mustard gas. At the end I accepted from Mr. Stettinius a contract of over £100,000,000 sterling to supply the whole requirements of the United States Army in medium artillery (6-in. guns and howitzers) for the campaign of 1919. The principles of this contract were simple. We guaranteed the United States we would make no profit, and they guaranteed us we should suffer no loss, however the event might turn.

Nitrates and Diplomacy.

It was not until after the war was over that I had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Baruch, the Chairman of the War Industries Board; but almost daily telegrams soon put us on excellent terms. I could feel at the other end of the cable a strong clear mind taking quick decisions and standing by them. After a few months' co-operation he paid me the very high compliment of placing in my hands the whole business of purchasing nitrates for the United States from Chili. The Headquarters of the Inter-Allied Nitrate Commission were necessarily in London, and although the American Government was buying at least five times our requirements at this period, Mr. Baruch in a laconic telegram placed American interests in my hands.

I now became the Nitrate King—the greatest there will ever be; and I reigned for nearly a year, apparently with acceptance. I formed a small department under my personal direction to cope with this entirely novel responsibility. At its head, under Sir Edmund Wyldbore-Smith, was a gifted young officer, Major Stomm, now lost to us, to whom I am deeply indebted. I used the potent influence which the control both of British and American purchases gave me, not only to procure nitrates, but to persuade the Chilian Government to hand over the sixteen valuable German ships which had taken refuge in Valparaiso Harbour. Two or three times a week I sent telegrams as long as letters to Mr. Baruch explaining exactly what we were doing, and he helped me and supported me throughout. The correspondence and its developments were only interrupted by the conclusion of the War. I print the culminating telegram:

Mr. Churchill to Mr. Baruch.
September 12, 1918.

Secret and Personal.

The disablement by sabotage of German ships interned in Chilian ports appears to have been the immediate response to our nitrate agreement with the Chilian Government. It reveals that the Germans regard this agreement as a blow against themselves. . . . I therefore look forward hopefully to the negotiations I now propose to begin about the 1919 purchases, throughout the course of which my endeavour will be to secure the use of the German ships. . . . I cannot of course tell whether with the limited means at our disposal these objectives can be secured, but I am sure they are the ones to make for. I hope you agree. Meanwhile the first thing to do is to press the Chilian Government to put guards on the ships.

It should be pointed out that if the Germans sink these ships in the fairway of the ports, the Chilian Government may be prevented from carrying out its nitrate contract. British and American interests in the execution of this contract give us each a right to make representations in this sense and within these limits. The acts of sabotage

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

CONFERENCE.

A scene in the Bois de Rheims during the battle of Tardenois in July, 1918. Officers of the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry are seen drawing up orders in collaboration with French officers.

already committed afford the Chilian Government ample grounds. The British Foreign Office have at my request pressed the Chilian Minister in London strongly to have the ships guarded, and he has telegraphed accordingly to his Government. I hope you may find it possible through the channels open to you to make similar representations. We need not commit ourselves any further than this at the present time. Pray let me know if any of your ships are hung up for want of nitrates. The Chilians have assured me they will do everything in their power to secure immediate cargoes being available.

The American Artillery Problem.

Very Private.

I am becoming embarrassed by the difficulty of getting a definite answer from the American War Department as to what help they want us to give them in their artillery programmes for next year. You will understand that it is very difficult to keep my programmes in suspense for so long. I do not know whether you can say a helpful word to accelerate decision one way or the other, but if so I should be very grateful. Many thanks for your friendly message about the nitrate deal. I am so glad you approve of my negotiations.

When we met in Paris during the Peace Conference, I found that Mr. Baruch apparently considered me an authority upon the deeper technical aspects of the nitrate trade. He one day asked me my advice upon an urgent and complicated question concerning it. But reputations are easier lost than gained. I thought I would let well alone, and disengaged myself with suitable modesty.

Day after day Stettinius, Loucheur and I grappled with the problem of the United States artillery. The American War Department now aimed at placing in the field eighty divisions, numerically equal in infantry to two hundred British or French divisions, by the end of June, 1919. The rate at which American troops were landing in France was already far ahead of their munitions programme. They hoped to have forty-eight divisions in France by the end of 1918. The transformation of their industry was still incomplete, and they could only arm from American sources a fraction of the men they were devoting to the struggle. Armies of eighty divisions required nearly 12,000 guns of various natures, with an unceasing flow of ammunition thereafter.

Towards this the United States could

not count on supplying more than 600 medium and heavy guns and howitzers. They could however provide the material out of which the immense established gun plants of France could make 8,000, and those of Britain 3,000 pieces. By the adoption of a proportion of the British pattern, all the American and Canadian factories which we had hitherto used could be made immediately available for United States needs, both in guns and ammunition. The well-known disadvantages of a mixed armament lose much of their importance when armies are upon the giant scale, especially if each nature of gun is uniform throughout the national forces.

All was finally arranged, and the following is my report to the War Cabinet of the British share in these large transactions :—

Its Solution—Cordial Co-operation.

SUPPLIES TO THE UNITED STATES ARMIES.

To the War Cabinet.

September 25, 1918.

The United States in response to our appeals are sending men to Europe far in advance of their general munitions programme. Their shell programme is hopelessly in arrear [of these increased numbers]. Their gun programme is even worse. Not only in the main staples of equipment, but in a very large number of minor supplies, they will find themselves deficient. Unless therefore the arsenals of Great Britain and France can supply these deficiencies, the Americans cannot be expected to continue pouring in men, and the armies available

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

DRESSING WOUNDED IN THE OPEN.

When a man is knocked down and injured by a car in the streets of London he is removed, within a very few moments, to hospital. There every aid known to medical and surgical science is at his service. In the Great War men suffering from wounds of the most serious nature were fortunate to find themselves in the position of the soldier shown above receiving attention on a stretcher. In the advanced areas surgical aid was confined to making the patient as comfortable as possible. At the base and in England the finest surgical skill was available. It says much for the work of the R.A.M.C. that so many of the wounded survived.

for 1919 must be proportionately reduced.

On the other hand, there is reason to believe that, working together, the French and British munition works can supply fully the needs of all the United States troops which can be brought by our maximum carrying capacity to Europe, and can supply them with good weapons and ample ammunition, provided only that the necessary raw materials are sent by America to be made up in our factories. No undue strain will be imposed upon our munition factories. The gun plants and the shell plants are running so smoothly now that, given raw material, they can easily meet their share of American needs. The processes of dilution and of releases of men will continue, in spite of this extra work, at a moderate rate. I am therefore pursuing the policy of doing everything possible to equip the United States armies, and offering every assistance in my power. I have agreed to supply them with more than 2,000 guns in 1919, and to make the ammunition for all these guns if they will send the raw materials. By this deal alone, considerably more than one hundred millions of British indebtedness to America will be extinguished. It seems to me indispensable that this process, to which we are deeply committed, should continue.

A "Gentleman's Agreement."

The longer we worked with the Americans, and the more interdependent our affairs became, the better grew our relations. In October we got rid of all sorts of rules prescribed in the early days of our association, and fell back on a "gentleman's agreement" to help each other by every conceivable means, the sole test being the relative importance of particular services to the common cause.

To the War Cabinet.

October 3, 1918.

I have been approached by various officers of the American Expeditionary Force on the question of replacement from the United States of material used in supplies produced in this country for the American Army.

More than a year ago we insisted upon the policy of replacement for three reasons:—

(1) At a time when a number of officers were asking for quantities of goods, estimated on a basis which we could not test, we found it useful to insist that these officers should get an assurance of replacement from Washington as some sort of guarantee of urgency.

(2) At that time we were not certain to what extent our own orders would be squeezed out by the competition of the American programme.

(3) The Shipping Controller naturally insisted that we should claim an allocation of an equivalent American tonnage.

As regards (1), the urgency of requirements is now much more fully understood both by the American staff and by ourselves, and is examined by Inter-Allied organizations set up for the purpose.

As regards (2), we are still apprehensive about our supplies from the United States. But we are compelled to admit that during the last eighteen months we have never, in fact, been denied supplies which have been really urgent, and we must assume that the United States Government will continue to meet us in the same spirit. In fact, they do their utmost to help us, and in spite of our special counter-claims we are heavily in their debt.

As regards tonnage, the Shipping Controller is making bargains with the American Government on much broader lines than the exchange of tens of thousands of tons, and I understand he no longer wishes us to bargain ton for ton as before.

In these circumstances, I propose to accede to the wishes of the American Army, to waive the question of replacement of specific quantities of material for particular cessions, and to rely on the broad principle that we are to help each

Photo: Associated Illustration Agencies Ltd.

ONE NIGHT'S RATION.

The aeroplane bombs shown here laid out in rows represent one night's ration of missiles for a single British bombing squadron. When it is recalled that similar preparations were going on daily over the many miles of front, and that in addition thousands of shells were being fired, some idea may be formed of the magnitude of the task confronting the Ministry of Munitions.

other to the utmost of our ability. I shall however keep a full account of the material used in the goods supplied to the United States, and shall naturally continue to put these figures before the United States representatives when discussing with them the allocation from the United States of bulk supplies to Great Britain. I am sure this is the wisest course to pursue, and the most likely to secure American assistance. *Nothing in the above proposals affects the question of money payments, which are all adjusted in the regular way.*[1]

I should be glad however to have the concurrence of the War Cabinet before definitely informing General Pershing that I am waiving our claim to specific replacement.

It is pleasing to revive these memories in years no longer terrible but sometimes bleak. No British Minister had, I believe, a greater volume of intricate daily business to conduct with United States representatives than I had during 1918. It is my duty to record the fact that no ally could have given more resolute, understanding, and broad-minded co-operation than the Ministry of Munitions received from the War Industries Board of the United States. These sentiments were reciprocated. I enjoy the honour of being the only foreign member of their post-war Association, and with the King's permission I wear the United States Distinguished Service Medal presented me by General Pershing.

* * * *

Munition Workers' Unrest.

I have described the admirable behaviour of the munition workers during the crisis of the twenty-first of March.

[1] My subsequent italics.

Misfortune and a sense of emergency seemed always to bring out their highest qualities. But once the situation at the front became easier, a wave of unrest swept across the factories. In the main this was born of overstrain; but beneath the surface, always ready to exploit any psychological reaction, lurked the pacifist and subversive elements of the labour world.

In July a whole series of strikes broke out in the munition industries at centres as widely separated as Sheffield, Avonmouth, Oldham, Coventry, Gateshead, Farnham, Birmingham, Manchester, Hendon, Gainsborough and Newport. Most of these disputes were composed, and many others prevented, by the ceaseless and skilful activities of the Munitions Labour Department under Sir Stephenson Kent. But Coventry proved intractable. We were confronted with a widespread cessation of work by the highly paid men engaged in the production of aeroplane engines, thus seriously endangering our programmes.

After consulting the Prime Minister I decided to take the step from which we had hitherto always abstained of withdrawing from men who would not work, their munitions protection against being taken for the Army. In order that the case might be fully explained to the public and to the workers throughout the country, I assembled, as was the custom on critical occasions in the war, the representatives of the Newspaper Proprietors' Association. Fifty or sixty gentlemen attended, covering virtually the entire Press. I could see from their faces as I proceeded that they viewed the decision with concern, deepening in some quarters to consternation. Despite their misgivings all undertook to sustain the national policy, and the Prime Minister continued resolute. On July 16 I therefore issued the following notice which was displayed everywhere in Coventry.

The Coventry Strike.

July 16, 1918.

Owing to the scarcity of skilled labour in the country created by the needs of the Army and the grave emergency of the war, it became necessary some time ago to make sure that the skilled labour available was fairly shared among munition firms, and in some cases to place a limit on the number of skilled workers which particular employers or firms were entitled to engage. If this had not been done, employers, instead of making reasonable efforts to economize skilled labour so that what we have might be used to the best public advantage, would have been led to scramble against each other for skilled men regardless of the national interest. One firm would have been overcrowded with skilled men; another doing equally important war work would have been stopped for want of them. The Defence of the Realm Act therefore gives power to the Government to limit the right of employers to engage skilled labour beyond their proper needs, and the use of this power was approved by the War Cabinet and announced on June 8th.

It is also the law that trade disputes in time of war shall be settled by arbitration without a stoppage of work. But the strike which is threatened at Coventry is not a trade dispute. It does not rise out of the ordinary relations of Capital and Labour. It cannot be settled by arbitration. It can only be regarded as an attempt to subvert and deflect the avowed policy of the State in time of national danger.

In consequence of this fact, the Minister of Munitions finds it necessary to state at the earliest moment that men who abandon their work in these circumstances will by that very act divest themselves of any protection against recruitment for the Army if they are liable to serve. It is already hard that men between forty and fifty should be called up for the Army while younger men are left to earn high wages in the munition factories. Only the fact that these men are absolutely needed at their work has induced the nation reluctantly to put up with what is from any other point of view unfair. It would indeed be wrong that a young man who is given special protection from recruiting to enable him to do work of great importance should

refuse to do that work and yet that his protection should continue.

The Minister has therefore obtained the authority of the War Cabinet, not only to proceed with the utmost rigour of the law against all persons conspiring or inciting to such a cessation of work, but also to make it clear that the protection from military service of all or any men who cease work in these circumstances will be allowed to lapse immediately.

An anxious week-end intervened. On the Monday considerable numbers of men from the Seamen and Firemen's Union, many of whom had been submarined more than once, entered Coventry headed by Mr. Havelock Wilson and preceded by bands; and at the same time the organization of the former Women's Suffrage Societies, under the fiery guidance of Miss Christabel Pankhurst, descended in a cloud of speakers, propagandists and canvassers. Patriotic meetings were held in all parts of the town. Under these varied pressures the strike collapsed, and by Tuesday night all Coventry was at work again.

* * * *

Château Verchocq.

From May onwards the Commander-in-Chief had assigned me regular quarters in the zone of his armies. I had a few rooms and facilities for a mess in an old French country-house amid wonderful avenues of trees near the village of Verchocq. I could reach this by aeroplane in two hours from Hendon, and so could upon occasions work at the Ministry of Munitions in the morning and follow the course of a great battle in the afternoon. I could come and go where I pleased on the front, and so far as it was possible without undue risk, could see all that there was to be seen. About one-fifth of my business lay at Headquarters or in Paris, where the Ministry of Munitions had large establishments. One way or another, either with General Tudor or with General Lipsett until he was killed, and also with Sir Alexander Godley, or with General Birdwood and the Australian Corps in which my brother was serving, or with Rawlinson's army, I managed to be present at almost every important battle during the rest of the war.

Once I flew in a fighting plane between the lines while a considerable action was in progress below. But from the height of 7,000 feet to which we had to keep on account of the German artillery, there was nothing to see but the bursting shells of the barrages far below. It is impossible to see a modern battle. One is always either much too far or much too near.

Meanwhile the schemes and preparations for 1919 were moving steadily forward. Maeterlinck says the God of the bees is the future. At the Ministry of Munitions we were the bees of Hell, and we stored our hives with the pure essence of slaughter. It astonishes me to read in these after years the diabolical schemes for killing men on a vast scale by machinery or chemistry to which we passionately devoted ourselves. "*Les bons pères de famille sont capables de tout.*" We denied ourselves nothing that the laws of war with their German applications allowed. The Germans had installed the cylinders of poison gas. We had followed them swiftly in these sinister experiments. In the end many more Germans died from British gas than British from German. In 1918 the enemy had far the larger supplies of the irritant mustard gas, but our outputs were broadening daily. Although the accidentally burned and blistered at the factories exceeded 100 per cent. of the staff every three months, volunteers were never lacking.

The Mechanical Battle—
My Letter to General Harington.

The Mechanical Battle now took definite shape.

Mr. Churchill to General Harington (Deputy-Chief of the Imperial General Staff).

Secret.

June 21, 1918.

The considerations principally I have in mind are of a more general nature.

The first thing to visualize is: —

(1) The future battle: when it is to

Photo: E.N.A.

MUNITION WORKERS OF THE U.S.A.

Many and important were the efforts put forth in the common cause by munition workers in America. As has been stressed in the text, large orders for war material were placed there, and the efforts of workers across the Atlantic helped to tide over many a difficult situation. America may not have won the war, but it is certain that had the resistance of the Central Powers endured into 1919 the power of the great Republic across the Atlantic would have speedily settled the issue.

be fought: by what methods, and on what scale.

(2) To answer this you must have some general idea of the resources and possibilities of Supply. If we continue working on present lines and existing programmes, we should have produced by April 1, 1919, 3,629 tanks of the Mark V and later varieties of heavy and medium. Working on till June on repeat orders would add 810 heavy and 370 medium. Châteauroux[1] should produce by April 1, 975, and on the existing scale and repeat orders could add by June 900 heavy tanks. To these totals can be added the surviving Mark IV tanks, estimated at 482; total heavy and medium tanks 7,166, from which must be deducted any fresh battle casualties from now on, which perhaps we might take as three or four hundred. These are maximum figures *on existing lines.* Unless special efforts are made in regard to man-power, their realization might well be somewhat retarded. But if special efforts are made, these programmes can probably be counted on. If fighting tanks are required in any large numbers in addition to these, altogether new and special arrangements would have to be made. It would not be impossible to make such arrangements if a decision were taken during the next month, but it means an entirely new effort on top of one which is already serious.

Besides the big fighting and medium fighting tanks of all kinds above enumerated, there should be available a very large number, possibly from 8,000 to 10,000, less battle casualties, of little tanks (Renaults).

Thirdly, there are the cross-country vehicles and tractors. I think you should assume at this stage and for the purposes of your battle plan that you can get all you are likely to require of these, even for an operation on the greatest scale, if the measures are taken not later than July.

(3) Taking the above as a general

[1] The Anglo-Franco-American Factory.

guide, it should be possible to formulate a definite tactical scheme comprising

(*a*) the length of front to be attacked;
(*b*) the locality suitable for this form of attack;
(*c*) the method of the attack;
(*d*) the number of troops to be (i) employed, and (ii) carried in the attack;
(*e*) the distance to be traversed by the attack;
(*f*) the use to be made of all our other military resources before and during the attack; and
(*g*) the military policy necessary to bring about the situation favourable to the attack.

(4) In this study it would be right provisionally and within limits, to vary the data so as to reach the best possible form of attack. It should be possible for instance, by special efforts, to make for you the actual weapons which you require, and to make them in their true proportion. If the existing types do not meet all the needs that may be foreseen in certain parts of the field or certain phases of the battle, there is time now to make new ones. It is not impossible to do anything that is desired, if sufficient importance is attached to it and adequate time and resources are assigned. There must however be behind exceptional exertions in material the driving power of a great military conception supported by the highest professional authority.

(5) If the General Staff are able to formulate their requirements after the sort of process indicated above, I am prepared to take all the steps necessary to secure a punctual, abundant and exact supply of what is requisite.

(6) It is evident that as soon as the main outlines of the plan have been decided a complete unity of purpose must be established between the British Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff at the War Office.

(7) Until the plan has been worked out both on its tactical and supply side and can be presented as a whole on the

Photo: E.N.A.

GENERAL PERSHING AT BOULOGNE.

The Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Force reached France in June, 1917. He is seen here shortly after disembarkation at Boulogne.

joint authority of the C.I.G.S. and the British Commander-in-Chief, it seems scarcely worth while to discuss it with the French or Americans. For the purposes of the plan their co-operation should be presumed. The unity and integrity of a military conception should not be marred by a succession of compromises and amalgamations. Afterwards, when the plan is ready as a whole, improvements may be suggested or modifications may be necessary as the result of consultation with the Allies.

The above seems to me to be the proper sequence of action. The time is passing, the weeks are slipping remorselessly away. Everyone's mind is absorbed in averting defeat in 1918, and meanwhile we are losing the chance of gaining victory in 1919. In the autumn it will be already too late. I have seen this melancholy process repeated year after year since the beginning of the struggle. In this war, the initiative can only be regained by looking and planning at least one year ahead, and patiently subordinating intervening events to the supreme climax.

If action is settled on the main lines, the details of organization of the Tank Corps in the War Office and in the field, its association with Design and Supply, and its liaison with the Allies, will all fall smoothly and easily into their places; but without a central and dominant purpose, culminating in an aggressive battle, nothing is possible, and we shall continue to be the sport of circumstances and of our enemy.

* * * *

The Man-Power Problem 1918 and 1919.

The man-power problem was at this time most complex. The War Office and General Headquarters, although neither anticipated an end of the war in 1918, continued to press incessantly for the release of men, and of skilled men, from munitions to the Army. On the other hand their demands for output of all kinds—particularly in the highest class of material—speedily increased. I had convinced myself that all should be staked upon a battle in the spring and summer of 1919. It was too late to strengthen the man-power of the Army during the campaign of 1918. Men taken in July could not be trained and reach the front in time to affect the operations already in progress. I wished therefore to develop the greatest munitions production in the autumn and winter of 1918, and to release the largest possible numbers for service in the field from January, 1919, onwards. The following extracts from notes, the first written by me in July and the second in August, explain the two stages of this policy which was, broadly speaking, adopted.

July and August Memoranda.

MUNITIONS AND THE LIMITS OF RECRUITING.

To the War Cabinet.

July, 1918.

Since the beginning of this year we have released no fewer than 100,000 men, nearly all of whom are skilled men, for military service. We have been deprived of all the Grade I. men of 19 and 20 without excepting even draughtsmen, men employed in making gauges, breech mechanisms, optical instruments, and vital pivotal men.

Hitherto I have done everything in my power to support the policy of the War Office and the Ministry of National Service. But I consider the time has now come when that policy requires to be the subject of a general reconsideration. Last autumn it was obvious that Russia would be out before America could come in, and that consequently the most strenuous efforts should be made to enable our Army to meet the attacks which would come upon it in the spring. The disasters of the spring rendered it still more imperative to provide men to carry us through the summer. I consider therefore we were right to run very great risks in all other directions in order to maintain the fighting front.

We have now to take into consideration a period where the conditions are entirely different from those of last autumn and this spring. The immediate crisis is not over, and indeed the worst may have yet to come. But men taken from industry after July will not reach

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

FUMIGATION OF SOLDIERS' UNIFORMS.

Of the many discomforts and dangers endured by the fighting troops one of the most unpleasant was the invasion of the men's clothes by lice and similar vermin. Every effort was made to deal with the nuisance by the installation of fumigating boilers into which bundles of infested clothing were stacked. This operation, known to the Army as "delousing," was sometimes efficacious and sometimes not. It served at least to purify the uniforms even if all the inhabitants therein were not in every case destroyed.

the battle-front in time to influence the decision. So far as man-power is concerned, the die is cast. Secondly, the Americans, who have ten million men between 20 and 30 on whom to draw, are now arriving in great numbers, more than 270,000 having disembarked in a single month. The main contribution to our manhood next year must be derived from them. If we are to obtain any effective superiority in numbers, it can only be by American aid. No contribution that we can make can substantially alter the situation in a numerical sense. The question for us therefore is how to use the last remains of our man-power so as to develop the greatest possible military effort. This will not necessarily be by making the largest possible number of infantry soldiers.

Since the subject was last considered, the American forces in Europe have risen to 1,000,000 men. It is stated that more than 2,000,000 Americans have already been enlisted, that 3,000,000 will have been enlisted by the 1st September, and that the War Department is preparing clothing for 4,000,000 as from January 1. It is evident that the solution of the man-power problem lies in the speedy transportation to France of these great numbers, their training and organization on the battle-front, and lastly their equipment and supply. The first 1,000,000 who have come have been almost entirely equipped by Britain and France. But for the fact that we were able to supply them with artillery, machine-guns, rifles, trench mortars, &c., and to feed them with munitions of all kinds, no use in the present crisis

could have been made of this first million. My latest report from America states that the American army in France will be almost entirely dependent during the whole of 1918 on British and French artillery production. If we are to continue to put, as we must do, the most extreme pressure upon the American Government to pour its men over, we must be in a position to guarantee them thorough and immediate equipment when they arrive, and ample supply thereafter. . . .

The limiting factors are perpetually changing. During the rest of 1918 and the first half of 1919 the limiting factor on the employment of American troops will not be men or tonnage or food, but equipment of all kinds. For the time being the American munitions programme, particularly in guns and aeroplanes, is woefully behind their available resources in man-power. Unless we and the French are able to supplement promptly every deficiency in the American munitions programme, the despatch of very large numbers of their troops may be retarded from this cause. On the one hand, there are available in America enormous numbers of men in the prime of life; on the other, in Great Britain, for the sake of getting comparatively small numbers of men of inferior physique who will not be much use, or of superior skill who cannot be spared, we run the risk of endangering production of munitions on which not only our own Armies, but the rapid importation of American troops, depend. The situation has in fact undergone a very marked change and we shall commit another of the great mistakes of the war if we do not adapt our policy to it in time. . . .

It seems to

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE KAISER IN 1918.

The year 1918 was bleak and dreary for the German Emperor. Appalled by the turn events were taking, the probable result of the gigantic struggle became to him each day more patent. He is seen here in the field decorating officers of his army, but if comparison is made between this and portraits taken at earlier stages of the war, it will be evident that the strain of the long campaign had told heavily upon him.

me evident that we are now going too far and over-shooting our mark in regard to man-power. Once the emergency of this summer has been surmounted, we ought not to rupture our munitions supply, particularly our supply of vital modern appliances, for the sake of adding 20,000 men more or less to our Army of over 3,000,000. We ought on the contrary to make sure that our great plants here are kept working at their fullest possible capacity in order that our own Army may be equipped with the most perfect, scientific, and life-saving weapons, and in order that we may be able to place in the field the largest possible number of Americans.

To the War Cabinet.

August, 1918.

The number of divisions available on either side at the commencement of the battle-period must be considered in relation to the power of replenishing those divisions with drafts. . . .

If the numbers of divisions expected by Sir Henry Wilson are realized, they will afford us by 1st July [1919] a moderate superiority. But this superiority could be greatly enhanced by the holding in readiness of an exceptionally large number of men not in divisional formations but as drafts. Although the American military organization may not be able to achieve the formation of more than 80 divisions by the date mentioned, there is no reason why another million American soldiers trained only as individuals should not be available for the climax.

Once the foreseeable needs of the American divisions on the basis of three replenishments during the battle period have been provided for, we should make the strongest possible appeal to President Wilson to supply an additional 200,000 or 300,000 men—over and above everything else—for service with British cadres, and we should adapt our own organization to profit by this. Above all, we should ask continually for the attaching of an American battalion to each British brigade.

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What is going to win a battle like this is the intensity of the fighting effort during a limited period of time. The only way to save life is to secure the superiorities necessary for *speedy* victory. The way to incur the greatest amount of slaughter is to continue waging war at three-quarter speed with well-matched forces. It is much better not to try at all, than to three-quarters try a plan we three-quarters believe in.

Clearly the dominating factor is the enormous reserve of American manhood which may be made available by wise and energetic action from now on. . . . I am of opinion that if it is decided to make an effort of this character everything should be subordinated to it; that the output of munitions, and consequently the requirement of coal, should be drastically reduced during the summer months of 1919, that we should cut in very largely upon our reserves of ammunition, &c., and that we should liberate from the mines, the munitions works, and the shipyards for the period of the battle a large number of men, as many as possible of whom would be returned the moment the main decision had declared itself. It seems to me that a scheme of this kind might be elaborated and surveyed. We are justified in running great risks to win an early and complete victory, because, even if we fail, we shall be steadily up-borne by the growing military power of America.

Very often things are started because they are necessary at the time, and then afterwards they are kept going indefinitely, eating up men, although the need which brought them into existence may have diminished or gradually changed. If we really believe in the possibility of winning a decisive battle in 1919, we must narrowly scrutinize every establishment in this country to see whether it can release forces for the decisive phase. . . .

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The 10,000 Caterpillars—Foch's Endorsement.

Once the leading personalities of the General Staff at the War Office lent

themselves to the scheme of the mechanical battle, it advanced steadily. I had appointed General Seely, who had been during the whole war in the fighting line, to be head of the Trench Warfare Department. I found myself strong enough in July to negotiate the placing of a block order for 10,000 cross-country caterpillar vehicles in the United States. Mr. Henry Ford's vast organization was capable, with other important American firms, of executing this contract without detriment to their other obligations. Mr. Perry, one of Mr. Ford's most trusted assistants, who had for some time been serving in the Ministry of Munitions, was sent on a special mission to Washington to unfold by word of mouth to Mr. Baruch alone the full scheme and purpose of our request. Mr. Baruch, having consulted the President, swiftly cleared all obstacles from the path. No questions were asked by subordinates, and full delivery of the whole 10,000 was guaranteed by the spring.

Such a degree of mutual confidence among the high British and American personnel had been attained, and such was the authority they exerted, that not more than three or four people had to know the strategic object for which these machines were designed. The matter was opened to Foch, on whom it produced a favourable impression. On July 24 he addressed a communication to all the Allied armies, asking to be furnished as soon as possible with the total forces they could put in the line on January 1 and April 1, 1919, respectively. He asked for this return under five heads: (1) the number of divisions and their flow of drafts; (2) the artillery—field, heavy and very heavy (*A.L.G.P.*), together with the necessary ammunition; (3) the number of aeroplanes of combat, observation and bombing; (4) *chars de combat* (tanks)—light, medium and heavy, excluding *chars de service* (supply tanks); (5) *mechanical means of cross country transport for artillery, munitions and supplies of all kinds.*[1] He added:—

"To reach the final decision of the war as early as possible in 1919 each of the Allied nations should prepare for the commencement of that year its maximum effort. For that:

"The British and French Armies should maintain and nourish their present number of infantry divisions; the American Army should increase its number to the utmost extent.

"Munitions should be prepared in quantities sufficient to permit of the prosecution of a battle of long duration. Aviation and tanks should receive the greatest development possible."

Future Hopes.

Thus at last the highest authority was engaged behind the true ideas, and the objections of half-informed potentates could be shouldered out of the way without the need of dangerously elaborate explanations. Although around us great battles raged and the thunder of the guns was unceasing, my mind amid a vivid life of movement and activity always rested on one picture of the future: 10,000 fighting tanks, large and small, specially adapted to the ground they had to traverse, moving forward simultaneously behind the artillery barrage on fronts of assault aggregating 300 or 400 kilometres; behind them, working with them, British, French and American infantry; and behind these again, 10,000 caterpillar vehicles unarmed and unarmoured, but each carrying forward across country, over fields and trenches, all the food, ammunition, kit and supplies of every kind which one platoon would require, while the roads remained clear and free for the advance of artillery and reserves.

But fortune had earlier and happier solutions in store.

[1] My italics.

CHAPTER LXXV

THE TURN OF THE TIDE

The Sombre German Outlook—The Ordeal of the Emperor—The Rheims Plan—Foch's Intervention—The Curtain Rises—The Battle of Rheims—The German Repulse—Foch and Pétain—Foch and Haig—The XXIInd. Corps—Mangin's Counter-stroke—His Comment—Rupprecht Suspended—Foch's Policy—The Decisive Battle—August 8—" Rawly "—The Battlefield.

A DREAR panorama confronted the rulers of Germany in the month that followed the Battle of Noyon, and a growing sense of the inevitable began to chill all hearts.

No rift, no crack, no crevice appeared in the mighty concourse of States, almost the world in arms, which glared stonily across the lines of battle at Germany and her Allies. France under Clémenceau was flint. The British Army was known to be rapidly recovering, and under Lloyd George's leadership the whole Empire resounded with the clang of redoubled exertion. The Americans were pouring in across the open seas. Italy, so nearly extinguished in the preceding winter, renewed her strength.

The Sombre German Outlook.

Meanwhile from every quarter dark tidings flowed in upon Great Headquarters. Turkey was desperate. A sinister silence brooded in Bulgaria. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was upon the verge of dissolution. A mutinous outbreak had occurred in the German Navy. And now the valiant German Army itself, the foundation and life of the whole Teutonic Powers, showed disquieting symptoms. The German nation had begun to despair, and the soldiers became conscious of their mood. Ugly incidents occurred. Desertion increased, and the leave men were reluctant to return. The German prisoners liberated from Russia by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk returned infected with the Lenin virus. In large numbers they refused to go again to the front. A campaign of unmerited reproach was set on foot against the German officer class. Their painstaking and thorough routine, which had enabled them on all the fronts to exact two Ally lives for every German, was no protection from the charge that they did not share the privations of the troops. The British fire had bitten deep in March and April, and for the first time since the earliest days of the war, Germany felt the swift blood-drain she was accustomed to exact from others. Still the majestic war machine obeyed the levers of authority, and the teeth of its thousand wheels, in spite of occasional jars and tremors, kept grinding on remorselessly.

And in Ludendorff was found a hardy gambler incapable of withdrawing from the game while he still had heavy stakes to play. Who shall say whether at this moment he was right or wrong? He could not tell whether the adoption of a defensive policy, of great strategic retirements, of gaining at all costs the winter for negotiation, might not have been the signal for the collapse he dreaded. No, it was better to brazen it out to the bitter end. He had gathered the strength for one more plunge. Was there not still one more good chance? A crashing victory against the French, the advance to Paris, and then, when all Allied reserves had been interposed to shield the Capital, a sudden right-handed drive against the British and the Channel ports. Such at least was his resolve.

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The Ordeal of the Emperor.

The ordeal of the German Emperor during the great Battle of Rheims has been the subject of an imaginative but profoundly instructive study by a German writer of distinction.[1] The story is confined to the hour to hour doings and experiences of the Emperor during the period of less than ten days in which the battle was launched and decided. And with German thoroughness more than five hundred closely printed pages are devoted to this theme. The arrival of the Imperial train at a wayside station; the supreme War Lord's meeting with his Generals, Hindenburg solemn, deferential, vague; Ludendorff preoccupied, terse, reserved, the man at the wheel—such is the opening picture. The Imperial trappings are becoming threadbare. These men are grappling with doom. They do not seek to add a third to their confidence. The Emperor is ceremoniously relegated to a tall wooden tower specially constructed in a wood, from whose platform above the level of the tree-tops the All Highest would be in the most favourable position to witness what might happen. And here with his immediate retinue he must dwell perched for six whole days, eyes glued to telescopes that show nothing but distant fumes and blurs and smudges; while his throne totters and his people's fortune is decided, utterly helpless and useless, a prey to the worst anxieties, but at any rate out of the way.

[1] *Der König,* by Carl Rosner.

Photo: Melcy.

GENERAL GOURAUD.

Henri Joseph Gouraud entered the French Army in 1890, and between that year and the outbreak of the Great War saw service in the Sudan, in the Congo, in Senegal and in Morocco. Severely wounded in Gallipoli in July, 1915, he returned to France and was later given command of the Fourth French Army. In 1918 he was conspicuous for his leadership in the fighting at Rheims and elsewhere.

The Rheims Plan.

Ludendorff's plan for the Battle of Rheims followed the usual German pincer model, and was in itself almost on the scale of March 21. Two separate simultaneous attacks, with a silent gap of 20 kilometres between them, were launched on each side of Rheims with the object of biting off that city and the difficult hilly region around it. The Seventh German Army attacked across the Marne to the west of Rheims, and the First and Third German Armies to the east. Fifteen divisions were assigned to the first wave of each attack. The total width of the offensive, including the gap, was nearly 70 kilometres. Its general convergence was upon Chalons. If this battle prospered, the growing threat to Paris would draw the Allied reserves southward to defend the capital. Whereupon, when the situation was ripe, the Crown Prince Rupprecht with thirty-one divisions would fall on the British in Flanders and resume the battle of the Lys

and the drive at the Channel ports. The conception was vast, and the forces employed in the whole combination the most widespread used since the original invasion.

The secret of these designs was not hidden from the Allies. The concentrations of the enemy were correctly defined. Information from deserters and from prisoners taken in organized raids supplied the French and British Headquarters with full confirmatory details, while time for the necessary preparations yet remained. Haig braced himself to meet Rupprecht, and Pétain organized the Rheims front with minute and studious care. The French line was held to the west of Rheims by the army of Berthelot and to the east by that of Gouraud, both comprised in the army group of Maistre. These measures taken, the general concert of the gigantic battle rested with Foch.

Photo: Manuel.

MARSHAL PÉTAIN.

One of the most distinguished of the French generals during the Great War, Pétain entered the army in 1878. In August, 1914, he was in command of the 4th Brigade, and became in succession commander of a corps and of an army. When unity of command on the Western Front was achieved in 1918 Pétain became Commander-in-Chief of all the French armies. He was made a Marshal of France on November 19, 1918.

Foch's Intervention.

The intervention of the supreme control was decisive. Neither Haig nor Pétain, with their own intense preoccupations, could have achieved the general view. Nor is it likely that from a discussion between two equally threatened equals, each with vital objectives to guard, the right arrangements would have emerged. Between co-operation, however loyal, and united action, there is a gap wide enough to turn victory into defeat.

Foch, trusting to the information to hand in spite of all its uncertainty, resolved to allow the Rheims battle to develop, and then at its height to strike at the right flank of the advancing Germans with a heavy counter-stroke. For this purpose he massed with all possible secrecy in the forests around Villers-Cotterets an army of more than twenty divisions and 350 small French tanks. He drew these forces from the reserves which Pétain wished to keep to guard Paris. He also on the 12th asked that four British divisions should be moved into the French zone, two south of the Somme and two astride of that river to ensure the connection between the French and British armies about Amiens, and to enable him to move four French divisions farther to the east and

nearer to the impending battle. This was agreed to by the British Headquarters and orders were given accordingly. On the 13th Foch demanded that these four divisions should be immediately placed unreservedly at his disposal for the battle, and further that four more British divisions should be despatched to take their places.

These were serious requests. Opposite the Hazebrouck sector, perilously near the coast, Rupprecht was known to have eight divisions in the line, and twenty-three, of which twenty-one were fresh, divisions in reserve. Against this already mounted attack the British could muster only fifteen divisions, including reserves, and of these two were half-trained and one of second line personnel. Sir Douglas Haig moved immediately the two additional divisions which were to replace those astride of the Somme, but he then dwelt upon the accumulating preparations of the Germans to attack the British front and the uncertainty as to where the next blow would fall, and declared himself against despatching any troops to Champagne at the moment. He asked that at least decision should be deferred on this last point till he could meet Foch at Mouchy as had been arranged for the 15th.

Meanwhile the British Government were alarmed by the substantial weakening of the British Reserves when unquestionably a series of enormous attacks could be launched at any moment upon our much tried troops. They were also deeply offended by the diversion from the British zone of almost all the American troops who had arrived. The Prime Minister called a meeting of the War Cabinet on the evening of the 13th at Hassocks, and as the result General Smuts was sent to Haig to say that if he considered it desirable to invoke the "Beauvais agreement" the Government would support him. Matters were in this position when the battle began.

The Curtain Rises.

As the curtain rises on the new scene we may take a sweeping glance at the principal characters. The Emperor before the dawn of July 15 is on his leafy perch among the tree-tops. Ludendorff is at Avesnes on tenter-hooks. Pétain's attention is riveted upon his front, and the capital city which lies only 90 kilometres behind it, on which the storm is about to break. Haig and his Chief of Staff think on the whole that the second rather than the first blow is reserved for them; but that it will be terrible they have no doubt. The French line, they believe, will hold after bending; but the possibility of a French counter-stroke is too good to be true.

East of Rheims behind a false front elaborately maintained lies Gouraud, a fiery spirit in a war-shattered frame, skilful, knightly, accurately informed. He knows even the German zero; and three hours before the German bombardment begins, all his artillery open counter-preparation fire on the crowded batteries and assembly trenches of the assault. In the forests of Villers-Cotterets crouches the army of Foch's counter-stroke—two strong American divisions, and eighteen of bitter Frenchmen. At its head we see again the impetuous Mangin. Dark days have come to him since Douaumont was recaptured; the Nivelle disaster of which he was the scapegoat, dismissal from his command, indeed from all commands, a Ministerial order not to reside within 50 kilometres of Paris, afterwards petty employment while Armageddon rages—horrible to endure.

Suddenly Clémenceau, above scapegoat-making, reaches down a strong hand. Foch, then only an adviser, proposes "To Mangin a Corps." Opposition and prejudice are swept aside. After six months' probation in command of the IXth Corps, "Mangin the Butcher" is placed once again at the head of an army. And now, like a hungry leopard on a branch, sees Incomparable Opportunity approaching and about to pass below. And last of all in the beautiful Château of Bombon, where the sunrise bathes the lawns and the ripple of waters joins the accompaniment of summer, sits Marshal Foch with Weygand at his side and his "military family" around him. He has battles to fight behind the line as well as in front of it.

The Battle of Rheims.

Down from beyond the German parapets leaped the cataracts of fire and steel. Forward the indomitable veterans of the Fatherland! It is the Marne that must be crossed. Thousands of cannon and machine guns lash its waters into foam. But the shock troops go forward, war-worn, war-hardened, and once again "*Nach Paris*" is on their lips. Launching frail pontoons and rafts in a whistling, screaming, crashing hell they cross the river, mount the further bank, grapple with the French; grapple also with the Americans—numerous, fresh, and coolly handled. After heavy losses they drive them back, and make good their lodgments. They throw their bridges, drag across guns and shells, and when night falls upon the bloody field, 50,000 Germans have dug themselves in on a broad front four miles beyond the Marne. Here they stop to gather further strength after performing all that soldiers have ever done.

But it was otherwise to the east of Rheims. Gouraud's counter-preparation smote the First and Third German Armies even before the signal to advance was due. The General had unmasked all his batteries on the hazard of his information. Would he be justified by the event? His Chief of Staff entered his room at Chalons watch in hand. They have not begun. It is past zero. We have been betrayed by the prisoners." "There are still two minutes," answered Gouraud, also watch in hand: and thus the two men stood waiting breathlessly for a new cannonade to supervene upon the muffled thunder of the French bombardment. Punctually as Gouraud's watch pointed to the hour, a roar like a railway train passed overhead, and with deafening detonation a gigantic German shell shattered the neighbouring lighting plant and plunged the headquarters in total darkness. The two French officers received this unmistakable message with feelings of profound thankfulness and relief. Their batteries had not been exposed in vain.

The German Repulse.

Very heavy losses were inflicted upon the assembled Germans by the forestalling fire. The advance began under heavy disadvantages. The false French front resisted ruggedly and must be laboriously exterminated. And then, beyond the range of their own artillery, the Germans collided with the real front, flaming, impenetrable, alive with counter-attacks. All along the line from end to end without exception, the advance of the First and Third Armies withered before the French defence; and after a day of frightful slaughter, nothing of consequence had been gained. The check was decisive. "By noon of the 16th," says Ludendorff, "G.H.Q. had given orders for the suspension of the offensive to the First and Third Armies and for their organization for defence by withdrawing certain divisions for this purpose. . . . Once the difficult decision to suspend the offensive of these armies had been taken, it was useless to attempt to advance further across the Marne or to leave our troops on the southern bank. We had to make arrangements for crossing before the retreat could even begin." The retreat was fixed for the night between the 20th and 21st. He still hoped however to make progress up the valley of the Ardre towards Rheims.

Foch and Pétain.

These decisions of Ludendorff were not of course known to Foch or Pétain, and the 15th was a day of great stress for General Foch. The first reports of the battle on the morning of the 15th from Gouraud's army were so satisfactory that Foch set off for his rendezvous with Haig at Mouchy. There can be little doubt that Grand Quartier Général was lukewarm about the Mangin counter-stroke. It is at least certain that they strove to delay it. In later years it has been said that Pétain argued: "It is too soon. Let the Germans advance further. Let them engage their reserves fully in the main battle, and your counter-stroke will be all the more effective." Whether this was the real motive or an after explanation to cover undue sensitiveness about Paris, will long be disputed. But there can be no dispute about the action of

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

AFTER BATTLE.

The 8th West Yorkshires moving back from the front line after a successful attack. On July 29, 1918, the day on which this picture was taken, heavy attacks were delivered by the British troops in the vicinity of Fère-en-Tardenois. This town was British G.H.Q. during the first battle of the Aisne in 1914.

General Foch. On his way to Mouchy he stopped at General Fayolle's headquarters at Noailles. There he heard that Grand Quartier Général had issued instructions for all available French reserves to be held in readiness to go to Rheims. He immediately cancelled these orders and said that the preparations for Mangin's attack should be pressed on with all speed and that the attack should take place as soon as possible. He wanted it to take place on the 17th, but acquiesced reluctantly in the date being finally fixed for the 18th.

Foch and Haig.

Further protests were raised by the French Headquarters. Whether they emanated directly from Pétain is not certain; but at 12.25 Foch telephoned to Pétain from Mouchy—"There can be no question of any slowing down, still less of stopping the Mangin preparations. In case of urgent, extreme need you may take troops absolutely indispensable, informing me at once." This done he opened his discussion with Haig.

The British Headquarters believed that the defeat of May 27 had grievously affected the morale of the French Army. They were extremely sceptical of the ability and resolve of the French to deliver a heavy offensive punch. They feared lest their own reserves should be reduced, not for the purpose of a decisive counter-stroke at the proper moment, but merely to add to the mass of troops between Paris and the enemy. The British and French High Commands were in close touch with each other, and the defensive views of Pétain were well known to Haig. The Generalissimo had nothing to his record but the disaster of May 27 and no machine at his disposal beyond his group of personal staff officers in the Château of Bombon. Haig might sympathize with Foch's conception. But would it be translated into action? In the crisis of the battle on the Rheims front, with Paris perhaps in the balance, would not the known views of Pétain and the power of the French staff organization prevail? Nevertheless Haig agreed to

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

IN THE BOIS DU PETIT CHAMP.

Man of the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington's Regiment advancing through the Bois du Petit Champ on July 22, 1918. This battalion, like the 8th West Yorkshires, who appear on the page opposite, belonged to the 62nd Division.

move the whole of the second four British divisions to the aid of the French, and the first two of them were actually ordered to complete the XXIInd Corps south of the Somme.

Late that same night General Smuts, member and envoy of the War Cabinet, arrived upon the scene. He explained his mission to the Commander-in-Chief, and offered him the support of the British Government, if he thought he was being unduly pressed. Haig replied "that he would take the risk, that he accepted the responsibility, and that he had acted in the main interest of the Allied cause." He even gave Smuts a written note that he "took the risk and fully realized that if the dispositions (of Foch) proved to be wrong, the blame will rest on me. On the other hand, if they prove right, the credit will lie with Foch. With this," he added pointedly, "the Government should be well satisfied."

Meanwhile a tense discussion was in progress at Provins. After the dismissal of General Anthoine in the aftermath of May 27 a new figure had appeared at the French Headquarters. The young and audacious Buat, chosen by Foch and Clémenceau, had been appointed the Major-General of the Armies and, independently of Pétain's wishes, had become his right-hand man. Buat, as he was no doubt expected to do by those who had selected him, hurled his weight upon the side of the immediate counter-stroke; and in the end Pétain and the French staff consented to obey the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

The battle on the Marne raged during the whole of the 16th with heavy French counter-attacks. On the morning of the 17th Foch sent General Du Cane with a letter to Haig on the subject of the attack threatening on the British front, and the precautionary disposal of the British reserves to meet it. As Du Cane was stepping into his car, Weygand, who had followed him through the doorway, said, "General Foch authorizes you to tell Sir Douglas Haig that Mangin's army will attack to-morrow morning, at 8 a.m., with twenty divisions."

The XXIInd. Corps.

The British Headquarters Staff were filled with the deepest misgivings upon the dispersal of their Reserves. Fortified by the Smuts visit they had made the strongest representation to the Commander-in-Chief during the 16th. General Du Cane was confronted on arrival with the draft of a letter which awaited Haig's signature, demanding the immediate return to the north of the Somme of all the four divisions of the XXIInd Corps. His personal interview with the Commander-in-Chief did not prevent the signing and sending of this letter. But Haig, convinced that the great counter-attack was now certain, added a verbal message that "If the British troops were wanted to exploit a success, they should of course be used." This in the event was all that was needed.

I have described these transactions in some detail, because they mark the crucial moment in Foch's career as Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies, and show, as it is right to do, alike his difficulties and the dominating personal part he played in victories which all henceforward were to share. They show also the important aid which in a crisis of terrible uncertainty was given him by Sir Douglas Haig and the British Army.

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Let us now for a moment cross the lines.

"In the night of the 17th-18th," writes Ludendorff,[1] "I myself went to the Headquarters of the Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht, to review once more the state of their preparations. The attack was intended as a continuation of that which had been suspended at the end of April. It was to be made by the Fourth and Sixth Armies north of the Lys, its objectives being the possession of the commanding heights between Poperinghe and Bailleul, as well as the high ground round Hazebrouck. During the discussion with the Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht on the morning of the 18th I received the first news that, by means of an unexpected tank attack, the French had pierced the line south-west of Soissons. . . . I concluded the conference at the Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht (naturally in a state of the greatest nervous tension) and then returned to Avesnes."

[1] *My War Memories*, pp. 667-8.

Mangin's Counter-stroke—His Comment.

At the appointed hour Mangin's army had sprung. His battle followed the Cambrai model. There was no artillery preparation. Three hundred and thirty small Renault tanks came out of the woods and ground their way through the German line. Behind them the French infantry rolled forward in immense superiority. Upon a wide front the enemy were overwhelmed. Behind the front the German troops were placidly harvesting the abundant crops. They cast down their sickles and fought where they stood. The high corn hampered their machine-guns except where occasionally provided with special tripods, and the small tanks continued murderously to break up the defence. By nightfall Mangin's army had advanced an average of 5 kilometres on a front of 45. The decisive blow on the Western Front had not yet been struck; but from this moment onwards to the end of the war, without exception, the Allies continued to advance and the Germans to retreat.

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During these tremendous days the British, French, American and Italian Munitions authorities had been in continuous conference in Paris. The distant rumble of the cannonade and the dull crash of the half-hourly Bertha shells reminded us that the campaign of 1918 was going on. But all our work was concerned with 1919.

The provision and division of steel, of coal, of nitrates; the manufacture of artillery, shells, machine-guns, tanks, aeroplanes, poison gas, upon the greatest possible scale and under the most harmonious arrangements kept us, and the enormous technical staffs we directed, at

the Conference table every day and all day. And of course while the battle hung in the balance I waited ready to set in motion, if it must be so, the far-reaching, elaborate scheme for evacuating and reconstituting the Paris munition factories in which we were concerned.

In the last week of July we were invited to take a day off and visit the scene of the victory. Passing through Château-Thierry and along the pulverized front, we repaired to Mangin's headquarters at Versigny. We approached the General's house through a long avenue of captured German cannon and trench mortars. Mangin received us with cordiality. His modest bearing did not conceal his joy. After luncheon I found myself alone with him, and knowing the ups and downs which he had survived, I offered some few words of admiration upon his signal victory. I record his reply exactly as he gave it: "Le Maréchal Foch l'a conçue. Le Général Gouraud l'a rendue possible. Moi, je l'ai faite." Some years afterwards when I repeated these words to General Gouraud, he considered them for an appreciable moment, and then said: "That is quite true." And indeed I think they may well serve as an epitome of this memorable event.

Rupprecht Suspended.

Unseen upon the surface, the turn of the tide had now begun. Nevertheless Ludendorff persevered, and the Crown Prince and his staff were found capable of stemming the French inroad on their flank. The divisions which would have backed the drive on Paris rapidly formed a front to the French counter-stroke; and after the first surprise very few kilometres were taken away from the stubborn enemy. In a fortnight of hard fighting the Germans skilfully extricated their masses of men and material from the perilous Marne salient. But Rupprecht, whose hammer was actually uplifted in Flanders, was frozen where he stood. At first it was a mere postponement: a week or two while the German position in the Marne salient was reorganized. And then a few divisions were taken from his army to help in the re-organization; and then a few more; and then another week's delay. Thus Rupprecht remained for twenty days, waiting for the signal. But the signal never came. The scale in which the struggling armies and the nations behind them were weighed had tilted. The inclination was imperceptible to the public eye, but the controlling minds of the German Headquarters registered a definite sensation.

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But now an event was to occur which would resolve all doubts. "August 8," writes Ludendorff, "was the black day of the German Army in the history of this war. . . . The 8th of August opened the eyes of the staff on both sides; mine were certainly opened. . . . The Emperor told me later on, after the failure of the July offensive and after August 8, he knew the war could be no longer won."

Foch's Policy.

On July 24 the only conference ever held between the Allied Commanders took place at Bombon. Foch presented to Haig, Pershing and Pétain a document setting forth in outline his policy for the rest of the year. His plans may be shortly described as follows:—First, to reduce the three principal salients on the enemy's front—Amiens, Château-Thierry and St. Mihiel, with a view to improving for the campaign of 1919 the lateral railway communications along the whole front from the Vosges Mountains to the sea, and by a subsidiary action to free the Bruay coalfield, and certain other minor enterprises. Secondly, if successful in these operations, to carry out a general offensive with all the troops available. It is said that he had among his intimates already begun to dwell on the hope of obtaining final victory in 1918. His favourite expression at this time was "L'édifice commence à craquer. Tout le monde à la bataille!"

On the other hand his memorandum stated that it would depend on the measure of success gained in these various operations whether that success could be more fully exploited "before the winter sets in." All his plans aimed at

the summer of 1919. In August, when asked when the war would end, his official answer was, "about next autumn —in twelve months"; and as late as the middle of October his Staff made the answer "in the spring."

The British Headquarters had been agreeably surprised by the success of Mangin's counter-stroke. Their scepticism was however fortified by the failure of the French, in spite of the initial surprise of July 18, to make effective progress against the Germans in the Château-Thierry salient or to prevent the Crown Prince from extricating his troops from their dangerous position. Nevertheless Haig was resolute for attack, and entirely agreed with the Generalissimo upon the immediate practical steps. He had as early as July 13 directed Rawlinson to prepare an offensive by the Fourth Army against the German salient before Amiens. Rawlinson's plans were in consequence well advanced. He had accepted with logic and conviction the whole model of a Tank battle. There were available in all nearly 600 tanks, of which, apart from spare machines, 96 were supply tanks, 22 gun carriers and 420 fighting tanks. Of the fighting tanks 324 were of the new Mark V pattern of superior speed and manœuvring power, and weighed over thirty tons apiece.

Everything was subordinated to the surprise of the tank attack. One hundred and twenty brigades of British artillery of all natures were assembled, but all preliminary bombardment was prohibited. Not a shot was to be fired even for registration. The tanks were to advance, unfettered and unprejudiced, simultaneously with the infantry and about 200 yards behind the creeping barrage. Their approach was assisted by special noise barrages, by the morning mist, and by artificial fog. The British heavy and medium artillery was mainly to be directed upon the enemy's similar guns. The infantry, closely accompanied by numerous field batteries and with large bodies of cavalry at hand, were to exploit the success of the tanks.

The essence of the whole plan was surprise. Rawlinson's army had a restricted position of assembly, and German



THE BATTLE OF RHEIMS.

Sketch map showing the progress of the Battle of Rheims from July 15 to August 4, 1918.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

BRITISH CAVALRY: AUGUST, 1918.

The 18th Hussars waiting under shelter of a bank ready to move forward during the battle of Albert on August 21, 1918. The photograph was taken near Courcelles.

counter-preparation, if it caught our troops in the act of assembling, would have serious results. For these reasons Rawlinson did not wish to fight hand in hand with the French on his right. He feared lest secrecy should be endangered by a joint operation. Moreover, Debeney's French army had few tanks and could not attack without artillery preparation. To ensure complete co-operation Foch placed all the troops, British and French, under Sir Douglas Haig. The danger lest the French preliminary bombardment should spoil the surprise was overcome by timing the French infantry attack three-quarters of an hour later than the British. Thus not a shot would be fired before zero. On the second and third days of the battle the rest of Debeney's army and Humbert's army were in succession to intervene.

The Decisive Battle—August 8.

At 4.20 a.m. on August 8, in the half light of a misty dawn, the British tanks rolled forward into No Man's Land, and simultaneously the Allied artillery opened fire. Four Canadian, four Australian and two British divisions, followed by three more in reserve and the Cavalry Corps, advanced on the British front. Eight French divisions co-operated later in *échelon* on their right. All along the line, but especially in the centre where the Canadians and Australians fought, victory declared itself forthwith.

Ludendorff had taken special measures to strengthen the German line. "In this storm-centre," he writes, "the divisional fronts were narrow, artillery was plentiful, and the trench system was organized in depth. All experience gained on the

18th July had been acted upon." It was of no avail. The Germans were unable to resist the tanks. "Six battle-worthy divisions"[1] collapsed almost immediately before forces scarcely superior in numbers. In less than two hours 16,000 prisoners and more than 200 guns were taken by the British, and by noon tanks and armoured motor cars, followed by cavalry, were scouring the country 14 kilometres behind the German front. The French, who attacked without tanks, advanced about half as far. But the British advance enabled Chaulnes junction to be brought under close fire and consequently destroyed the German communications on which their whole front from Montdidier to Lassigny depended. This was decisive. Two days later, when Humbert's army joined the battle, the high ground near Lassigny was found abandoned; and the advance of the Allies was general along a front of 120 kilometres.

* * * *

I spent the 9th and 10th on this battlefield. I had been at the War Cabinet the day before when Sir Henry Wilson had announced the opening of the attack, and when in the afternoon the first reports of a great Tank victory began to come through, I decided to get into my aeroplane and take a couple of days' holiday. Rawlinson's Headquarters were at Flixicourt, near Amiens. I was much delayed in reaching them by enormous columns of German prisoners which endlessly streamed along the dusty roads. No one who has been a prisoner of war himself can be indifferent to the lot of the soldier whom the fortunes of war condemn to this plight. The woe-begone expression of the officers contrasted sharply with the almost cheerful countenances of the rank and file. All had passed through a severe experience, the crashing bombardment, the irresistible onrush of the tanks spurting machine-gun bullets from every unexpected quarter. the catastrophe of surrender, the long march from the battlefield with many claims to consideration in front of theirs, night in the advanced cages—now another long march since dawn. "A la guerre, comme à la guerre!"

The General received me with his customary good humour, and at luncheon, while the tramp of new columns of prisoners proclaimed his victory, explained how it had been achieved. It was, truly, *his* victory, and that of the Fourth Army which he directed. He had put aside old-fashioned ideas, he had used new weapons as they should be used, he had reaped swift and rich reward.

"Rawly."

This is perhaps the place where I may give the reader some slight impression of Sir Henry Rawlinson. I had known him since Omdurman, where he was one of Kitchener's leading Staff Officers. In the Great War we had met in every variety of fortune. First on the Aisne in September, 1914, before he had any command at all, when we lay on an unfinished haystack watching the shells play on the Soissons road: next at Antwerp, where he arrived to take over the command at the moment when further defence had become extremely questionable: next in my room at the Admiralty, after the Seventh Division under his command had been virtually destroyed in the first battle of Ypres and when many were ready to lay blame on his tactics. In April 1918, I had been with him at Dury in the last extremes of March 21, when with a few cavalry and machine guns and details from the training establishments, he was covering and enduring the dissolution of the Fifth Army. Now we met at the zenith of his career, when he had largely by his personal contribution gained a battle which we now know ranks among the decisive episodes of war.

During these vicissitudes he was always the same. In the best of fortunes or the worst, in the most dangerous and hopeless position or on the crest of the wave, he was always the same tough, cheery gentleman and sportsman. He had always the same welcome for a friend, be he highly or lowly placed,

[1] Ludendorff.

and the same keen, practical, resolute outlook on facts however they might be marshalled. The readers of Rawlinson's "History of Assyria" and another, Rawlinson's "Herodotus," will trace with confidence the hereditary source of his strongly-marked capacity.

The Battlefield.

The battle was still in full blast and I asked how best to see it. There is a road well known to the Royal Air Force which runs straight as a die for 50 kilometres due east from Amiens to Vermand. "It is being shelled, but there is no congestion, you can go ahead along it as far as you care." So off we went along this famous road, through deserted, battered, ghostly Amiens; through Villers-Bretonneux, a heap of smouldering wreckage, threading our way through the intervals of an endless convoy which moved slowly forward from one shell-hammered point to another.

The battlefield had all its tales to tell. The German dead lay everywhere, but scattered in twos and threes and half-dozens over a very wide area. Rigid in their machine-gun nests, white flaccid corpses, lay those faithful legionaries of the Kaiser who had tried to stem the rout of "six battle-worthy German divisions." A British war balloon overhead burst into a sheet of fire, from which tiny black figures fell in parachutes. Cavalry cantered as gaily over the reconquered territory as if they were themselves the cause of victory. By a small wood seven or eight Tanks with scattered German dead around them lay where a concealed battery had pierced them, twisted and scorched by the fierce petrol fires in which they had perished. "Crews nearly all burned to death," said the officer of the burying-party. "Those still alive are the worst off."

Finally where bullets began to cut the leafage and freshly wounded men streamed back from an advancing fighting line, an Australian soldier said: "It's the best we've ever had. We went hard all day yesterday, but this morning we have been relieved, and *an Imperial brigade*" (note the phrasing) "is now attacking."

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE FRUITS OF VICTORY.

The great offensive of the Allies which began in August, 1918, speedily produced results which but a few months previously, in March of that year, would have been unbelievable. Cages crammed with prisoners, and captured guns in rows, were sure evidence of that which was to come.

CHAPTER LXXVI

THE TEUTONIC COLLAPSE

". . . and from the charge they drew,
As mountain waves, from wasted lands,
Sweep back to ocean blue."

SCOTT, "Marmion."

Endurance—After Jena—The Chance of Retreat—Impedimenta—Foch and Haig—The Battle of Bapaume—Its Consequences—Inadequate Recognition at Home—The Cabinet View—The Generals Vindicated—A 1919 Climax—My Letter to the Prime Minister—Artillery—Air—Tanks—The Drocourt-Quéant Switch—Ludendorff's Captured Order—The First Sure Sign.

BEFORE the war it had seemed incredible that such terrors and slaughters, even if they began, could last more than a few months. After the first two years it was difficult to believe that they would ever end. We seemed separated from the old life by a measureless gulf. The adaptive genius of man had almost habituated him to the horrors of his new environment. Far away shone a pale star of home and peace; but all around the storm roared with unabated and indeed increasing fury.

Endurance.

Year after year every optimist had been discredited, every sober hope cast down, and the British nation had doggedly resigned itself to pursue its task without inquiry when the end would come. In the circles of Government, where so many plans had to be made for more than a year ahead, this mood formed the subconscious foundation of our thoughts. Ultimate victory seemed certain. But how it would come, and whether it would come in 1919 or in 1920, or later, were inquiries too speculative to pursue amid the imperious needs of each day. Still less would anyone dare to hope for peace in 1918. Nevertheless, when from time to time the mental eye fell upon these puzzles, this question immediately presented itself: Would Germany collapse all of a sudden as she had done after Jena, or would she fight it out to the bitter end like the French under Napoleon or the Confederates under Lee? The Great War came when both sides were confident of victory. Would it continue after one side was sure it had no hope? Was it in the German nature, so valiant yet at the same time so logical, to fight on in revengeful despair? Should we have a year of battle on the Rhine, the march to Berlin, the breaking up of the armies in the open field, the subjugation of the inhabitants; or would there be some intense nervous spasm, some overwhelming and almost universal acceptance of defeat and all that defeat involved? We had always fancied it would be Jena. But all our plans were for a long-drawn alternative.

After Jena.

Certainly the highest interests of Germany, once all hope of victory was closed, required the orderly retreat of the greater part of her armies to the Antwerp-Meuse line, and thence to the German frontier. To secure this at all costs became, after the battle of August 8, and the conclusions drawn from it by the rulers of Germany, the paramount duty of soldiers and statesmen, and of all parties and classes. Moreover, such a retreat could assuredly have been accomplished, provided the decision was immediate.

Apart from all the methods of delaying a pursuit which tactics and strategy suggest, the Germans possessed at this time a simple mechanical device, the full use of which would with certainty have gained them a breathing space until the spring of 1919. They had developed time fuses for exploding mines or shells, which could be regulated to retard the explosion not merely for days or weeks, but actually for many months. It would therefore have been possible for the retreating invaders to have sown the roads and railways behind them with mines and buried shells so that they would be continually destroyed day after day by a fresh and inexhaustible series of explosions at points and moments which their pursuers could never foresee. The only method of dealing with a railway thus mined would be to build an entirely new line out of such material as could be salved alongside the original. It would therefore not have been possible for the Allied armies to advance to the German frontiers until they had reconstructed the whole intervening railway system. This could certainly not have been completed before the end of the year. Not till then could the process of dragging forward the ponderous mass of material necessary to mount a grand offensive have even been begun.

The Chance of Retreat.

There might therefore have been gained for Germany a period of perhaps six months before the full strength of the Allied armies could have been brought to bear upon her frontiers and before she was exposed to actual invasion. The time was sufficient for strong positions to be selected and prepared, and for the whole remaining resources of the nation to be marshalled in defence of its territory. But far more important than any military advantage was the effect which Germany, by admitting defeat and withdrawing completely from France and Belgium, would have produced upon the cohesion and driving power of the Allies.

The liberation of the soil of France was the dominating impulse which held the French people to the war. The rescue of Belgium was still the main rallying point of the British war resolve. Had Germany therefore removed both these motives, had she stood with arms in her hands on the threshold of her own land ready to make a defeated peace, to cede territory, to make reparation; ready also if all negotiation were refused to defend herself to the utmost, and capable of inflicting two million casualties upon the invader, it seemed, and seems, almost certain that she would not have been put to the test. The passion for revenge ran high, and stern was the temper of the Allies; but retribution, however justified, would not in the face of real peace offers have been in itself a sufficient incentive to lead the great war-wearied nations into another year of frightful waste and slaughter. In the lull and chill of the winter with the proud foe suing for terms and with all his conquests already abandoned, a peace by negotiation was inevitable. Even in this last phase Germany need not have placed herself in the appalling position of yielding to the discretion of those upon whom she had inflicted the utmost injuries of hate.

Impedimenta.

Many factors and influences were no doubt simultaneously at work upon those who still ruled Germany. But it is probable that the last chance was lost for a very inadequate reason. The German Headquarters could not make up its mind to face the consequences of a swift and immediate retreat. Foch is reported to have said at the end of August, pointing to the war map: "This man (the German) could still escape if he did not mind leaving his luggage behind him." The immense masses of munitions and war stores of all kinds which the Germans had in four years accumulated in France and Belgium became a fatal encumbrance. The German Staff could not bear to sacrifice them. Their railways soon became congested with mountainous impedimenta. Meanwhile the supreme policy of the State was paralysed, and the hard-strained fighting front began to quiver and rock and crack.

* * * *

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

MARSHAL FOCH AND GENERAL WEYGAND.

Taken at Flixicourt on August 12, 1918, this photograph shows Marshal Foch and General Weygand on their way to meet H.M. the King on the occasion of his visit to the British Fourth Army Headquarters. General Weygand, Foch's chief of staff, was a brilliant soldier. He entered the French Army in 1887 as an artillery officer, and his appointment to the staff of Foch dated from October, 1914. During the Great War he rendered services of the greatest value to his country and to the great soldier with whom he was associated.

It is possible in these pages to do little more than mention the series of great and bloody battles and other events by which the German armies were now to be driven out of France and Belgium and the German Empire into collapse, unconditional surrender and internal revolution. The victory of August 8 was no sooner ended, than both Foch and Haig sought to renew the attack. But some divergence arose upon the method and direction. Foch's Directive of August 10 prescribed the immediate advance of Rawlinson's Fourth British and Debeney's First French Armies towards the Somme in the general direction of Ham. The Third French Army was ordered to prolong the attack and profit by the advance of the First; and Haig was directed to launch at the earliest moment the British Third Army (Byng, lying northward of the Fourth) in an offensive towards Bapaume and Péronne.

Haig had other ideas. He did not consider a further immediate advance towards the Somme by Rawlinson and Debeney practicable. The hostile artillery fire, he said, had greatly increased. The enemy had established themselves in their old front line of 1914-15, which was still in good order and well wired. The ground was broken and unsuitable for tanks. At least sixteen German divisions were holding this sector of the front. In these circumstances and after personal inspection, Haig directed that the attack should be postponed until the heavy guns could be brought forward and a full artillery battle mounted. He was however in complete accord with the attack of the British

Third Army, and had in fact upon his own initiative given orders to General Byng before the issue of Foch's Directive of the 10th. He now planned to use the right of the British First Army (Horne) as well.

Foch and Haig.

Foch reiterated his instructions on August 14. He saw no need to delay the Rawlinson-Debeney frontal attack till Byng could participate. He had not considered the possibility of using Horne. Haig continued to refuse to attack until his artillery preparation was complete. "Nothing," he said, "had happened to cause him to alter his opinion. . . . He declined to change his orders to either of the armies in question." Meanwhile he was rapidly and secretly transferring his reserves to Byng and reinforcing Horne with the fresh and powerful Canadian Corps. In short, Foch called for a continuance of the frontal attack south of the Somme, and Haig insisted on opening a new and wider battle to the north (on the front Monchy-le-Preux-Miraumont).

The difference between the two plans was fundamental. A conference was held at Sarcus on the 15th. Haig adhered to his intentions, and though "observing a most friendly tone," emphasized his "sole responsibility to his Government and fellow-citizens for the handling of the British forces." Foch saw no headway could be made, and submitted. In his Directive, issued after the conference, he accepted the British plan and its argument. But he withdrew forthwith the First French Army from Sir Douglas Haig, and from noon

Photo: Imperial War Museum

GENERAL PLUMER AND HIS SECOND ARMY.

Comparison of the merits of the various armies composing the British Expeditionary Force would be perhaps invidious, but it might be said with truth that none was more distinguished than the valiant Second Army of General Plumer. Operating mainly in the front covering the Ypres district, the Second Army was responsible for a part of the line the importance of which could hardly be exaggerated. The Second Army was worthy of its resolute commander, who is seen above at the saluting base on the occasion of a march past of units of the army at the Fourth of August Commemoration at Terdeghem, 1918.

on August 16 it reverted to the command of General Pétain.

The Battle of Bapaume.

Haig may have exaggerated the resisting powers of the Germans south of the Somme (on the front Roye-Chaulnes); but his reasons were as solid as his refusal, and the event proved most fortunate. On August 21 the Third British Army began the important battle of Bapaume.[1] Reinforced by 100 tanks and striking south-south-eastward over country not unsuited—as would have been the crater fields of the Somme—to the operations of these sovereign weapons, General Byng pressed back the German line.

The German Seventeenth Army, on whom the onset fell, was disposed behind a false front on the Gouraud model. This Army counter-attacked along the whole line on the 22nd. But the British having themselves warily engaged at first only a part of their forces, strongly reinforced their assault, beat off the counter-attack and maintained their forward movement. Albert was recovered on the 22nd, and on the 23rd Haig was able to order a general advance on a 33-mile front. The battle was unrelentingly contested, but the British progress was continuous. On the 26th the right of the British First Army from Arras intervened, and added another seven miles to the breadth of the attack, which thus became the longest unbroken front of any offensive battle yet fought in the west. The Fourth Army was also by now in motion again.

Its Consequences.

That same day, yielding to the pressure from the north, the Germans retired from Roye and fell back to the line of the Somme. Thus the immediate objective which Marshal Foch demanded, and would have sought through a frontal attack of the Fourth British Army, was gained automatically by the attack of the Third. The ruins of Bapaume were retrieved on the 29th. From Péronne to Noyon the Germans stood fast; but on the night of August 30-31 the 2nd Australian Division by a remarkable feat of arms captured Mont St. Quentin, the key of Péronne, and thus compromised the whole of the river line. Péronne changed hands again on September 1. On the 2nd, the left of the British First Army came into the battle, and with the Canadian Corps and the British 4th Division, after a bloody conflict, broke through in the north the strong system of entrenchments known as the "Drocourt-Quéant switch." Whereupon the Germans abandoned the whole line of the Somme, and from the Oise River to the Sensée retreated towards the Hindenburg Line.

This great British drive may be said to have ended on September 3, by which date the three British armies and particularly the Third Army had advanced on their wide fronts an average of 20 miles, and had captured 53,000 German prisoners and 470 German guns. The German movements, not only during this battle, but till the end of the war, resembled those of a squad of soldiers trying to align themselves by their right, and kept in a continual shuffle by the fact that their right-hand man was himself thrust violently backward by British pressure, every time they tried to take up their correct position.

Mangin's Tenth Army had meanwhile pressed with increasing force north-east through Soissons; and although neither the scale nor the results of his operations were so large as those of the British, the double movement was followed by the general retreat of the German centre. Thus the rest of the Fourth British Army and the First and Third French armies on its right moved forward abreast without heavy losses, and by September 3 the Allied front stood along a line running almost north and south from below Douai to the gates of La Fère. The success of the British attacks exceeded Foch's imperious expectations, and with a magnanimity not always exhibited by great Commanders he was unrestrained in his approval. He sent General Du Cane to tell Sir Douglas Haig that "the operations of the British Army in August

[1] See general map facing p. 1227.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE GERMAN RETREAT.

August and September, 1918, were black months for the German Army. As one long summer day succeeded another this great force of brave soldiers was for the first time confronted with the certainty of coming defeat. The three photographs on this page are impressions of the scenes as the invading army retired. The first, reproduced above, shows stores burning outside Péronne on August 29, 1918.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

SMOKE SCREEN.

A smoke screen put up by the Australian artillery near Péronne, September 5, 1918.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

BURNING STORES: ESTREES EN CHAUSSES.

The Germans in retreat, as in advance, meant destruction by fire of everything that would burn. Buildings and stores of all kinds were consumed as the tide of battle receded over the stricken country. But the terror was nearing its end.

and the early part of September would serve as a model for all time." But these operations were by no means at an end.

* * * *

Inadequate Recognition at Home.

It was galling to the British Headquarters, justly conscious of the predominant part which our armies were beginning to play in these great successes, to find the credit ascribed by their own Cabinet and public opinion to Marshal Foch. The part the Prime Minister had played in establishing unity of command led him unconsciously to dwell upon the brilliant conceptions of the Generalissimo, and to view only in a half light the potent forward heave of the British Army without which the results would have been mediocre.

The Press and public at home followed the lead thus given, and the prevailing impression during these months—and never since effectually corrected—was that after many disasters and much mismanagement, an extraordinary genius had obtained the supreme command and had almost instantaneously converted defeat into victory. Care has been taken in this account to describe some of the splendid decisions on which the fame of Marshal Foch is founded; but this in no way diminishes the services in this campaign of the British Commander-in-Chief. His armies bore the lion's share in the victorious advance, as they had already borne the brunt of the German assault. Foch took a wider survey because he had a higher sphere. It was Haig's duty to take a more restricted view.

"Act well thy part; there all the honour lies."

But nevertheless, as has been and will be shown, on more than one cardinal occasion Haig by strenuous insistence deflected the plans of the Supreme Commander with results which were glorious. And ever his shot-pierced divisions, five times decimated within the year, strode forward with discipline, with devotion and with gathering momentum.

Reaction from the mood in fashion at home led the British Headquarters into some disparagement of the French contribution to the final advance. In this they were as far from the truth in one direction as their own Government in the other. In the victorious period from July to November 11, the French suffered no less than 531,000 casualties themselves, and inflicted 414,000 upon the enemy. That an army and a nation engaged at their full strength from the beginning of the war, which had sustained 700,000 casualties in the first few weeks and nearly three millions in the first three years, should have been capable of so noble an effort at the end will ever command the admiration and gratitude of their Ally.

The Cabinet View.

None of the British Authorities, military or civilian, at home or in France, was induced by these remarkable victories to predict an early end of the war. General Headquarters, Sir Henry Wilson, the Imperial War Cabinet, the Prime Minister, all proceeded rigorously upon the belief that another most severe campaign would be necessary in 1919. For this every preparation continued to be made on the largest scale by the Ministry of Munitions.

The War Cabinet were concerned lest Haig should be drawn by the successes of his army into enterprises beyond the strength of troops who had suffered so much. The Hindenburg Line might well, they feared, not without excuse, become the scene of another Paschendaele. The state of our Man Power, with men of fifty already summoned to the colours and the standards of physical fitness lowered to a harsh point, made the maintenance of the armies in 1919, on a scale of sixty divisions, a problem of extreme difficulty. Another three or four hundred thousand men shorn away would compel a melancholy contraction in the number of British divisions available for 1919, which it now seemed not unreasonable to hope would be the final and decisive year. The Cabinet therefore at the end of August sent their Commander-in-Chief a message warning him of the grave consequences which would result from a

further heavy blood drain. The "Staff Officer" writes some unpleasantly turned sentences about this improper interference with the prerogatives of the High Command, and the pitiful inability of politicians to face casualties with a hearty spirit.

The Generals Vindicated.

The Cabinet acted only in accord with prudence and duty in their intervention. Nevertheless, Haig at this time held a truer view both of the deterioration of the Germans and of the resilience of his own army. He shared the military doctrines of Foch. Both these illustrious soldiers had year after year conducted with obstinacy and serene confidence offensives which we now know to have been as hopeless as they were disastrous. But the conditions had now changed. Both were now provided with offensive weapons, which the military science of neither would have conceived.

The German losses in Ludendorff's attacks had affected alike the number and quality of the enemy. The swift and ceaseless inflow of the Americans turned the balance of Man Power heavily in favour of the Allies; there was at last enough artillery for formidable attacks to be delivered against almost any part of the hostile line. The Goddess of Surprise had at last returned to the Western Front. Thus both Haig and Foch were vindicated in the end. They were throughout consistently true to their professional theories, and when in the fifth campaign of the war the facts began for the first time to fit the theories, they reaped their just reward.

I was at this time so often at the Front and in such agreeable relations with the Headquarters, British and French, that I was able to appreciate to some extent the new conditions. Sir Douglas Haig's conviction that the British armies would continue to drive the Germans from their successive lines was intense. In his train at Frévent in the closing stages of the Battle of Bapaume, he showed me the order he had just given for three British armies to attack simultaneously; and pointing to the German lines, Siegfried, Wotan, Brunhilde, Hindenburg, etc., with which the map was scored, he said: "Now you will see what all these fortifications are worth when troops are no longer resolved to defend them."

I now began to do a good deal of my business at Château Verchocq. The munitions organization was working so easily that I had plenty of time to see and to think. My central problem was founded on Tonnage, and its offspring —Steel.

The second issue was the apportionment between present needs and future preparation. Of this I was not the arbiter, but I had at least the influence which comes from the right to marshal the facts and to state the case. Like the rest of us I was still living in the future rather than in the terrific present; but after what I had seen and learned with the armies, the future meant at the worst 1919. To make sure of winning then, if we did not win before, and to concentrate on 1919 to the deep detriment of more remote periods, seemed certainly right. The reader, who now knows what actually happened and takes it all for granted, may be surprised that such issues were ever balanced. But at the time we had no right to count upon a Jena collapse. Even in famine the seed corn must be preserved. On September 5 I wrote for the Cabinet as follows:

TO THE WAR CABINET

Munitions Policy.

A 1919 Climax.

1. The extremely important paper written by the Chief of the Staff on the 25th July [not printed here] affirms the conviction that the German armies in the West could be decisively defeated in the summer of 1919, provided that we selected a climax, concentrated every available resource upon it, and subordinated intervening events to it. The method of mechanical attack was also set out by the General Staff, and our preparations to produce the necessary vehicles are at hand. The brilliant successes which have been gained, almost without intermission, since General

Wilson's paper was written, reveal the justice of the above conception, with which, I may mention, General Pétain seems to be in the most complete accord. No doubt it is right to exploit to the full the present favourable situation, and we need not exclude the possibility of results being achieved of a very far-reaching character.

On the assumption however that these results are not decisive, and that the winter closes down with an unbroken German front in the West, we ought now to have reached definite conclusions as to the character of next year's campaign. The questions involved affect directly every arrangement for munitions supply and man-power. All these questions can be settled harmoniously if they are related to some central design, if for the first time we have a definite war policy towards which every part of our organization contributes.

After arguments designed to exclude any reservations in favour of 1920, I continued :

2. The policy of aiming at victory next year would appear to require *inter alia* the following measures :—

(*a*) The bringing over of the largest possible number of American troops.

(*b*) In order to encourage the above, we must do our very utmost to arm, equip, and clothe them in advance of their own war industries.

(*c*) All works of construction which cannot yield a war result during the period of climax in 1919 should be rigorously pruned.

(*d*) Every effort should be made during the winter to accumulate munitions, and further releases from the munitions works should be stopped during that period; but in the early spring of 1919 large releases should again begin from the munitions works, and for this purpose our reserves of ammunition, filled and unfilled, should be decidedly drawn upon.

(*e*) From March onwards every effort should be concentrated in the shipyards on vessels nearing completion, and there should be a definite diminution in the starting of new work or of long-dated work. A substantial contribution of men from Admiralty industries of all kinds should be made in time for them to reach the field trained during the battle period.

(*f*) The release of coal-miners from the mines should be renewed in the early spring, agreeably to the diminution in the output of munitions, and we should be prepared to run considerable risks in the winter of 1919 in coal supply in the effort of making victory certain.

(*g*) It should be possible for the Navy to assist during the period of the decisive battle by releasing temporarily sailors and marines to strengthen the Army. There could be no better form for a naval contribution than to supply the men necessary to steer and manage, say, the last 2,000 British tanks to be completed before the battle.

(*h*) The Air Force should conform in its development to the policy of a climax, i.e., all establishments in this country should be cut down to the minimum during the decisive period. The Aerial Home Defence in all its forms should be temporarily cut down. The long periods of training and preparation which intervene between the handing over of machines and the formation of squadrons should in regard to the last batch of squadrons that can be completed in time be deliberately curtailed.

(*i*) The people of the country as a whole should be taught to look for a climax and work for it. They would then be found to be ready to make very great sacrifices to secure victory, even if this involved a far harder state of life than anything we have yet experienced.



Photo : Imperial War Museum.

BREECH OF A 12-IN. HOWITZER.

Gunners with a heavy 12-in. howitzer, showing the open breech and the shell ready for loading. Heavy guns of all calibres played a big part in hastening the retreat of the Germans. No longer did the British Army fight ill-supported by their own artillery. The Ministry of Munitions revolutionized the entire situation. In 1918 the Germans were subjected to that devastating hail of iron and steel to which for years, with scant opportunity for retaliation, the British had been forced to submit.

My Letter to the Prime Minister.

To the Prime Minister.

CHÂTEAU VERCHOCQ,
September 9, 1918.

Before I can make definite proposals about steel, and consequently coal, I must first have the whole Munitions programme for 1919 worked out; and secondly I must know what the Americans are really going to require of us. The programme is now completed in draft, and I have made certain proposed reductions, the effects of which are being examined this week. I am to see the Americans in Paris on Wednesday or Thursday. When this is completed I shall be able to provide the Cabinet with a definite basis on which any necessary decision can be taken.

Artillery.

I have however been looking into the question of ammunition expenditure out here under the new conditions which the War has taken, and I regret to say that, so far from offering hopes of reductions, there is every sign of increased demand. For instance, in each of the last two weeks of open fighting on the wide battle front they have fired over 70,000 tons, and they are now asking for a daily intake of over 9,000 tons against 5,000, 6,000 and 7,000 with which we have been able to satisfy them to date. It appears that although the prolonged bombardments, like Messines, etc., have been given up, the firing is now maintained by all the guns of the army over practically the whole front at once.

The old limiting factor, namely the fatigue of the gunners, which imposed a certain limitation on the concentrated local operations of last year, is no longer present when all, or almost all, the batteries of the army are able to fire over the whole front. It would of course be quite impossible to continue to supply ammunition at the present rate indefi-

nitely, and I do not think that will be demanded of us; but in view of the hopes in which I indulged when we last discussed this matter, I thought you ought to know at the earliest moment that very heavy demands, backed by very solid reasons, will come from the army for next year. In addition to this, if the prospects of a forward move mature, we shall have a largely increased demand for rails. I do not think it is impossible to satisfy both demands within reason, provided the right measures are taken, and provided the Admiralty bear their share in the consequent reductions.

To a certain extent coal can be economized if more tonnage can be given. For instance, every ton of steel I can get from the United States will save at least 4 tons of coal, and more if we use it in substitution of making steel from low grade British ores. It is really therefore impossible for me to make definite proposals about steel and coal without hearing definitely from the Shipping Controller what he is going to do for us next year. All this is going forward, and I deprecate a hasty decision on any one part of the programme until a general view can be taken. We are beginning these discussions much earlier this year than we did last year, and a fortnight or three weeks spent in getting all the cards on the table at once will certainly not be wasted. My own feeling is that there will be enough to meet all reasonable needs.

Air.

There is a considerable set-back here against the Air. There is no doubt that the demands of the Air Force on men and material are thought to be much in excess of the fighting results produced. There is no doubt that if Haig had to choose between 50,000 men for the Infantry and 50,000 men for the Air Force, he would choose 50,000 men for the Infantry. The reason is not that a man in the air is not worth more than a foot soldier, but that a man in the Air Force is not a man in the air, and that from 50 to 100 men are required in the Air Force for every one man fighting in the air. The magnificent performances and efficiency of the squadrons cannot be accepted as the final test. Everything ought to pay a proportionate dividend on the capital invested, and it is from this point of view that the Air Force should be tested.

How much flying, for instance, is done by the Royal Naval Air Service for the 45,000 first-rate fighting men and skilled men they employ? How many bombs are dropped? How many submarines are sunk? How many flights are made? How many Germans are killed for the enormous expenditure of national energy and material involved? Again, take the balloons and the airships. Let a similar test be applied to them. You really cannot afford to let any part of your organization fail in this culminating period to produce continuously war results equal to its demand on the public resources.

Tanks.

I do not think tanks would suffer by this comparison. At any rate, I am very ready they should be subjected to it. Up to the present there have only been about 18,000 men in the Tank Corps, and they have only had 600 or 700 tanks to use in action. It is universally admitted out here that they have been a definite factor in changing the fortune of the field and in giving us that *tactical* superiority, without which the best laid schemes of strategists come to naught. It is no exaggeration to say that the lives they have saved and the prisoners they have taken have made these 18,000 men the most profit-bearing we have in the army. As for the demand which tanks have made up to the present on material and skilled labour, it is indeed a very modest one. I am having graphics prepared which will illustrate these facts.

It has now been settled to raise the tanks to 35,000 men. This is only about half what will be needed for the tanks I shall actually have ready by the summer of next year. Although my outputs [at present] are only about half what I had expected, General Elles of the Tank Corps tells me "that the tanks they

have will see out the tank men this year." The tank men are killed and wounded in considerable numbers, and the permanent wastage of the personnel is high, whereas the tank in any victorious battle recovers very quickly from his wounds and hardly ever dies beyond the hope of resurrection. A few months' sojourn in the grave is nearly always followed by a reincarnation, so long, that is to say, as he is not snaffled by the powers of evil. Apart from the above, the fatigue on the tank crews in action is very great, and the idea of the same crew working double relays of tanks will certainly not carry us very far.

From the above it is clear to me that you will have large numbers of these invaluable weapons without the men to man them, and that therefore you will be faced with the need of handing over these unique products of British ingenuity, which properly used would give us a great influence and control over war policy, to our Allies who will not understand how to use them nearly so well as our officers and men would do. I do trust therefore that you will not quit the opinions which you held so strongly a few months ago, and in consequence of which preparations have already far advanced on an important scale. Although it is quite true that the Germans will develop their means of attacking tanks by anti-tank rifles as well as by field guns, land mines, etc., there are four new circumstances which will tend to make the tank an invaluable weapon next year. Here they are:

(1) Greatly increased numbers. They will be able to afford to have a considerable proportion knocked out in each battle and yet have enough left at every point to secure success.

(2) They have never yet developed smoke appliances, with which they are being fitted. Smoke as an aid to the attack, and particularly to tank attack, is only in its infancy. It is going to receive an enormous expansion next year.

(3) They have never yet been used in darkness; but that was the original idea which I had when they were conceived. Hitherto they have not been capable of negotiating the accidents of ground by night, but with better tanks and a proportion, though only a proportion, of larger tanks, night operations will become possible at points where trench warfare has given place to open fighting.

(4) The tactical manœuvring power of the tank and its combined training with infantry are developing fast and will yield immensely improved results. Tanks are not opposed to infantry: they are an intimate and integral part of the infantrymen's strength.

What has made it so difficult to develop a good policy about tanks has been the repeated shifts of opinion for and against them. Every time a new success is gained by their aid, there is an immediate clamour for large numbers. The moment the impression of that success passes away, the necessary men and material are grudged and stinted. I repeat what I said to you in my last letter—that there ought to be nearly 100,000 men in the Tank Corps by the time the programme on which I am working by your express directions is completed.

The Drocourt-Quéant Switch.

I spent yesterday on the battle-front, and guided by General Lipsett of the 3rd Canadian Division, went over a large part of the ground taken by us beyond Monchy. I walked over the Drocourt-Quéant line and went on up to the extreme high watermark of our attack. I noticed several remarkable things. The Drocourt-Quéant trench was strongly held with Germans, and it was a very fine, strong, deep trench. In front of it was a belt of wire, nearly 100 yards broad. This wire was practically uncut and had only little passages through it, all presumably swept by machine guns. Yet the troops walked over these terrific obstacles, without the wire being cut, with very little loss, killed many Germans, took thousands of prisoners and hundreds of machine guns.

Three or four hundred yards behind these lines was a second line,

almost as strong and more deceptive. Over this also they walked with apparently no difficulty and little loss. Behind that again, perhaps a mile farther on, were just a few little pits and holes into which German machine guns and riflemen threw themselves to stop the rout. Here our heaviest losses occurred. The troops had got beyond the support of the tanks, and the bare open ground gave no shelter. In one small space of about 300 yards wide nearly 400 Canadian dead had just been buried, and only a few score of Germans. The moral appears to be training and tanks, short advances on enormous fronts properly organized and repeated at very brief intervals, not losing too many men, not pushing hard where there is any serious opposition except after full preparations have been made. It is the power of being able to advance a reasonable distance day after day remorselessly, rather than making a very big advance in a single day, that we should seek to develop. This power can only be imparted by tanks and cross-country vehicles on the largest scale.

You would have been shocked to see the tragic spectacle of the ground where our attack for the time being withered away. It was just like a line of seaweed and jetsam which is left by a great wave as it recoils.

Ludendorff's Captured Order.

At the end of September General Birch, Chief of the Artillery, showed me a captured German document which greatly affected my outlook. I drew the attention of the Cabinet to it on September 26 in a note on Ammunition from which the following is an extract:

There is no foundation for the view that the conditions of semi-open warfare which have now supervened in France and the abandonment of the prolonged artillery bombardment previous to assaults will afford us any relief in shell consumption. On the contrary, since this matter was last discussed in Cabinet, the heaviest firings yet recorded have taken place in France during a period of open warfare. For fifteen successive days the expenditure exceeded 10,000 tons a day. These very wide battles, fought on the fronts of two or three British armies simultaneously, in which almost all the guns in France are employed, use more and not less ammunition than was required for the intense local fighting of Messines, Paschendaele, etc.

On the other hand, this great consumption of ammunition is being attended by remarkable results. A recent order of General Ludendorff's which has been captured states that in a single month more than 13 per cent. of the German artillery in the West has been completely destroyed by counter-battery fire. As this method is comparatively little used by the French, the main credit of this astonishing achievement falls to the British Artillery. A superior Artillery supplied with ample ammunition and working in combination with a superior and highly-trained Air Force is thus producing an immense effect, not only in destroying the enemy's power of resistance but in saving our own men.

If the destruction of German artillery could be maintained at the rate stated by General Ludendorff, it would become practically necessary to replace the whole of the German artillery in the West, apart altogether from the wear of guns, twice in the course of a year. This would be quite impossible. We are therefore in this field of effort also perhaps within measurable distance of decisive and final results. It would be disastrous if, for any reason, we were compelled to stint our gunners in ammunition at the very time when the result of all the immense efforts which have been made to increase the power and perfect the combination of our Artillery and Air Services is coming to hand. Rather than do that we ought to be ready to make very great sacrifices indeed in every direction.

The First Sure Sign.

I do not burden the reader with the further arguments about steel and tonnage to which this extract was the prelude. It carried to my mind the first sure sign that the end was approaching, and faster than we had dared to hope.

CHAPTER LXXVII

VICTORY

" The fighting man shall from the sun
Take warmth, and life from the growing earth ,
Speed with the light-foot wind to run,
And with the trees to newer birth,
And find when fighting shall be done
Great rest and fullness after dearth.

* * * *

The thundering line of battle stands,
And in the air Death moans and sings ;
But day shall clasp him with strong hands,
And night shall fold him in soft wings."

JULIAN GRENFELL.
Flanders, *April*, 1915.

The Culmination of the British War Effort—New Combinations—The German Railway System—The Convergent Attack—The Triple Plan—The Eve of the Triple Battle—The Southern and Northern Attacks—The Centre Battle—The British Storm the Hindenburg Line—The Weakest Link—Surrender of Bulgaria—The Final Battles—Breaking Strain—The Armistice Terms—The Eleventh Hour—The German Military Effort—The Future Hope.

THE war was now entered upon its final phase.

The Culmination of the British War Effort.

During the year 1918, the effort of Britain and of the British Empire reached its highest pitch. The Imperial forces in the field against the enemy in all theatres amounted to four and a half million men, and those under arms to nearly six millions. The strength of the Grand Fleet in vessels of every kind reached its maximum, and the Germans were no longer in a condition even to put to sea. The U-boat warfare was defeated and kept down by the operations of nearly 4,000 armed vessels flying the White Ensign. Under the protection of these agencies upwards of two million United States troops were transported across the Atlantic, of which more than half were carried in British ships and landed in France during the year with hardly any loss of life by enemy action. The British Mercantile Marine of 20,000 vessels maintained the supply of all the British armies and carried without appreciable hindrance all the food and materials needed for the life of the British islands, for their war industries and for any commerce not required for war production. The control of the seas against the enemy in every quarter of the globe was absolute, and this result was obtained by the employment in the fighting fleets and flotillas, in the Mercantile Marine, in the Naval arsenals and dockyards, and in the shipbuilding yards of over 1,200,000 men.

The British munition plants, absorbing the labours of nearly two and a half million persons, produced all the shell and artillery that the British armies could use, together with every other requisite in increasing abundance. In addition Britain furnished steel, coal and other war materials in immense quantities to France and Italy, and was preparing, without prejudice to any other obligation, to supply the United States with the whole of the medium artillery required for an Army of eighty divisions for a campaign in 1919. All the preparations had been made, and the process was far advanced of fitting the British armies with technical

equipment of every kind for 1919 on a scale in quality and in novelty far superior to any outputs yet achieved. In all there were actually employed under the Crown in the armies, in the fleets and in the war factories, excluding those engaged in the production of food, coal and civil necessaries, nearly eight million men and three-quarters of a million women.

The financial measures needed to develop and sustain this prodigious manifestation had required in 1918 alone over three thousand million pounds sterling, of which one thousand millions was raised by the taxation of forty-five million persons in the British Isles and sixteen hundred millions were borrowed at home from the same persons and four hundred millions borrowed abroad mainly from the United States on the credit of the British Government.

But it is with the final effort of the British Army that this chapter is chiefly concerned. From the opening of the campaign of 1918 on March 21 down to the Armistice on November 11 the British armies in France suffered 830,000 casualties, and inflicted on the Germans in killed, wounded and prisoners a comparable loss of 805,000 men. During the same period the French (and Belgians) sustained 964,000 casualties and inflicted 660,000 upon the enemy.

Up to July, when the tide began definitely to turn, the British armies had already lost during the year chiefly in bearing the brunt of the German attack over 400,000 men. In spite of this loss they were almost continuously engaged in full battle and took from that time onwards at least as many prisoners and guns from the Germans as all the other Allied forces on the Western Front put together.[1] At the same time Great Britain provided the second largest Allied army in the Balkans and terminated the enemy's resistance in German East Africa. Finally, Great Britain and India bore unaided the whole burden of the war against the Turkish Empire, and with an army of over 400,000 men in Mesopotamia and nearly 300,000 men in Palestine, shattered or destroyed three-quarters of the whole remaining Turkish forces and conquered all the regions and provinces in which the operations took place. Such was the culminating war effort of a State which, before the campaign of 1918 began, had already been at war for three and a half years, suffered more than a million and three-quarters casualties, sustained a loss of over six and a half million tons of shipping, and expended six thousand millions sterling. These facts and figures will excite the wonder of future generations.

[1] The above figures do not include the supplementary German casualties set forth in the tables. See Appendix.

* * * *

New Combinations.

The first stage of the Great Advance may be said to have closed on September 3. But once the general success of the Battle of Bapaume was assured, new and even wider combinations were open to Marshal Foch. Of the original projects of biting off the three German salients—Amiens, Château-Thierry, St. Mihiel, and freeing the important lateral railways behind them, the two first and greatest were already accomplished, and the American enterprise against the third—St. Mihiel—was mounted and imminent. These great local operations which at one time had seemed sufficient for the year, could now be followed by a deliberately-conceived combined attempt, involving all the Allied forces, to break up the German front and drive their armies out of France before the winter.

The German Railway System.

It is now necessary to take a parting glance at the structure of railways on which the German armies in France had depended during the four years of the War. The tap root of their supplies was the main trunk railway (**A**) from the munition factories of Westphalia through Cologne, Liège, Namur and Maubeuge. Through Maubeuge ran in a crescent shaped T (lying thus

) the great lateral line (**B**) on which the invading front was built, viz. the

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

IN THE CAGES AT ABBEVILLE.

The general offensive of the Allies which began on September 26, 1918, and lasted without respite until the Armistice, resulted in captures of men and material vastly in excess of anything that had hitherto come within the experience of the French and British infantry. The impressive photograph reproduced above, which was taken at a clearing depôt at Abbeville on October 2, 1918, illustrates the vast numbers of the enemy forced to surrender in this the closing phase of the Great War.

railway from Germany through Metz, Mezières, Hirson, Maubeuge, Mons, Ghent and Bruges. From this railway there branched southward and westward all the lines which with various subsidiary laterals fed the German armies spread fanwise towards Calais, Amiens and Paris. Behind the southern portion lay the rugged forest region of the Ardennes, comparatively roadless and railless, and an impassable barrier to the organized retreat of huge modern armies. The German Army in France was therefore strategically to a large extent "formed to a flank" along their main lateral communications. If these were broken or they were driven beyond them, the bulk would never get away.

Further, nearly three-quarters of the whole German strength radiated from the lateral arc Mezières-Hirson-Aulnoye-Mons. The railway junctions of Mezières and Aulnoye (near the lost French fortress and railway centre of Maubeuge) were therefore vital organs of the enemy. If these junctions could be captured or paralysed, the immense mass of invaders depending on them, or on the lateral line between them, would be cut off. Hitherto the Germans had not been in any strategic anxiety. The front with its successive systems of defence stood, except before Verdun, 50 miles ahead of the lateral line. But now the front was bending and recoiling fast, and the margin of safety space narrowed day by day.

Lastly it must be remembered that all the traffic from the Flanders Front, from the Arras Front, from the Somme and the Aisne fronts, as well as the bulk of that from the Argonne, passed in the end through Liège. This bottle-neck was too small to cope with



THE ALLIED LINE, SEPTEMBER 25, 1918.

Sketch map showing the positions of the various armies, Belgian, British, French and American, immediately prior to the general advance on the Western Front, the progress of which was to be stayed only by the signing of the Armistice.

the deluge of retreating stores and munitions, and at the same time to supply the imperative to-and-fro needs of the armies when all were continually in heavy battle.

The Convergent Attack.

These considerations dictated the movements of the Allies. It was obvious that apart from Verdun, barred by its inferior communications, the nearest point at which the most deadly blow could be delivered upon the enemy was the junction of Aulnoye near Maubeuge. A British advance against the enemy's front, Cambrai-St. Quentin, in the direction of Maubeuge would if successful compromise and compel the early retreat of all the hostile armies deployed with the Ardennes at their back between Maubeuge and Verdun. This, from the moment when these possibilities came into the practical sphere, was the goal of Sir Douglas Haig.

Marshal Foch independently from his higher standpoint held of course the same view; and it fell to him to concert the whole immense operation. He had however at General Pershing's desire lent himself reluctantly to an American advance upon Metz and into the Saar Valley, if the St. Mihiel attack succeeded. This was an irrelevant and divergent feature. If the British Army was to undertake the tremendous task of smashing through the Hindenburg Line and advancing upon Maubeuge, it was imperative that all other operations should aim at the vital point and contribute to the supreme result. Haig therefore at the end of August urged Foch to alter the American offensive from a divergent to a convergent direction, i.e. from east to north-west, and towards Mezières instead of towards Metz. Foch entirely agreed, and after further conferences with Pershing obtained his assent to the change of plan.

Photo: Paul Popper.

GERMAN SIGNAL LINESMEN AT WORK.

One of the most difficult, dangerous and thankless tasks necessary to the efficiency of an army in the field is the provision and upkeep of field-telephone communications. This work falls to the lot of the Signal Service, and in particular to the linesmen. When armies are on the move the wires are reeled out above the ground, but when opposing forces are stationary they are more frequently buried. Heavy shell-fire inevitably causes much damage to the wires whether buried or not, and in such cases it is the linesman's job, shelling or no shelling, to track down the fault and repair the line.

The Triple Plan.

On September 3, Marshal Foch's "Directive" prescribed that while (1) the British Armies supported by the left of the French Armies continue to attack in the general direction Cambrai-St. Quentin, and (2) the centre of the French Armies continues its action to drive the enemy beyond the Aisne and



THE AMERICAN VICTORY OF ST. MIHIEL.

This sketch map outlines the position at St. Mihiel on September 12, 1918, and succeeding days. The operation was an American victory on a considerable scale, and it yielded 16,000 prisoners and 450 guns.

the Ailette, (3) the American Army after delivering at the latest by September 10 their attack on the St. Mihiel salient, should prepare "as strong and violent an offensive as possible in the general direction of Mezières, covered on the east by the Meuse and supported on the left by the attack of the Fourth French Army (Gouraud)."

In addition to this, by a Note of September 8, Foch prescribed a third offensive in Belgium in the general direction of Ghent. A new army group was to be formed comprising the British Second Army (now again under Plumer), the Belgian Army and a French contingent, in all sixteen infantry and seven cavalry divisions. These forces were placed under the command of the King of the Belgians with the French General Dègouttes as Chief of the Staff. The attack was in principle a left-handed scoop pivoting on the British troops holding the Lys near Armentières.

The Eve of the Triple Battle.

Such was the gigantic triple offensive of the Allies: towards Mezières by the French and Americans; towards Maubeuge by the British; and towards Ghent by the Belgians and British with a French contingent. The time was fixed for the end of September. The interval was filled by the forward movement of the Allied armies towards the new main fronts of assault. This involved important preliminary battles. Of these the first and most famous was the attack by the First American Army on the St. Mihiel salient.

On the morning of September 11, nine United States divisions (each equal in infantry numbers to two and a half French or British divisions) and three French divisions broke into the St. Mihiel salient. The German and Austrian defenders, who had already been ordered to evacuate, were caught in the early stages of that operation. The Americans attacking with the utmost ardour penetrated at the first shock of their eastern attack nearly six miles

upon a front of eleven. On the 12th they joined hands across the salient with their western attack, and by the 14th when the operation was completed had captured 16,000 prisoners and 450 guns. On September 18 the Fourth and Third British armies attacked on a 17-mile front centring on Epéhy, with the object of bringing the main forces into striking distance of the Hindenburg Line. This preparatory battle was most severe. The British advanced about three miles and captured 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns, but with heavy loss. Meanwhile the French armies slanting back from the British right had on the night of the 8th surprised the crossings of the Crozat Canal, and by continual fighting emphasized and exploited the German retreat.

The Southern and Northern Attacks.

The map on pages 1224 and 1225, which was given to me by Sir Douglas Haig, shows the position of all the troops on the Western Front on the eve of its largest battle. Colonel Boraston discharges a necessary task when he sets forth the respective forces on the three fronts of the assault. The facts which follow are based on his account, independently checked. For the southern battle there were assembled 31 French and 13 United States divisions, the latter equal in rifle strength to at least 30 French divisions; a total comparable mass of above 60 Ally divisions. To this the enemy opposed 1 Austrian and 19 German divisions, of which 6 were first-class troops.

For the northern battle the Allies had gathered 8 Belgian, 5 British and 3 French infantry divisions, with 1 Belgian, 3 British and 3 French cavalry divisions. Against this army stood 12 German divisions, 4 of good quality.

Photo: Associated Illustration Agencies.

HIDDEN CONTROLLERS OF THE CREEPING BARRAGE.

In a modern battle smoke, gas, and the flames and fumes of shell explosions render it extremely difficult to see what is going on. In particular the gunners, considerable distances in rear of the waves of attacking infantry, would find it impossible to operate but for the steady stream of information sent back by artillery officers and signallers, who keep in close touch with the infantry. Here, from a partially wrecked loft situated close to the line, messages are being sent back to the gunners, thus enabling them to maintain the accuracy of their fire.



THE SITUATION ON SEPTEMBER 25, 19

The map reproduced above, which is of particular interest and importance, was given to Mr. the positions of all the troops on the Western Front on the eve o

l by Sir Douglas Haig. Upon it are plotted
greatest battle.

But in the central battle the Germans were actually superior in numbers to the British. No less than 57 German divisions, 18 of which were assault divisions, were concentrated in the battle area behind the far-famed defences of the Hindenburg Line. To storm these fortifications and to defeat the German masses upon its front, Sir Douglas Haig could marshal no more than 40 British divisions and the IInd American Corps. Moreover, the interposition of the Canal du Nord and the Scheldt Canal deprived the British attack almost entirely of the aid of tanks.

Each of these episodes would make a thrilling monograph, but these pages can only record in a few sentences the outstanding results.

Pershing and Gouraud fell on shoulder to shoulder at daybreak on the 26th, the Americans engaging on a 20-, the French on a 24-mile front. The Americans, undaunted by severe losses, stormed the German first system of defences on almost the whole front of attack and penetrated at some points nearly $6\frac{3}{4}$ miles. Gouraud's army also advanced from $1\frac{1}{4}$ to $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles, but thereafter neither attack made much progress. The American supply arrangements broke down, the roads became hopelessly blocked for tens of miles with stationary vehicles. The nourishment of the American fighting line with food, ammunition and reinforcements was only achieved partially and with extreme difficulty. The German counter-attacks retrieved some of the lost ground, and in places cut off or destroyed the American units which had advanced the farthest. The ground was difficult in the extreme, and a weltering deadlock supervened for several weeks. During this time however the French and Americans captured 39,000 prisoners and 300 guns, and held the outnumbered German forces stoutly in their grip.

The northern battle was victorious. The Germans overmatched fell back before the assault, the British and Belgian divisions fought their way forward through the awful desolation of the Ypres-Paschendaele battlefield, and in three days stood on the Menin-Roulers road ten miles from their starting point,

having captured with small losses nearly 11,000 prisoners and 300 guns. The French contingent was not at this stage engaged.

The Centre Battle.

The centre battle had begun on the 27th, on which day the extraordinary obstacle of the Canal du Nord, with its cutting often 60 feet deep, was stormed by the right of the First Army (Horne) and the left of the Third (Byng). Upon a 13-mile front, a four-mile advance was achieved with a capture of 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns. This enabled the rest of the Third Army and the Fourth Army (Rawlinson) to come into action to the southward. Rawlinson's artillery in the absence of tanks in large numbers had on this occasion subjected the Hindenburg positions to forty-eight hours' intense bombardment in the old style. Nevertheless when his army attacked on the 29th it encountered a most severe resistance. The American Corps led the centre of the assault. They were supported and were to be leap-frogged by the Australians. A noble rivalry—carried by the Americans to an utter disregard of losses—prevailed between these proud soldiers, sprung from the same stock, speaking the same language, yet drawn from far distant quarters of the globe and by different paths of history.

Several strong posts in advance of the German front had not as was intended been reduced on the previous day, and moreover both American divisions started 1,000 yards behind their barrage. Over a part of the attack their dead lay "in orderly lines" mowed down by machine-gun fire. Elsewhere their extraordinary ardour carried them deep into the German defences. The great tunnel through which the canal passed and the deep dugouts of the long prepared fortifications disgorged strong German forces who took the ambitious assailants in rear, and cut off and slew large numbers. But all fought desperately without thought of retirement. The war-experienced Australians advanced in succour, and after further close and bloody fighting all the ground was gripped and held.

The British Storm the Hindenburg Line.

This tragic glorious episode was only a part of the Fourth Army's battle, and all three British armies were fully and continuously engaged. By the night of the 30th the Hindenburg Line on a front of 25 miles was blasted and pierced to an average depth of seven miles, and 36,500 prisoners and 380 guns were reported to Sir Douglas Haig. The total British casualties in France from the beginning of September to October 9 were over 200,000, of which 6,500 officers and 133,700 men fell in the series of battles for the Hindenburg Line, otherwise called Cambrai-St. Quentin. To these must be added 6,000 Americans, or a fifth of the infantry of the United States IInd Army Corps. The battle and advance were continued from October 8 to October 10, 20 kilometres being gained by the latter date on the whole Cambrai-St. Quentin front and 12,000 more prisoners and 230 guns being captured. Under the impulsion of this tremendous central thrust and on the northern and southern battles, the Germans withdrew their forces in all the intervening sectors of the front. They were followed in the closest contact by all the opposing Allied troops.

* * * *

The Weakest Link.

Yet it was only indirectly from the tremendous collisions in the west that the final blow to German resisting power came. The theatre where the war had languished in a costly and futile fashion since the summer of 1915, the theatre in which exertions were universally condemned by all the highest military authorities of the Allies, was destined to produce the culminating decision. The strength of a chain, however ponderous, is that of its weakest link. The Bulgarian link was about to snap, and with it the remaining cohesion of the whole hostile coalition. This event was not however induced by local circumstances. It resulted from the consternation which followed the defeat of the German armies in France.

On September 15, agreeably with the general forward movement of the Allies


BRITISH BATTLES DURING 1918 (8TH AUG. TO 11TH NOV. 1918).
BRUGES
DIXMUIDE
Thourout
Thielt
AREA OF FRANCO-BELGIAN ATTACKS
Poelcappelle
Iseghem
Poperinghe YPRES
YPRES SECOND ARMY 28TH-29TH SEPT. 4,800 PRISONERS 100 GUNS
COURTRAI 2ND ARMY 14TH-31ST OCT. 6,000 PRISONERS 200 GUNS
CASSEL
HAZEBROUK
ROULERS
TOURCOING
XENAIX
CRAONNE
AREA OF GERMAN WITHDRAWALS 15TH AUG.-20TH SEPT. (CONSEQUENT ON BRITISH ADVANCES TO HINDENBURG LINE)
ARMENTIERES
ROUBAIX
LILLE
AREA OF GERMAN WITHDRAWALS NOV. 8TH-11TH
(CONSEQUENT ON BATTLE OF MAUBEUGE)
ATH
ENGHIEN
TOURNAI
BETHUNE
La Bassee
AREA OF GERMAN WITHDRAWALS OCT. 14TH-31ST (CONSEQUENT ON BRITISH ATTACKS, NORTH & SOUTH)
Peruwelz
LENS
MONS
DOUAI
VALENCIENNES
ARRAS
ARRAS 1ST ARMY 26TH AUG.-3RD SEPT. 18,850 PRISONERS 200 GUNS
SELLE RIVER 1ST 3RD & 4TH ARMIES 17TH-25TH OCT. 21,000 PRISONERS 450 GUNS
VALENCIENNES-MAUBEUGE-MONS 1ST 3RD & 4TH ARMIES 1ST-11TH NOV. 19,000 PRISONERS 460 GUNS
MAUBEUGE
CAMBRAI-ST QUENTIN PHASES 1 & 2 1ST 3RD & 4TH ARMIES 27TH-30TH SEPT. 36,500 PRISONERS 380 GUNS
CAMBRAI-ST QUENTIN PHASE 3 1ST 3RD & 4TH ARMIES 8TH-10TH OCT. 12,000 PRISONERS 250 GUNS
BAPAUME THIRD & FOURTH ARMIES 21ST-31ST AUG. (& SUBSEQUENT DAYS) 34,250 PRISONERS 270 GUNS
PERONNE
AVESNES
AMIENS FOURTH ARMY 9TH-12TH AUG. 21,850 PRISONERS 400 GUNS
ST QUENTIN
AREA OF FRENCH ATTACKS
CAPTURES BY BRITISH AND ALLIED ARMIES FROM JULY 18TH TO NOV. 11TH, 1918.
PRISONERS GUNS
BRITISH ARMIES - 188,700 2,840
FRENCH ARMIES - 139,000 1,880
AMERICAN ARMIES - 48,800 1,424
BELGIAN ARMIES - 14,500 474

BRITISH BATTLES DURING 1918.

Statistical map giving details of Allied advances and German withdrawals on the Western Front during the final and critical period of the Great War, which extended from August 8, 1918, to November 11, 1918. Upon this map are plotted particulars relating to dates, armies, and captures of prisoners and guns.

on all the fronts, the so-called Salonica Army developed an offensive against Bulgaria, having for its central objective the important town and railway junction of Uskub. It was indeed an heterogeneous army that advanced under the orders of Franchet d'Esperey, the ultimate successor of Sarrail. Eight French, seven British, six Greek (Venizelist), six Serbian, and four Italian divisions —all under strength, wasted with fever, and modestly equipped with artillery, set themselves in motion against the mountainous frontiers of Bulgaria. Seventeen Bulgarian and two Turkish divisions, gripped and guided by a few German battalions and batteries and the prestige of Mackensen, constituted a force ample for a successful defence of such difficult country.

But the Bulgarians would fight no more. Bulgaria quitted the field as sullenly, as callously, and as decidedly as she had entered it. The accession of the tepid Malinoff Ministry to power in the last week in June had caused anxiety in Berlin, and had afforded to the diplomacy of the Allies a fertile opportunity. In particular the influence of the United States, who had never declared war against Bulgaria and whose representative was still in Sofia, was exerted with potent skill.

After weak resistance, which nevertheless revealed the advantages of the defenders, the Bulgarian soldiers retreated, ceased to fight, and declared their intention of going to their homes to gather the harvest. These sturdy peasants were deaf to German expostulations. They were quite friendly to the small German forces which steadily advanced to sustain the front. The retreating battalions even spared the time to help the German cannon out of the ruts. But turn, or stand, or fight—all that was over for ever!

Surrender of Bulgaria.

On the night of September 26, a Bulgarian Staff Officer carried a flag of truce to General Milne's Headquarters, and in the name of his Commander-in-Chief sought a 48-hours' suspension of hostilities, to be followed by a peace delegation. On the 28th Bulgaria agreed unconditionally to demobilize her army, to restore all conquered territory, to surrender all means of transport, to cease to be a belligerent, and to place her railways and her territory at the disposal of the Allies for their further operations.

I was in Paris with Loucheur when the news arrived, and it was recognized at once that the end had come. On September 29 a Conference convened at Spa on Ludendorff's initiative decided to approach President Wilson, whose "high ideals" fostered hope, with proposals on behalf of Germany for an armistice. On October 1 Hindenburg, under the pressure of the Triple battle, demanded that the request for an armistice should be made by the next morning. On October 4 King Ferdinand abdicated the Bulgarian crown and fled to Vienna. This extraordinary figure, who combined the extremes of craft, fierceness, resolution, and miscalculation, now vanished from view. It had been twice in his power to achieve a large part of those overweening ambitions of his country which he so ardently championed. Alike after the first Balkan war (against Turkey) in 1912, or before Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in 1915; he could, by taking a different and easier course, have raised his country to the headship of a Balkan confederation; but the erroneous valuations on which the power and logic of his mind based itself in complete exclusion of moral factors, forced him at immense personal risk and toil to thrust his country twice over into utter disaster.

* * * *

The Final Battles.

Those who choose the moment for beginning wars do not always fix the moment for ending them. To ask for an armistice is one thing, to obtain it is another. The new Chancellor—Prince Max of Baden—sent his Note to President Wilson on the 5th. He based himself on the "Fourteen Points," which in the name of Germany he accepted. The President replied on the 8th, asking questions and demanding a German withdrawal from invaded territory as a guarantee of good faith. On the 12th

Germany and Austria declared themselves willing to evacuate all invaded territory as a preliminary to an armistice. On the 14th the President indicated that there could be no negotiation with the Emperor. As for an armistice, the conditions must be left to the Commanders in the field, but absolute safeguards must be provided for the maintenance of "the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field."

During this correspondence, which Mr. Wilson was peculiarly fitted to conduct, and which promised to be lengthy, the Allied armies rolled forward all along the line in France, maintaining a ceaseless battle and at an ever more powerful crescendo of attack. The vital German lateral railway still worked in front of the Ardennes. Pershing and Gouraud were steadily approaching it in the south, and Haig's heavy artillery already held Aulnoye Junction under continual fire. On the northern flank King Albert's army advanced upon Courtrai. The German troops in the wide intervals between these main thrusts fell back continually in conformity with battle results.

Ludendorff's reserves were exhausted. A large proportion of his divisions could not be relied upon to fight with determination; all were reduced to a third or a fifth of their fighting strength. The Siegfried Line collapsed at many points. Feverish exertions were made to fortify the Antwerp-Meuse positions, and Ludendorff with true instinct but tardy decision began to survey a line along the German frontier. Desperate agitated councils were held between the military leaders and the new political figures who had appeared. On the 20th the German Government renounced the submarine campaign. Meanwhile in Italy the whole of the Italian Army with their Allies—Lord Cavan's British Army in the van—hurled themselves across the Piave upon the forces of the liquefying Austro-Hungarian Empire, and in the last week of October completely shattered their military value. The Vatican stretched out an appealing hand. On November 4 an armistice, which deprived the Empire of the Hapsburgs of every means of resistance, and placed her territories at the disposal of the Allies for further operations, brought hostilities in this theatre to an end.

The British armies had now passed the Selle River, taking in the process 21,000 prisoners and 450 guns, and were marching swiftly forward on Valenciennes, Mons and Maubeuge, driving the enemy before them. The ardour of the troops knew no bounds. The conviction that the terrible enemy they had fought so long was breaking up under their hammer blows, and the rapture and joy of the liberated populations, made them more ready to sacrifice their lives in these last days than even in the darkest periods of the war. Every soldier felt himself at once a Conqueror and a Deliverer. The same impulses inflamed the Americans. As for the French, who shall describe the emotions with which haggard and torn, but regardless of a loss which in these last months (July to November) exceeded half a million men, they day by day battered down their ancient foe, and redeemed the sacred soil of France?

The armistice for which Hindenburg and Ludendorff had argued wore by now the aspect of an unconditional surrender. Ludendorff thereupon wished to fight on, declaring with truth that nothing could worsen the terms which Germany would receive. On the 27th the German Government, being resolved on total submission, moved the Emperor to dismiss him from his post. Hindenburg remained "greatly falling with a falling State." To him and to the German machine gunners belong the honours of the final agony.

* * * *

Breaking Strain..

When the great organizations of this world are strained beyond breaking point their structure often collapses at all points simultaneously. There is nothing on which policy, however wise, can build; no foothold can be found for virtue or valour, no authority or impetus for a rescuing genius. The mighty framework of German Imperial Power,

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

ON THE MENIN ROAD.

Of all the roads in France and Flanders that which ran out of Ypres to Menin was, perhaps, the most dangerous. Blasted and pulverised by shell-fire for four years, it frequently became impassable, and wheeled transport was forced to halt whilst shells and stores were taken forward by pack mules. By amazing exertions the Royal Engineers so repaired the road that not long after the Armistice it was once again in full use.

which a few days before had overshadowed the nations, shivered suddenly into a thousand individually disintegrating fragments. All her Allies whom she had so long sustained, fell down broken and ruined, begging separately for peace. The faithful armies were beaten at the front and demoralized from the rear. The proud, efficient Navy mutinied. Revolution exploded in the most disciplined and docile of States. The Supreme War Lord fled.

Such a spectacle appals mankind; and a knell rang in the ear of the victors, even in their hour of triumph.

* * * *

The Armistice Terms.

Parliament was disposed to be suspicious of the Armistice terms until they heard them. But when the document was read overwhelming thankfulness filled all hearts. No one could think of any further stipulation. Immediate evacuation of invaded countries; repatriation of all inhabitants; surrender in good condition of 5,000 guns, 30,000 machine-guns, 3,000 minenwerfers, 2,000 aeroplanes; evacuation of the left bank of the Rhine; surrender of three bridge-heads on the Rhine; surrender of 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 waggons, 5,000 motor lorries in good working order (and with spare parts); disclosure of all mines, of delay-action fuses, and assistance in their discovery and destruction; immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all prisoners of war; abandonment of the Treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk; surrender of 6 battle-cruisers, the best 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers, 50 of the best destroyers; surrender of all submarines; the right of the Allies on failure of execution of

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

IN THE CANAL DU NORD.

Canadian infantry are seen here waiting in the Canal du Nord to go forward on September 27, 1918. This obstacle, with its cutting often 60 feet deep, was on that day stormed by the right of the British First Army (Horne) and the left of the Third Army (Byng). The battle, in which was presently involved Rawlinson's Fourth Army, was both fierce and bloody. By the night of the 30th the Hindenburg Line was pierced on a front of twenty-five miles to an average depth of seven miles.

any condition to denounce the Armistice within 48 hours. Such were the covenanted clauses. And thus did Germany hand herself over powerless and defenceless to the discretion of her long tortured and now victorious foes!

* * * *

The Eleventh Hour.

It was a few minutes before the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month. I stood at the window of my room looking up Northumberland Avenue towards Trafalgar Square, waiting for Big Ben to tell that the War was over. My mind strayed back across the scarring years to the scene and emotions of the night at the Admiralty when I listened for these same chimes in order to give the signal of war against Germany to our Fleets and squadrons across the world. And now all was over! The unarmed and untrained island nation, who with no defence but its Navy had faced unquestioningly the strongest manifestation of military power in human record, had completed its task. Our country had emerged from the ordeal alive and safe, its vast possessions intact, its war effort still waxing, its institutions unshaken, its people and Empire united as never before. Victory had come after all the hazards and heartbreaks in an absolute and unlimited form. All the Kings and Emperors with whom we had warred were in flight or exile. All their armies and fleets were destroyed or subdued. In this Britain had borne a notable part, and done her best from first to last.

The minutes passed. I was conscious of reaction rather than elation. The material purposes on which one's work

had been centred, every process of thought on which one had lived, crumbled into nothing. The whole vast business of supply, the growing outputs, the careful hoards, the secret future plans—but yesterday the whole duty of life—all at a stroke vanished like a nightmare dream, leaving a void behind. My mind mechanically persisted in exploring the problem of demobilization. What was to happen to our three million munition workers? What would they make now? How would the roaring factories be converted? How in fact are swords beaten into ploughshares? How long would it take to bring the armies home? What would they do when they got home? We had of course a demobilization plan for the Ministry of Munitions. It had been carefully worked out, but it had played no part in our thoughts. Now it must be put into operation. The levers must be pulled—*Full Steam Astern.* The Munitions Council must meet without delay.

And then suddenly the first stroke of the chime. I looked again at the broad street beneath me. It was deserted. From the portals of one of the large hotels absorbed by Government Departments darted the slight figure of a girl clerk, distractedly gesticulating while another stroke resounded. Then from all sides men and women came scurrying into the street. Streams of people poured out of all the buildings. The bells of London began to clash. Northumberland Avenue was now crowded with people in hundreds, nay, thousands, rushing hither and thither in a frantic manner, shouting and screaming with joy. I could see that Trafalgar Square was already swarming. Around me in our very headquarters, in the Hotel Metropole, disorder had broken out. Doors banged. Feet clattered down corridors. Everyone rose from the desk and cast aside pen and paper. All bounds were broken. The tumult grew. It grew like a gale, but from all sides simultaneously.

The street was now a seething mass of humanity. Flags appeared as if by magic. Streams of men and women flowed from the Embankment. They mingled with torrents pouring down the Strand on their way to acclaim the King. Almost before the last stroke of

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE ADVANCE TO THE HINDENBURG LINE.

Mark V Tanks going forward for the battle of the St. Quentin Canal. This type of tank, the best evolved during the war, was employed during the attack upon the Hindenburg Line. Each tank is carrying a device known as a " crib " to assist in the crossing of the exceptionally wide trenches of the German main defence lines.

the clock had died away, the strict, war-straitened, regulated streets of London had become a triumphant pandemonium. At any rate it was clear that no more work would be done that day. Yes, the chains which had held the world were broken. Links of imperative need, links of discipline, links of brute force, links of self-sacrifice, links of terror, links of honour which had held our nation, nay, the greater part of mankind, to grinding toil, to a compulsive cause—every one had snapped upon a few strokes of the clock. Safety, freedom, peace, home, the dear one back at the fireside—all after fifty-two months of gaunt distortion. After fifty-two months of making burdens grievous to be borne and binding them on men's backs, at last, all at once, suddenly and everywhere the burdens were cast down. At least so for the moment it seemed.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE ST. QUENTIN TUNNEL.

This photograph, taken on October 15, 1918, at Bellicourt, Aisne, shows one of the entrances to the St. Quentin Tunnel which formed a part of the formidable defensive system of the Hindenburg Line.

My wife arrived, and we decided to go and offer our congratulations to the Prime Minister, on whom the central impact of the home struggle had fallen, in his hour of recompense. But no sooner had we entered our car than twenty people mounted upon it, and in the midst of a wildly cheering multitude we were impelled slowly forward through Whitehall. We had driven together the opposite way along the same road on the afternoon of the ultimatum. There had been the same crowd and almost the same enthusiasm. It was with feelings which do not lend themselves to words that I heard the cheers of the brave people who had borne so much and given all, who had never wavered, who had never lost faith in their country or its destiny, and who could be indulgent to the faults of their servants when the hour of deliverance had come.

* * * *

The German Military Effort.

It will certainly not fall to this generation to pronounce the final verdict upon the Great War. The German people are worthy of better explanations than the shallow tale that they were undermined

by enemy propaganda. If the propaganda was effective, it was because it awoke an echo in German hearts, and stirred misgivings which from the beginning had dwelt there. Thus when four years of blockade and battle against superior numbers and resources had sapped the vitality of the German people, the rebellious whispers of conscience became the proclaimed opinion of millions.

Yet in the sphere of force, human records contain no manifestation like the eruption of the German volcano. For four years Germany fought and defied the five continents of the world by land and sea and air. The German Armies upheld her tottering confederates, intervened in every theatre with success, stood everywhere on conquered territory, and inflicted on their enemies more than twice the bloodshed they suffered themselves. To break their strength and science and curb their fury, it was necessary to bring all the greatest nations of mankind into the field against them. Overwhelming populations, unlimited resources, measureless sacrifice, the sea blockade, could not prevail for fifty months. Small States were trampled down in the struggle; a mighty Empire was battered into unrecognizable fragments; and nearly twenty million men perished or shed their blood before the sword was wrested from that terrible hand. Surely, Germans, for history it is enough!

* * *

The Future Hope.

The curtain falls upon the long front in France and Flanders. The soothing hands of Time and Nature, the swift repair of peaceful industry, have already almost effaced the crater fields and the battle lines which in a broad belt from the Vosges to the sea lately blackened the smiling fields of France. The ruins are rebuilt, the riven trees are replaced by new plantations. Only the cemeteries, the monuments and stunted steeples, with here and there a mouldering trench or huge mine-crater lake, assail the traveller with the fact that twenty-five millions of soldiers fought here and twelve millions shed their blood or perished in the greatest of all human contentions but a few years ago. Merciful oblivion draws its veils; the crippled limp away; the mourners fall back into the sad twilight of memory. New youth is here to claim its rights, and the perennial stream flows forward even in the battle zone, as if the tale were all a dream.

Is this the end? Is it to be merely a chapter in a cruel and senseless story? Will a new generation in their turn be immolated to square the black accounts of Teuton and Gaul? Will our children bleed and gasp again in devastated lands? Or will there spring from the very fires of conflict that reconciliation of the three giant combatants, which would unite their genius and secure to each in safety and freedom a share in rebuilding the glory of Europe?

Photo: Central News.

MONS AGAIN: NOVEMBER 11, 1918.

General Sir Arthur Currie taking the salute in Mons on November 11, 1918, after the re-occupation of the town by the Canadians.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

THE BLOOD TEST

A General Survey—The First Shock—The Five Great Allied Assaults—Battles and the Time Factor—The Great Battle Days—The Battle Weeks—Colonel Boraston's Contentions—Sir William Robertson's Policy—His Reasonings—His Admissions—The Blood Test—British, French and German Losses—The Price of the Offensive—The Casualty Tables—"Killing Germans"—Wearing down the Germans—The Balance of Attrition—Ludendorff's Contribution—The Moral Factor—The General Conclusion—Manœuvre and Surprise—The "Side Shows"—The Limits of Responsibility.

IT is necessary in this chapter to ask the reader to take a somewhat statistical view of the whole war in the west, and to examine its main episodes in their character, proportion and relation.

A General Survey.

The events divide themselves naturally into three time-periods: the first, 1914; the second, 1915, 1916 and 1917; and the third, 1918: the First Shock; the Deadlock; and the Final Convulsion. The first period is at once the simplest and the most intense. The trained armies of Germany and France rushed upon each other, grappled furiously, broke apart for a brief space, endeavoured vainly to outflank each other, closed again in desperate conflict, broke apart once more, and then from the Alps to the sea lay gasping and glaring at each other not knowing what to do. Neither was strong enough to overcome the other, neither possessed the superior means or method required for the successful offensive. In this condition both sides continued for more than three years unable to fight a general battle, still less to make a strategic advance. It was not until 1918 that the main force of the armies on both sides was simultaneously engaged as in 1914 in a decisive struggle. In short, the war in the west resolved itself into two periods of supreme battle, divided from each other by a three-years' siege.

The First Shock.

The scale and intensity of the First Shock in 1914 has not been fully realized even by the well-instructed French public, and is not at all understood in England. At the beginning all totals of casualties were suppressed in every combatant country by a vigorous censorship. Later on in the war when more was known, no one had time to look back in the midst of new perils to the early days; and since the war no true impression has ever reached the public. British eyes have been fixed upon the vivid pictures of Liège, Mons and Le Cateau, that part of the Battle of the Marne which occurred near Paris, and the desperate struggle round Ypres. The rest lies in a dark background, which it is now possible to illuminate.

In the first three months of actual fighting from the last week in August to the end of November, when the German drive against the Channel ports had come to an end and the first great invasion was definitely arrested, the French lost in killed, prisoners and wounded 854,000[1] men. In the same period the small British army, about one-seventh of the French fighting strength, lost 85,000[2] men, making a total Allied loss of 939,000. Against this, in the same period, the Germans lost 677,000.[3] The fact that the Germans, although invading and presumably attacking, inflicted greater

[1] *Journal Officiel Documents Parlementaires*, Mars 29, 1920.
[2] *Military Effort of the British Empire*, Monthly Returns.
[3] German Federal Archives (*Reichsarchiv*).
} See Appendix for details.

slaughter than they suffered, is due to the grave errors in doctrine, training and tactics of the French army, and to the unsound strategic dispositions of General Joffre. But more than four-fifths of the French losses were sustained in the First Shock.

In the fighting from August 21, when the main collision occurred, down to September 12, when the victory of the Marne was definitely accomplished (a period of scarcely three weeks), the French armies lost nearly 330,000 men killed or prisoners, or more than one-sixth of their total losses in killed or prisoners during the whole fifty-two months of the war. To these permanent losses should be added about 280,000 wounded, making a total for this brief period of over 600,000 casualties to the French armies alone; and of this terrific total three-fourths of the loss was inflicted from August 21 to 24, and from September 5 to 9, that is to say, in a period of less than eight days.

Nothing comparable to this concentrated slaughter was sustained by any combatant in so short a time, not even excluding the first Russian disasters, nor the final phase on the Western Front in 1918. That the French army should have survived this frightful butchery, the glaring miscalculations which caused it, and the long and harassed retreats by which it was attended, and yet should have retained the fighting qualities which rendered a sublime recovery possible, is the greatest proof of their martial fortitude and devotion which History will record. Had this heroic army been handled in the First Shock with prudence, on a wide strategic scheme, and with practical knowledge of the effects of modern firearms and the use of barbed wire and entrenchments, there is no reason to doubt that the German invasion could have been brought to a standstill after suffering enormous losses within from thirty to fifty kilometres of the French frontiers. Instead, as events were cast, the French army in the first few weeks of the war received wounds which were nearly fatal, and never curable.

Of these the gravest was the loss of regular regimental officers, who sacrificed themselves with unbounded devotion. In many battalions only two or three officers survived the opening battles. The cadres of the whole French Army were seriously injured by the wholesale destruction of the trained professional element. The losses which the French suffered in the years which followed were undoubtedly aggravated by this impoverishment of military knowledge in the fighting units. Although the Germans are accustomed to bewail their own heavy losses of officers in the opening battles, their injury was not so deep, and until after the Ludendorff offensives they always possessed the necessary professional staff to teach and handle successive intakes of recruits.

After the situation was stabilized at the end of November, the long period of siege warfare on the Western Front began. The Germans fortified themselves on French and Belgian soil, along a line chosen for its superior railway network, and the Allies for more than three years endeavoured, with unvarying failure, to break their front and force them to retreat.

The Five Great Allied Assaults.

In all, five great Allied assaults were made.

(i) By the French in Champagne and Artois, in the spring and early summer of 1915.

(ii) By the French in Champagne during the late autumn and winter of 1915, and by the British simultaneously at Loos.

(iii) By the British and French on the Somme from July to October, 1916.

(iv) By the British at Arras and by the French on the Aisne, from April to July, 1917, and

(v) By the British virtually alone at Paschendaele in the autumn and winter of 1917.

In these siege-offensives which occupied the years 1915, 1916 and 1917 the French and British Armies consumed themselves in vain, and suffered as will be seen nearly double the casualties inflicted on the Germans. In this same period the Germans made only one great

Photo: A. W. Kerr.

THE CENOTAPH: LONDON.

The War of 1914–18, as the present chapter will show, resulted in casualties on a scale hitherto unknown. Each combatant nation suffered grievous loss. As is usual in war, the finest men of the warring armies were mown down, and upon those who were left, combatants and non-combatants alike, wounds were inflicted which have not yet healed. The flower of the manhood of Great Britain and Ireland, of the Dominions, of the Indian Empire, and of the Crown Colonies, fell upon the field of battle. The homage paid by the Empire to the memory of her gallant sons is symbolized by the Cenotaph, which stands in Whitehall, London. Designed by Sir Edward Lutyens, this dignified memorial stone was erected in 1920, and replaced a temporary structure prepared for the Peace Procession of July 19, 1919. It has been thought fitting to reproduce on the following pages a few of the representative memorials to the Empire's dead. Few words are necessary to describe these monuments, each one of which has been conceived in love and remembrance.

Photo: Wide World.

THE TOMB UNDER THE ARC DE TRIOMPHE.

M. Doumergue, Prime Minister of the French Republic, passing before the grave of the Unknown Soldier of France.

counter-offensive stroke: Falkenhayn's prolonged attack on Verdun in the spring of 1916. The special features which this operation presented have already been related.

These sanguinary prodigious struggles, extending over many months, are often loosely described as "Battles." Judging by the number of men who took their turn in the fighting at different times, by the immense quantities of guns and shells employed, and by the hideous casualty totals, they certainly rank, taken each as a whole, among the largest events of military history. But we must not be misled by terminology. If to call them "battles" were merely a method of presenting a general view of an otherwise confusing picture, it might well pass unchallenged. But an attempt has been made by military Commanders and by a whole school of writers to represent these prolonged operations as events comparable to the decisive battles of the past, only larger and more important. To yield to this specious argument is to be drawn into a wholly wrong impression, both of military science and of what actually took place in the Great War.

Battles and the Time Factor.

What is a battle? I wrote on March 5, 1918: "War between equals in power . . . should be a succession of climaxes on which everything is staked, toward which everything tends and from which permanent decisions are obtained. These climaxes have usually been called battles. A battle means that the whole of the resources on either side that can be brought to bear are, during the course of a single episode, concentrated upon the enemy." The scale of a battle must bear due proportion to the whole fighting strength of the armies. Five divisions engaged out of an army of seven may fight a battle. But the same operation in an army of seventy divisions, although the suffering and slaughter are equal,

sinks to the rank of a petty combat. A succession of such combats augments the losses without raising the scale of events.

Moreover, a battle cannot, properly speaking, be considered apart from the time factor. By overwhelming the enemy's right we place ourselves in a position to attack the exposed flank or rear of his centre; or by piercing his centre we gain the possibility of rolling up his flanks; or by capturing a certain hill we command his lines of communication. But none of these consequential advantages will be gained if the time taken in the preliminary operation is so long that the enemy can make new dispositions—if, for instance, he can bend back his lines on each side of the rupture and fortify them, or if he can withdraw his army before the hill is taken which would command his communications. If he has time to take such measures effectively, the first battle is over; and the second stage involves a second battle.

Now the amount of time required by the enemy is not indefinite. One night

Photo: Walter Scott.

THE GRAVE OF "THE UNKNOWN WARRIOR."

In the nave of Westminster Abbey lies buried "The Unknown Warrior." The tomb bears the following inscription:

Beneath this stone rests the body of a British Warrior unknown by name or rank brought from France to lie among the most Illustrious of the Land and buried here on Armistice Day—11: Nov: 1920. In the presence of His Majesty King George V., His Ministers of State, the Chiefs of His Forces, and a vast Concourse of the Nation.

Thus are commemorated the many multitudes who during the Great War of 1914-1918 gave the most that man can give—Life itself—for God, for King and Country, for Loved Ones, Home and Empire, for the sacred cause of Justice and the Freedom of the World.

They buried him among the kings, because he had done good toward God and toward His House.

THE MILITARY CEMETE
One of the largest of the British War Cemeteries. Here lie the remains

is enough to enable a new position to be entrenched and organized. In forty-eight hours the railways can bring large reinforcements of men and guns to any threatened point. The attacker is confronted with a new situation, a different problem, a separate battle. It is a misnomer to describe the resumption of an attack in these different circumstances as a part of the original battle, or to describe a series of such disconnected efforts as one prolonged battle. Operations consisting of detached episodes extending over months and divided by intervals during which a series of entirely new situations are created, however great their scale, cannot be compared—to take some modern instances—with Blenheim, Rossbach, Austerlitz, Waterloo, Gettysburg, Sedan, the Marne, or Tannenberg.

The Great Battle Days.

The real battle crises of the Great War stand out from the long series of partial, though costly, operations, not only by the casualties but by the number of divisions simultaneously engaged on both sides. In 1914, during the four days from August 21 to 24 inclusive, 80 German divisions were engaged with 62 French, 4 British and 6 Belgian divisions. The four decisive days of the Marne, September 6 to 9 inclusive, involved approximately the same numbers. Practically all the reserves were thrown in on both sides, and the whole strength of the armies utilized to the utmost. The operations in Artois in the spring of 1915, which lasted three months and cost the French 450,000 men,[1] never presented a single occasion where more

[1] This figure and other similar figures include the normal wastage of trench warfare on the quiet portions of the front. The official statistics do not enable me to distinguish between the actual battle front and the ordinary front. A uniform deduction of one-eighth would probably be sufficiently correct in all cases.

Photo: Central Press.

T TYNE COT, NEAR YPRES.
11,851 soldiers of the Empire who fell in action in the Ypres Salient.

than 15 divisions were simultaneously engaged on either side.

The Battle of Loos-Champagne, beginning on September 25, 1915, comprised an attack of 44 French and 15 British divisions (total 59) upon approximately 30 German divisions. But within three days the decisive battle-period may be said to have passed, and the numbers engaged on the Anglo-French side were reduced rapidly. 1916 was occupied by Verdun and the Somme. In this year of almost continuous fighting, in which more than two and a half million British, French and German soldiers were killed or wounded, there is only one single day, July 1, on the Somme, where as many as 22 Allied divisions were engaged simultaneously. The rest of the Somme with all its slaughter contained no operations involving more than 18 Allied divisions, and in most cases the time was occupied by combats between 3 or 4 British or French divisions with less than half that number of the enemy. In the whole of the so-called "Battle of Verdun" there were never engaged on any single day more than 14 French and German divisions, and the really critical opening attack by which the fate of the Fortress was so nearly sealed was conducted by not more than 6 German divisions against 2 or 3 French.

In 1917, with the accession of General Nivelle to the French command, an attempt was made to launch a decisive operation, and the French engaged in a single day, though with disastrous results, as many as 28 divisions. Thereafter the operations dwindled again into sanguinary insignificance. The autumn fighting in Flanders by the British Army produced a long succession of attacks delivered only by from 5 to 15 British divisions.

I wrote in October, 1917, "Success will only be achieved by the

Photo : Central Press.

THE MEMORIAL AT THE MENIN GATE.

An aerial view of the Memorial at the Menin Gate of Ypres, showing the ramparts and moat. No more fitting site could have been found for this dignified memorial than the gateway through which at one time or another practically every regiment in the armies of the Empire passed. The Memorial was unveiled by Lord Plumer on Sunday, July 24, 1927, and is dedicated to the memory of 54,896 officers, n.c.o.'s and men of the British forces reported missing in the Ypres Salient.

scale and intensity of our offensive effort within a limited period. We are seeking to conquer the enemy's army and not his position. . . . A policy of pure attrition between armies so evenly balanced cannot lead to a decision. It is not a question of wearing down the enemy's reserves, but of wearing them down so rapidly that recovery and replacement of shattered divisions is impossible. . . . Unless this problem can be solved satisfactorily, we shall simply be wearing each other out on a gigantic scale and with fearful sacrifices without ever reaping the reward."

It was not until March 21, 1918, when the third and final phase of the war began, that Ludendorff reintroduced the great battle period. The mass of artillery, which the Germans had by then accumulated in the west, was sufficient to enable three or four great offensives to be mounted simultaneously against the Allies, and the power to release any one of these at will imparted the element of surprise to Ludendorff's operations. The great reserves of which he disposed, and which he used, after four years of carnage, with all the ruthlessness of the first invasion, carried the struggle leap by leap along the whole Western Front, until the entire structure of the opposing armies and all their organizations of attack and defence were strained to the utmost. The climax of the German effort was reached in July. Ludendorff had worn out his army in the grand manner, but thoroughly, and the Allied offensive, supported by an equally numerous artillery, then began. As this developed all the armies became involved in constantly moving battles, and nearly 90 Allied divisions were on numerous days simultaneously engaged with 70 or 80 German. Thus at last a decision was reached.



Photo: Photopress.

NAMES OF THE MISSING.

Inscribed on the walls of the Memorial at the Menin Gate are the names of officers, n.c.o.'s and men who have no known graves. In consequence of this the Menin Gate is a sacred place to which thousands of men and women from all parts of the Empire make pilgrimage.

The Battle Weeks.

The fundamental proportion of events which the foregoing facts and figures reveal, is more apparent if weeks instead of days are taken as the test. Let us therefore multiply the number of divisions by the number of days in which they were actively engaged in any given week. The "Battle of the Frontiers"

Photo : Photopress.

TO FALLEN GUARDSMEN.

From the early days of 1914 until Armistice Day, 1918, the regiments of Guards in France and Flanders fought unflinchingly. Their losses were grievous. The photograph reproduced above shows a corner of their cemetery at Les Boeufs, on the Somme.

shows from August 21 to 28 about 600 division-battle days. The week of the Marne, September 5 to 12, shows a total of nearly 500. The week of Loos-Champagne in 1915, September 25 to October 2, produces a total of approximately 100. The continuous battle intensity of the first week of Verdun is only 72 divisions and never again attained that level. The opening week of the Somme, also the most important, is 46. General Nivelle's attack in April, 1917, engaged in a week 135. Paschendaele never rose above 85 division-battle days in a single week. With Ludendorff in 1918 we reach the figure of 328 between March 21 and 28. All through the summer of 1918 the weeks repeatedly show 300 entries by divisions of all the armies into battle: and finally, Foch's general advance, August, September and October, attained the maximum intensity of 554 divisional engagements a week and maintained an average weekly intensity in the fiercest month of over 400.

* * *

I conceive myself entitled to repeat, now that the results are known, the opinions which I put on record before all these battles were fought. I wrote to the Prime Minister on December 29, 1914, as follows: "I think it quite possible that neither side will have the strength to penetrate the other's lines in the western theatre. . . . Without attempting to take a final view, my impression is that the position of both armies is not likely to undergo any decisive change." And in June, 1915: "It is a fair general conclusion that the deadlock in the West will continue for some time and the side which risks most to pierce the lines of the other will put itself at a disadvantage."

Colonel Boraston's Contentions.

When the Comte de Ségur wrote his captivating account of Napoleon's Russian campaign, the defence of the Emperor was undertaken by General Gourgaud, a highly placed officer of his staff, which defence produced a far less favourable impression of Napoleon than had resulted from the original criticism. In 1922, a book, entitled *Sir Douglas Haig's Command*, 1915-1918 was published by a member of his staff, Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Boraston. This gentleman was employed during the greater part of the period concerned in drafting and preparing the official communiqués. He thus had access to many forms of confidential information, and he watched the great events of the war in relation-

ship to a chief who had gained his whole-hearted admiration. His work is aggressive to a degree that sometimes ceases to be good-natured. It is marred by small recriminations, by an air of soreness, by a series of literary sniffs and snorts, which combine to produce an unpleasant impression on the mind of the general reader.

For the views expressed in this book Sir Douglas Haig is in no way responsible. But the point of view which it discloses is nevertheless of interest. With all its faults, indeed to some extent because of them, *Sir Douglas Haig's Command* is a document of real value. It represents and embodies more effectively the collective view of the British Headquarters upon the different phases of the struggle than any other work which has yet appeared. There are none of those reticences and suave phrasings with which the successful actors on the world-stage are often contented when they condescend to tell their tale. Here we have the record of actual feelings unadorned. We have also a wealth of secret information for the first time placed at the disposal of the public in a responsible and authentic form. The public are therefore under an obligation to Colonel Boraston, and if from time to time in these pages his views are treated somewhat controversially, that should in no way obscure the service he has rendered to everyone except his Chief.

This Staff Officer is throughout concerned to sustain the theme of Sir Douglas Haig's final despatch. The Western Front was at all times, according to this view, the decisive theatre of the war, and all the available forces should continually have been concentrated there. The only method of waging war on the Western Front was by

Photo: L.N.A.

THE GREAT CEMETERY AT ÉTAPLES.

To Étaples, in the Pas-de-Calais, one of the most important of the British Base Camps, were sent thousands of men for treatment in the great military hospitals there. Many among them were so dangerously wounded as to be beyond human aid. 10,729 officers, n.c.o.'s and men of the Empire rest in the cemetery shown above, almost within rifle shot of the Straits of Dover.

wearing down the enemy by "killing Germans in a war of attrition." This we are assured was always Sir Douglas Haig's scheme; he pursued it unswervingly throughout his whole Command. Whether encouraged or impeded by the Cabinet, his policy was always the same: "Gather together every man and gun and wear down the enemy by constant and if possible by ceaseless attacks." This in the main, it is contended, he succeeded in doing, with the result, it is claimed, that in August, 1918, the enemy, at last worn down, lost heart, crumpled, and finally sued for peace.

Viewing the events in retrospect Colonel Boraston invites us to see, not only each of the various prolonged offensives as an integral operation, but the whole four years, 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918, as if they were one single enormous battle every part of which was a necessary factor in the final victory. We wore the enemy down, we are told, upon the Somme in 1916, we wore him down at Arras in the spring, we continued to wear him down at Paschendaele in the winter of 1917. If the army had been properly reinforced by the politicians we should have persisted in wearing him down in the spring of 1918. Finally, as the fruits of all this process of attrition and "killing Germans" by offensive operations, the enemy's spirit was quelled, his man power was exhausted, and the war was won. Thus a great design, measured, foreseen and consciously prepared, reached its supreme accomplishment. Such is the theory.

Sir William Robertson's Policy.

These views are supported in the two important volumes published by Sir William Robertson. This officer was Chief of the Imperial General Staff with unprecedented powers during the whole of 1916 and 1917. Robertson's doctrines were clear and consistent. He believed in concentrating all the efforts of the British and French armies upon offensive action in France and Flanders, and that we should stand on the defensive everywhere else. He advocated and pressed every offensive in which the British armies were engaged, and did his utmost to procure the compliance of the Cabinet in every operation.

In an illuminating sentence he complained that "certain Ministers still held fast to the belief that victory could never be won—or only at prohibitive cost—by *straightforward action on the Western Front,*[1] and that it must be sought through lines of indirect attack elsewhere."[2] "Straightforward action on the Western Front," in 1915 (when Robertson was Chief of the Staff in France) and in 1916 and 1917 (when he was C.I.G.S.), meant, and could only mean, frontal assaults upon fortified positions defended by wire and machine guns without the necessary superiority of numbers, or an adequate artillery, or any novel offensive method. He succeeded in enforcing this policy against the better judgment of successive Cabinets or War Councils, with the result that when he left the War Office in February, 1918, the British and French armies were at their weakest point in strength and fighting power, and the Germans for the first time since the original invasion had gathered so great a superiority of reserves as to be able to launch a gigantic attack.

Robertson's explanations of the costly failures of the successive offensives for which he was so largely responsible are worth quoting. Of the disastrous battles of Loos and Champagne which cost the French 350,000 casualties and the British 95,000 in September and October, 1915, he writes:

"Although the operations were unproductive of decisive success, and were attended by tactical miscalculations which would have to be corrected before the enemy's lines could be breached, they nevertheless rendered valuable aid to an ally in distress, and furnished useful experience in the handling of new troops and in the methods to be employed in the attack on continuous lines of field fortifications. They were, in fact, necessary stages in the preparation for the great battles that were subsequently fought."[3]

To obtain "useful experience in the

[1] My italics.

[2] *Soldiers and Statesmen,* 1914-1918: Robertson. Vol. I, p. 239.

[3] *Ibid.,* Vol. I, p. 70.

Photo: Central Press.

THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL WAR MEMORIAL.

This beautiful conception, perhaps the most wonderful Memorial in the world, was inaugurated by H.R.H. The Prince of Wales on July 14, 1927. Enclosed within the walls of Edinburgh Castle, it is the work of Sir Robert Lorimer, A.R.A., R.S.A., who was architect of the Chapel of the Order of the Thistle.



Photo: F. C. Inglis.

THE SHRINE.

The Shrine of the Memorial is built upon the living rock of the Castle, which projects through the floor, as in the case of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. Upon a marble base and guarded by angels rests a casket of steel containing the Rolls of Honour. The Casket, which is very beautiful, was presented by the King and Queen.



THE MULE.

THE HORSE.



THE CAMEL.



CANARIES AND WHITE MICE.

Photos: F. C. Inglis.

"THE HUMBLE BEASTS THAT SERVED AND DIED."

Upon the walls of the Hall of the Regiments are carvings to the honour of the many dumb animals, friends of man, who endured sufferings and death with the army in the field. In addition to the carvings reproduced above are others of the Elephant, the Ox, the Reindeer, the Dog, and the Carrier-Pigeon.

Photo: F. C. Inglis.

THE HALL OF THE REGIMENTS.

The ante-chamber to the Shrine, known as The Hall of the Regiments or The Hall of Honour, contains the individual memorials of the Scottish Regiments. Each memorial bears a tablet upon which are inscribed battle honours, and upon which is emblazoned the regimental crest. At the base of the tablet, upon a stone pedestal, rests the Book of the Roll of Honour.



Photo: F. C. Inglis.

THE GORDON HIGHLANDERS.

To the Memory of 453 Officers and 8509 Warrant Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men of the Regiment who gave their lives for their King and Country during the Great War, 1914-1919.



Photo: F. C. Inglis.

THE BLACK WATCH.

This tablet is erected to the Memory of 566 Officers and 9459 Other Ranks who gave their lives for King and Country in the Great War.

Photo: F. C. Inglis.

TO THE WOMEN OF SCOTLAND.

In Honour of All Scotswomen who amid the stress of War sought by their labours, sympathy and prayers to obtain for their Country the blessings of Peace.

handling of new troops" and educational preparation for future battles may be deemed an inadequate result for 95,000 British casualties.

During the battle of the Somme he wrote, on July 29, to Haig as follows:

His Reasonings.

"The powers that be are beginning to get a little uneasy in regard to the situation. The casualties are mounting up, and Ministers are wondering whether we are likely to get a proper return for them. I do my best to keep the general situation to the front, and to explain what may be the effect of our efforts, and to ask what alternative could be adopted. I also try to make them think in German of the present situation. But they will persist in asking me whether *I* think a loss of, say, 300,000 men will lead to really great results, because if not we ought to be content with something less than what we are now doing, and they constantly inquire why we are fighting and the French are not. . . . In general, what is bothering them is the probability that we may soon have to face a bill of between 200,000 and 300,000 casualties with no very great gains additional to the present. It is thought that the primary object—the relief of Verdun—has to some extent been achieved."[1]

And three days later:

"L.G. is all right provided I can say that *I* am satisfied, and to enable me to say this it is necessary you should keep me acquainted with your views. . . . If I have to depend almost entirely upon Press communiqués my opinion is not much more valuable than that of anyone else."[2]

[1] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 270.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 271.



Photo: Central Press.

TO THE FALLEN OF NEW ZEALAND.

The tower erected at Wellington to the Memory of the officers and other ranks of the New Zealand forces who were killed in action during the Great War.

But his was the opinion that overbore all others; and that it should have depended upon these and similar jejune reflections and on such defective information excites, even after the lapse of years, a painful emotion.

His Admissions.

When on October 5, 1917, the Paschendaele offensive was sinking into the mire, and the Cabinet sought to bring it to a conclusion, Robertson was compelled to rest himself upon "the unsatisfactory state of the French armies and of the general political situation in France, which was still far from reassuring";[1] and again: "The original object of the campaign—the clearance of the Belgian coast—was seen to be doubtful of attainment long before the operations

[1] *Soldiers and Statesmen*, 1914-1918: Robertson. Vol. II, p. 256.

Photo: Central Press.

TO THE CANADIANS.

This beautiful Memorial is shown as it was when erected temporarily in Hyde Park in 1932 before shipment to Canada. Finely conceived, this noble work is worthy of the magnificent men to whose memory it has been erected.

terminated, owing to the bad weather experienced and to the delay in starting caused by the change of plan earlier in the year. But, as already explained, there were strong reasons why activity had to be maintained. We must give the French armies time to recover their strength and morale, make every effort to keep Russia in the field in some form or other, and try to draw enemy troops to Flanders which might otherwise be sent against Italy, especially after her defeat at Caporetto. All these purposes of distraction were achieved, and in addition heavy losses were inflicted upon the German armies."[1]

For these "purposes of distraction" the killing, maiming or capture of over 400,000 British soldiers was apparently considered a reasonable price to pay.

It appears however that although Robertson drove the Cabinet remorselessly forward, he had convinced himself that none of the British attacks for which he bore responsibility in 1915 and in 1916 had had any chance of decisive success. "With respect to the alleged error of always attacking where the enemy was strongest," he writes,[1] "I could not refrain from saying that the greatest of all errors was that of not providing before the war an army adequate to enforce the policy adopted. . . *Until this year we have not had the means to attack with the hope of getting a decision,*[2] and therefore we have had no choice in the point of attack." He used these words on his own avowal on June 21, 1917; so that the highest expert authority responsible for procuring the support of the Cabinet to two years of offensive operations had already convinced himself that up till 1917 the British Army "had not the means to attack with the hope of getting a decision." Undeterred however by this slowly-gained revelation, he proceeded to drive the unfortunate Ministers to authorize the prolongation into the depths of winter of the Paschendaele offensive.

* * * *

The Blood Test.

During the war it was the custom of

[1] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 261-2.

[1] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 244.
[2] My italics.

the British and French staffs to declare that in their offensives they were inflicting heavier losses on the Germans than they themselves suffered. Similar claims were advanced by the enemy. Ludendorff shared the professional outlook of the British and French High Commands. Even after the war was over, with all the facts in his mind or at his disposal had he cared to seek them, we find him writing, "Of the two [policies] the offensive makes less demands on the men and gives no higher losses."[1] Let us subject these assertions and theories of the military schools of the three great belligerents to a blood test as pitiless as that to which they all in turn doomed their valiant soldiers.

Since the Armistice the facts are known; but before proceeding to detailed figures it will be well to take a general survey.

The Germans, out of a population of under 70 millions, mobilized during the war for military service 13¼ million persons. Of these, according to the latest German official figures for all fronts including the Russian, over 7 millions suffered death, wounds or captivity, of whom nearly 2 millions perished.[1] France, with a population of 38 millions, mobilized a little over 8 million persons. This however includes a substantial proportion of African troops outside the French population basis. Of these approximately 5 millions became

[1] *My War Memories:* Ludendorff. Vol. II.

[1] *Zentral Nachwieseamt.* This figure is also given by the French military historian, Lieut.-Col. Corda, *La Guerre Mondiale,* p. 413.

Photo: Central Press.

A ROYAL FELLOWSHIP.

One of the most impressive of all the Memorials is that of the Royal Artillery which stands at Hyde Park Corner. Stark and full of realism, it carries the mind back to the days when the guns roared incessantly by day and by night; when the field-gunners toiled with the infantry, and when from every copse and wood farther back the heavies sought unceasingly to harass and to destroy.

casualties, of whom 1½ millions lost their lives. The British Empire, out of a white population of 60 millions, mobilized nearly 9½ million persons and sustained over 3 million casualties including nearly a million deaths.

British, French and German Losses.

The British totals are not directly comparable with those of France and Germany. The proportion of coloured troops is greater. The numbers who fell in theatres other than the western, and those employed on naval service, are both much larger.

The French and German figures are however capable of very close comparison. Both the French and German armies fought with their whole strength from the beginning to the end of the war. Each nation made the utmost possible demand upon its population. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the official French and German figures tally with considerable exactness. The Germans mobilized 19 per cent. of their entire population, and the French, with their important African additions, 21 per cent. Making allowance for the African factor, it would appear that in the life-and-death struggle both countries put an equal strain upon their manhood. If this basis is sound—and it certainly appears reasonable—the proportion of French and German casualties to persons mobilized displays an even more remarkable concordance. The proportion of German casualties to total mobilized is 10 out of every 19, and that of the French 10 out of every 16. The ratios of deaths to woundings in Germany and France are almost exactly equal, viz. 2 to 5. Finally these figures yield a division of German losses between the western and all other fronts of approximately 3 to 1 both in deaths and casualties. All the calculations which follow are upon the basis of the tables which yield these authoritative and harmonious general proportions.

Photo: Central Press.

AT DELVILLE WOOD.

The Memorial erected to the South African soldiers on the Somme at Delville Wood. Here, in July, 1916, the South Africans captured the wood, but suffered so severely that, although they fought with distinction on many parts of the front, Delville Wood was selected as the most suitable site.

The British War Office published in March, 1922, its *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War.*[1] A section of this massive compilation records the comparative figures of British and

[1] Hereafter referred to as *The Military Effort.*

Photo : Planet News Ltd.

TO THE AUSTRALIANS OF VICTORIA.

The War Memorial of the State of Victoria erected to the memory of Australian officers, n.c.o.'s and men of that State who fell in action in the Great War.

German casualties on the British sector of the Western Front from February, 1915, to October, 1918, inclusive. The British figures are compiled from the official records of the War Office. The German figures have been obtained from the Federal Archives Office at Potsdam. The result of the calculation is summed up as follows: The total number of British "Officer" casualties was 115,741 and of German "Officer" casualties 47,256. The total number of British "Other Ranks" casualties was 2,325,932 and of German "Other Ranks" casualties 1,633,140. The casualties among British "Officers" compared to German were therefore about 5 to 2, and of British "Other Ranks" compared to German about 3 to 2.

The Price of the Offensive—The Casualty Tables.

Comparative tables are given in the same work which show the losses of both sides in the various offensive periods.[1]

[1] *The Military Effort*, pp. 358 *et seq.*

There is no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of these authoritative and difficult calculations, nor the truth of the picture they present. But since 1918 supplementary casualty returns have been presented both in Germany and Britain which must be brought into the account. They do not materially alter the picture.[1] The tables printed on pages 1258 and 1259 show in

[1] The campaigns have been divided into the main operations and the intervening periods, in accordance with the return of French casualties presented to the Chamber in response to the resolution obtained by the deputy Marin on March 29, 1922. The French figures are taken from this source, which is the latest and sole authoritative statement of the French casualties. The British figures are taken from the monthly returns of casualties published in *The Military Effort*.[2] These are the official figures of the War Office, and the final corrections and additions [3] are also embodied.

For the German figures there are two sources: first, the Federal Archives Office at Potsdam (*Reichsarchiv*) which collected the casualties returned every ten days by the units; and secondly, the Central Inquiry Office (*Zentral*

(*Continued on page 1256.*)

[2] p. 271.

[3] pp. 237 *et seq.*

BRITISH OFFENSIVES OF 1916 AND 1917.

	Officers[1] British.	Officers[1] German.	Other Ranks British.	Other Ranks German.
1916 July–December The Somme	21,974	4,879	459,868	231,315
	over 4–1		about 2–1	
1917 January–June Arras and Messines	15,198	3,953	295,803	172,962
	about 4–1		about 5–3	
1917 July-December Paschendaele and Cambrai	22,316	6,913	426,298	263,797
	about 3–1		about 5–3	
Totals . . .	59,488	15,745	1,181,969	668,074
	about 4–1		nearly 2–1	

[1] The German commissioned officers were less numerous per unit than in the British Service.

their simplest form the respective total casualties suffered and inflicted according to the latest information by all the three main combatants on the Western Front. It would not be right to claim for any elaborate set of figures built up under such varying circumstances an exact and meticulous accuracy; nor is such exactness necessary for the use to which the figures are put in this account. The authority for every set of figures is given. All the modifications which are required have been made, and in the

Nachweiseamt) which, working separately, received the periodical returns from all the hospitals at the front and at home. The classification of the casualties into periods is the work of the *Reichsarchiv*. They accepted the figures as recorded at the end of the war, and have classified them in the same operation periods as those chosen by the French. The Central Inquiry Office, which includes the War Graves Administration, continued however to revise the casualty returns, and in particular to break up the large category of "Missing" which existed at the end of the war. As missing men were finally despaired of or proved to have been killed, as wounded men after long illness died, these were added to the total deaths, and the other categories reduced accordingly. Moreover, the revision of casualties in accordance with the hospital records increased the total number. In five successive estimates ending with June, 1923, the *Nachweiseamt* added 497,000 casualties to the total at the Armistice, on which the *Reichsarchiv* had worked: and their final figure becomes 7,080,000 German casualties on all fronts out of a total mobilization of 13,250,000.

It is not possible to distribute these additional German casualties according to the time or operation periods of the *Reichsarchiv's* calculation; nor to divide them between the Western and Eastern theatres of the war. In order to make sure that I am in no way overstraining the argument, I have added four-fifths of the 497,000 supplementary German casualties, viz. 397,000, to the Western Front. This is admittedly an arbitrary method. But in so far as it errs, it is upon the safe side. Moreover, the *Reichsarchiv's* figures for the Western Front admittedly do not include either casualties inflicted upon the Germans by the Americans, which may be estimated at 140,000; nor the very heavy German casualties for part of October and the last eleven days of the war in November, 1918. In the confusion of the collapse on the Western Front a temporary breakdown occurred in the returns made by the various German units. This is the chief explanation of the increase of nearly 500,000 discovered and reported by the Central Inquiry Office in the following twelve months.

It does not seem therefore that the additional 397,000 German casualties should be spread over the whole period of the war. By far the larger portion occurred in the last few months. If uniform allowance were made for this addition, it would increase all the German figures in the comparative tables by about 8 per cent. But the British figures in these tables have also undergone a progressive revision. Allowing for the fact that they do not include 102,000 British casualties of 1914, their original total fell short of the British final total by 222,000. This number, if distributed, would add almost exactly the same percentage to the British numbers. The effect of these changes therefore leaves the comparison unaltered.

result I believe it to be a sound and correct presentation of fact.

* * * *

"Killing Germans."

Let us now proceed to draw the conclusions which emerge from the figures. They do not appear to have been at all appreciated even in the most expert circles. I state them in their simplest form.

During the whole war the Germans never lost in any phase of the fighting more than the French whom they fought, and frequently inflicted double casualties upon them. In no one of the periods into which the fighting has been divided by the French authorities, did the French come off best in killed, prisoners and wounded. Whether they were on the defensive or were the attackers the result was the same. Whether in the original rush of the invasion, or in the German offensive at Verdun, or in the great French assaults on the German line, or even in the long periods of wastage on the trench warfare front, it always took the blood of 1½ to 2 Frenchmen to inflict a corresponding injury upon a German.

The second fact which presents itself from the tables is that in all the British offensives the British casualties were never less than 3 to 2, and often nearly double the corresponding German losses.

However, comparing the French and British efforts against the Germans on the Western Front, the French suffered in all the periods concerned irrespective of the kind of operation heavier losses than those they inflicted on the enemy: whereas while the British suffered heavier losses in all offensives, they exacted more than their own losses when attacked by the Germans.

In the series of great offensive pressures which Joffre delivered during the whole of the spring and autumn of 1915 the French suffered nearly 1,300,000 casualties. They inflicted upon the Germans in the same period and the same operations 506,000 casualties. They gained no territory worth mentioning, and no strategic advantages of any kind. This was the worst year of the Joffre régime. Gross as were the mistakes of the Battle of the Frontiers, glaring as had been the errors of the First Shock, they were eclipsed by the insensate obstinacy and lack of comprehension which, without any large numerical superiority, without adequate artillery or munitions, without any novel mechanical method, without any pretence of surprise or manœuvre, without any reasonable hope of victory, continued to hurl the heroic but limited manhood of France at the strongest entrenchments, at uncut wire and innumerable machine guns served with cold skill. The responsibilities of this lamentable phase must be shared in a subordinate degree by Foch, who under Joffre's orders, but as an ardent believer, conducted the prolonged spring offensive in Artois, the most sterile and prodigal of all.

During the Somme in 1916, where the brunt of the slaughter was borne by the British, the French and German losses were much less unequal. But, on the other hand, their rigid method of defence at Verdun, which has already been described, led the French to suffer in a far greater degree even than the attacking Germans.

Wearing down the Germans.

In the face of the official figures now published and set out in the tables, what becomes of the argument of the "battle of attrition"? If we lose three or four times as many officers and nearly twice as many men in our attack as the enemy in his defence, how are we wearing him down? The result of every one of these offensives was to leave us relatively weaker—and in some cases terribly weaker—than the enemy. The aggregate result of all of them from 1915 to 1917 (after deducting the losses on both sides in the German attack on Verdun) was a French and British casualty list of 4,123,000 compared to a German total of 2,166,000. Not only is this true of numbers, but also of the quality of the troops. In the attack it is the bravest who fall. The loss is heaviest among the finest and most audacious fighters. In defence the casualties are spread

A.—LOSSES ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

(*Killed, died in hospital, missing, prisoners and wounded, including officers.*)

Period.[1]	Description.	SUFFERED by Germans.	SUFFERED French.	SUFFERED British.
Aug.–Nov., 1914.	Battle of the Frontiers (Aug. 6–Sept. 5) and Battle of the Marne (Sept. 6–13). The race to the sea (1st Battle of Artois, the Yser). *British: 1st Ypres.*	677,440	854,000	84,575
Dec., 1914–Jan., 1915	Stabilization	170,025	254,000	17,621
Feb.–Mar., 1915.	1st offensive of 1915 (1st Battle of Champagne)	114,492	240,000	33,678
Apr.–June, 1915.	2nd Battle of Artois. *British: 2nd Ypres*	233,506	449,000	119,557
July–Aug., 1915.	Stabilization	78,402	193,000	30,902
Sept.–Nov., 1915	2nd offensive of 1915 (2nd Battle of Champagne, 3rd Battle of Artois). *British: Loos*	186,188	410,000	94,787
Dec., 1915–Jan., 1916	Stabilization	39,702	78,000	22,092
Feb.–June, 1916.	Defensive Battle of Verdun	334,246	442,000	118,992
July–Oct., 1916.	Battle of the Somme	537,919	341,000	453,238
Nov.–Dec., 1916.	1st offensive Battle of Verdun	92,273	93,000	60,041
Jan.–Mar., 1917.	The German retreat	65,381	108,000	67,217
Apr.–July, 1917.	Offensive of the Aisne (Chemin-des-Dames, and Battle of the Mounts). *British: Arras, Messines*	414,071	279,000	355,928
Aug.–Dec., 1917.	Minor operations (Flanders, right bank of the Meuse, the Malmaison). *British: Paschendaele, Cambrai*	404,517	182,000	394,645
Jan.–Feb., 1918.	Stabilization	24,064	51,000	22,851
Mar.–June, 1918.	Defensive campaign of 1918. *British: March 21, Lys*	688,341	433,000	418,374
July–Nov., 1918.	Offensive campaign of 1918	785,733	531,000	411,636
	Totals	4,846,300[2]	4,938,000[3]	2,706,134[4]
	Four-fifths of 494,000 German casualties reported after Armistice: *and British additional*	397,000	..	52,000
	Casualties inflicted by Americans (say)	140,000	..	..
	French officers killed (not included in periods)	..	36,000	..
	Final Totals	5,383,300[5]	4,974,000	2,758,134[5]
	Of which (*a*) Deaths (killed, died in hospital, permanently missing)	1,493,000[7]	1,432,000	684,000
	(*b*) Non-fatal casualties	3,890,000	3,506,000	2,074,000
	Ratios of (*a*) to (*b*)	*1 to 2·60*	*1 to 2·45*	*1 to 3·03*

[1] One-eighth may be deducted from all figures on both sides for casualties on parts of the front other than the battle-fronts in each period.

[2] Federal Archives (*Reichsarchiv*), Potsdam, Dec. 31, 1918.

[3] Official Returns to the Chamber, Resolution of Deputy Marin, March 29, 1922.

[4] Military Effort of the British Empire. Monthly Returns, pp. 253 to 271.

[5] A small percentage, probably less than 2 per cent., may be deducted from the British casualty totals in each period to allow for a more thorough recording than appears in the German figures of very slightly wounded men who remained at duty.

[6] Add German casualties suffered on Russian and other fronts, viz. 1,697,000, making German total loss 7,080,300, of which Deaths, 2,000,000.

[7] For method of estimating this figure, see Appendix 1, Table III.

B.—LOSSES ON THE WESTERN FRONT.[1]

(Killed, died in hospital, missing, prisoners and wounded, including officers.)

Period.	Description.	INFLICTED. by Germans.	French.	British.
Aug.–Nov., 1914.	Battle of the Frontiers (Aug. 6–Sept. 5) and Battle of the Marne (Sept. 6–13). The race to the sea (1st Battle of Artois, the Yser). *British : 1st Ypres*	938,575	747,465	say 100,000
Dec.–Jan., 1915	Stabilization	271,621		
Feb.–March	1st offensive of 1915 (1st Battle of Champagne)	273,178	96,002	18,490
April–June	2nd Battle of Artois. *British : 2nd Ypres*	568,557	190,420	43,086
July–August	Stabilization	223,902	66,785	11,617
Sept.–Nov.	2nd offensive of 1915 (2nd Battle of Champagne, 3rd Battle of Artois). *British : Loos*	504,787	154,139	32,049
Dec.–Jan., 1916	Stabilization	100,092	28,933	10,769
Feb.–June	Defensive Battle of Verdun	560,992	278,739	55,507
July–Oct.	Battle of the Somme	794,238	338,011	199,908
Nov.–Dec.	1st offensive Battle of Verdun	153,041	56,037	36,236
Jan.–March, 1917	The German retreat	175,217	30,183	35,198
Apr.–July	Offensive of the Aisne (Chemin-des-Dames, and Battle of the Mounts). *British : Arras, Messines*	634,928	238,310	175,771
Aug.–Dec.	Minor operations (Flanders, right bank of the Meuse, the Malmaison). *British : Paschendaele, Cambrai*	576,645	167,381	237,136
Jan.–Feb., 1918	Stabilization	73,853	12,230	11,834
Mar.–June	Defensive campaign of 1918. *British : March 21, Lys*	851,374	253,204	435,137
July–Nov.	Offensive campaign of 1918	942,636	414,617	371,116
	Totals	7,643,636[2]	3,072,456	1,773,854

Not included above.			
Additional British and German losses reported after Armistice and not classified by months or fronts	52,000	494,000	
French officers killed (not distributed)	36,000	..	
American losses	302,000	..	
Belgian losses	93,000	..	

[1] Authorities and deductions as on previous table.

[2] No figures are included for the enormous casualties inflicted by the Germans on the Russians nor for those inflicted by the British on the Turks.

evenly throughout the total number exposed to the fire. The process of attrition was at work; but it was on our own side that its ravages fell, and not on the German.

It may be contended that if one side is much more numerous than the other it may "wear down" the enemy, as Grant sought vainly to wear down the Confederates before Richmond in 1864, even at a cost of two to one. But this argument cannot be applied to the struggle on the Western Front. First, the Allies never had the superiority to afford such an uneven sacrifice of life. Secondly the German annual intake of recruits was large enough to repair the whole of their permanent loss in any year.

Let us here examine the total German losses on the Western Front.

Casualties inflicted on the Germans [1] *by*

	British.	*French.*[2]	*Total.*
1914 (say)	100,000	748,000 [3]	848,000
1915 . .	116,000	536,000	652,000
1916 . .	291,000	673,000	964,000
1917 . .	448,000	436,000	884,000
1918 . .	818,000	680,000	1,498,000
Total .	1,773,000	3,073,000	4,846,000 [4]

The Balance of Attrition.

From the tables of killed, missing, prisoners and wounded it is necessary to extract the permanent loss to the Army, i.e. men rendered incapable of taking any further part in the war. For this purpose we include all the killed, missing and prisoners and one-third only of the wounded. On this basis the total permanent German loss in the west during the three years of siege warfare was as follows :—

1915	337,000
1916	549,000
1917	510,000
Total . . .	1,396,000 [1]

Thus in the three years of siege conditions the losses of the Germans on the Western Front averaged 465,000 a year.

[1] See Table B.

[2] Including losses inflicted by the Belgians.

[3] 100,000 deducted for British share, no separate figures being available.

[4] These figures take no account of the supplementary German casualties not distributed into periods.

[1] No allowance is made in these figures for the supplementary German casualties, since these could at most vary the totals to the extent of 8 per cent. *See footnote to p.* 1255

Photo: Central Press.

TO THE AIR SERVICES.

The above Memorial, erected at the Faubourg d'Amiens Cemetery, Arras, as one of a number intended to commemorate those who fell in action on the Western Front and who have no known graves, includes also a special monument to the officers and other ranks of the Air Service to the number of 1,018 who were posted as missing. This monument is seen in the centre, in the background.

Their annual intake of recruits through young men growing up was over 800,000. But, in their hard need, and often through the ardour of their young men, they heavily anticipated their annual harvests. From May, the normal conscription month, to the end of 1915, they drew 1,070,000 men to the Colours.[1] In the similar period of 1916 they overdrew no less than 1,443,000 men. Thus, in 1917 they could call up only 622,000. Nevertheless, the least of these figures far exceeded the attrition value of the Allied offensives. It was not until 1918 that the intake of available Germans fell to 405,000. It would probably, if the national resistance had not collapsed, have risen in 1919, for the ample crops of German youth were steadily coming forward at 800,000 a year. The figures of German loss and intake for the three siege years are therefore as follows:—

	Loss in the West.	*Total Intake.*	*Balance for all Fronts.*
1915	337,000	1,070,000	733,000
1916	549,000	1,443,000	894,000
1917	510,000	622,000	112,000
Totals	1,396,000	3,135,000	1,739,000

Where then in mere attrition was the end to be discerned? On the terms of 1915, 1916, and 1917 the German man power was sufficient to last indefinitely. In fact in the three years of the Allied offensives on the Western Front they gained actually to the extent of 1,739,000 men more than their losses. We were in fact, as I wrote early in March, 1918, "merely exchanging lives upon a scale at once more frightful than anything that has been witnessed before in the world, and too modest to produce a decision."[1]

[1] These figures include sick and wounded who had recovered and men combed from industries.

Photo: Central Press.

TO THOSE MISSING ON THE SOMME.

The Memorial at Thiepval, erected to commemorate French and British soldiers missing on the Somme battlefields, stands 140 feet high. Upon panels on the Memorial are the names of 73,357 officers and other ranks of the British Empire. The Memorial was unveiled in August, 1932.

Ludendorff's Contribution.

It was not until 1918 that the change fatal for Germany occurred. There was one period in the warfare between the British and Germans in which the relative losses are strikingly reversed. That period is not, as the casual reader might expect, when our troops were gaining ground, storming trench lines, pulverizing fortified villages, gathering prisoners and the grisly spoils of battle, and when

[1] My Memorandum of March 5, 1918, printed in Chapter LXX.

our propaganda, domestic and external, was eagerly proclaiming that the tide of victory flowed. It was during the period which probably in most people's minds represents the most agonizing and alarming phase of the war on the Western Front, the days of the greatest German victories and the most grievous British reverses. For the first time in Ludendorff's tremendous offensive of 1918, in the battles following the twenty-first of March and in the battles of the Lys, the German losses in men and officers, in killed and wounded, especially killed, and above all in officers killed, towered up above those of the troops whom they thought they were defeating, and whom we knew they were driving back.

It was their own offensive, not ours, that consummated their ruin. They were worn down not by Joffre, Nivelle and Haig, but by Ludendorff. See again the remorseless figures from March 21, 1918, to the end of June.[1] In barely three months the Germans suffered against the British alone 16,000 officer casualties and 419,000 casualties among the other ranks. They lost in almost the same period[2] against the British alone, 3,860 officers killed compared with 3,878 officers killed by the British in the whole preceding two years.

Against the French in the same three months, but mainly in the last five weeks, the Germans lost 253,000 officers and men. Their total casualties in only thirteen weeks amounted to 688,000, very few of whom in the short time that was left ever returned to the front. In this period their intake was reduced to 405,000 for the nine months of the year that the war lasted. Therefore they consumed nearly 700,000 men in a time when their corresponding intake did not exceed 150,000. Here then was the wearing down which, coming at the moment when the German national spirit was enfeebled by its exertions during four years and by the cumulative effects of the blockade, led to the German retreat on the Western Front; to the failure to make an effective withdrawal to the Antwerp-Meuse line with all the bargaining possibilities that this afforded, and to the sudden final collapse of German resistance in November, 1918.

[1] *Military Effort*, p. 62.
[2] Including the quiet month of July.

The Moral Factor.

But, it will be said, numerical attrition is not the only test, there is moral attrition which wears down the will power of an enemy who is constantly being attacked. He has to yield ground; he loses prisoners, guns, and trophies; he sees the strongest defences stormed; his battle line is constantly receding. It is this experience which wears him out in spite of the fact that he is killing two or often three assailants for each of his own men slain. It may be conceded that the ordeal of the defending troops in modern warfare is no less trying than that of the attacker. But after all there is no greater stimulus to the soldier in his agony than the knowledge of the loss he is inflicting on his foe. Crouched by his machine gun amid the awful bombardment he sees long lines mowed down, wave after wave, in hundreds and in thousands. He knows how few and far between are the defenders, he sees how many are their targets. With every attack repulsed he gains confidence, and when at last he is overwhelmed there are others behind him who know what is happening and which side is suffering most.

But let us test the theory of moral attrition also by the facts. Can it be disputed that the confidence of the German armies was increased as well as their relative numerical strength by the repulse of the British and French at Loos and Champagne in 1915? Did these battles induce them to weaken in any way their pressure upon Russia? Was it not during these very battles that German divisions conquered Serbia and overran the Balkans? Was not the German High Command at the height of the Somme offensive able to withdraw more than a dozen divisions from the various fronts to strike down Roumania? Which army exulted over the Nivelle offensive in 1917? Who emerged with the greatest confidence from the prolonged fighting which followed the Battle

of Arras? What were the relative positions of the British and German Armies at the end of Paschendaele—the British exhausted, shot to pieces, every division having to be reduced from thirteen to ten battalions; the Germans training, resting, gathering their reinforcements from Russia for a greater effort than any they had yet made?

The General Conclusion.

It is certain, surveying the war as a whole, that the Germans were strengthened relatively by every Allied offensive —British or French—launched against them, until the summer of 1918. Had they not squandered their strength in Ludendorff's supreme offensive in 1918, there was no reason why they should not have maintained their front in France practically unaltered during the whole of the year, and retreated at their leisure during the winter no farther than the Meuse.

But, it will be said, if the conditions over a prolonged period are such that all offensives are equally injurious to the attacker, how then is war to be waged? Are both sides to sit down with enormous armies year after year looking at each other, each convinced that whoever attacks will be the loser? Is this the sterile conclusion to which the argument tends? What positive courses should have been adopted? No one need go so far as to say that every Allied offensive could have been avoided. Indeed, there were at least five examples of short sudden "set piece" attacks—the opening of the Battle of Arras, the capture of the Messines Ridge, the French recaptures of Fort Douaumont and of Malmaison, and the first day's battle of Cambrai—which in themselves were brilliant events.

All of these, if they had ended with the fruits of the initial surprise, would have been more costly in men as well as in repute to the Germans than to the Allies. It is indeed by such episodes that the prestige of an "active defensive" might have been maintained. But the question is whether it was wise policy to seek and pursue prolonged offensives on the largest scale in order to wear down the enemy by attrition; whether instead of seeking the offensive ourselves in France, both British and French ought not consistently on all occasions to have endeavoured to compel the enemy to attack. If our whole strategy and tactics had been directed to that end, would not the final victory have been sooner won?

Manœuvre and Surprise.

Once the enemy was committed to the attack we could have exacted a cruel forfeit. It would have been his part, not ours, to crunch the barbed wire and gorge machine guns with the noblest sacrifices of youth. And need the tale have ended there? The use of force for the waging of war is not to be regulated simply by firm character and text-book maxims. Craft, foresight, deep comprehension of the verities, not only local but general; stratagems, devices, manœuvres, all of these on the grand scale are demanded from the chiefs of great armies.

Suppose we—both French and British —have trained our armies behind the trench line to a high standard of flexible manœuvring efficiency; suppose we have permanently fortified with concrete and every modern device those portions of the front where we cannot retreat; suppose we have long selected and shrewdly weakened those portions where we could afford to give 20 or 30 kilometres of ground; suppose we lure the enemy to attack there and make great pockets and bulges in a thin and yielding front, and then, just as he thinks himself pressing on to final victory, strike with independent counter-offensive on the largest scale and with deeply planned railways, not at his fortified trench line, but at the flanks of a moving, quivering line of battle! Are there not combinations here which at every stage would sell ground only subject to the full blood tax, and finally offer to brave, fresh, well-trained troops the opportunities of sudden and glorious victory?

And why should the view be limited to the theatre in which the best and largest armies happen to face each other? Sea power, railway communications,

foreign policy, present the means of finding new flanks outside the area of deadlock. Mechanical science offers on the ground, in the air, on every coast, from the forge or from the laboratory, boundless possibilities of novelty and surprise. Suppose for instance the war power represented by the 450,000 French and British casualties in the Champagne-Loos battle of 1915 had been used to force the Dardanelles or to combine the Balkan States!

The "Side Shows."

Let us, to cultivate a sense of proportion, digress for a moment from the Western Front to the "side shows" of the war—many of them in themselves ill-judged—in order to measure the distribution of our total war power. A calculation has been made by the War Office and published in *The Military Effort*[1] on the basis, not of course of casualties, but of the men employed in any theatre multiplied by the number of days so employed. From this the following proportions are derived, taking the effort at the Dardanelles as the unit.

[1] p. 742 *et seq.*

MAN-DAYS.
(*Officers Excluded*)

Dardanelles	1·00
Salonica	6·40
North Russia	·08
Palestine	12·20
Mesopotamia	11·80
East Africa	8·20
France	73·00

And is there not also a virtue in "saving up"? We never gave ourselves the chance. We had to improvise our armies in face of the enemy. The flower of the nation, its manhood, its enterprise, its brains were all freely given. But there never was found the time to train and organize these elements before they were consumed. From the priceless metal successive half-sharpened, half-tempered weapons were made, were used and broken as soon



Photo: Manuel.

TO THE FRENCH DEFENDERS OF VERDUN.

The French losses at Verdun, particularly during the German offensive of February to June, 1916, were very heavy, and, as already stated in the text, reached the great figure of 442,000, including wounded, missing and prisoners. The Memorial and cemetery shown here mark the last resting-place of over 40,000 French soldiers killed in this sector.

as they were fashioned, and then replaced by others similarly unperfected. The front had to be defended, the war had to be waged, but there was surely no policy in eagerly *seeking* offensives with immature formations or during periods when no answer to the machine gun existed. Suppose that the British Army sacrificed upon the Somme, the finest we ever had, had been preserved, trained and developed to its full strength till the summer of 1917, till perhaps 3,000 tanks were ready, till an overwhelming artillery was prepared, till a scientific method of continuous advance had been devised, till the apparatus was complete, might not a decisive result have been achieved at one supreme stroke?

Photo: Central Press.

A VILLAGE MEMORIAL.

An Armistice Day scene in an English village where, as in hundreds of other towns and villages up and down the country, the men of 1914–18 have not been forgotten.

The Limits of Responsibility.

It will be said—What of the Allies—what of Russia—what of Italy, would they have endured so long, while France and Britain perfected their plans and accumulated their power? But if direct aid had come to Russia through the destruction of Turkey, and to Italy through the marshalling of the Balkans against Austria, might not both these States have been spared the disasters to which they were in fact exposed? And is there any use in fighting a prolonged offensive in which the attacker suffers without strategic gain nearly double the loss of the defenders?

How does the doing of an unwise, costly and weakening act help an Ally? Is not any temporary relief to him of pressure at the moment paid for by him with compound interest in the long run? What is the sense of attacking only to be defeated: or of "wearing down the enemy" by being worn down more than twice as fast oneself? The uncontrollable momentum of war, the inadequacy of unity and leadership among Allies, the tides of national passion, nearly always *force* improvident action upon Governments or Commanders. Allowance must be made for the limits of their knowledge and power. The British commanders were throughout deeply influenced by the French mood and situation. But do not let us obscure the truth. Do not found conclusions upon error. Do not proclaim its melancholy consequences as the perfect model of the art of war or as the triumphant consummation of a great design.

Photo: Photopress.

SOUNDING THE LAST POST AT YPRES.

A simple but impressive ceremony is conducted nightly at the Menin Gate Memorial, when the Last Post is sounded by the Ypres Pompiers. The bugles used are of silver and were presented by the British Legion.

CHAPTER LXXIX

THE BROKEN SPELL

Four Centuries of Persistency—The Pageant of Victory—Rejoicing and Reaction—The Masters of the World—An Armistice Dream : The Rendezvous—Russia—Germany's Opportunity—The New Arm—The New Nobility—Abnormal Conditions—An Unforeseeable Situation—The Shock of Peace—The Broken Spell.

THE conclusion of the Great War raised England to the highest position she has yet attained.

Four Centuries of Persistency.

For the fourth time in four successive centuries she had headed and sustained the resistance of Europe to a military tyranny; and for the fourth time the war had ended leaving the group of small States of the Low Countries, for whose protection England had declared war, in full independence. Spain, the French Monarchy, the French Empire and the German Empire had all overrun and sought to possess or dominate these regions. During 400 years England had withstood them all by war and policy, and all had been defeated and driven out. To that list of mighty Sovereigns and supreme military Lords which already included Philip II, Louis XIV and Napoleon, there could now be added the name of William II of Germany. These four great series of events, directed unswervingly to the same end through so many generations and all crowned with success, constitute a record of persistency and achievement without parallel in the history of ancient or modern times.

But other substantial advantages had been obtained. The menace of the German navy was destroyed and the overweening power of Germany had been for many years definitely set back. The Russian Empire which had been our ally had been succeeded by a revolutionary government which had renounced all claims to Constantinople, and which by its inherent vices and inefficiency could not soon be a serious military danger to India. On the other hand, England was united with her nearest neighbour and oldest enemy—France—by ties of comradeship in suffering and in victory which promised to be both strong and durable. British and United States troops had fought for the first time side by side, and the two great branches of the English-speaking world had begun again to write their history in common. Lastly, the British Empire had stood every shock and strain during the long and frightful world convulsion.

The parliamentary institutions by which the life of the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions found expression had proved themselves as serviceable for waging war as for maintaining freedom and progress in times of peace. The invisible ties of interest, sentiment and tradition which across all the waters of the world united the Empire had proved more effective than the most binding formal guarantees, and armies of half a million Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders had been drawn by these indefinable and often imperceptible attractions across greater distances than any armies had travelled before, to die and conquer for a cause and quarrel which only remotely affected their immediate material safety.

All the peoples and all the creeds of India during the years of crisis had made in their own way a spontaneous demonstration of loyalty, and sustained the war by arms and money on a scale till then unknown. The rebellion in

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

AFTER THE ARMISTICE.

In 1918 the German Army, defeated in the field, was forced to sue for an armistice, and the cessation of hostilities which followed upon the granting of the request enabled the defeated troops to pass back unmolested through their own territory. Here German troops are seen marching through Berlin.

South Africa in 1914 had been repressed by the very Boer generals who had been our most dangerous antagonists in the South African War, and who had signed with us the liberating treaty of Vereeniging. Only in parts of Ireland had there been a failure and a repudiation, and about that there was a lengthy tale to tell.

The Pageant of Victory.

The pageant of victory unrolled itself before the eyes of the British nation. All the Emperors and Kings with whom we had warred had been dethroned, and all their valiant armies were shattered to pieces. The terrible enemy whose might and craft had so long threatened our existence, whose force had destroyed the flower of the British nation, annihilated the Russian Empire and left all our Allies except the United States at the last gasp, lay prostrate at the mercy of the conquerors. The ordeal was over. The peril had been warded off. The slaughter and the sacrifices had not been in vain and were at an end; and the overstrained people in the hour of deliverance gave themselves up for a space to the sensations of triumph. Church and State united in solemn thanksgiving. The whole land made holiday. Triple avenues of captured cannon lined the Mall. Every street was thronged with jubilant men and women. All classes were mingled in universal rejoicing. Feasting, music and illuminations turned the shrouded nights of war into a blazing day. The vast crowds were convulsed with emotions beyond expression; and in Trafalgar Square the joy of the London revellers left enduring marks upon the granite plinth of Nelson's column.

Rejoicing and Reaction.

Who shall grudge or mock these overpowering entrancements? Every

Allied nation shared them. Every victorious capital or city in the five continents reproduced in its own fashion the scenes and sounds of London. These hours were brief, their memory fleeting; they passed as suddenly as they had begun. Too much blood had been spilt. Too much life-essence had been consumed. The gaps in every home were too wide and empty. The shock of an awakening and the sense of disillusion followed swiftly upon the poor rejoicings with which hundreds of millions saluted the achievements of their hearts' desire. There still remained the satisfactions of safety assured, of peace restored, of honour preserved, of the comforts of fruitful industry, of the home-coming of the soldiers; but these were in the background; and with them all there mingled the ache for those who would never come home.

* * * *

Along the British lines in France and Belgium eleven o'clock had produced a reaction revealing the mysterious nature of man. The cannonade was stilled; the armies halted where they stood. Motionless in the silence the soldiers looked at each other with vacant eyes. A sense of awe, of perplexity, and even of melancholy stole coldly upon men who a few moments before had been striding forward in the ardour of hot pursuit. It was as though an abyss had opened before the conquerors' feet.

"Unarm! Eros! The long day's work is done."

The fighting troops seemed for a time incapable of adjusting themselves to the abrupt relaxation of strain. So quiet were the forward camps on the night of victory that one would have thought they belonged to brave men after doing their best at last defeated. This wave of psychological depression passed as quickly as the opposite mood in Britain; and in a few days Home had become the foundation of all desires. But here again were disillusion and hope deferred.

* * * *

On the night of the Armistice I dined

Photo: Copyright.

ARMISTICE DAY IN LONDON, 1918.

Wildly enthusiastic crowds before the gates of Buckingham Palace on the first Armistice Day. The cessation of hostilities was the signal for the release of emotions long held in check. Once more the future, which earlier in the year had seemed without hope, held promise of better times and the return of loved ones whose lives had been almost despaired of. The loyal and enduring citizens of the Empire held high festival.

with the Prime Minister at Downing Street. We were alone in the large room from whose walls the portraits of Pitt and Fox, of Nelson and Wellington, and—perhaps somewhat incongruously—of Washington then looked down. One of the most admirable traits in Mr. Lloyd George's character was his complete freedom at the height of his power, responsibility and good fortune from anything in the nature of pomposity or superior airs. He was always natural and simple. He was always exactly the same to those who knew him well: ready to argue any point, to listen to disagreeable facts even when controversially presented. One could say anything to him, on the terms that he could say anything back. The magnitude and absolute character of the victory induced a subdued and detached state of mind. There was no feeling that the work was done. On the contrary, the realization was strong upon him that a new and perhaps more difficult phase of effort was before him.

My own mood was divided between anxiety for the future and desire to help the fallen foe. The conversation ran on the great qualities of the German people, on the tremendous fight they had made against three-quarters of the world, on the impossibility of rebuilding Europe except with their aid. At that time we thought they were actually starving, and that under the twin pressures of defeat and famine the Teutonic peoples—already in revolution—might slide into the grisly gulf that had already devoured Russia. I suggested that we should immediately, pending further news, rush a dozen ships crammed with provisions into Hamburg. Although the armistice terms enforced the blockade till peace was signed, the Allies had promised to supply what was necessary, and the Prime Minister balanced the project with favouring eye. From outside the songs and cheers of multitudes could be remotely heard like the surf on the shore. We shall see that different sentiments were soon to prevail.

* * * *

The Masters of the World.

On that November evening the three men at the head of Great Britain, the United States and France seemed to be the masters of the world. Behind them stood vast communities organized to the last point, rejoicing in victory and inspired with gratitude and confidence for the chiefs who had led them there. In their hands lay armies of irresistible might, and fleets without whose sanction no vessel crossed the sea upon or beneath the surface. There was nothing wise, right and necessary which they could not in unity decree. And these men had been drawn together across differences of nationality and interest and across distances on land and sea by the comradeship of struggle against a dreaded foe. Together they had reached the goal. Victory absolute and incomparable was in their hands. What would they do with it?

But the hour was fleeting. Unperceived by the crowd as by the leaders, the spell by which they had ruled was already breaking. Other forms of authority would presently come into play and much might yet be done. But for the supreme tasks, for the best solutions, for the most serviceable policies NOW was the only time.

These men must come together. Geographical and constitutional obstacles are mere irrelevancies. They must meet face to face and settle swiftly after discussion the largest practical questions opened by the total defeat of the enemy. They must relegate to a lower plane all feelings of passion roused in conflict, all considerations of party politics in the countries they represent, all personal desire to continue in power. They must seek only the best arrangements possible for the brave nations that had followed them, for a tormented Europe and an awe-struck world.

If they could come together they would face realities and discern the proportion of events. The German, Austrian and Turkish Empires and all the mighty forces that had held the victors in check so long had yielded themselves helpless and disarmed. But the task was unfinished. Other foes

remained in the field; other impulsions challenged the authority of the victors and barred a fair settlement of the world's affairs. Well might they have bethought themselves of the Roman motto "Spare the conquered and war down the proud."

An Armistice Dream.

The reader may perhaps at this point be willing to study some speculative questions in a purely imaginary form. Let us then for a few moments leave the region of "What happened" for those of "What might have happened." Let us dream one of the many Armistice dreams. It is only a dream.

* * * *

The victory produced an astonishing effect upon President Wilson. His responsibility and glory lifted him above the peace-time partisanship in which so much of his life had been lived. At the same time it exercised a sobering effect upon his judgment of foreign countries and their affairs. As soon as he received the joint message of Lloyd George and Clémenceau proposing a meeting in the Isle of Wight (or perhaps it was Jersey) before the end of November, he realized that he must go, and whatever had happened in the past he must go as the representative of the whole of the United States. He asked himself what his position would be in history if he pledged the faith of his country without warrant, or if what he promised in his country's name was not made good. So, in the very flush of success, he appealed to the Senate of the United States to fortify him with a delegation of their strongest men, having due regard to the Republican majority in that body. "I cannot tell," he said, "how party affairs will develop in the next few years, but nothing compares with the importance of our bearing our part in the peace as our soldiers have borne theirs in the war. We have been drawn against our wish, against our whole tradition, into the affairs of Europe. We have not entered without reason, we will not quit without honour."

Clémenceau said (to himself): "I have got to think of the long safety of France. Not by our own exertions alone but by miracles we have been preserved. The greatest nations in the world have come to our aid and we are delivered out of the deadly peril. Never again can we hope for such aid. A thousand years will not see such fortunate conjunctures for France. Now is the appointed time for making friends with Germany and ending the quarrel of so many centuries. We, the weaker, have got them down; we, the conquerors, will lift them up."

As for Lloyd George, he said: "History will judge my record and will not find it unworthy. In order to win through in this war I have destroyed every political foundation by which I rose and on which I stood. But after all, life is a brief span, and all that matters is not to fall below the level of events upon the greatest occasions. The British people have good memories, and I shall trust to them."

The Rendezvous.

So these three men met within three weeks of the Armistice in the Isle of Wight (or was it Jersey?) and settled together the practical steps which should be taken to set the world on its feet again in an enduring peace.

Meanwhile the Delegation from the Senate of the United States proceeded direct to Paris and visited their armies at the front.

When the three men met together they found themselves in complete agreement that a League of Nations must be set up not as a Super-State but as a Super-Function above all the valiant and healthful nations of the world. But they saw that they could only plant a tree which would grow strong enough as the years passed by, and at their first meeting, which might have occurred on December 1, 1918, they agreed that a League of Nations must embrace all the dominating races of the world. This was their first Resolution. Wilson said, "I can answer for the United States, because I have behind me both the great

SOME GENERAL OFFIC

Left to right: Sir W. R. Birdwood; General Smuts, S. Africa; General Botha, S. Africa; Horne; Sir G. F. Milne; Sir Henry Wilson; Sir A. H. Russell, New Zealand; Lord Plumer; Allenby; Sir W. R. Marshall; Sir A. W. Currie, Canada; Lord Cavan; Sir C. M. Dobell. by Sir Abe Bailey,

parties, the Republicans as well as my own Democrats." Lloyd George said: "I speak for the British Empire and am sustained by the Prime Ministers of all the self-governing Dominions; and moreover both Mr. Asquith and Mr. Bonar Law have consented to support me till the settlement is made, when it is my inflexible resolve to withdraw (I will not say for ever) from public affairs."

Clémenceau said: "I am seventy-five years old and I am France."

Russia.

So they said: "It is no use setting

National Portrait Gallery, London.

OF THE GREAT WAR.

Lord Byng; Lord Rawlinson; Sir H. T. Lukin, S. Africa; Sir J. Monash, Australia; Lord
Sir J. S. Cowans; Lord Haig; Lord Ypres; Sir W. Robertson; Sir F. S. Maude; Lord
(From the painting by Sir John S. Sargent, R.A., presented to the National Portrait Gallery
Bart., K.C.M.G.)

up a League of Nations without Russia, and Russia is still outside our jurisdiction. The Bolsheviks do not represent Russia, they represent an international conception of human affairs entirely foreign and indeed hostile to anything we know of civilization; but the Russians stood by us in the worst of the war and we owe it to them that they have a fair chance of national self-expression."

They then agreed to their second Resolution: *The Russian people must be enabled to choose a national assembly before whom the present issues can be laid.*

So they sent for Marshal Foch and asked him, "What can you do about Russia?"

Foch replied: "There is no great difficulty and there need be no serious fighting. A few hundred thousand American troops who are longing to play a part in events, together with volunteer units from the British (I am afraid he said 'English') and French armies can easily with the modern railways obtain control of Moscow; and anyhow we hold already three parts of Russia. If you wish your authority to embrace the late Russian Empire for the purpose of securing the free expression of the Russian wish, you have only to give me the order. How easy this task will be to me and Haig and Pershing compared with restoring the battle of the 21st March or breaking the Hindenburg Line!"

Germany's Opportunity.

But the statesmen said: "This is not a military proposition only, it is world politics. To lay hands on Russia, although no doubt physically practicable, is morally too big a task for the victors alone. If we are to accomplish this it can only be with the aid of Germany. Germany knows more about Russia than anyone else. She is at this moment occupying as sole guarantee of civilized life the richest and most populous parts of Russia. Germany let Lenin loose on Russia. Ought she not to play her part in clearing up this whole eastern battlefield like the others?" And they said, "This will be the opportunity for Germany. This will enable a proud and faithful people to avoid all humiliation in defeat. They will slide by an almost unconscious transition from cruel strife to natural co-operation with all of us.

Photo: E.N.A.

THE KAISER AT THE DUTCH FRONTIER.

On November 9, 1918, Prince Max of Baden announced that the Kaiser and the Crown Prince had renounced all claim to the throne. On the following day the monarch who, four years previously had been all powerful, slipped unostentatiously over the Dutch frontier to face a long period of exile. In the photograph reproduced above, the Kaiser (*fourth from the left*) is seen standing on the platform of the frontier station.

Nothing is possible in Europe without Germany and everything will be easy with her."

Then they passed the Third Resolution: *That Germany shall be invited to aid in the liberation of Russia and the rebuilding of Eastern Europe.*

But Foch said: "How will you guarantee the life of France?" and the President and Mr. Lloyd George in their turn replied: "Within the limits of the Fourteen Points the life of France will be guaranteed by the English-speaking peoples throughout the world and by all the states and races associated with them."

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

BRITISH SENTRY AT COLOGNE.

The British Army made its formal entry into Cologne on December 12, 1918, although cavalry patrols entered the city six days previously. The Rhine bridgeheads were taken over on December 12. A sentry is seen above on duty by the riverside at Cologne.

Then, having settled all vital matters, the three chiefs turned for a moment to the expenses of the war. But this presented no difficulty. Evidently only one principle could rule, namely, *Equality of Sacrifice.* There were three factors to be fused,—loss of blood, loss of treasure, and on the other hand—rated very high—acquisition of territory. They laughed a little at the idea of appraising life in terms of money and deducting territorial gains therefrom. But they said: "Though money is no doubt an inadequate token, it is the handiest we have in our present state of development. After all we only require a mathematical formula which experts can work out at the same time they are calculating the reparations of Germany and the defeated countries. Much has been destroyed that can never be repaired, but if we all stand together the burdens even on the vanquished need not be very great. We will have a world bank-note on the double security of Victory and Reconciliation. To the support of this, all will contribute on a basis which will recognize the difference between winning and losing. It might perhaps eventually become the foundation of a universal currency. Anyhow, so long as we are agreed upon the principle we can easily have the applications worked out."

Then they went back to the League of Nations plan. No doubt once all the greatest nations were included, their moral force alone was an immense security for peace and justice. An almost universal trade and financial boycott, and total exclusion from the seas, were additional severe deterrents upon an aggressor. Credit, food, munitions were strong defences for the attacked. But surely the august authority of the League must not shrink in the last resort from the use of force!

The New Arm.

It is not known which of the three chiefs first conceived the master-plan by which the peace of the world was to be so well defended that national armaments would fall into increasing neglect. But history records the fact that on the second day of conversation it was decided that the new instrument of world-order should be armed with the new weapons of science. Nations great or small might, if they wished, for their own reassurance have battleships and cruisers, cavalry, infantry and artillery, and spend their money as they chose on these; but war from the air and war by chemical means were reserved to League and to international authority alone.

The New Nobility.

At the moment when science had produced weapons destructive of the safety and even the life of whole cities and populations, weapons whose action was restricted by no frontiers and could be warded off neither by fleets nor armies, a new instrument of human government would be created to wield them. Conversely, just as this new instrument was coming into being, the new weapons which it required were ready to its hand. But with that practical spirit which shone in these three experienced statesmen, they proclaimed at once the principle and its gradual application. Every state signatory of the Covenant would in the first instance dedicate to the League so many squadrons of aeroplanes. From these a new force would be formed.

"We are reviving, in fact," said Clèmenceau, "the old Orders of chivalry like the Knights Templars and the Knights of Malta to guard civilisation against barbarism." Here he made a remark of a somewhat irreverent character which has escaped the chronicler. "There is certainly no lack," said the President, "of knights whose renown is deathless to found the Order. French, British, American, German, Italian aces have performed exploits for which there is no counterpart in human annals. Let these be the new nobility." "At any rate," said Lloyd George, "they are better than the profiteers who are sitting on my doorstep every day."

So it was agreed that in principle the power of the air should be reserved to the League of Nations for the purpose of maintaining world peace against aggression. No absolute veto was placed in the first instance upon national air forces, but the whole emphasis of the policy of the Great Powers would be laid upon building up the International Air Force, with the intention that as general confidence grew only commercial aviation should be developed nationally, and the military aspect should be reserved to international authority alone.

They thought the question of chemical warfare too difficult to settle at the moment further than by a universal decree forbidding any individual nation to practise it. "Perhaps, however," it was added, "some day recalcitrant nations will be punished by being made to sneeze and if all else fails, to vomit."

As they were going to bed on the third night of their talks someone inquired, "What will happen if our peoples will not take our advice?" Then they all said, "Let them get somebody else. We shall have done our bit."

It was at this moment that the spell broke. The illusion of power vanished. I awoke from my Armistice dream, and we all found ourselves in the rough, dark, sour and chilly waters in which we are swimming still.

* * * *

Abnormal Conditions.

Great allowances must be made for

the behaviour of all the peoples and of all their governments—victors and vanquished alike—as they emerged from the furnace of fifty-two months' world war. The conditions were outside all previous experience. At the outbreak with all its unknown and measureless possibilities the flood of crisis flowed along channels which for some distance had already been prepared. The naval and military leaders and the staffs behind them assumed the immediate direction; and they had plans which, whether good or bad, were certainly worked out in the utmost detail. These plans of scientific havoc were put into execution; and the second series of events arose out of their clashings.

Every War Office and every Admiralty emitted laconic orders, and for a while the consequences followed almost automatically. The immense forces of destruction, long gathered and stored, were released. When a battleship is launched the operation is short and simple. A few speeches are made; a few prayers are said; a bottle of champagne is broken; a few wedges are knocked away; and thousands of tons of steel swiftly gathering momentum glide irrevocably into the water. Very different are the problems of bringing that same ship, shattered in action, ripped by torpedoes, crowded with wounded, half full of water, safely back to harbour through storm and mist and adverse tides.

Of course, for more than a year before the war ended plans had been prepared for demobilization and for reconstruction. Men had been withdrawn from the conduct of the war to study and elaborate the measures consequent upon an assumed successful peace. But they were not in any sphere the dominant figures. All other eyes were riveted on the war. The whole mind of the state, every energy which it could command, were concentrated on victory and self-preservation. This other field of interest—hypothetical, contingent, remote—was but dimly lighted. What had we to do with peace while we did not know whether we should not be destroyed? Who could think of reconstruction while the whole world was being hammered to pieces, or of demobilization when the sole aim was to hurl every man and every shell into the battle?

An Unforeseeable Situation.

Moreover, the governing minds among the Allies never expected the war to end in 1918. Behind the advancing armies all thought and preparation were concentrated upon the spring campaign on the Meuse or on the Rhine. It was to be the greatest campaign of all. More millions of men, more thousands of cannons, more tens of thousands of shells a week; aeroplanes by the hundred thousand and tanks by the ten thousand; new deadly engines, inventions and poisons of diabolical quality applied upon a gigantic scale; all were moving forward under the ceaseless impulse of the whole effective manhood and womanhood of every warring state. And then suddenly peace! The ramparts against which the united battering-rams of the strongest part of mankind were thundering disintegrated, leaving behind them only a cloud of dust into which the Allies and all their apparatus toppled headlong forward and lay sprawling.

The British Empire, apart from its navy, had only come gradually into the war. The armies had grown up division by division. The front had broadened a few miles at a time. The transformation of industry had taken years. Compulsion for national service and all the grinding codes of wartime had come into force by almost insensible degrees. We were in fact just approaching our maximum potential in every material sphere. The limits of our war effort in quantity and quality were everywhere in sight. How long those efforts could have been maintained at the highest pitch is unknowable, for at the culminating point every form of resistance simultaneously collapsed.

The Shock of Peace.

The dire need and the high cause which had cemented the alliance of twenty-seven States and held their workers and their warriors in intensifying

comradeship, vanished in a flash. The scythe that shore away the annual swathes of youth stopped at the very feet of a new generation. Those who had braced themselves for the ordeal gazed stupefied rather than thankful at the carnage from which they had been withheld. The current of man's will and of his fate was suddenly, not merely stopped, but reversed. Therefore, I hold that for us at any rate the transition to peace was more violent than the entry into war, and that it involved a more complete and universal revolution of our minds.

The men at the head of the victorious States were subjected to tests of the most trying kind. They seemed all-powerful: but their power was departing. Although it was departing, the appearance of it remained for a space: and it might perhaps be recalled by great action. But time was paramount. With every day's delay it became more difficult to gather the fruits of victory. With every day the power not only of statesmen, but of the Allied nations themselves, and their unity, must decline. Their armies must come home; their electorates must regain their sway. Jealousies, factions, revenges long pent up now advanced on every side. Yet every day was so full of important and urgent business, and so disturbed by jostling personalities and events, that human nature could not cope with the task. Was it strange that these men should yield themselves to the illusion of power, to the relief of victory and to the press of business? Was it strange that they should wish to draw breath before beginning new tasks? They remained for some time under the impression that the same strenuous controls would continue in other forms and that equal powers and sanctions would be available for overcoming the new difficulties. In fact, however, just as the ship was coming into port more than half the rudder had dropped off without the men at the helm perceiving it.

The Broken Spell.

The former peace-time structure of

Photo: Central News.

THE SURRENDER OF THE GERMAN FLEET.

On November 21, 1918, the German Fleet surrendered. Admiral Beatty is seen here on the bridge of H.M.S. *Queen Elizabeth* watching the historic spectacle as the German ships came on, their movements directed by a light cruiser, H.M.S. *Cardiff*, of the 6th Light Cruiser Squadron.

Photo: G.P.U.

THE CAPTIVE BATTLE-CRUISERS.

The German battle-cruisers as seen from H.M.S. *Seymour*. The names of the surrendered ships in their order from left to right are : *Seydlitz*, *Moltke*, *Hindenburg*, *Derfflinger*, and *Von Der Tann*.

Photo: G.P.U.

THE FORTY-NINE SURRENDERED DESTROYERS.

The destroyers handed over by the Germans, forty-nine in number, made an imposing array. Surrounded by one hundred and fifty British destroyers they were complete encased. So vast was the area covered that it was impossible to see them all from any one position.

society had for more than four years been superseded and life had been raised to a strange intensity by the war spell. Under that mysterious influence, men and women had been appreciably exalted above death and pain and toil. Nothing had been too hard to bear or too precious to cast away. Unities and comradeships had become possible between men and classes and nations and grown stronger while the hostile pressure and the common cause endured.

But now the spell was broken; too late for some purposes, too soon for others, and too suddenly for all! Every victorious country subsided to its old levels and its previous arrangements; but these latter were found to have fallen into much disrepair, their fabric was weakened and disjointed, they seemed narrow and out of date. The boundless hopes that had cheered the soldiers and the peoples in their tribulations died swiftly away. The vision of a sunlit world redeemed by valour, where work would be less and its recompense more, where Justice and Freedom reigned together through centuries of unbroken peace—that vision which had flickered over the battlefields and beckoned from behind the German or Turkish trenches, comforting the soldier's heart and fortifying his strength, was soon replaced by cold, grey reality.

How could it have been otherwise? By what process could the slaughter of ten million men and the destruction of one-third of the entire savings of the greatest nations of the world have ushered in a Golden Age? A cruel disillusionment was at hand for all. All men, all women, all soldiers, all citizens were looking forward to some great expansion, and there lay before them nothing but a sharp contraction; a contraction in material conditions for the masses; a contraction in scope and command for those who had raised themselves by their qualities—and they too were numbered by the hundred thousand—to stations of responsibility.

With the passing of the spell there passed also, just as the new difficulties were at their height, much of the exceptional powers of guidance and control. The triumphant statesmen, the idols of the masses, acclaimed as saviours of their countries, were still robed with the glamour of war achievement and shod with the sanctions of Democracy. But their hour was passing; their work was almost done, and Wilson, Clémenceau and Lloyd George were soon to follow into retirement or adversity the Kings and Emperors they had dethroned.

To the faithful, toil-burdened masses the victory was so complete that no further effort seemed required. Germany had fallen and with her the world combination that had crushed her. Authority was dispersed; the world unshackled; the weak became the strong; the sheltered became the aggressive; the contrast between victors and vanquished tended continually to diminish. A vast fatigue dominated collective action. Though every subversive element endeavoured to assert itself, revolutionary rage like every other form of psychic energy burnt low. Through all its five acts the drama has run its course; the light of history is switched off, the world stage dims, the actors shrivel, the chorus sinks. The war of the giants has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun.

CHAPTER LXXX

DEMOS

Ministry of Munitions Problems—Work, Wages and Raw Material—Munitions Demobilization—The War Unity—The Revival of Party Politics—Mr. Lloyd George and the Liberals—The Peace Conference and its Delegates—The General Election—The Hard Line—The National Temper—"Hang the Kaiser"—"Make them Pay"—Methods of Payment—How much?—Letters to Constituents—The Prime Minister and the Indemnity—The Result of the Election—Its After Effects.

WE must first of all unravel our own domestic affairs guided by the thread of personal narrative.

Ministry of Munitions Problems.

On the afternoon of November 11 I assembled the Munitions Council and directed their attention to the immediate demobilization of British industry. The problems were intricate and perplexing. Nearly all the mines and workshops of Britain were in our hands. We controlled and were actually managing all the greatest industries. We regulated the supply of all their raw materials. We organized the whole distribution of their finished products. Nearly five million persons were directly under our orders, and we were interwoven on every side with every other sphere of the national economic life.

Certainly the organization and machinery of which we disposed was powerful and flexible in an extraordinary degree. The able business men among us, each the head of a large group of departments, had now been working for a year and a half in a kind of industrial cabinet. They were accustomed to unexpected changes enforced by the shifting fortunes of war. Four or five of them, representing the departments involved in any project, would put their heads together in an intimate and helpful manner; and in a very few hours—at most in a few days—orders would be given which worked smoothly downwards through innumerable ramifications. There was very little in the productive sphere they could not at this time actually do. A requisition, for instance, for half a million houses would not have seemed more difficult to comply with than those we were already in process of executing for a hundred thousand aeroplanes, or twenty thousand guns, or the medium artillery of the American army, or two million tons of projectiles.

But a new set of conditions began to rule from eleven o'clock onwards. The money-cost, which had never been considered by us to be a factor capable of limiting the supply of the armies, asserted a claim to priority from the moment the fighting stopped. Nearly every manifestation of discontent on the part of the munition workers had in the end been met by increases of wages—("Let 'em have it and let's get the stuff")—and the wage rates now stood at levels never witnessed in England before or since.

The intensity of the exertions evoked by the national danger far exceeded the ordinary capacities of human beings. All were geared up to an abnormal pitch. Once the supreme incentive had disappeared, everyone became conscious of the severity of the strain. A vast and general relaxation and descent to the standards of ordinary life was imminent. No community could have gone on using up treasure and life energy at such a pace. Most of all was the strain apparent in the higher ranks of the brain workers. They had carried on uplifted by the psychological stimulus which

was now to be removed. "I can work till I drop" was sufficient while the cannon thundered and armies marched. But now it was peace; and on every side exhaustion, nervous and physical, unfelt or unheeded before, became evident.

Work, Wages and Raw Material.

The first question was what to do with the five million munition workers whose work and wages had to be provided week by week. It was clear that the majority of these would very soon have to find new occupations, and many hundreds of thousands would have to change their place of abode. More than one and a half million women were employed in the war industries, and had proved themselves capable of making nearly every conceivable commodity and of earning wages on piece work far in excess of what the strongest men had earned before the war. If the soldiers returning from the front were to find employment in any of the known industries, all these had in a few months to quit the factory for the home. How would they feel about this transformation of their life and outlook?

In the meanwhile the main situation was still uncertain. An armistice is not a peace. The impression of the German might was still strong upon all of us. No orders of demobilization had been issued or were imminent. At the best there would be an interval of months before large numbers of soldiers could return. Enormous programmes of war material were in every stage of completion. Were they all to be stopped at a stroke? Was a gun or a tank or an aeroplane, almost ready, to be scrapped as it stood? Obviously no new raw materials should be consumed. The tap could be turned off at the source. But the outflow of what was already pouring through the vast system could not be sealed up without throwing five million persons simultaneously into idleness. Could they be left without wages? Could they, on the other hand, be paid their inflated wages for doing nothing, while the armies were still on guard abroad on only soldiers' pay? Were there no dangers to social order in leaving these great numbers, whether paid or unpaid, to drift aimlessly about the cities and arsenals without any sense of guidance from the organization which hitherto had gripped them all?

Fortunately an immense amount of work had been done. My predecessors, Mr. Montagu and Dr. Addison, had in 1916 and 1917 studied the subject. In the spring of 1917 the latter had appointed a Reconstruction Department to collect information, and in July this had been expanded into a Ministry of Reconstruction of which Dr. Addison became the head. This Ministry had the prime duty of making plans for demobilization. For the special question of the liquidation of war contracts and the transition to peace production I had appointed in November, 1917, a standing committee of the Munitions Council under Sir James Stevenson. This body, with numerous sub-committees, had pursued its task in spite of all the distractions of war and a massive report had been completed by the beginning of October, 1918. The whole field had therefore been surveyed and we were able to take the decisions which the situation required with knowledge of what each step involved and how it could be carried out.

Munitions Demobilization.

Compromise solutions were adopted. There was to be no immediate general discharge of munition workers; all who desired to withdraw from industry or to leave for any reason and all who could be absorbed elsewhere were at once to be released. Holidays were lavishly given. The production of guns and ammunition, aircraft and explosives was to be reduced by the abolition of overtime, by the suspension of systems of payment by results, and by a reduction of work hours to half the normal week. An elaborate scheme of unemployment donation prepared beforehand mitigated loss of wages. We were able to issue these instructions the same afternoon. They involved, however, the ruling that war material more than 60 per cent. advanced would generally be finished. The rest with all raw material on the spot was to be dispersed for removal

Imperial War Museum.

THE ROAD FROM ARRAS TO BAPAUME.

This grim impression of what was prior to the Great War a part of the smiling countryside of France is by C. R. W. Nevinson, the first artist to make a reputation by his original and intense interpretation of scenes on the battlefields. The picture is reproduced here because it recalls to mind the France of the later war years, when trees, grass, homes, indeed every distinguishing mark on the landscape, had been swept away, and the once pleasant scene transformed into what was practically desert.

Photo: Photopress.

THE MENIN GATE: 1914.

The town of Ypres, in the pre-war days one of the most fascinating in Europe, has passed through many stirring times. Of great antiquity, surrounded by ramparts and a moat, she has on many occasions felt the weight of an invader's heel. Besieged and burnt by Ghent, terrorised by the Spaniards, and four times taken and sacked by the French, she yet continued to provide the world with linen, as the word diaper, a contraction of *d'Ypres*, confirms.

Photo: Photopress.

DURING THE GREAT WAR.

The year 1914 was to bring further disaster upon Ypres. Standing in the path of determined German armies intent upon reaching the Channel Ports, she was exposed to a cannonade which, roaring unceasingly for nearly four years, reduced the town to ruins. This photograph shows the Menin Gate towards the end of the war.

Photo: Photopress.

THE MENIN GATE TO-DAY.

The Menin Gate Memorial, which has already been described in this work, and which commemorates officers and men who fell in the Ypres Salient, "but to whom the fortunes of war denied the known and honoured burial given to their comrades in death," serves also the purpose of recalling the fact that no man of the invading army passed through the streets save as a prisoner of war.

by sea or rail and diverted to its probable peace-time destination. Thus for many weeks after the war was over we continued to disgorge upon the gaping world masses of artillery and military materials of every kind. It was certainly waste, but perhaps it was a prudent waste.

These arrangements worked smoothly, and although the Ministry of Munitions was twice visited by mass deputations of ten or twelve thousand persons from Woolwich and other great establishments in London, no serious hardships or discontents were caused. Large numbers of war volunteers employed as "dilutees" and a considerable proportion of women workers dispersed to their homes in a steady flow. Day after day we continued to liberate industry. A catalogue of the commodities successively freed from control in their prearranged order would be an instructive treatise on modern industry. But I forbear. In two or three months the Ministry of Munitions had dispossessed itself of the greater part of its extraordinary powers and had cleared the path of peace-time industry. Credit is due to the group of able business men whose thought and action ensured this swift transition.

* * * *

The War Unity.

The removal of the paramount war motive made men conscious not only of exhaustion but of party politics. The gale no longer raged, and as the tide went out all the rocks and shallows, the stranded wreckage, the lobster-pots and local sewage outfalls became visible in detail from the esplanade. The outbreak of hostilities had found the British Isles plunged in an extremity of faction, not only fantastic but full of danger. The Conservative and Liberal masses, each under the impulse of their own

Irish party—Orange or Green—charged against each other in hearty vigour and increasing disregard of national consequences. In Ireland both sides had begun unlawfully to arm and organize for lethal conflict ; and it was cheerfully supposed that, even if actual bloodshed was confined to Irish soil, each side in Ireland would be reinforced from their respective partisans in Great Britain. The ordinary party strife between Right and Left provided a well-sustained accompaniment to the Irish chorus. In the midst of these festivities Armageddon arrived.

Under the new spell all political values and relationships were instantly transmuted ; all that was deep and permanent in our island life became dominant : and it could then be perceived, had there been leisure for moralizing, how many times over what we felt and cherished in common exceeded the importance of our quarrels. In the space at most of a few days party bitterness disappeared. The Conservative leaders hastened to support the Ministers they had so long denounced. The rival party machines became one pervasive recruiting agency. Except for a handful of unlucky politicians who committed themselves to pacifism before the issues were plain, all opposition to the war was obliterated. Ulster sent the smuggled rifles, on which she had believed her life depended, to arm the Belgians. The two Redmonds and the whole Nationalist Party proclaimed the accession of Ireland to the cause of the Allies ; Dr. Clifford and the leaders of the Free churches manned the platforms of war meetings ; the overwhelming majority of Trade Unionists earnestly endorsed the national action.

In the main all these forces had continued throughout the whole struggle, especially in its worst periods, in resolute and indissoluble accord. Neither the shortcomings of Ministers and governments, nor military mistakes and disasters, nor the long weariness of years of slaughter, nor disappointment, nor just ground of complaint, nor loss, nor hardship had led to any falling away among those who had plighted their faith. They had endured together to the end. But now the end had come, and everywhere men drew breath and looked around them.

The Revival of Party Politics.

Since May, 1915, the Coalition Governments had been in power, but the second Coalition of 1916 differed significantly from its predecessors. The Conservative Party, although in a large minority in the House of Commons, had obtained an obvious and decisive ascendancy. Mr. Lloyd George had secured as partners in his Government the official representatives of the Labour Party ; but the leaders of the Liberal Party as well as a substantial majority of its members were under Mr. Asquith's control. The Liberal Ministers and members who adhered to the new Prime Minister might speak in the name of their individual constituencies but could not claim official and collective party status.

No one had troubled about this during the war. Whatever differences had appeared in the House of Commons had been due not to party feelings but to divergent personal loyalties and for the rest were solely concerned with the question of how best to procure victory. From the hour of the Armistice, however, the situation in the Liberal Party became a matter of practical and urgent concern to the Prime Minister. He had wandered far from the orthodox paths of Liberalism ; he was known to be the main author of conscription ; he had raised his hand with noticeable animus against the conscientious objector ; he had not hesitated in the public need to violate and trample upon Liberal sentiments ; he had driven his old chief, the honoured leader of the Liberal Party, and nearly all his former colleagues from office and from all share in the conduct of the war. They naturally took a different view of his personal contribution to the victory from that of the cheering multitude. They were hostile, competent, extremely well informed and in possession of the party machine.

Mr. Lloyd George and the Liberals.

The one significant division which had been taken against Mr. Lloyd George in war time had revealed one hundred and

nine inveterate party opponents among the Liberal members compared to seventy-three Parliamentary adherents. It was moreover certain that as soon as peace was signed the Labour Ministers would be formally recalled by the Labour Party from further participation in the Government. There remained the Conservative Party, loyal and determined in their support of the Prime Minister, a very strong integral organization, but entirely separate from him. Thus from the moment party politics began to rise again upon the threshold of political consciousness, Mr. Lloyd George's position, at the height of his fame, became one of singular insecurity.

The Peace Conference and its Delegates.

For the moment, however, all eyes were turned upon the approaching Peace Conference, and historical pictures of the Congress of Vienna rose in the political mind. Paris became the centre of the world, and thither as soon as the urgent domestic business could be dispatched all the leading statesmen of all the victorious countries were intending or eager to repair.

The choice before Mr. Lloyd George was not free from embarrassment. His right-hand colleague must obviously be the Conservative leader, Mr. Bonar Law. Mr. Barnes must represent Labour. The limit provisionally imposed upon national delegations for the sake of convenience was three, and it was already complete. But two personages, very different in character and methods, and each with much to give or to withhold, had also to be considered. The first was Lord Northcliffe who, armed with *The Times* in one hand and the ubiquitous *Daily Mail* in the other, judged himself at least the equal of any political leader, and appeared prepared to assert his claims or resent their disregard with a directness scarcely open to a statesman. A general election was imminent, and the wise and helpful behaviour of these great newspapers, obedient as they were to the orders of their proprietor, seemed to the Prime Minister a serious factor. The appointment of Lord Northcliffe as a principal peace delegate over the heads of Mr. Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, and all the Prime Ministers of the British Empire was not, however, to be conceded.

The remaining figure was the leader of the Liberal Party. Mr. Asquith, both at the moment and after his fall from power, had steadily refused to contemplate serving under or even with Mr. Lloyd George; and he and his friends had been accustomed to treat any suggestion of that kind as highly offensive. Nevertheless, in the weeks which immediately followed the victory, it was indicated that he would not be unwilling to join as the head of his party in the national making of a peace. Such a development would in many ways have strengthened the Prime Minister's position. The peace negotiations must last for many months, and the close co-operation between the Prime Minister and the Liberal leader could scarcely have failed to heal the breach between them. Mr. Asquith's own qualities would also have been of inestimable service at the Conference. On the other hand, his inclusion would still further have angered Lord Northcliffe. Weighing all these somewhat ill-assorted considerations, Mr. Lloyd George decided not to increase the size of the delegation beyond the limits already agreed upon with the other Powers.

I have no doubt that from his own point of view his decision was a mistake. He had no real knowledge of the Conservative Party; he must soon expect to lose the Labour Ministers; and here at hand was the opportunity of at once making amends to the chief to whom he had owed so much, and of reuniting the Liberal forces with which alone he could work contentedly in times of peace. But far above all personal and political considerations the association of all parties in the peace treaty was an object of national importance, and no one was more fitted than Mr. Asquith to enrich the councils of the Allies. We should have had a more august delegation, a better treaty and a more friendly atmosphere at home.

While these delicate issues remained unsettled, except in his own mind, the Prime Minister resolved upon an immediate appeal to the country. He was armed with victory, complete, absolute,

SOME SEA OFFICER

Left to right: Sir E. S. Alexander-Sinclair; Sir W. H. Cowan; Sir O. de B. Brock; Sir W. E. H. L. A. Hood; Sir J. M. de Robeck; Sir W. C. Pakenham; Sir R. Y. Tyrwhitt; Sir R. Keyes; Sir A. C. Leveson; Sir D. Sturdee; Sir C. E. Madden; Lord Jellicoe; Lord Wester Wemyss. Sir Abe Bailey,

tremendous; victory beyond the dreams of the most ardent, the most resolute, the most exacting. The whole nation was eager to acclaim "the pilot who weathered the storm." Was it wonderful that that pilot should turn from aggrieved and resentful associates of former days who sourly awaited the hour of peace to call him to account, and from Conservatives with whom he had no real sympathy, to the vast electorate who sought only to testify their gratitude by their votes?

The General Election.

To this election I was a consulted and consenting party. I thought we had need of all the strength we could get to

National Portrait Gallery, London.

THE GREAT WAR.

Goodenough ; Sir R. K. Arbuthnot ; Sir M. E. Browning ; Sir C. G. F. M. Cradock ; the Hon. Sir C. Burney ; Lord Beatty ; Sir T. D. W. Napier ; Lord Milford Haven ; Sir H. Evan-Thomas ; (From the painting by Sir Arthur Cope, R.A., presented to the National Portrait Gallery by Bart., K.C.M.G.)

face the problems of bringing home and disbanding our armies, which then numbered at home and abroad nearly four million men, of reconstructing our industry, and making the Treaty of Peace. Moreover, I had in the stress of war resumed intimate contact with the Conservative Party and with the friends of my youth. Having seen so many implacable party quarrels swept away by the flood, I was in no mind to go back and look for them. The idea of methodically fishing up and revitalizing all the old pre-war party controversies, and of fabricating disagreements even where none existed, was absurd and abhorrent. I, therefore, swam with the stream. If I had taken the opposite

course it would not have made the slightest difference to the event. But candour compels acknowledgment of this measure of responsibility.

On constitutional grounds the case was overwhelming. The Parliament, elected for five, had lasted for eight years. The electorate was increased from eight to twenty millions by a newly passed Reform Bill. The people and the soldiers who had stubbornly maintained the war, had a right to a decision upon the use to be made of the victory. But the election at once raised the party issue in its crudest form.

The Hard Line.

The Conservatives had been for thirteen years in a minority in the House of Commons. They were in a minority of about 100 in the Parliament now to be dissolved. On the other hand, they were sure that their hour had come. They believed that the events and passions of the war had been withering in their effects upon Liberal principles and ideals ; they held that these had been stultified or proved visionary by all that had occurred ; they knew that the quarrels between Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Asquith had split the Liberal Party from end to end ; and finally they knew that in the personal prestige of the Prime Minister they had an overwhelming advantage. How then could they be asked to make an agreement to safeguard all Liberal seats ? To do so was not only to condemn themselves to a minority in the new Parliament but to make the whole election a farce. Conservative candidates were in the field throughout the constituencies. Evidently a hard line must be drawn through the midst of those who had in the main shared the efforts and the sorrows of the terrible years, and the decision to have an election inevitably involved the drawing of this line. Where then should it be drawn ?

The test adopted for sitting Members was their vote in April in the division on General Maurice's allegations. All who had followed Mr. Asquith on that occasion were considered opponents. Translated into the rough methods of electioneering, this meant that even if such a Liberal member or candidate had fought in the war, or been wounded, or lost his son, or two sons, or his brother, or had throughout in every way sustained loyally the national cause, he must be ruled out of any share in the victory, or even be accused of having impeded it. Letters were written by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Bonar Law, afterwards described in the jargon of war-time rationing as " coupons," to the avowed supporters of the Coalition. These included 158 Liberal members and candidates who followed Mr. Lloyd George and were now described as National Liberals. The rest were attacked with vigour. All these consequences were inherent in the original decision to hold an election at this moment, and judgment need only be given upon the main issue.

The National Temper.

But when the election came it woefully cheapened Britain. The Prime Minister and his principal colleagues were astonished, and to some extent overborne, by the passions they encountered in the constituencies. The brave people whom nothing had daunted had suffered too much. Their unpent feelings were lashed by the popular press into fury. The crippled and mutilated soldiers darkened the streets. The returned prisoners told the hard tale of bonds and privation. Every cottage had its empty chair. Hatred of the beaten foe, thirst for his just punishment, rushed up from the heart of deeply injured millions. Those that had done the least in the conflict were, as might be expected, the foremost in detailing the penalties of the vanquished. A police report thrust under my eye at this time said :—" The feelings of all classes are the same. Even those who a few weeks ago were agitating for peace, now say, 'The Germans should pay every penny of the damage even if it takes them a thousand years.' " In my own constituency of Dundee, respectable, orthodox, life-long Liberals demanded the sternest punishment for the broken enemy. All over the country the most bitter were the women, of whom seven millions were for the first time to vote. In this uprush and turmoil State policy and national dignity were speedily engulfed

Three demands rose immediate and clangorous from the masses of the people, viz. to hang the Kaiser; to abolish conscription; and to make the Germans pay the uttermost farthing.

Upon conscription the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet endeavoured at first to practise considerable reserve. With the lesson before our eyes of what we had suffered through not having a national army, it seemed imprudent in the last degree to cast away the weapon only just created at measureless cost, and to re-erect all those barriers against obligatory service which had been tardily and with difficulty overthrown. The idea of preserving a national militia on something like the Swiss system was certainly in the mind of the Government; but contact with the constituencies swept it out of existence before it was even mooted. Everywhere the cry was for the abolition of all compulsion, and everywhere candidates yielded readily to the popular wish. The Cabinet who had not committed themselves in any positive manner, hastened to bury and forget the dangerous convictions with which they had toyed. Before the election was a week old the people had settled that Britain should go back to the small professional army with which she had entered the war.

"Hang the Kaiser."

The demand to hang the Kaiser found great favour with the press and was voiced by Ministers. It was first raised in official circles by Lord Curzon: a piquant conjunction recalling Wilde's description of fox-hunting, "The inexpressible in pursuit of the uneatable." But unquestionably it also arose spontaneously from the great masses. For four years the Kaiser had been pilloried by every form of propaganda as the man whose criminal ambition and wicked folly had loosed the awful flood of misery upon the world. He was the man responsible for all the slaughter. Why should he not be punished for it? Why should the humble soldier who fell asleep through exhaustion at his post, or who broken with wounds and long service turned from the fighting line, be put to death, and this pampered miscreant who had darkened every home be allowed to scuttle off in wealth and luxury? We had armies; we had fleets; we had Allies; the arm of Britain was long, it could find him wherever he was and execute upon his person the justice of an outraged world. Quoth—in public speech—Mr. Barnes, the official representative of the Labour Party in the War Cabinet—". . . The Kaiser has been mentioned. . . . I am for hanging the Kaiser."

The Prime Minister was from the first singularly affected by these opinions. He spoke with the utmost vehemence on both occasions when the topic was discussed in the Imperial War Cabinet. Not only at the election but throughout the Peace Conference he showed himself ready to make persevering efforts to procure the surrender of the Emperor and to put him on trial for his life. Personally, I was not convinced that the responsibility of princes for acts of State could be dealt with in this way. It seemed that to hang the Kaiser was the best way to restore at once his dignity and his dynasty. The popular wish did not in its initial form apparently contemplate a trial. It was evident, however, that the lawyers would have to have their say, both on the validity of the proceedings and on the personal accountability of the accused. This also opened up a vista both lengthy and obscure.

I find that when my opinion was given officially (November 20), I urged circumspection. "On the basis of Justice and Law, it would be difficult to say that the ex-Kaiser's guilt was greater than many of his advisers, or greater than that of the Parliament of the nation which had supported him in making war. It might well be that after an indictment had been laid against the ex-Kaiser, it would be found that it could not be sustained, and a serious *impasse* would be created."

In the face, however, of the earnest and deep-seated demand from all classes and all parties in the city of Dundee that the Kaiser should be hanged, I was constrained to support his being brought to trial. I descanted upon the fundamental principles of British justice, that every man no matter how vile his crimes and



Commandement en Chef
des Armées Alliées

Etat-Major Général

1e Section

G.Q.G.A. le 12 Novembre 1918

OFFICIERS, SOUS-OFFICIERS, SOLDATS DES ARMÉES ALLIÉES,

Après avoir résolument arrêté l'ennemi, vous l'avez, pendant des mois, avec une foi et une énergie inlassables, attaqué sans répit.

Vous avez gagné la plus grande bataille de l'Histoire et sauvé la cause la plus sacrée : la Liberté du Monde.

Soyez fiers !

D'une gloire immortelle vous avez paré vos drapeaux.

La Postérité vous garde sa reconnaissance.

Le Maréchal de France,
Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées:

F. Foch

Monsieur le Maréchal HAIG, Commandant en Chef les Forces Britanniques en France.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

MARSHAL FOCH'S LETTER.

This letter, addressed to the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Allied Armies, reads: "After bringing the enemy advance to a standstill by your resolution, you have attacked them for months unremittingly with unflagging faith and energy. You have won the greatest battle in history and brought about the triumph of the most sacred of all causes: the Freedom of the World. You have a right to be proud of yourselves. You have won immortal glory for your banners. You have earned the gratitude of posterity."

obvious his guilt was entitled to a trial, and, of course, to a fair trial. We must not descend to his level by omitting this usual feature in the conviction and punishment of crime. This argument was accepted, though without much enthusiasm, as solid and valid. The Liberals drew a difference against the Coalitionists on the question of the Kaiser's punishment. He was, it appears from the *Daily News*, only to be "incarcerated under the same conditions as any reprieved murderer." But then they hastened to explain that this was really "a harder penalty than execution." These contortions were not successful from any point of view.

"Make Them Pay."

But the crux of the whole election was the German indemnity. "Hang the Kaiser" was a matter of sentiment, but "make them pay" involved facts and figures. The first question was—How much could they pay? No General Election, no popular demand, no Ministerial promises could settle this. It was easy to sequestrate or surcharge all German property abroad and to require the surrender of all gold in German hands. But apart from this, payment from one country to another can only be made in goods or services. These goods or services may be rendered directly to the creditor country or they may be rendered to third parties who pass them on to their destination by roundabout routes and in a different form.

Nothing, however, alters or can alter the simple nature of the transaction. Something that a German has made must be carried out of his country in a ship, or in a train, or in a cart, and must be accepted directly or indirectly in payment of his debt. Now the amount of goods which the Germans could make in a year exceeded the amount that could physically be carried out of the country by any vehicles then in existence, and this reduced amount again far exceeded what other countries, including the creditor countries, wished to receive. For instance, the Germans could and would readily

have set to work to rebuild all the ships their submarines had sunk—but what was to happen to British shipbuilding if they did? They could no doubt make every form of manufactured article; but surely we had not fought the war in order to have all our native industries ruined by state-fostered dumping on a gigantic scale! They could export coal for nothing, and have done so regularly since, but the advantage to the British coal-fields has not been obvious. They could export to neutral countries only so far as they could tempt these countries with their wares, and the resulting credits would be transferable to the Allies in the form of other goods only by degrees as opportunity offered.

Methods of Payment.

There remained the method of service. The Germans could, for instance, have manned all the merchant ships and carried everybody's goods at German expense till further notice, thus gaining the complete carrying trade of the world; or the Germans could go in scores of thousands into France and into Belgium and build up by their labour the houses that had been destroyed and recultivate the devastated areas. As, however, they had just been turned out of these very places at so much expense, and had left some unpleasant memories behind them, the inhabitants of these regions having at last got back to the ruins of their homes were not at all anxious to see the German face or hear the German tongue again so soon. Something might be done in all of these directions, but it was evident to anyone with the slightest comprehension of economic facts that the limits would very soon be reached and could not possibly be exceeded. They were limits not removable by ignorance and passion.

How much?

The bill for the damage was many months later scaled down to between

Photo: Copyright.

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S HOMECOMING.

On December 19, 1918, Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in France, accompanied by his Army Commanders, returned to England. At Charing Cross the distinguished soldiers were met by the Duke of Connaught and thereafter were driven in five carriages to Buckingham Palace. Outside Marlborough House, Sir Douglas Haig's carriage stopped for a few moments while, as shown here, the Commander-in-Chief received a greeting from Queen Alexandra, who was accompanied by Lady Haig and her two daughters.

six and seven thousand millions sterling. This figure was not known at the election. Had it been known, it would have been scouted. Germany could, by lowering the wages and lengthening the hours of labour, and by limiting the profits of capital, undoubtedly pay very large sums; but then by this same process she would render herself the overmastering, if profitless, competitor in every market. Even so the result would be but a fraction of the damage done. In olden times a conquering army carried off in its own way all movable property in the territory which it ravaged, and in antiquity the conquerors drove along with them in a state of slavery all the men and women who were likely to be of use. Sometimes also a tribute was exacted for many years or in perpetuity. But what was now expected was on a scale utterly beyond these comparatively simple procedures. The payment of even the most moderate indemnity on a modern scale required the revival and maintenance of a superlative state of scientific production in Germany, and of the highest commercial activity. Yet those who clamoured for enormous figures were also the foremost in proposing every method by which German trade and industry could be crippled.

These arguments were unseasonable. Their mere statement exposed the speaker to a charge of being pro-German or at best a weakling. Not only the ordinary electors, but experts of all kinds, financial and economic, as well as business men and politicians, showed themselves unconsciously or wilfully blind to the stubborn facts.

No one understood the question better than the Prime Minister. His first statement to his colleagues on the subject

Photo: Central News.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE OPENING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, 1918.

The Premier opened the General Election Campaign of 1918 with a speech delivered before a great meeting held at Westminster on November 16, 1918. Among those supporting Mr. Lloyd George on the platform on this occasion were many men who had rendered devoted service to the State in the anxious years of 1914–18. Mr. Bonar Law is seen here on the Premier's right hand with Sir Eric and Sir Auckland Geddes seated in the second row of chairs, whilst Sir F. E. Smith, as he then was, may be seen in the centre of the third row.

Photo: Topical Press.

PROCLAMATION OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC.

No sooner was the abdication of the Kaiser confirmed than Germany was proclaimed a Republic. The proclamation was made in a speech delivered outside the Reichstag by Herr Scheidemann in the presence of a great concourse of people.

Photo: Topical Press.

WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' COUNCIL IN THE REICHSTAG.

The first sitting of the Workers' and Soldiers' Council in Berlin was held at 9.30 p.m. on Sunday, November 10, 1918. The sitting was opened by Herr Barth, who as President paid a tribute to the behaviour of the Berlin garrison which, having allied itself with the people, had thus done much to achieve a change of régime with but slight cost in lives and bloodshed.

November 26) was a forceful epitome of the arguments recited here. A Committee of Treasury officials,[1] equipped with the profound knowledge of their Department, had already reported that spread over thirty years a total present value of £2,000 millions might be a reasonable and practicable sum for Germany to pay. This unwelcome figure was sharply challenged, and a new Committee of the Imperial War Cabinet was set up to test it. I was present with other Ministerial officials at the meeting where these statements were made. I held firmly to the Treasury estimate when I faced the electors of Dundee. I dressed it up as well as possible. "We will make them pay an indemnity." (Cheers.) "We will make them pay a large indemnity." (Cheers.) "They exacted from France a large indemnity in 1870. We will make them pay ten times as much." (Prolonged cheers. ("200 millions × 10 = 2,000 millions.")

Everybody was delighted. It was only the next day that the figures began to be scrutinized. Then came a hectoring telegram from an important Chamber of Commerce, "Haven't you left out a nought in your indemnity figures?" The local papers gibbered with strident claims. Twelve thousand millions, fifteen thousand millions were everywhere on the lips of men and women who the day before had been quite happy with two thousand millions, and were not anyhow going to get either for themselves. However, adding under daily pressure, "Of course if we can get more, all the better," I stuck to my two thousand millions, and this figure has not yet been impugned. But all over the country the most insensate figures were used. One Minister, reproached with lack of vim, went so far as to say "We would squeeze the German lemon till the pips squeaked," and many private candidates with greater freedom and even less responsibility let themselves go wherever the wind might carry them.

Letters to Constituents.

I cannot pretend not to have been influenced by the electoral currents so far as verbiage was concerned. But in order to establish my credentials for the further discussion of these issues, I print two letters to influential constituents which I wrote during the election.

[1] Headed by Mr. Keynes.

November 22nd, 1918.

I am in sympathy with your feeling that we must not allow ourselves to be deprived of the full fruits of victory. But do you think that you are quite right in saying that we ought to impose upon Germany the same sort of terms as they imposed upon France in 1871? Surely the forcible annexation by Germany of Alsace-Lorraine against the will of the people who lived there and who wanted to stay with France was one of the great causes at work in Europe all these years to bring about the present catastrophe. If we were now to take provinces of Germany inhabited by Germans who wished to stay with Germany, and held them down under a foreign government, should we not run the risk of committing the same crime as the Germans committed in 1871 and bringing about the same train of evil consequences?

Again with regard to payment for the war, I am entirely in favour of making the Germans pay all they can. But payment can only be made in one of three ways. (A) Gold and securities. This would only be a drop in the bucket. (B) Forced labour, i.e. Germans coming to work for us and our Allies in a state of servitude. This would take the bread out of the mouths of our own people, and, besides, we would rather have these Germans' room than their company. Or (C) payment in goods. We must be careful not to demand payment in goods from the Germans which would undercut our own trade here. Otherwise we shall be creating by Treaty that very dumping against which our own manufacturers are so much up in arms. The Allies have demanded from the Germans Reparation, i.e. payment by them for the damage which they have done. This may easily amount to more than £2,000,000,000. They have not asked them to pay for the expenses of the war which I see have been calculated at £40,000,000,000. The reason why they have not done so is because they believed that it was physically impossible for them to do so, and

that a Treaty drawn up on that basis would be found afterwards to be valueless.

Speaking more generally, I think that the Government which has conducted this country to this astounding triumph and has compelled Germany to accept the hard conditions of the armistice, is entitled to claim some measure of confidence, and that the Allied statesmen who are now going to meet together should be trusted, with their superior knowledge and experience, which cannot be shared by everybody, to do their best for the general future of the world. We must be very careful to stand firm upon those great principles for which we have fought and in whose name we have conquered.

And again :

December 9th, 1918.

If the peace which we are going to make in Europe should lead, as I trust it will, to the liberation of captive nationalities, to a reunion of those branches of the same family which have been long arbitrarily divided, and to the drawing of frontiers in broad correspondence with the ethnic masses, it will remove for ever most of the causes of possible wars. And with the removal of the *Cause, the Symptom*, i.e. armaments, will gradually and naturally subside.

I cannot but think we have much to be thankful for, and more still to hope for in the future.

With regard to Russia, you have only to seek the truth to be assured of the awful forms of anti-democratic tyranny which prevail there, and the appalling social and economic reactions and degenerations which are in progress. The only sure foundation for a State is a Government freely elected by millions of people, and as many millions as possible. It is fatal to swerve from that conception.

Mr. Lloyd George, having committed himself to the electoral scrimmage, played the part which circumstances enjoined. In his august station, national and European, he ought never to have been called upon to speak night after night upon the platform. The hardest test of all is to stand against the current of millions of rejoicing and admiring supporters. He ought to have been more sure of himself at this time, and of the greatness of his work and situation. He could well have afforded, as it turned out, to speak words of sober restraint and of magnanimous calm. More than this, it would only have been prudent to pour some cold water upon inordinate hopes and claims, and have on record a few sour statements, which, however resented at the time, would have been precious afterwards. He tried his best. His speeches soon fell far behind the popular demand. On two occasions, one a great meeting of women, he was almost howled down. In the hot squalid rush of the event he endeavoured to give satisfaction to mob-feeling and press chorus by using language which was in harmony with the prevailing sentiment, but which contained in every passage some guarding phrase, some qualification, which afterwards would leave statesmanship unchained.

The Prime Minister and the Indemnity.

On the actual figure of the indemnity the Prime Minister was studiously vague. The Committee of the Imperial War Cabinet upon the German capacity to pay reported during the election. Largely on the evidence of Lord Cunliffe of all people, the Governor of the Bank of England, they lent countenance to a maximum annual payment by "the enemy Powers" (not Germany alone) of no less than £1,200 millions, i.e. the interest on £24,000 millions capital. Mr. Lloyd George had this staggering report before him when he made his Bristol speech. He did not accept it; and in spite of the public passion on the one hand and the Governor's opinion on the other, he delivered a restrained and cautious statement. Germany must be made to pay every penny, and a Commission would be set up to see how much she could pay. There was, however, an overflow, and the weary Prime Minister flung out this sentence to a rapturous crowd. "They must pay to the uttermost farthing and we shall search their pockets for it." This dominated all his qualifications. "Search their pockets" became the slogan of the hour.

The actual decision which the Prime Minister recommended to, and obtained from, the Imperial War Cabinet, will stand the test of time. "To endeavour to secure from Germany the greatest possible indemnity she can pay, consistently with the economic well-being of the British Empire and the peace of the world, and without involving an Army of Occupation in Germany for its collection."

The Result of the Election.

Apart from these issues the election resolved itself into an overwhelming vote of confidence in Mr. Lloyd George. Nearly every candidate who obtained his benediction was returned; nearly every one who did not seek or receive it was rejected. When the results, which were delayed for a month in order to collect the military votes, were announced, barely ninety of his Liberal and Labour opponents found seats in the House of Commons. Simultaneously, the Irish elections swept away the Nationalist Parliamentary Party and, as the Sinn Fein members boycotted Westminster, the Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament disappeared.

The Prime Minister found himself, with a five-years' constitutional tenure before him, at the head of a majority, elected mainly upon his personal prestige and popularity, comprising nearly five-sixths of the whole house. But for this he had paid a heavy price. The Liberal Party was mortally injured. Those who opposed him were blotted out. The 136 Liberal members who supported him were cut from their party basis, and in nearly every case were dependent upon Conservative support, and Mr. Lloyd George was thus sustained only by his transient personal prestige. So long as this lasted his position and authority were unchallengeable, but how long would it last?

Its After Effects.

Moreover, in the wider sphere of Europe the blatancies of electioneering had robbed Britain in an appreciable degree of her dignity. The national bearing, faultless in the years of trial—loyal, cool, temperate, humane amidst terrors and reverses—had experienced quite a vulgar upset. It was not from the majesty of the battlefield nor the solemnity of the council chamber, but from the scrimmage of the hustings, that the British plenipotentiaries proceeded to the Peace Conference. On the other side of the account there was, however, a solid and practical asset. We had a new Parliament, with a great majority, ready to sustain the Government in the labours and perplexities which lay before it.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THEIR LAST QUARTERS IN GERMANY.

"The *Malabar's* in 'arbour with the *Jumner* at 'er tail,
An' the time-expired's waitin' of 'is orders for to sail."
From "Troopin'," by Rudyard Kipling.

CHAPTER LXXXI

DEMOBILIZATION

" All the world over, nursing their scars,
Sit the old fighting men, broke in the wars :
All the world over, surly and grim,
Mocking the lilt of the conqueror's hymn."

RUDYARD KIPLING.

Mr. Lloyd George and the New Ministry—At the War Office—A Serious Situation in the Army—The Remedy—The New System—A Dangerous Interlude—Imponderabilia—The Calais Mutiny—On the Horse Guards' Parade—The Young Guard—Conduct of the ex-Soldiers—The Blockade—Lord Plumer's Despatch—The German Prisoners.

THE new administration was formed on the morrow of the election results.

Mr. Lloyd George and the New Ministry.

I had obtained a promise beforehand from the Prime Minister that he would restore the old system of Cabinet Government at the earliest moment possible. This was not immediately achieved. The five members of the War Cabinet, who were alone responsible for all policy and to whose direction the Secretaries of State and other Ministers were in theory amenable, appeared reluctant to distribute their powers around a wider circle. It was, indeed, nearly a year before the normal constitutional practice was resumed. The principle was, however, conceded from the outset.

The Prime Minister reconstructed his Government with masterful despatch. At the end of a conversation on various topics, he said to me, in so many words, " Make up your mind whether you would like to go to the War Office or the Admiralty, and let me know by to-morrow. You can take the Air with you in either case ; I am not going to keep it as a separate department."

I spent the night at Blenheim, and from there accepted the Admiralty together with the Air Ministry ; but when I reached London the next afternoon I found the position had changed. The temper of the Army and the problem of demobilization caused increasing anxiety. I could not refuse the Prime Minister's wish that I should go to the War Office. The new Ministry was announced on January 10, and I quitted the Ministry of Munitions and became responsible for the War Office on the 15th. I was immediately confronted with conditions of critical emergency.

At the War Office.

In the summer of 1917 a draft scheme of demobilization had been prepared partly in the War Office, but mainly in accordance with civilian opinion. The prime object was naturally the restarting of industry, and questions of the feelings and discipline of the troops themselves were not accorded proper weight. In June, 1917, the scheme had been referred to General Headquarters, and it was immediately criticized by Sir Douglas Haig as " most objectionable and prejudicial to discipline." The views of the civil departments were, however, generally sustained by the War Cabinet. The scheme lay in the background during the prolonged crisis of the war, and at the Armistice suddenly became vigorously operative.

According to the logic of this scheme the first men to be released were what were called " key men," i.e. men who were asked for by employers at home to restart the industries. These " key men " were, therefore, being picked out by scores of thousands from all the units

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

DEMOBILIZATION ON THE RHINE.

A party of soldiers selected for demobilization waiting for a Rhine steamer to carry them from Cologne to Rotterdam, from which port they would be shipped to England for dispersal. During demobilization there were here and there hitches and grievances, but on the whole the scheme worked admirably, and within the space of a few months the huge army drifted away.

of the army and hurried back across the channel. But these "key men" who were to be the first to come home had been, in many cases, the last to go out. The important parts they played in war industry had retained them at home until the needs of the Army became desperate after March 21, 1918.

In practice also the system lent itself to inevitable abuse. Those who were so fortunate as to be able to present letters and telegrams from employers at home offering them employment and claiming their services were immediately released. Influence was not slow to procure such credentials. Several thousands while on leave at home were actually excused from returning to the Army. The ordinary soldier without these advantages saw his lately joined comrade hurrying home to take his job, or somebody's job, in England, while he, after years of perils and privations on a soldier's pay, wounded and sent back to the carnage three or sometimes four times, was to be left until all the plums at home had been picked up and every vacancy filled. The fighting man has a grim sense of justice which it is dangerous to affront. As the result the discipline of every single separate unit throughout the whole of our Army in all the theatres of war was swiftly and simultaneously rotted and undermined. For nearly two months this process had continued, and it had become intolerable to the fighting troops.

A Serious Situation in the Army.

The study I gave to the matter in the five days which intervened between the acceptance and the assumption of my new office, left me in no doubt upon the course to pursue. Mutinies and disorders had already taken place on both sides of the Channel. In particular a mutiny had occurred at Folkestone on January 3. Sir Eric Geddes had newly succeeded General Smuts in dealing with the restarting of industry. A few days before I entered the War Office the approaches to the buildings were blocked by lorry loads of insubordinate Army Service Corps men who had seized these vehicles and driven them up to London. On each lorry was painted the legend borrowed from a *Daily Express* cartoon, "Get on or Get out Geddes." A wave of intense impatience and resentment accompanied by serious breaches of discipline spread across the splendid armies which had never faltered in the direst stress of war.

If the cause was plain, so was the remedy. My only difficulty was to procure the assent of others; my only

apprehension, whether we were not already too late. I had before taking up my new duties insisted that the Secretary of State for War should have the final word against all civilian departments in matters affecting the discipline of the troops. In the situation which had now developed this could hardly be denied, and was readily conceded.

The Remedy.

I propounded forthwith the following policy—

First: Soldiers should as a general rule only be released from the front in accordance with their length of service and age. Those who had served the longest at the front were to be the first to be demobilized, and any man with three wound stripes or more was to be discharged forthwith. Everyone must take his turn in accordance with this order.

Secondly: The pay of the Army must be immediately increased to more than double the war rate, in order to lessen the gap between the rewards of military and civilian employment.

Thirdly: In order, whilst still maintaining the necessary forces in the field, to release the men who had fought in as large numbers and as quickly as possible, the 80,000 young lads who had been trained but had not quitted our shores must be retained compulsorily for a period of two years and sent abroad.

Ardently supported by Sir Douglas Haig, whom I summoned from France, and amid the continued and growing demoralization of the Army, I obtained the necessary authority from the War Cabinet. But this took some time. The Prime Minister was in France. Mr. Bonar Law, though exercising a wide measure of discretion, referred important matters to him. The War Cabinet were

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

EN ROUTE TO ROTTERDAM.

Demobilization involved an immense amount of clerical work. Each man received twenty-eight days' furlough with full pay, ration and family allowance. He also received out of work insurance operative for a year and payable for twenty weeks, a railway warrant, and a protection and identity certificate.

perturbed at the idea of presenting a new Conscription Bill to Parliament after the war was over, and after the electorate had shown such vehement repugnance to the idea. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was rightly concerned at the expenditure involved in the heavy cost of the increased pay to the Services.

There was no time for ceremony. After consultation with the Adjutant-General, Sir George Macdonogh, an officer of brilliant attainments, I decided to take him over to Paris with me on the evening of January 23, to obtain the Prime Minister's approval to the scheme which had been proposed. We breakfasted with Mr. Lloyd George on the morning of the 24th, accompanied him to the Peace Conference at the Quai d'Orsay, returned with him to lunch and discussed the whole position. I instructed the Adjutant-General to draw up two Army Orders embodying the decisions which had been obtained from the Prime Minister, and to submit them to me at 6 p.m. Having approved these orders I directed the Adjutant-General to return to London by the midnight train and to get the Army Orders issued, with such departmental additions and Army Council instructions as might be needed with the least possible delay. This he did, and on January 29 Army Order 54 (Extra Remuneration to those retained on Military Service) and Army Order 55 (Armies of Occupation) were issued. The title of the first of these Army Orders explains itself. The second announced the Government's intention about the maintenance of Armies of Occupation pending the reconstruction of the Regular Forces, and laid down the rules under which officers and other ranks would be retained or demobilized. Corresponding Royal Warrants were issued concurrently.

The New System.

I wrote an explanation for the Armies of the whole position in language which they would understand, and it was published officially at the same time as the Army Orders. It covered the whole field of War Office policy in relation to

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

SENTRY DUTY IN COLOGNE.

The occupation of any area in an enemy country, whether hostilities have ceased or not, involves both care and tact. This is particularly the case when the area occupied is normally inhabited by a civilised and intelligent people. Much of the responsibility for the maintenance of order devolves upon the Military Police and upon sentries, who have frequently to examine papers and permits in cases where pedestrians pass to or from the occupied territory.

the troops during the year 1919. It was strictly and unchangingly carried into effect.

The Armies of Occupation.

Explanatory Note by the Secretary of State for War.

1. On November 11, when the Armistice was signed, there were about 3,500,000 Imperial British officers and soldiers on the pay and ration strength of the British Army. During the two months that have passed since then, rather more than three-quarters of a million have been demobilized or discharged. The system of demobilization which has been adopted aims at reviving national industry by bringing the men home in the order of urgency according to trades. There is no doubt that this is the wisest course, and it will continue to be followed in the large majority of cases. The time has now come, however, when military needs must be considered as well as industrial needs.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

EXAMINING A CIVILIAN.

Military Police of the Rhine Army interrogating a suspected person in a Cologne street.

2. Unless we are to be defrauded of the fruits of victory and, without considering our Allies, to throw away all that we have won with so much cost and trouble, we must provide for a good many months to come Armies of Occupation for the enemy's territory. These armies must be strong enough to exact from the Germans, Turks and others the just terms which the Allies demand, and we must bear our share with France, America and Italy in providing them. The better trained and disciplined these armies are, the fewer men will be needed to do the job. We have, therefore, to create, in order to wind up the war satisfactorily, a strong, compact, contented, well-disciplined army which will maintain the high reputation of the British Service and make sure we are not tricked of what we have rightfully won. It will be an army far smaller than our present army. In fact, it will be about one-quarter of the great armies we have been using in the war.

3. Our Military Commanders, who know what Marshal Foch's wishes are, say that in their opinion not more than 900,000 men of all ranks and arms will be sufficient to guard our interests in this transition period. Therefore, when this new Army has been organised, and while it is being organized, over two and a-half million men who were held to military service when the fighting

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

INSPECTING TROOPS OUTSIDE COLOGNE CATHEDRAL.

An interesting photograph showing Sir William Robertson, with the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill and members of the Army Council, inspecting a guard in front of the Cathedral at Cologne.

stopped will be released to their homes and to industry as fast as the trains and ships can carry them and the Pay Offices settle their accounts. In other words, out of 3,500,000 it is proposed to keep for the present about 900,000 and release all the others as fast as possible.

4. How ought we to choose the 900,000 who are to remain to finish up the work? When men are marked for release they obviously ought to go home in the order which will most quickly restart our industries, for otherwise they would leave their means of livelihood in the Army and relinquish their rations and their separation allowance only to become unemployed in great numbers. But, when men are kept back in the Service to form the Armies of Occupation a choice cannot be made simply on trade grounds. It must be made on grounds which appeal broadly to a sense of justice and fair play. Length of service, age and wounds must be the main considerations entitling a man to release. The new Army will, therefore, be composed in the first instance only from those who did not enlist before January 1, 1916, who are not over 37 years of age, and have not more than two wound stripes. If anyone has to stay, it must be those who are not the oldest, not those who came the earliest, not those who have suffered the most.

5. We, therefore, take these broad rules as our main guide. According to the best calculations which are possible they should give us about 1,300,000 men, out of which it is intended to form the Army of 900,000. If we find, as we shall do in all probability, that we have in the classes chosen more men than we actually require after dealing with a certain number of pivotal and compassionate cases, we shall proceed to reduce down to the figure of 900,000 first by reducing the age of retention to 36, to 35, next

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

MARSHAL FOCH AT COLOGNE.

On May 17, 1919, Marshal Foch paid a visit to the British zone of the occupied territory. He is seen here with Sir William Robertson taking the salute immediately after disembarkation.

releasing the men with two wound stripes and then on to 34.

As the time goes on we shall not require to keep so large an Army as 900,000 in the field, and it will be possible to continue making reductions on the principle of releasing the oldest men by the years of their age. When, however, the results of the war are finally achieved, the Divisions which have remained to the end will be brought home as units and make their entry into the principal cities of Great Britain with which they are territorially associated.

Volunteers for one year's service at a time for the Armies of Occupation will be accepted from men who would otherwise be entitled to release if they are physically fit and otherwise suitable; and young soldiers now serving will be sent from home to take their turn and do their share. All these will be in relief of the older men. They will enable the age limit to be further reduced and the older men to be sent home. In particular the sixty-nine battalions of young soldiers of 18 years of age and upwards who are now at home will be sent at once to help guard the Rhine bridgeheads. They will thus enable an equal number of men, old enough to be their fathers, to come home, and they themselves will have a chance to see the German provinces which are now in our keeping and the battlefields where the British Army won immortal fame.

6. The new Armies of Occupation will begin forming from February 1, and it is hoped that in three months they may be completely organized. There will then be two classes of men in khaki, viz., those who form the Armies of Occupation, and those who are to be demobilized. Everything possible will be done to send home or disperse the two and a half million men who are no longer required, But they must wait their turn patiently and meanwhile do their duty in an exemplary manner. Any of these men who are marked for home who are guilty

of any form of insubordination will, apart from any other punishment, be put back to the bottom of the list. There are no means of getting these great numbers of men home quickly unless everyone does his duty in the strictest possible way. It is recognized, however, that service in the Armies of Occupation is an extra demand which the State makes in its need upon certain classes of its citizens. The emoluments of the Armies of Occupation will, therefore, be substantially augmented, and every man will draw bonuses from the date of his posting to these Armies with arrears from February 1.

* * * *

9. The Armies of Occupation will be as follows :—

Home Army.
Army of the Rhine.
Army of the Middle East.
Detachment of the Far North.
Garrisons of the Crown Colonies and India.

* * * *

12. The above arrangements seem to be the best that can be devised for the year 1919. During this year, however, we must remake the Old British Regular Army so as to provide on a voluntary basis the Overseas Garrisons of India, Egypt, the Mediterranean Fortresses and other foreign stations.

It is believed that volunteering for the Regular Army will improve, as soon as the great mass of those who volunteered for the war against Germany in the early days have come back to the freedom of civil life, and have had a chance to look round. It is upon the steady rebuilding of this Army that the relief of the Territorial battalions in India and various detachments in distant theatres now depends. Every effort will therefore be made to hasten its formation both by recruiting and by re-engagement.

13. It is not necessary at this stage to settle the conditions on which the National Home Defence Army for after the War will be formed. There are many more urgent problems which should be solved first.

14. The entire scheme of the War Office for dealing with the many difficulties of the present situation and for safeguarding British interests is thus published to the Army and the Nation at large ; it has been agreed upon between all the authorities and departments concerned. The consent of Parliament, where necessary, will be asked for at the earliest possible moment. It remains for all ranks and all classes to work together with the utmost comradeship and energy to put it into force, and thereby to safeguard the best interests of each one of us and the final victory of our cause.

A Dangerous Interlude.

But the time to prepare and decide upon these far-reaching measures and to procure the assent or submission of so many important personages, namely fourteen days, and the further time needed for the Armies to realize the new decisions was a very anxious period, marked by many ugly and dangerous episodes. Not only the armies but the peoples were profoundly affected by the sudden cessation of the war. The poise and balance even of Britain was deranged. In those days the Russian revolution had not been exposed as a mere organization of tyranny, perverse and infinitely cruel. The events which had taken place in Russia, the doctrines and watchwords which poured out from Moscow, seemed to millions of people in every land to offer prospects of moving forward into a bright new world of Brotherhood, Equality and Science. Everywhere the subversive elements were active ; and everywhere they found a response. So many frightful things had happened, and such tremendous collapses of established structures had been witnessed, the nations had suffered so long, that a tremor, and indeed a spasm, shook the foundations of every State.

Imponderabilia.

Here in Britain we know our own people well. Millions of men and women have been accustomed for generations to take an active part in politics, and have felt that in their sphere and station they were constantly deciding and guiding the policy of their country. The political parties with all their organiza-

tions, associations, leagues and clubs afforded effective vehicles of popular expression. Moreover, the Constitution had itself grown up as the most thorough and practical mechanism yet devised in the modern world for bringing the force of public opinion to bear upon the conduct of affairs. Well was it that we were "broad based upon the people's will" and newly authorized by their direct pronouncement.

Certainly there were factors which nobody could measure and which no one had ever before seen at work. Armies of nearly four million men had been suddenly and consciously released from the iron discipline of war, from the inexorable compulsions of what they believed to be a righteous cause. All these vast numbers had been taught for years how to kill; how to punch a bayonet into the vital organs; how to smash the brains out with a mace; how to make and throw bombs as if they were no more than snowballs. All of them had been through a mill of prolonged inconceivable pressures and innumerable tearing teeth. To all, sudden and violent death, the woeful spectacle of shattered men and dwellings was, either to see in others or expect and face for oneself, the commonest incident of daily life. If these armies formed a united resolve, if they were seduced from the standards of duty and patriotism, there was no power which could even have attempted to withstand them.

This was the testing time, if there ever was one, for the renowned sagacity and political education of the British Democracy.

In a single week more than thirty cases of insubordination among the troops were reported from different centres. Nearly all were repressed or appeased by the remonstrances of their officers. But in several cases considerable bodies of men were for some days entirely out of control. The chief offenders were the Army Service Corps in the Grove Park and Kempton Park Mechanical Transport Depôts. Some units informed their officers that they had constituted themselves a Soldiers' Council and intended to march to the nearest township and fraternize with the workmen, Usually they were dissuaded by reasonable arguments. Sometimes the officers cycling by a circuitous route intercepted their men before the town was reached and induced them to return to their duty. The influence of the regimental officers was nearly always successful. Although the situation was very threatening in many places, almost the only spot where there was actual and serious rioting was at Luton, where, owing to the weakness of the civic authorities, the Town Hall was burnt by the mob.

The Calais Mutiny.

A regular mutiny broke out at Calais. Between January 27 and 31 the Army Ordnance detachments and the Mechanical Transport, which were the least-disciplined part of the Army, had seen least of the fighting and were most closely associated with political Trade Unionism, refused to obey orders. They met the leave-boats and induced a large number of the returning soldiers to join them. In twenty-four hours the ringleaders were at the head of about three or four thousand armed men and in complete possession of the town. All the fighting divisions had moved on towards or into Germany, and there was no force immediately at hand to cope with the mutineers. The Commander-in-Chief accordingly recalled two divisions from their forward march, and placing them under the personal control of a most trusted and respected Army Commander, General Byng, directed them upon the scene of the disorders.

The soldiers of these divisions were roused to indignation at the news that demobilization was being obstructed by comrades of theirs who had in no wise borne the brunt of the fighting. By nightfall of the second day the disaffected soldiery were encircled by a ring of bayonets and machine-guns. At daylight a converging advance was made upon them. In front officers, unarmed, called upon them to return to duty; behind them deadly overwhelming force was arrayed. Thus confronted, most of the men drifted to the rear, but several hundreds stood their ground with obstinacy. A shocking explosion would have been precipitated by

a single shot; but self-restraint and good feeling triumphed. The ringleaders were arrested, and the rest returned to their obedience without the shedding of a drop of blood.

Simultaneously with this came the news of serious riots in Glasgow and Belfast. Both these riots were fomented by the Communists. The Army was called upon to aid the civil power. Two brigades were moved into Glasgow. These were only second-line troops consisting of the least efficient soldiers or young recruits. They had not, like those at the front, been tempered in war nor had they tasted victory. However, officers and men discharged their duty faultlessly. Order was restored. Very few lives were lost, and when blood flowed, it was mostly from the nose.

On the Horse Guards' Parade.

The last incident that I shall record came under my personal notice. At half-past eight on the morning of February 8 I was summoned urgently to the War Office. As I drove thither I observed a battalion of guards drawn up along the Mall. I passed through the Admiralty Arch and reached my office without remarking anything else unusual. Arrived there I received a disagreeable report: About 3,000 soldiers of many units and all arms of the service had gathered at Victoria Station to catch the early train for those returning from leave. The Director of Movements had failed to make adequate arrangements for the transport, feeding and housing of leave men coming in this case principally from the north.

The poor soldiers, many of whom had waited all night on the platform, none of whom could obtain food or tea, felt it very hard to be going back to France now that the fighting was over and the war was won, while so many of their comrades were, as they had been told, snapping up the best billets in England. They had suddenly upon some instigation resorted in a body to Whitehall, and were now filling the Horse Guards' Parade armed and in a state of complete disorder. Their leader, I was informed, was at that very moment prescribing conditions to the Staff of the London Command in the Horse Guards building.

Sir William Robertson and General Feilding, commanding the London District, presented themselves to me with this account, and added that a reserve battalion of Grenadiers and two troops of the Household Cavalry were available on the spot. What course were they authorized to adopt? I asked whether the battalion would obey orders, and was answered, "The officers believe so." On this I requested the Generals to surround and make prisoners of the disorderly mass. They departed immediately on this duty.

I remained in my room a prey to anxiety. A very grave issue had arisen at the physical heart of the State. Ten minutes passed slowly. From my windows I could see the Life Guards on duty in Whitehall closing the gates and doors of the archway. Then suddenly there appeared on the roof of the Horse Guards a number of civilians, perhaps twenty or thirty in all, who spread themselves out in a long black silhouette and were evidently watching something which was taking place, or about to take place, on the parade ground below them. What this might be I had no means of knowing, although I was but a hundred yards away.

Another ten minutes of tension passed and back came the Generals in a much more cheerful mood. Everything had gone off happily. The Grenadiers with fixed bayonets had closed in upon the armed crowd; the Household Cavalry had executed an enveloping movement on the other flank; and the whole 3,000 men had been shepherded and escorted under arrest to Wellington Barracks, where they were all going to have breakfast before resuming their journey to France. No one was hurt, very few were called to account, and only one or two were punished, and that not seriously. A large portion of the blame lay upon the administration, which had made no change in its routine at the railway stations since the fighting had stopped. For years men had gone back punctually and faithfully to danger and death, with hardly any officers or organization, just as if they were ordinary

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN A MILK QUEUE.

During the early months of the occupation milk in Cologne could only be provided for children under three years of age and for the sick. Women and children are shown here waiting to receive their ration from cans in charge of a soldier. The humane attitude of all ranks of the British Army towards the civilian population on the Rhine created an atmosphere which went far to ease a situation which might easily have been difficult.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

CHANGING GUARD AT BONN.

Young soldiers of the New Army taking over from the veteran troops they relieved on the Rhine. The new battalions of young soldiers trained at home speedily became efficient. On parade at Aldershot and elsewhere their general bearing was excellent, and as reliefs for troops on the Rhine waiting demobilization they proved of the utmost value.

Photo: Central News.

ABOUT TO READ THE RIOT ACT.

The signing of the Armistice brought easements of many kinds to a nation which during four years had put forth exertions on a titanic scale. The cessation of hostilities, however, was presently followed by a reaction which expressed itself in movements of a disquieting nature. Riots took place in Belfast and in Glasgow and a mutiny broke out among the troops at Calais. None of these affairs developed seriously; each was due to sudden change from war to peace. In the photograph shown above Sheriff Mackenzie (fifth from the left) is about to read the Riot Act during the disturbance in Glasgow. In the course of the rioting he received slight injuries.

passengers on an excursion train, and those responsible had not realized that much more careful arrangements were required in the mild reign of Peace.

The Young Guard.

The result of the new policy and of its explanation to the troops was almost instantaneous. A very few days sufficed to set back the evil currents which had begun to flow. The unfair trial to which our Army had been subjected was at an end. A system of demobilization had now been instituted, the justice of which carried conviction to the soldier's mind. The principle that length of service, age and wounds counted before every other consideration, and every form of influence commanded the immediate assent of all ranks. The increases of pay were accepted in a friendly spirit. As for the 80,000 lads of eighteen, they were eager to see the Rhine and set their fathers, uncles and elder brothers free after all the hardships these had gone through. The King reviewed a dozen of these fine young battalions in Hyde Park before their departure, and everyone was struck with their alert and confident bearing. Within a fortnight of the new Proclamation the discipline of our immense though melting armies all over the world had regained its traditional standards.

The new House of Commons met for the first time upon the heels of these events. It asked literally several thousand questions about the details of demobilization, and special machinery had to be set up to cope with this unparalleled curiosity. But the Con-

scription Bill was passed by a very large majority. The Liberal and Labour oppositions, animated by a sense of detachment from responsibility, fought it tooth and nail. It was lucky they were so few, for the essential services of the State might have been greatly obstructed at a critical time.

Conduct of the ex-Soldiers.

Meanwhile the demobilization of the armies proceeded on the greatest scale. For a period of nearly six months we maintained an average rate of 10,000 men a day discharged to civil life. This immense body, equal to a whole peace-time division, was collected daily from all the theatres of war, disembarked, de-trained, disarmed, de-kitted, demobilized, paid off and discharged between sunrise and sunset. I regard this as an enormous feat of British organizing capacity. The armies had grown up gradually; men had enlisted as individuals; they were dispersed in great masses, and somehow or other, at the outset, they nearly all found homes and employment.

The history books boast of the way in which twenty or thirty thousand of Cromwell's Ironsides laid down the panoply of war and resorted to peaceful occupations. But what was this compared with the noble behaviour of nearly four million British soldiers who, without confusion or commotion of any kind—once they were treated as they deserved—merged themselves unostentatiously in the mass of the nation and gathered together again the severed threads of their former lives? One had expected, after all the methodically inculcated butchery and barbarism of five years of war, that acts of murder and pillage, brutality and rapine, would for some years, at any rate, be rife in

Photo: Central News.

POLICE USING THE BATON IN GLASGOW.

The rioting in Glasgow took place on January 31, 1919, and was fomented by Communist propaganda. The police, mounted and on foot, were forced to charge, and three strike leaders, William Gallagher, Emmanuel Shinwell, and David Kirkwood, were arrested. There were a number of collisions between police and strikers, but fortunately no cases of serious injury resulted.

the land. On the contrary, such are the powers of civilization and education, and such are the qualities of our people, that crimes of violence actually diminished and prisons had to be closed and sold, when four million trained and successful killers, or nearly one-third of the whole manhood of the nation, resumed their civic status.

* * * *

Meanwhile, having halted for a week to allow the enemy to retreat, the armies of the Allies had advanced into Germany by easy marches. All the roads from France and Belgium which in 1914 had carried the invaders were now filled with endless columns marching in the reverse direction. The British troops were so good-humouredly received by the enemy population and got on so well with them that stringent and reiterated orders against "fraternization" were required. By the end of November the heads of Sir Douglas Haig's columns had reached the Rhine, and a few days later the occupation of the Bridge Head at Cologne was completed. In all almost a quarter of a million men representing the British Empire actually entered Germany and settled down in pleasant quarters and rest camps, where their natural friendliness and good conduct speedily reassured the inhabitants.

The Blockade.

But a hard story has here to be told. The Armistice conditions had prescribed that the blockade of Germany was to continue. At the request of the Germans a clause had been added that "The Allies and the United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany to such an extent as shall be found necessary." Nothing was done in pursuance of this until the second renewal of the Armistice on January 16, 1919. In fact the blockade of Germany was extended to the Baltic ports and was thus made more severe than before. The food situation in Germany became grave, and painful stories circulated of the hardships of mothers and children. During these months very few people in Germany, except profiteers and farmers, had enough to eat. Even as late as May members of the German Delegation at Versailles were suffering from the after effects of want of proper food. There was in France, and to some extent in England, a deliberate refusal to face the facts.

In January, 1919, began a prolonged series of negotiations upon the conditions under which food might be imported into Germany. Public opinion in the Allied countries was callous. Their leaders were overwhelmed with business. A possible charge of "pro-Germanism" intimidated politicians. The officials into whose hands the arrangements fell thought they were doing their duty by haggling and stippling. Equally bad food conditions existed in other defeated States, for which partial provision was being made. There was also a general shortage of food and shipping throughout the world. But meanwhile the Germans underwent a period of extreme stringency equal to that of a beseiged town.

Lord Plumer's Despatch.

It is remarkable that the sudden punch which destroyed this hateful deadlock originated with the British Army on the Rhine. In February the reports of military officers which reached the War Office of the food conditions in the occupied areas became increasingly disquieting. A note of anger began to mingle in the dry official chronicles. I made deliberately a rough exposure to the House of Commons on March 3. "We are enforcing the blockade with rigour, and Germany is very near starvation. All the evidence I have received from officers sent by the War Office all over Germany show, first, the great privations which the German people are suffering; and, secondly, the danger of a collapse of the entire structure of German social and national life under the stress of hunger and malnutrition."

Early in March the food negotiations at Spa appeared about to break down in glacial rigmarole. But Lord Plumer, who commanded the British Army of Occupation in Germany, sent a telegram to the War Office, forwarded to the Supreme Council, urging that food should be supplied to the

suffering population in order to prevent the spread of disorder as well as on humanitarian grounds. He emphasized the bad effect produced upon the British Army by the spectacle of suffering which surrounded them. From him and through other channels we learned that the British soldiers would certainly share their rations with the women and children among whom they were living, and that the physical efficiency of the troops was already being affected.

Armed with Lord Plumer's despatch and these details, Mr. Lloyd George took the Supreme Council by the throat. "No one," he remarked "can say that General Plumer is pro-German." The officials were chidden, and the negotiations resumed. The difficulties and disorganization of the world were, however, so great that it was not until May that substantial importations of food into Germany actually took place. The blockade, though according to the Peace Treaty in force until its ratification, disappeared altogether by the middle of July. But a great opportunity had been lost. The German people, on November 11, had not only been defeated in the field, they had been vanquished by world opinion. These bitter experiences stripped their conquerors in their eyes of all credentials except those of force.

* * * *

The German Prisoners.

A remaining task at the War Office was to get rid of the 250,000 German prisoners of war in British hands. For this we had to wait for many months. The French found it very difficult to release them. When they thought of all the slaughter represented by their capture, and of the depleted manhood of France, they could not bring themselves to let these hundreds of thousands of unlucky men go home. It was like surrendering captured cannon. But by the end of the summer the battlefields had all been cleared; every toil appointed to the prisoners had been performed. There was no longer excuse or reason for their retention. Yet as Pharaoh found it of old, it was hard "to let the people go." I determined to break this complex by direct action. The telegrams tell the tale.

Mr. Churchill to Mr. Balfour.

August 21, 1919.

After discussing the situation about German prisoners with General Asser, I am convinced that their repatriation should begin immediately.

Their work is done; they are costing us more than £30,000 a day. A fine opportunity of repatriating them is afforded by using the return trains which are bringing back the British Divisions from the Rhine to French ports. In addition they can proceed by march. I have therefore given directions to prepare plans for both these methods. The operation will begin at the earliest possible moment and at latest by September 1. May I urgently appeal to you to set the machinery in motion at your end which will ensure the reception of these prisoners in Germany. Eighty per cent. of them belong to unoccupied Germany or our own area, and less than 20 per cent. to territories under Allied control. I propose to begin with the German repatriations. Every day counts, as every day trains are arriving with Rhine soldiers and going back empty.

Mr. Churchill to Sir Henry Wilson.

Please see my telegram about the German prisoners and do your utmost to facilitate immediate action. The whole economy of this army depends upon it. We should not hestitate to act independently of the French. Will you communicate direct with Asser, advising him when he may begin. He could fill every train returning to the Rhine from to-morrow onwards. 10,000 at Audricq, for example, could start at once. I am counting upon sanction being given within the next two or three days.

All went well. The French delayed no longer, and the process of repatriating the immense numbers of German soldiers, who were eating their hearts out in captivity, once begun, continued without ceasing, until one more miserable relic of the war had passed out of daily life.

CHAPTER LXXXII[1]

RUSSIA FORLORN

"He is no Socialist who will not sacrifice his Fatherland for the triumph of the Social Revolution."—LENIN.

"Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint."

"I am the Spirit that evermore denies."

MEPHISTOPHELES *in Faust.*

The Absentee—"The Nameless Beast"—A Retrospect—The Revolution of March, 1917—Lenin—The Grand Repudiator—The Liberal Statesmen—Kerensky—Savinkov—The Bolshevik Punch—The Dictatorship—Peace at any Price—Brest-Litovsk—Bolshevik Disillusionment—The German Advance—Effect of the Treaty.

FROM the circle of panoplied and triumphant States soon to gather from all over the world to the Peace Conference in Paris there was one absentee.

The Absentee.

At the beginning of the war France and Britain had counted heavily upon Russia. Certainly the Russian effort had been enormous. Nothing had been stinted; everything had been risked. The forward mobilization of the Imperial Armies and their headlong onslaught upon Germany and Austria may be held to have played an indispensable part in saving France from destruction in the first two months of the war. Thereafter in spite of disasters and slaughters on an unimaginable scale Russia had remained a faithful and mighty ally. For nearly three years she had held on her fronts considerably more than half of the total number of enemy divisions, and she had lost in this struggle nearly as many men killed as all the other Allies put together. The victory of Brusilov in 1916 had been of important service to France and still more to Italy; and even as late as the summer of 1917, *after the fall of the Czar*, the Kerensky Government was still attempting offensives in aid of the common cause. The endurance of Russia as a prime factor, until the United States had entered the war, ranked second only to the defeat of the German submarines as a final turning-point of the struggle.

"The Nameless Beast."

But Russia had fallen by the way; and in falling she had changed her identity. An apparition with countenance different from any yet seen on earth stood in the place of the old Ally. We saw a state without a nation, an army without a country, a religion without a God. The Government which claimed to be the new Russia sprang from Revolution and was fed by Terror. It had denounced the faith of treaties; it had made a separate peace; it had released a million Germans for the final onslaught in the west. It had declared that between itself and non-communist society no good faith, public or private, could exist and no engagements need be respected. It had repudiated alike all that Russia owed and all that was owing to her. Just when the worst was over, when victory was in sight, when the fruits of measureless sacrifice were at hand, the old Russia had been dragged down, and in her place there ruled "the nameless beast" so long foretold in Russian legend. Thus the Russian people were deprived of Victory, Honour, Freedom, Peace and Bread. Thus there

[1] For this and the next Chapter see map of Russia on pages 1336 and 1337.

was to be no Russia in the Councils of the Allies—only an abyss which still continues in human affairs.

* * * *

A Retrospect.

A retrospect is necessary to explain how this disaster had come upon the world, and to enable the reader to understand its consequences.

The Czar had abdicated on March 15, 1917. The Provisional Government of Liberal and Radical statesmen was almost immediately recognized by the principal Allied Powers. The Czar was placed under arrest; the independence of Poland was acknowledged; and a proclamation issued to the Allies in favour of the self-determination of peoples and a durable peace. The discipline of the fleets and armies was destroyed by the notorious Order which abolished alike the saluting of officers and the death penalty for military offences.

Photo: Central News.

AFTER THE REVOLUTION.

Despite the upheaval in Russia large bodies of her troops remained for a time loyal to the Allied cause and maintained an unbroken front. The company of infantry shown here belonged to the Army of General Kornilov, an Army which, during the first fortnight of July, 1917, captured upwards of 35,000 prisoners, pierced the Austrian line, and took the town of Halicz. The company commander seen standing in the background, Captain Glouschkoff, was later killed in action

The Council of Soldiers and Workmen's deputies at Petrograd so prominent in the revolution, the parent and exemplar of all the soviets which were sprouting throughout Russia, maintained a separate existence and policy. It appealed to the world in favour of peace without annexations or indemnities; it developed its own strength and connections and debated and harangued on first principles almost continuously. From the outset a divergence of aim was apparent between this body and the Provisional Government. The object of the Petrograd Council was to undermine all authority and discipline; the object of the Provisional Government was to preserve both in new and agreeable forms. On a deadlock being reached between the rivals, Kerensky, a moderate member of the Council, sided with the Provisional Government and became Minister of Justice. Meanwhile the extremists lay in the midst of the Petrograd Council, but did not at first dominate it. All this was in accordance with the regular and conventional Communist plan of fostering all disruptive movements, especially of the Left and of pushing them continually further until the moment for the forcible supersession of the new government is ripe.

The Revolution of March, 1917.

The Provisional Ministers strutted about the offices and palaces and discharged in an atmosphere of flowery sentiments their administrative duties. These were serious. All authority had been shaken from its foundation; the armies melted rapidly to the rear; the railway carriages were crowded to the roofs and upon the roofs with mutinous soldiers seeking fresh centres of revolt and with deserters trying to get home. The soldiers' and sailors' councils argued interminably over every order. The whole vast country was in confusion and agitation. The processes of supply, whether for the armies or for the cities, were increasingly disjointed. Nothing functioned effectively and everything, whether munitions or food, was either lacking or scarce. Meanwhile the Germans, and farther south the Austrians and the Turks, were battering upon the creaking and quivering fronts by every known resource of scientific war. The statesmen of the Allied nations affected to believe that all was for the best and that the Russian revolution constituted a notable advantage for the common cause.

In the middle of April the Germans took a sombre decision. Ludendorff refers to it with bated breath. Full allowance must be made for the desperate stakes to which the German war leaders were already committed. They were in the mood which had opened unlimited submarine warfare with the certainty of bringing the United States into the war against them. Upon the Western Front they had from the beginning used the most terrible means of offence at their disposal. They had employed poison gas on the largest scale and had invented the "Flammenwerfer." Nevertheless it was with a sense of awe that they turned upon Russia the most grisly of all weapons. They transported Lenin in a sealed truck like a plague bacillus from Switzerland into Russia. Lenin arrived at Petrograd on April 16. Who was this being in whom there

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE CELLAR AT EKATERINBURG.

In this apartment, a cellar in a house at Ekaterinburg, the Czar, the Czarina, and their son and daughters were murdered by the Bolsheviks on July 16, 1918.

Photo: Copyright.

AT TSARSKOE SELO.

The Czar and his daughters during their captivity at Tsarskoe Selo. According to information supplied by a correspondent of the Paris *Journal* the sojourn of the Imperial Family at Tsarskoe Selo was not unpleasant, although, as may be seen from this photograph, a military escort was always in attendance. From the same source it appears that whilst the Czar endured his altered state with every appearance of good humour and resignation, the Czarina seemed to be ill. The children were in good spirits and amused themselves with games Revolutions on the grand scale, such as those in France and Russia, bring in their train suffering and worse to thousands of people. The Russians may be forgiven much. They were as a race sorely tried. Notwithstanding this, the brutal means which the Bolsheviks adopted to rid themselves of their former ruler and his helpless family will not be soon forgotten.

resided these dire potentialities? Lenin was to Karl Marx what Omar was to Mahomet. He translated faith into acts. He devised the practical methods by which the Marxian theories could be applied in his own time. He invented the Communist plan of campaign. He issued the orders, he prescribed the watchwords, he gave the signal and he led the attack.

Lenin.

Lenin was also Vengeance. Child of the bureaucracy, by birth a petty noble, reared by a locally much respected government school inspector, his early ideas turned by not unusual contradictions through pity to revolt extinguishing pity. Lenin had an unimpeachable father and a rebellious elder brother. This dearly loved companion meddled in assassination. He was hanged in 1894. Lenin was then sixteen. He was at the age to feel. His mind was a remarkable instrument. When its light shone it revealed the whole world, its history, its sorrows, its stupidities, its shams, and, above all, its wrongs. It revealed all facts in its focus—the most unwelcome, the most inspiring—with an equal ray. The intellect was capacious and in some phases superb. It was capable of universal comprehension in a degree rarely reached among men. The execution of the elder brother deflected this broad white light through a prism: and the prism was red.

But the mind of Lenin was used and driven by a will not less exceptional. The body tough, square and vigorous in spite of disease was well fitted to harbour till middle age these incandescent agencies. Before they burnt it out his work was done, and a thousand years will not forget it. Men's thoughts and systems in these ages are moving forward. The solutions which Lenin adopted for their troubles are already falling behind the requirements and information of our day. Science irresistible leaps off at irrelevant and henceforth dominating tangents. Social life flows through broadening and multiplying channels. The tomb of the most audacious experimentalist might already bear the placard "Out of date." An easier generation lightly turns the pages which record the Russian Terror. Youth momentarily interested asks whether it was before or after the Great War; and turns ardent to a thousand new possibilities. The educated nations are absorbed in practical affairs. Socialists and Populists are fast trooping back from the blind alleys of thought and scrambling out of the pits of action into which the Russians have blundered. But Lenin has left his mark. He has won his place. And in the cutting off of the lives of men and women no Asiatic conqueror, not Tamerlane, not Jenghiz Khan, can match his fame.

Implacable vengeance, rising from a frozen pity in a tranquil, sensible, matter-of-fact, good-humoured integument! His weapon logic; his mood opportunist. His sympathies cold and wide as the Arctic Ocean; his hatreds tight as the hangman's noose. His purpose to save the world: his method to blow it up. Absolute principles, but readiness to change them. Apt at once to kill or learn: dooms and afterthoughts: ruffianism and philanthropy. But a good husband; a gentle guest; happy, his biographers assure us, to wash up the dishes or dandle the baby; as mildly amused to stalk a capercailzie as to butcher an Emperor. The quality of Lenin's revenge was impersonal. Confronted with the need of killing any particular person he showed reluctance—even distress. But to blot out a million, to proscribe entire classes, to light the flames of intestine war in every land with the inevitable destruction of the well-being of whole nations—these were sublime abstractions.

"A Russian statistical investigation," writes Professor Sarolea, "estimates that the dictators killed 28 bishops, 1,219 priests, 6,000 professors and teachers, 9,000 doctors, 12,950 landowners, 54,000 officers, 70,000 policemen, 193,290 workmen, 260,000 soldiers, 355,250 intellectuals and professional men, and 815,000 peasants."[1] These figures are endorsed by Mr. Hearnshaw, of King's College, London, in his brilliant introduction to "A Survey of Socialism." They do not, of course, include the vast

[1] Sarolea, *Impressions of Soviet Russia* [1924], p. 81.

abridgments of the Russian population which followed from famine.

The Grand Repudiator.

Lenin was the Grand Repudiator. He repudiated everything. He repudiated God, King, Country, morals, treaties, debts, rents, interest, the laws and customs of centuries, all contracts written or implied, the whole structure—such as it is—of human society. In the end he repudiated himself. He repudiated the Communist system. He confessed its failure in an all important sphere. He proclaimed the New Economic Policy and recognized private trade. He repudiated what he had slaughtered so many for not believing. They were right, it seemed, after all. They were unlucky that he did not find it out before. But these things happen sometimes: and how great is the man who acknowledges his mistake! Back again to wash the dishes and give the child a sweetmeat. Thence once more to the rescue of mankind. This time perhaps the shot will be better aimed. It may kill those who are wrong: not those who are right. But after all, what are men? If Imperialism had its cannon food, should the Communist laboratory be denied the raw material for sociological experiment?

When the subtle acids he had secreted ate through the physical texture of his brain Lenin mowed the ground. The walls of the Kremlin were not the only witnesses of a strange decay. It was reported that for several months before his death he mumbled old prayers to the deposed gods with ceaseless iteration. If it be true, it shows that irony is not unknown on Mount Olympus. But this gibbering creature was no longer Lenin. He had already gone. His body lingered for a space to mock the vanished soul. It is still preserved in pickle for the curiosity of the Moscow public and for the consolation of the faithful.

Lenin's intellect failed at the moment when its destructive force was exhausted, and when sovereign remedial functions were its quest. He alone could have led Russia into the enchanted quagmire; he alone could have found the way back to the causeway. He saw; he turned; he perished. The strong illuminant that guided him was cut off at the moment when he had turned resolutely for home. The Russian people were left floundering in the bog. Their worst misfortune was his birth: their next worst—his death.

* * * *

The Liberal Statesmen.

With Lenin had come Zinoviev. Trotsky joined them a month later. It appears that it was actually at the request of the Provisional Government that he was allowed to leave Halifax, Nova Scotia, where he had been shrewdly intercepted by the Canadian authorities. Under the impulsion of these three the differences between the Soviet and the Provisional Government were soon brought to a head.

During May and June the two powers faced each other in armed and brawling antagonism. But the Provisional Government had to maintain the daily life of the nation, to keep order and to produce military victory over the Germans, while the sole immediate aim of the Bolsheviks was a general smash. The eminent Liberal statesmen, Guchkov and Milyukov, well-meaning and unwitting decoy-ducks, soon passed from the scene. They had played their part in the astounding pageant of dissolution now in progress. With the best of motives they had helped to shake old Russia from its foundations; by their example they had encouraged many intelligent and patriotic Russians to put their shoulders to the work. They now found themselves destitute of influence or control. Venerable and in their own way valiant figures they slipped from the stage, a prey to tormenting afterthoughts. Said Guchkov, "It is now to be proved whether we are a nation of free men or a gang of mutinous slaves." But words had ceased to count in the universal chatter.

Kerensky.

However, the agony of Russia did not find her without some last defenders. Among these with all his vanities and self-delusions Kerensky has his place. He was the most extreme of all the

RUSSIA'S PROVIS

M. Kerensky, the Russian Minister of War and the leading spirit in the Russian offensive of July. The names of the Ministers, reading from left to right (beginning with the third figure from the left) Minister) ; M. Kerensky (War) ; Prince Lvoff (Premier and Minister of Interior) ; M. Miliukoff (ex-

immature and amateur politicians included in the Provisional Government. He was one of those dangerous guides in revolutionary times who are always trying to outvie the extremists in order to control them, and always assuring the loyal and moderate elements that they alone know the way to hold the wolf by the ears. Successively he forced changes of policy which moved his colleagues week by week further to the Left. There was a point beyond which Kerensky did not mean to go. Once that point was reached he was ready to resist. But when at last he turned to fight, he found he had deprived himself of every weapon and of every friend.

Kerensky succeeded Guchkov as Minister of War in the middle of May. He became Prime Minister on August 6. The tide of events which had carried him during a summer from a revolutionary to a repressive temper had been strengthened by two personalities. One was the General Kornilov, a patriotic soldier, resolute, popular, democratic ; ready to accept the revolution ; ready to serve the new Russian régime with the loyalty he would more gladly have given to the Czar. Trusted by the troops ; not obnoxious to the politicians of the hour —he seemed to possess many of the qualities, or, at any rate, many of the assets, which a revolutionary government wishing to wage war and to maintain order required in a commander.

Photo: Illustrations Bureau.

GOVERNMENT.

917, is seen (sixth from the left) in this photograph of a Cabinet meeting of the Provisional Government. re: M. Manuiloff (Education Minister); M. Godneff (State Controller); M. Terestchenko (Foreign oreign Minister); M. Nekrassoff (Railways); M. Shingareff (Finance); and M. Konovaloff (Commerce).

Savinkov.

But a more dynamic figure had arisen in the background—Boris Savinkov, the ex-Nihilist, the direct organizer of the pre-war assassinations of M. de Plehve and the Grand Duke Serge, had been recalled from exile in the early days of the revolution. Sent as military commissar to the Fourth Russian Army, he had grappled with mutiny and dissolution with a quality of energy which amid these boorish Russian tumults recalls the tenser spirit of the French Revolution. In so far as comparisons are possible he seems in some respects to resemble in fiction Victor Hugo's Cimourdain, and to some extent in real life St. Just; but with this difference, that while second to none in the ruthlessness of his methods or the intrepidity of his conduct, his composed intellect pursued moderate and even prosaic aims. He was the essence of practicality and good sense expressed in terms of nitroglycerine. Above and beyond the whirling confusion and chaos of the Russian tragedy he sought a free Russia, victorious in the German war, hand in hand with the Liberal nations of the west, a Russia where the peasants owned the land they tilled, where civic rights were defended by the laws, and where parliamentary institutions flourished even in harmony perhaps with a limited monarchy.

This man of extreme action and

sober opinions had risen in two months to a position of central dominance in Russian military affairs. Assistant Minister for War to Kerensky, and in control of the Petrograd garrison, Savinkov had his hand on the vital levers. He knew all the forces at work; he had the root of the matter in him and he shrank from nothing. Would he be allowed to pull the levers, or would they be wrested from his grasp? Would they act or would they break?

Savinkov reached out for Kornilov, he pressed him upon Kerensky as the one indispensable sword. As the result of a prolonged internal struggle at the end of July, even the Petrograd Soviet agreed by a majority to the use of unlimited authority to restore discipline in the army. On August 1, Kornilov became Commander-in-Chief; on September 8 the death penalty for breaches of discipline was restored. But meanwhile the German sledge-hammers were still beating in the front. The Russian summer offensive, Kerensky's supreme effort, had been repulsed with a woeful slaughter of the truest and best. In the middle of July the German counter-offensive had rolled forward, and the towns of Stanislau and Tarnopol were retaken by the Austro-German forces on July 24.

Photo: Wide World.

LEV DAVIDOVITCH TROTSKY.

Trotsky's real name was Leiba Bronstein. He was born in 1877, the son of a Jewish chemist. A noted revolutionary during the Czarist régime, he was twice banished to Siberia. In 1917 Trotsky became a supporter of Lenin and helped him to form the Bolshevist revolutionary committee, of which Lenin became president. Trotsky was made commissary for foreign affairs, and in 1918 became commissary for war. In 1924 he resigned his offices and in 1929 was deported.

The hostile advance continued. On September 1 the German Fleet, in concert with their armies entered the Gulf of Riga. Riga fell on the 3rd. The forlorn nation had to bear simultaneously all that could be done by Ludendorff and all that could be done by Lenin. At the culminating crisis the electric currents fused all the wires, physical and psychological alike. Kornilov revolted against Kerensky; Kerensky arrested Kornilov; Savinkov striving to keep the two together and to fortify the executive power was thrust aside. There was a fleeting interlude of Babel, of courageous hard-won Duma Resolutions, and of Russian Democratic Congress appeals for stability. The Duma, the Parliament of Russia, presented a large anti-Bolshevik majority. The Provisional Government issued manifestoes in favour of a liberal policy and loyalty to the Allies. So far as words and votes would serve, nothing was left undone. Meanwhile the German hammer broke down the front and Lenin blew up the rear.

The Bolshevik Punch.

Who shall judge these harassed champions of Russian freedom and democracy? Were they not set tasks beyond the compass of mortal men? Could any men or any measures have made head at once against the double assault? Politicians and writers in successful nations should not too readily assume their superiority to beings subjected to such pressures. Cæsar, Cromwell, Napoleon, might have been smothered here like Captain Webb in the rapids of Niagara. All broke, all collapsed, all liquefied in universal babble and approaching cannonade, and out of the anarchy emerged the one coherent, frightful entity and fact — the Bolshevik punch.

In the first week of November the Soviets, inspired by a military committee headed by Lenin and Trotsky, claimed supreme power to command the troops and arrest the Ministers. Mutinous warships steamed up the Neva, the troops deserted to the usurpers; the Duma, the All-Russian Democratic Congress, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, still talking and all protesting by substantial majorities, were brushed into the void. The Provisional Government was besieged in the Winter Palace. Kerensky, rushing to the front to gather loyal troops, was deposed by Lenin's proclamation, and on his return was defeated in street fighting by the mutineers. His last defenders were the women and children. The battalion of women and the Cadets of the Military College held unflinching to their posts;

Photo: E.N.A.

LENIN.

Vladimir Ilitch Ulivnoff was born in 1870. He later assumed the name by which he is now known. Like Trotsky, he was a pronounced revolutionary and spent some years in exile in Siberia. He lived for many years in Switzerland and Galicia, and after the Russian Revolution was transported through Germany to Russia, where he began at once to carry out his plans. Opposed to Kerensky, he determined to bring about his downfall, and in November, 1917, having gained the necessary support, felt strong enough to depose the Government and to establish himself as President of the "Council of the People's Commissioners." It is as yet too early to pronounce an impartial judgment upon this remarkable figure, or to form any opinion as to the policy he would have formulated had his life been spared. It is sufficient to say that, whether for good or for ill, he was the outstanding figure of Russia during some of the most eventful years in her history.

Photo: Daily Mirror.

VICTIMS OF THE REVOLUTION.

A scene in the grounds of the Winter Palace at Tsarskoe Selo. In the foreground are the coffins of men who fell fighting for what they believed to be the cause of liberty. Beside the coffins is an open grave, past which Russian troops are marching.

the cadets were shot and the women were defiled so far as was judged necessary by the new ruling intelligences of Russia. The British Court of Appeal subsequently decided that for our domestic purposes the Soviet Government became the *de facto* authority in Russia as from November 14, 1917.

* * * *

The Dictatorship.

Gone for ever was the Empire of Peter the Great, and the long-dreamed-of liberal Russia, and the Duma, and the already summoned Constituent Assembly. Cast into outer darkness with the Czarist Ministers were the Liberal and Radical politicians and reformers. Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, many smaller groups of Socialists; all, especially the most extreme, those nearest in opinion to the Bolsheviks, were marked for destruction. The doctrinal left flank had been turned, and every gradation of political opinion known to men crumpled up almost simultaneously. One sect alone made a momentary stand. The Anarchists, strong in the traditions of Bakunin, conceived themselves unapproachable in extremism. If the Bolsheviks would turn the world upside down, they would turn it inside out; if the Bolsheviks abolished right and wrong, they would abolish right and left. They therefore spoke with confidence and held their heads high. But their case had been carefully studied in advance by the new authorities. No time was wasted in argument. Both in Petrograd and in Moscow they were bombed in their headquarters and hunted down and shot with the utmost expedition.

The Supreme Committee, sub-human or superhuman—which you will—crocodiles with master minds, entered upon their responsibilities upon November 8. They had definite ideas upon immediate policy—"Down with the War," "Down with Private Property," and "Death to all internal Opposition." Immediate peace was to be sought with the foreign enemy and inexpiable war was to be waged against landlords, capitalists and reactionaries. These terms were given the widest interpretation. Quite poor people with only a handful of savings, or a little house, found themselves denounced as "Bourjuis." Advanced Socialists found themselves proscribed as reactionaries. Pending more detailed arrangements, Lenin issued a general invitation to the masses to "Loot the looters." The peasants were encouraged to kill the landlords and seize their estates; and massacre and pillage, collective and individual, reigned sporadically over immense areas.

Peace at any Price.

The domestic programme was thus initiated with remarkable promptitude. The foreign situation was more intractable. Lenin and his confederates began their task in the belief that they could appeal by wireless telegraphy to the peoples of every warring State over the heads of their governments. They did

not, therefore, contemplate at the outset a separate peace. They hoped to procure under the lead of Russia and under the impact of the Russian desertion a general cessation of hostilities, and to confront every government, Allied and enemy alike, with revolt in their cities and mutiny in their armies.

Many tears and guttural purrings were employed in inditing the decree of peace. An elevated humanitarianism, a horror of violence, a weariness of carnage breathed in their appeal—for instance the following:—" . . . Labouring peoples of all countries, we are stretching out in brotherly fashion our hands to you over the mountains of corpses of our brothers. Across rivers of innocent blood and tears, over the smoking ruins of cities and villages, over the wreckage of treasures of culture, we appeal to you for the re-establishment and strengthening of international unity." But the Petrograd wireless stirred the ether in vain. The Crocodiles listened attentively for the response; but there was only silence. Meanwhile the new régime was sapiently employed in securing intimate and effectual control of the Czarist police and secret police.

By the end of a fortnight the Bolsheviks abandoned the plan of " peace over the heads of the governments with the nations revolting against them." On November 20 the Russian High Command was ordered to " propose to the enemy military authorities immediately to cease hostilities and enter into negotiations for peace," and on November 22 Trotsky served the Allied Ambassadors in Petrograd with a note proposing an " immediate armistice on all fronts and the immediate opening of peace negotiations." Neither the Ambassadors nor their governments attempted any reply.

The Russian Commander-in-Chief, the aged General Dukhonin, refused to enter into communication with the

Photo: E.N.A.

THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK.

Prince Leopold of Bavaria is signing the Treaty. On his left sits the able General Hoffmann, of whom mention has frequently been made in this account. The numbered figures are: (1) Kameneff (Russia); (2) Joffe (Leader of the Russian Delegation); (3) Mme. A. A. Biecenko (a member of the Russian Delegation); (4) Rear-Admiral Altvater (Russia); (5) Lipsky (Captain of the Russian General Staff); (6) Karachin (Secretary of the Russian Delegation); (7) Fokke (Lieutenant-Colonel of the Russian General Staff); (8) Zeki Pasha (Head of the Turkish Delegation); (9) von Méry (Austro-Hungarian Ambassador); (10) Prince Leopold of Bavaria (Commander of the Austro-German forces on the Eastern Front); (11) Major-General Hoffmann (Chief of Staff); (12) Colonel Gantscheff (of the Bulgarian Delegation); (13) Naval Captain Horn; (14) Captain Hey (of the German General Staff); (15) Major Brinkmann (of the German General Staff); (16) Major Kameke; (17) Captain von Rosenberg; (18) Major Mirbach.

enemy. He was instantly superseded at the head of the Russian armies by a subaltern officer, Ensign Krilenko, who delivered the arrested general to be torn to pieces by a mutinous mob. The request for an armistice was then made to the Central Powers. These Powers also remained for a time plunged in silence. The promise of "an immediate peace" had, however, to be made good at all costs by the Bolshevik Government, and orders were issued to the army at the front for "compulsory fraternization and peace with the Germans by squads and companies." All military resistance to the conqueror thenceforward became impossible. On November 28 the Central Powers announced that they were ready to consider armistice proposals. On December 2 firing ceased on the long Russian fronts, and the vast effort of the Russian peoples sank at last into silence and shame.

* * * *

Brest-Litovsk.

Three months' negotiations were required before the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed. The Bolshevik leaders found this period filled with disappointing experiences. They asked for a six-months' armistice; all they could obtain was a month's respite denunciable at a week's notice. They wished to have the negotiations transferred to a neutral capital like Stockholm; this was refused. They sought to explain with their usual volubility to the conquerors, themselves desperate, the political principles on which human society should be conducted. "But, pray, dear Sirs," asked the German General Hoffman, "what do we care for your principles?" An inconsistent flicker of faith to the Allies led them to request that no German or Austrian troops should during the armistice be transferred from the east to the west. To this the Germans agreed, and at once began transporting their troops uninterruptedly to France. By the end of December such illusions as with singular credulity the Bolsheviks had nursed were at an end. They found themselves confronted with Force, armed and resolute; and they knew that they had rendered Russia incapable of resistance.

Bolshevik Disillusionment.

Nevertheless, when the meaning of the Peace terms came home to this strange band of revolutionaries, a spasm of revolt, impotent but intense, shook their conclaves. The cruder spirits raved against Prussian Imperialism; the more subtle vented their bitterness in sarcastic newspaper articles. Trotsky and Zinoviev had indulged in imprudent mockery and empty threats. "A time would come, Ha! Ha!" etc. "The destiny of mighty peoples," said Trotsky, "cannot be determined by the temporary condition of their technical apparatus." The Germans remained rigorously impassive. They received equally with the Bolshevik delegation representatives of a separate Ukraine Government. Vainly the Bolsheviks protested that they and they alone spoke for all the Russias. The Germans brushed their expostulations aside. Whatever else miscarried, the Central Powers meant to have the corn and the oil of the Ukraine and the Caucasus, and elaborate agreements to secure all they required without payment were presented to the new Ministers of the Russian people.

At the end of December the negotiations were suspended and the Bolshevik delegates returned home to consult with their confederates. Some details of this new debate in pandemonium have been preserved. Trotsky, in the rôle of Moloch, urged the renewal of the war, and the majority of the secret assembly seemed to share his passion. The calm, sombre voice of Lenin rallied them to their duty in a Belial discourse of eighteen theses:

"I should be much for open war, O! Peers,
As not behind in hate." . . .

But how could they resist? The armies were gone, the Allies estranged, the fleet in mutiny, Russia in chaos! Even flight over the vast spaces still at their disposal could not last long. And was not something more precious than the fate of Russia at stake? Was there not the Communist Revolution? Could they fight the Bourjuis at home if they wasted their remaining strength upon withstanding the foreign invader?

Geographical boundaries, political allegiances were not so important after all to

Internationalists striving for world-wide revolution. Let them make themselves supreme and unchallengeable in whatever territories might still be left to Russia, and from this as a base spread the social war through every land. The arguments of Lenin prevailed. He did not even wait to hear rejoinders, but sat, according to an English eyewitness, cool and unconcerned in an ante-room while his followers frothed and raged inside. The most that Trotsky could obtain was the formula, " No war, no peace." The Soviets would submit, but they would not sign. On February 10 Trotsky stated by wireless " that in refusing to sign a peace with annexations Russia declares on its side that the state of war with Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria has ended. The Russian troops are receiving at the same time an order for a general demobilization on all lines of the fronts."

The German Advance.

But this was not good enough for the Germans ; they allowed a week to pass in silence, and on February 17 declared abruptly that the armistice was at an end and that the German armies would advance along the whole front at daybreak. Trostsky's ululations that they should have had at least a further week's notice were drowned in cannon fire. From Reval to Galatz on a front of a thousand miles, the German and Austrian armies rolled forward. There still remained a ragged line of troops in various stages of decomposition and of officers faithful to the end. All these were now swept away without the slightest difficulty. The whole front was destroyed, 1,350 guns were captured in a single day, together with masses of material and prisoners in a German advance of about 20 miles. The town of Dvinsk, the principal objective, was captured the same evening, and on the 19th the Soviets made absolute submission. Trotsky yielded the Foreign Office to the more pacific Chicherin, and on March 3 the peace treaties were signed.

Effect of the Treaty.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk stripped Russia of Poland, Lithuania and Courland ; of Finland and the Aaland Islands ; of Esthonia and Livonia ; of the Ukraine ; and, lastly, in the Caucasus, of Kars, Ardahan and Batum.

" This is a peace," said the Soviet wireless, " not based upon a free agreement but dictated by force of arms . . . which Russia grinding its teeth is compelled to accept. . . . The Soviet Government being left to its own forces is unable to withstand the armed onrush of German Imperialism and is compelled for the sake of saving Revolutionary Russia to accept the conditions put before her."

Said Lenin some years later, " We must have the courage to face the unadorned bitter truth, we must size up in full to the very bottom the abyss of defeat, partition, enslavement and humiliation into which we have been thrown." It is not possible to better these descriptions of the first boon which Lenin conferred upon the Russian nation. In Mr. Buchan's well-weighed words : " They " (the Bolsheviks) " lost for Russia 26 per cent. of her total population, 27 per cent. of her arable land, 32 per cent. of her average crops, 26 per cent. of her railway system, 33 per cent. of her manufacturing industries, 73 per cent. of her total iron production and 75 per cent. of her coalfields. So much for the policy of ' No annexations.' They had saddled themselves with a gigantic but as yet unassessed payment by way of war tributes, and had been compelled to grant free export of oils and a preferential commercial treaty. So much for ' No Indemnities.' They had placed under German rule fifty-five millions of unwilling Slavs. So much for ' Self-Determination.' "

If to-day these consequences have been to any extent modified, and if the Soviet Republic is independent of German tutelage and systematic exploitation, it is because the democracies of the west and across the Atlantic, undismayed by Russian desertion, continued to uphold the common cause. It was upon them that the re-gathered might of Germany was now to fall.

CHAPTER LXXXIII

INTERVENTION

Kornilov and Alexeiev on the Don—The Rise of the Russian Volunteer Army—The Munitions at Archangel—Grave Situation in the West—American-Japanese See-Saw—A New Feature: Professor Masaryk—The Czecho-Slovak Army Corps—The Bolshevik Treachery—Astounding Retaliation—Allied Intervention in Siberia—The Omsk Government—A Surprising Transformation—The Baltic States—Finland—Poland—Pilsudski—The Ukraine—German Efficiency—Bessarabia.

THE Bolshevik truce and later peace with the Central Powers produced a far-reaching reaction in Russia.

Kornilov and Alexeiev on the Don.

On the same day that hostilities were suspended (December 2, 1917), Generals Kornilov, Alexeiev and Denikin raised a counter-revolutionary standard on the Don. Each had made his way to this refuge among the loyal Cossacks by routes of various hazards. There among the rude surroundings of a primitive and loyal-hearted population these military leaders presented a rallying-point for all that was noblest in Old Russia. What was their political authority? The Imperial régime was discredited with all classes. The Czar had abdicated and was already approaching the slaughter-house of Ekaterinburg. Bolshevism still masqueraded as democratic progress carried in the pressure of events to a violent manifestation.

In the domestic sphere nothing could stand against "The land for the peasant," "Soviets for all." But the safety and integrity of Russia against the invader, and the honour of the Russian name plighted to the Allies, were impulsive and commanding notes to sound. True, they appealed only to individuals, and these were scattered along the immense fronts and vast spaces of the interior. But the trumpet call was carried by the wind across the steppes and echoed by the mountains, and everywhere, in every class, in every town, in every village there were ears to hear it. If world revolution had reared its head, world civilization was still in the field. More than twenty States and peoples spread over five continents were marching against the Central Empires that had laid Russia low. All the seas of the world bore their unimpedible ships to the western battlefields. Mighty America, far across the ocean, resounded with a clang of reinforcing preparation. Statesmen, whose names were household words, stood at the head of vast organizations. Although Russia had been struck down and battered, the Cause continued. Despotic governments should be destroyed and not replaced by other tyrannies in other forms. For these Russian patriots there was also the honour of the Russian arms and the inheritance of Peter the Great to guard or to die in guarding.

The Rise of the Russian Volunteer Army.

The rise and achievements of the Russian Volunteer Army should certainly form the theme of an historical monograph to be read with gratitude by all their comrades in the British Empire, in France, in Italy and in the United States, as well as in the smaller States whose freedom is safe to-day. As news of the mutilations of the Russian Fatherland, and of the shame in which it had been involved, gradually permeated the enormous Empire the knowledge of disaster which appalled the many animated the few. Twenty unknown battles, comparable to the fights of Garibaldi or Hofer or de Larocheja-

quelein against astounding odds, marked the growth of a troop of desperate refugees into a substantial military entity. One by one the leaders fell. Kornilov was killed at the end of March. Kaledin, the leader of the Don Cossacks, committed suicide after a temporary defeat.

The heaviest loss of all was Alexeiev, a strategist of the rank of Foch and Ludendorff, long versed in the highest affairs of the Russian State. He survived the hardships of the struggle only until September, 1918, when he was succeeded by Denikin, who possessed both the qualities and limitations of a tough, sensible, steady and honourable military man. In the ups and downs of civil war the Russian Volunteer Army widely extended the limits of its authority during the latter part of 1918; but

Photo: E.N.A.

GENERAL KORNILOV.

Lavr Georgievitch Kornilov was born in Siberia in 1870. The son of a Cossack officer, he entered the Russian Army and saw service in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, having previously gained experience fighting as a volunteer on the side of the Boers in the South African War. He served with distinction in the Great War, particularly in the final offensive of the Russians in 1917. He was removed from his command by Kerensky and later, in 1918, was killed in Caucasia during operations against the Bolsheviks.

Photo: E.N.A.

GENERAL ALEXEIEV.

The son of a private soldier, Michail Alexeiev entered the army and first saw service in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–8. Thereafter his rise was sure and steady. At the outbreak of the Great War Alexeiev was chief of staff to General Ivanoff, a position he had achieved by sheer merit. He served throughout the war and during Kerensky's period of office was Commander-in-Chief. When Lenin seized power in November, 1917, Alexeiev joined forces with Kornilov and other moderate leaders in an attempt to overcome the Bolsheviks. He died in Caucasia on September 25, 1918.

Photo: E.N.A.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIAN TROOPS AT VLADIVOSTOCK.

The amazing story in the text in which the achievements of the Czecho-Slovakian troops in Russia are recounted is one of the most interesting in the history of the Great War. This small army, a mere handful of 60,000, some of whom are shown above at Vladivostock, proved themselves more than a match for the treacherous rabble by which they were surrounded. At one period they controlled something like a million square miles of Russian territory.

for a more detailed account of its adventures and achievements our retrospect can find no place. While all else was at first disputed and confused, a sense of association with the great world outside was a sure foundation upon which the authority of the counter-revolutionary leaders could rest, and this association was soon to take a practical form.

The Munitions at Archangel.

At the time of the Revolution, France, Britain and the United States were engaged in supplying munitions to Russia on a gigantic scale. These munitions had been purchased by Russia, Czarist and Revolutionary, upon loans. More than 600,000 tons of military material, apart from an equal quantity of coal, had been landed at Archangel and Murmansk. Thither, in the days of the Czar, a railway 800 miles long from Petrograd had been built by the unrecorded sufferings of multitudes of war prisoners. The munitions and supplies lay stranded on the quays. The Bolshevik Government had repudiated all the loans by which they had been purchased. They were, therefore, in equity the property of the Allies. But a far more urgent question was, " Into whose hands would they fall ? "

A similar situation obtained at Vladivostok, where enormous importations had been made by the Americans and Japanese. Was all this mass of deadly material to replenish the arsenals of the Central Powers and prolong the war in indefinite slaughter ? Ought it even to enable a recreant government, traitor to the Allies and the avowed foe of every civilized institution, to crush every form

of opposition to its absolute sway? These issues arose in the winter of 1917; they became vital even before the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed.

The terms of the Treaty made it plain that the blockade of the Central Powers on which such immense naval efforts had been concentrated was to a large extent broken. The Germans obviously had Russia at their disposal.

The granaries of the Ukraine and Siberia, the oil of the Caspian, all the resources of a vast continent could, it seemed to us, henceforth be drawn upon to nourish and maintain the German armies now increasing so formidably in the west, and the populations behind them. Germany had, in fact, achieved in the early months of 1918 all and more than she might have won two years before had Falkenhayn not imprudently preferred to break his teeth on the stones of Verdun. How far or how soon these reliefs could become effective was uncertain; but the subsidiary arrangements made with the Ukraine revealed the immediate German intention of overrunning that country and drawing from it the largest quantities of supplies. No one at this time saw any prospect of a speedy end to the war, and there seemed no reason to doubt that the Germans and Austrians would have the time—as they certainly had the power—to draw new life almost indefinitely from the giant Empire prostrated before them.

Grave Situation in the West.

Finally, the Germans were in process of transporting 70 divisions, comprising more than a million men, and 3,000 guns with all their munitions from the Russian to the Western Front. The Austrians had similarly reinforced their Italian front and further reinforcements were moving westward in a continuous stream. The French Army had scarcely recovered from the mutinies of 1917 and the British, in their efforts to take the pressure off the French and secure them a breathing space, had bled



Photo: Manuel

PROFESSOR MASARYK.

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, the first president of the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, was born in 1850. In 1891 he was elected a member of the Austrian Reichsrath but resigned two years later. In 1907 he was re-elected. At the outbreak of the Great War Masaryk escaped from Austria and for some years lived in London, during which he never ceased to work for Bohemia. At the end of the war Professor Masaryk took a leading part in the representations which gained for Czecho-Slovakia the recognition of the Allies.

themselves white in ceaseless offensives from Arras to Paschendaele. Such was the dark situation on the morrow of the Russian collapse. It was soon to become even graver in the explosion of the greatest battles ever fought.

The reconstitution of an Eastern Front against Germany and the withholding of Russian supplies from the Central Powers seemed even from the end of 1917 vital to win the war. The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council accordingly recommended, on December 23, that all national troops in Russia who were determined to continue the war should be supported by every means in our power. In Siberia one ally above all others could act with swiftness and overwhelming power. Japan was near, fresh, strong, ready, and intimately affected. The counter-argument was weighty. If Japan was loosed against Russia the Bolsheviks, with the support of the Russian people, might, it was said, actually join hands with Germany against the Allies.

The Japanese showed themselves not unwilling to make exertions. They were prepared to take control of a considerable section of the Siberian railway. But they said that American participation would be unpopular in Japan. On December 31 the British Government opened these possibilities to President Wilson. The United States expressed themselves averse from either solitary intervention by Japan or combined intervention by America and Japan. The Japanese were offended by this attitude, which the British Government at first felt bound to endorse. They thought they ought to be entrusted with any intervention at Vladivostok which might be agreed upon, since the development of hostile German influence on the shores of the Pacific would be a

Photo: Daily Mail.

A COMPOSITE UNIT AT VLADIVOSTOCK.

Men of three allied nations on parade at Vladivostock. Czech soldiers and Japanese and British sailors landed from ships lying in the harbour were among those responsible for controlling the situation in the far east of Russia.

Photo: Central News.

ON THE MURMANSK FRONT.

British bluejackets guarding railway engines wrecked by the Bolsheviks at Saroka, the advanced base of the Murmansk front. This front was fed by a single line of railway which passed over a considerable number of bridges and was therefore extremely vulnerable.

peculiar menace to Japan. The British Government, with the support of the French, at the end of January decided to propose that Japan should be invited to act as the mandatory of the Allies. President Wilson remained adverse to all intervention and especially to isolated action by Japan. The Japanese, on the other hand, stipulated that if Japan were to act as mandatory for the Powers she must receive American aid in gold and steel.

American-Japanese See-Saw.

The shock of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Ludendorff's swiftly following onslaught in the west, and the intense crisis which resulted, extorted from the two desperately struggling Allies increasingly vehement appeals. President Wilson, however, remained unconvinced. For four precious months a see-saw process between Japan and America continued, in which one or the other successively demurred to every variant proposed by the French and British. However, the terrible conflict in France and Belgium and the increasing German exploitation of Russia presented arguments of inexorable force.

They were aided from an unexpected quarter. Trotsky was now Minister of War, and with remarkable energy was creating a Red Army to defend alike the Revolution and Russia. On March 28 he informed our representative at Moscow, Mr. Lockhart, that he saw no objection to Japanese forces entering Russia to resist German aggression if the other Allies co-operated and certain guarantees were given. He asked for a British Naval Commission to reorganize the Russian Black Sea Fleet and for a British officer to control the Russian railways. Lastly, even Lenin was said to be not opposed to foreign intervention against the Germans, subject to guarantees against interference in Russian politics. Every effort was made by the British to obtain a formal invitation from the Bolshevik leaders. This would have been all important in overcoming the reluctance of the United States. Probably the Bolsheviks were only manœuvring to gain a measure of external sanction for their régime in its early days and to baffle and divide the patriotic

antagonisms which were arming against them. Something else was needed to clinch the issue and bring the five great Allies into practical agreement. This new incentive was now to be supplied.

A New Feature : Professor Masaryk.

There suddenly appeared in Russia a foreign factor, unique in character and origin. On the outbreak of war a number of Czecho-Slovaks resident in Russia had voluntarily entered the Russian army. A body of Czecho-Slovak prisoners of war had enlisted in the Serbian voluntary division in the Dobrudja. Czecho-Slovaks had also deserted in considerable numbers and joined their compatriots in the Russian army both during the early months of the war and notably after Brusilov's victory on the Styr in 1916. These men had followed the guidance of the venerable Professor Masaryk, who had lived in London during 1914, '15 and '16 as a refugee from Austrian animosity, and kept alive the conception not only of Bohemian nationality but of a considerable Czecho-Slovak state.

The bond was purely of intellect and sentiment, but it proved in men of high morale superior to all the strains of this exceptional time. These soldiers, separated from their homes and families by immense distances, by a world of war and infinite confusion, and finally by the offences they had committed against the Austrian Government, preserved a disciplined comprehension of national and international causes and were entirely immune from all local Russian influence. The Czar's Government had embodied the Czecho-Slovaks as military units in the Russian army, but it had regarded with some misgiving the loyalty of foreigners who had denied the authority of their legal sovereign. After the outbreak of the Russian revolution, however, Professor Masaryk went to Russia, brought about the consolidation of all Czecho-Slovak units in one force, placed them under the red and white flag of Bohemia, and procured for them in Paris the status of an Allied army. From the moment of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk they held themselves fully armed at the disposition of the Allies for the general purposes of the war.

On a much larger scale and with the necessary differentiations they resembled the Scottish Archers of Louis XI and the Irish Brigade of Sarsfield, or the Swiss Guard of Louis XVI and, like them, far from home and all that home means, surrounded by alien people whose passions did not stir and whose habits did not attract them, they lived a life by themselves. But in contrast to their forerunners they were linked with what had by now become almost a world cause in which they steadfastly persevered. By a continued collective study of the course of the war, by constant gymnastics and intense group-consciousness they held their heads high through all the welter : and in the crash of the Russian Empire remained

> "Among innumerable foes unmoved,
> Unshaken, unseduced, unterrified."

The Czecho-Slovak Army Corps.

When the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ended the Russian resistance to Germany the Czecho-Slovak Army demanded to be transported to the Western Front. The Bolsheviks were equally anxious that they should leave Russia. A free exit was promised to the Czechs by the Bolshevik Commander-in-Chief and embodied in a formal agreement between the Allies and the Soviet Government in Moscow on March 26. The Siberian railway offered the safest route and the Czechs began their journey by Kursk, Penza, Cheliabinsk and Samara. They had started with 42,500 men, but their numbers were increased as they proceeded by fresh recruits from among the Czecho-Slovak prisoners of war to a total of about 60,000.

The Bolshevik Treachery.

It was natural that the Germans should view these arrangements with disapproval. To prevent the manhood of two army corps of trustworthy troops from being transported round the world to the Western Front became an object of urgent consequence to the enemy General Staff. Exactly what pressures they put upon the Soviet authorities is not yet known. At any rate they were effective. Lenin and Trotsky freed themselves from their engagements to the

Czechs by treachery. Measures were rapidly taken under German direction to intercept and capture the Czech troops on their long journey. Many thousands of German and Austrian prisoners in Russian hands were hurriedly armed and, under the supervision of German officers, began to assume military formations. While Trotsky on the one hand was settling with Mr. Lockhart in detail the safe conduct of the Czechs through Russia, he was also moving his Red Guard forces to their appropriate stations.

Astounding Retaliation.

On May 26 the first echelon of Czecho-Slovak artillery arrived at Irkutsk. Their agreement with the Bolsheviks had left them only thirty carbines and some grenades for personal self-defence. When the trains steamed into the station the Czechs found themselves in the presence of a large and greatly superior force of Red Guards. They were ordered to surrender their few remaining arms within a period of fifteen minutes. While the Czechs, nearly all of whom were unarmed, were discussing the situation on the railway-station platform, a machine gun fired upon them from the station building. The Czechs did not succumb. The training of the Red Army at this time had not progressed beyond a knowledge of Communism, the execution of prisoners and ordinary acts of brigandage and murder. In a few minutes with their thirty carbines and hand-grenades the Czechs not only defeated but captured and disarmed their despicable assailants. Equipped with the captured weapons they overcame a few days later new forces sent against them by the local Soviet, and reported what had occurred to their army headquarters.

The whole of the Czech troops thereupon ceased to deliver up their arms, and wherever they stood assumed an attitude of active self-defence which passed quite rapidly into a vigorous counter-attack. Their very dispersion now became the foundation of an extraordinary power. Eleven thousand had already arrived at Vladivostok, the rest were scattered all along the Trans-Siberian railway and its subsidiary lines from a hundred miles west of the Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. By June 6, 1918, they were in possession of all the railway stations between Omsk and Krasnoyarsk. Their comrades still in European Russia had gained corresponding successes. Their control of the vital communications rapidly extended eastward to Nijni-Udinsk and Penza in the west.

On June 28 they assumed control of Vladivostok; by July 6 they were moving out of Nikolsk towards Harbin and Habarovsk. They took charge of Irkutsk on July 13. By the third week of July an immense area of Russia, several hundred miles broad and 3,000 miles long, including the backbone connections from the Volga River almost to Lake Baikal, was in the effectual possession of these strangers thus foully attacked when seeking to leave the country in virtue of signed agreements. The pages of history recall scarcely any parallel episode at once so romantic in character and so extensive in scale.

We may anticipate the culmination of this effort. Those Czechs who had already reached and made themselves masters of Vladivostok, determined to return to the rescue of their compatriots cut off in Central Siberia, and by about the middle of September, 1918, railway communication had again been established along the whole Trans-Siberian route. Thus, through a treacherous breach of faith, by a series of accidents and chances which no one in the world had foreseen, the whole of Russia, from the Volga River to the Pacific Ocean, a region almost as large as the continent of Africa, had passed as if by magic into the control of the Allies.

The message sent by the Czecho-Slovak Army to Professor Masaryk in the United States at the end of July epitomizes the situation. "In our opinion it is most desirable and also possible to reconstruct a Russian-German front in the East. We ask for instructions as to whether we should leave for France or whether we should stay here to fight for Russia at the side of the Allies and of Russia. The health and spirits of our troops are excellent." The Czecho-Slovak National Council residing at Washington on this observed: "Professor Masaryk has since then



RUSSIA AND

Map showing the approximate distribution of troops on November 11, 1918, throughout the confronting the Allies will be readily appreciated. Whereas a huge area of the country was on the map –in which stands Petrograd and Moscow was ringed about by the Bolsheviks. The



THERN ASIA.

vast country which is Russia. By using the scale of miles given on the map the difficulties in the hands of White Russians, of Czechs and Allied troops, the highly important area—shaded positions, descriptions and approximate number of each body of troops are clearly plotted.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

SLEIGH CONVOY.

Any campaign conducted in Russia depends for success upon a knowledge of conditions, most of which are unfamiliar to troops from milder climates. Many photographs of transport employed on the Western Front and elsewhere have appeared in this work, but possibly this column of pony-sleighs, essential in a snow-bound land, may prove of some interest.

instructed the forces in Siberia to remain there for the present. . . . The Czecho-Slovak Army is one of the Allied armies and it is as much under the orders of the Versailles War Council as the French or American Army. No doubt the Czecho-Slovak boys in Russia are anxious to avoid participation in a possible civil war in Russia, but they realize at the same time that by staying where they are they may be able to render far greater service both to Russia and the Russian cause than if they were transported to France. They are at the orders of the Supreme Council of the Allies."

* * * *

Allied Intervention in Siberia.

These astonishing events as they proceeded were decisive upon the action of the great Allies. On July 2, 1918, the Supreme War Council had made from Versailles a further appeal to President Wilson to agree to the support of the Czech forces. The President thereupon proposed the dispatch of an international force of British, Japanese and United State troops, avowedly to restore and preserve the communications of the Czechs. The next day the British Government, in concert with their Allies, resolved to extend to them military help. On July 5 the United States announced that they had decided upon a limited intervention in Siberia " for the purpose of rendering protection to the Czecho-Slovaks against the Germans and to assist in the efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be ready to accept assistance." They also proposed to send a detachment of the Young Men's Christian Association to offer moral guidance to the Russian people.

Two Japanese divisions, 7,000 Americans and two British battalions, under the command of Colonel Johnson and of Colonel John Ward, a Labour Member of Parliament, 3,000 French and Italians, all under the supreme command of Japan, were set in motion, landed as rapidly as possible at Vladivostok and proceeded westward along the railway. Concurrently with this an international force of 7,000 or 8,000 men, mainly British, and all under British command, disembarked in June and July at Murmansk and Archangel. They were welcomed by the inhabitants, who expelled the Bolsheviks and formed a local administration. Agreements were signed between this Northern Government and the British

commander whereby the local authorities undertook to assist the Allies to defeat German aggression, and the Allied Governments became responsible for finance and food.

In Siberia within the widespread picket line—for it was little more—of the Czecho-Slovaks, an Anti-Bolshevik Russian Government began to organize itself at Omsk. Broadly speaking, Siberia bore the same relation to Russia as Canada does to Great Britain. The apparition of the Czechs, their sudden extraordinary activity and success, their manifest personal superiority to the armed political rabble of Bolshevism, had created an enormous enclave in *Sovdepia*, within which a Russian administration and military organization could be set on foot on a considerable scale.

The Omsk Government.

In the summer of 1918 a provisional Government was formed at Omsk, aiming primarily at the convocation of a constituent assembly for all Russia. This Government passed through various transformations during its tenure. It reflected the chaos reigning throughout Russia when everybody was eager to talk and many were ready to kill, and no large body of persons could be got to agree upon anything for any reasonable space of time. Even before the Armistice cast its fatal depression upon all anti-Bolshevik movements, the tide of Siberian fortunes had begun to ebb. The Czechs were already wearying somewhat in well-doing. Their toils were ceaseless and their dangers increasing. Their own political opinions were of an advanced character, and accorded ill with White Russian views. They were, moreover, exasperated by constant contact with Russian instability and mismanagement. Their far-spread southern line in October, 1918, had been forcibly contracted by Red pressure in front and around them.

Already, also, by September, 1918, there were two governments functioning side by side at Omsk—one for Siberia and the other claiming to be an all-Russian body. Meanwhile, Cossack and anti-Bolshevik officers had been energetically raising armed forces. As these forces grew in size and influence they overshadowed both these mushroom administrations. It became increasingly evident that all would have soon to fight for their lives, and in these straits the military point of view quickly became predominant. The original Omsk Government yielded readily to this new pressure; its brother government, on the contrary, became a hotbed of socialist

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

BRITISH SOLDIERS IN NORTH RUSSIA.

In a camp on the British Front in North Russia. The inevitable game of football is in progress, as is the case wherever British troops are gathered together.

conspiracy. The rival administrations counterworked each other. The futility of these proceedings in the face of impending slaughter led to a military *coup d'état*. On November 17, a week after the Armistice, the leaders of the new armies forcibly appropriated one government and arrested the principal members of the other. They decided, probably wisely in the desperate circumstances, to concentrate all power in the hands of one man. They found this man in Admiral Koltchak, the former commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

At the same time, far to the south in the Province of Don, the Russian Volunteer Army, now under Denikin, had already made itself master of a large and fertile area, and before the end of the year was destined to advance to Ekaterinodar after an operation in which over 30,000 Bolsheviks were made prisoners.

A Surprising Transformation.

Such was the surprising transformation of the Russian situation which followed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The snows of winter war had whitened five-sixths of Red Russia, but the springtime of Peace, for all others a blessing, was soon to melt it all again.

* * * *

The Baltic States.

To the preoccupations which these developments caused the Allies another set of problems was added. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had formally detached from the Russian Empire all her western provinces. The Germans evidently had in mind the creation of a chain of buffer states carved out of the Russian Empire to guard their eastern marches. We saw reproduced in the twentieth century, and five hundred miles farther east, a new version of Napoleon's plan for a Confederation of the Rhine. Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russian Poland, the Ukraine, Bessarabia, the Caucasus, were all to exercise under the guidance of a victorious Germany, and in repulsion from a defeated and Communist Russia, the power of self-determination. They were to owe their liberty, if not their independence, to Germany, and the Russian Empire was to be stripped, by one sabre-cut drawn across the map of Europe from Helsingfors to Batoum and Baku, of all the conquests of Peter and Catherine the Great. Lenin and Trotsky had agreed to this.

Imperial Germany had now disappeared; the mighty centre of the whole new system had been destroyed. Germany had yielded herself, disarmed and helpless, at the disposal of the conquerors, and her part for the time being was punctually to obey the orders they might give. Therefore all these States were released almost at a stroke alike from their old allegiance and from their new. For several months the light of coming events had shone with increasing plainness. From August, 1918, onwards the defeat of the Central Powers was certain; the only questions were how complete it would be and how long delayed. Everyone wanted to get out of Bolshevik Russia, and to the desire for racial or national independence was added resolve to escape from a frightful reversion to barbarism and terror.

The movement of opinion in every one of these countries was passionately decisive. Esthonia declared independence on November 28, 1917; Finland on December 6; the Ukraine on December 18; Latvia on January 12, 1918; Lithuania on February 16, 1918. On April 9 Bessarabia contracted a union with Roumania subject to autonomy; on April 22 the Transcaucasian Council declared the complete independence of its Federal Republic and claimed to place its territory outside the operation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. At the end of May the Transcaucasian Federal Government dissolved into its constituent elements; Georgia formed an independent national government; the Armenian National Council assumed charge in Armenia; the Tartar National Council proclaimed the independence of Azerbaijan. All these movements may be said to have originated in the prospect of a war settlement in which Germany would have been the greatest power in Europe. They were now stimulated by the growing fear of Bolshevik aggression,

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

MULE OF A MOUNTAIN BATTERY.

This photograph, together with that reproduced below, was taken during the campaign in North Russia. A mule of a 3·7 Howitzer Mountain Battery is shown ready to move. Each pack-mule carries sections of the gun, which can be quickly off-loaded and assembled for action.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

READY FOR ACTION.

3·7 mountain howitzer assembled and ready to go into action. Guns of this type are of exceptional value in country where mobility is of the first importance. Another type of mountain gun is shown in the illustration given on page 709.

which Germany was no longer likely to hold in check.

As, therefore, the power of Germany waned and when she suddenly collapsed entirely, every one of these States transferred their hopes and their loyalty to the league of victorious democracies which, from across the Atlantic Ocean and the English Channel, and over the battle lines in France and Italy, poured an irresistible avalanche of flame and steel upon the recoiling German-Austrian fronts. And when in the end all resistance fell in one stupendous crash, it was to the triumphant western allies that all these peoples and embryo governments rallied with joy and conviction.

Finland.

However, this transition did not take place without opposition. The Bolsheviks who, on January 4, had joined with the French and Swedish Governments in recognizing the independence of Finland, invaded Finland and captured Helsingfors on January 28, 1918.

This was no ordinary war of troops and cannon. The Soviet Red Guards advanced by mob-like methods, and before them, more deadly than carnal weapons, sprang up the local forces of Communist propaganda and revolt. Two horrible pages in Finnish history were successively written. On March 1 a treaty of peace and amity was signed between the Finnish Republic and the Soviet. A Red Terror followed in Finland.

But here the Germans intervened as rescuers. On April 3 a German division landed in Finland under the command of General Von der Goltz; and the anti-Communist Finns under General Mannerheim, an ex-officer of the Russian Imperial Guard, joined them in large numbers. The Soviet forces and local Communists were scattered like chaff, and on April 13 Generals Von der Goltz and Mannerheim reoccupied Helsingfors.

Less than three months of Communist rule had made an impression upon public opinion which a generation will not efface. The Communist flight from the Finnish capital had been hurried; the corpses of the executed bourgeoisie cumbered the courtyards and corridors of the public offices. This dour northern people, roused to fury, took a merciless revenge upon their late oppressors. They were resolved to give them a lesson as lasting as that which they themselves had learned.

A White Terror, certainly not less bloody, succeeded the red. May 7 is regarded as the end of the Finnish civil war, but it was by no means the end of the punishment inflicted not only upon the Finnish Communists but upon many harmless socialists and radicals in the unmeasured and undiscriminating resentment of the victors. So much for Finland.

Immediately south of Finland the three Baltic States of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania found themselves in a peculiarly unhappy position. They were close neighbours on the east to Petrograd and Kronstadt, the nurseries of Bolshevism; on the west to the birthplace and stamping-ground of those Prussian landowners who had proved themselves to be the most rigid element in the German system and one of the most formidable.

During the winter of 1918 and the early summer of 1919, the Baltic States were subjected alternately to the rigours of Prussian and Bolshevik domination. Immediately after the Armistice the retiring Germans mischievously yielded their military material to the Bolsheviks, who quickly overran Esthonia and a large part of Latvia and Lithuania. Assisted by Finnish volunteers and British war material the Esthonians drove back the Bolsheviks at the beginning of February, 1919, but the Letts and Lithuanians were not so successful.

While these events were in progress, the Germans, under Von der Goltz, organized an unauthorized partisan force ultimately numbering 20,000 men, which was intended to turn out the Russians and establish in their stead, and in spite of anything the Peace Conference might decide, a refuge for the distressed nobility of East Prussia. They were temporarily successful, and

exercised like the "free companies" a fierce and adventurous licence until the arrival, in July, of an Allied military mission. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the independence of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania existed for the time being only in the aspirations of their inhabitants and the sympathies of the allied and associated Powers.

Poland.

Let us turn to Poland. In March, 1917, the Russian Provisional Government had, as we have seen, declared that Poland should be "an independent state attached to Russia by a free military union." At Brest-Litovsk Trotsky proposed the independence of Poland, and this was embodied in the Treaty. But the Polish troops in the Russian army were anti-Bolshevik, and the Polish Legion in the Ukraine soon revolted against the Russian Soviet Commissariat supervision of Polish national affairs. The representative in Moscow of the Polish Regency Council was also at once in full clash with the Soviet Government. One of those rugged figures which come to the succour of peoples in tribulation now appeared upon the scene—Josef Pilsudski.

Pilsudski.

Pilsudski was born in Lithuania in October, 1867, and he was, therefore, brought up amongst peasants who had a first-hand recollection of the atrocities committed after the insurrection of 1863. At the age of twenty-two he became involved with Russian revolutionaries and was condemned to five years' deportation to Siberia. He returned to Vilna in 1892, and four years later was again arrested for sedition, but escaped. During these years he was intermittingly linked with Boris Savinkov, and a life-long friendship was formed between the two men. Pilsudski, in consequence of these events, naturally looked on Russia as the principal enemy of his country.

At the outbreak of war in 1914 he devoted himself to raising a volunteer force for use against Russia and made Galicia the base of his operations: but he entered into no engagement with either Germany or Austria. He had no illusions as to what the fate of Poland would be if the Central Powers emerged victorious from the war. While fighting under their ægis against Russia and her allies, he remembered always the ancient Greek saying, "Love as if you shall hereafter hate, and hate as if you shall hereafter love."

The Russian Revolution changed the scene, Czardom disappeared, and the implicit conflict between Pilsudski and the Central Powers became manifest. At the end of July, 1917, he refused to swear allegiance to them. He was imprisoned at Magdeburg. On regaining his liberty immediately after the Armistice of November, 1918, Pilsudski was acclaimed as leader not only by the patriotic military associations which had been growing up during the German occupation, but by the Polish nation as a whole. He proceeded to Warsaw, disarmed the German soldiers left there, and assumed with profound national assent all the powers of the Regency Council. At the end of January, 1919, Pilsudski, retaining in fact dictatorial authority, entrusted the formation of the Government to Paderewski, the great pianist. But the Polish nation had now risen again to its feet. The ancient state, torn into three pieces by Austria, Prussia and Russia, had been liberated from its oppressors and reunited in its integrity after 150 years of bondage and partition.

The Ukraine.

In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks had from the first taken up the challenge of separation. The Germans had signed their separate peace treaty with the Ukrainian Government centred upon Kharkov. But another Ukrainian Government at Kiev, in sympathy with the Bolsheviks, carried on armed resistance, both against counter-revolutionary Kharkov and the arriving Germans seeking corn and oil. The Ukrainian population was distracted by the double collision between anti-Germanism and anti-Communism, between the foreign invader and the domestic infection. These conflicting lines of pitiless quarrel ran through every town, street, village and family, and even individuals were often at a loss to tell which side of their

changing partisanships they hated most.

German Efficiency.

But German efficiency and discipline pushed steadily through all these feeble-passionate cross-currents. With small bodies of good soldiers they rapidly occupied most of the regions necessary to their replenishment. On March 13, 1918, they occupied Odessa; on the 17th, Nikolaev; on April 8 they took Kherson. On the 28th they established a military dictatorship in the Ukraine under their local nominee, General Skoropadski. On May 1 they occupied Sevastopol, seizing part of the Russian Black Sea fleet; on May 8 they took Rostov on the Don. In all these operations, resulting in the effective acquisition of a rich, fertile area the size of a considerable country, not more than five reserve divisions of the German Army were employed.

Everything is relative. Everyone remembers (and tries to forget) the German occupation of Belgium. Here in the Ukraine these same Germans came as deliverers and were spontaneously recognized as such, not only by the general population, but by those patriotic elements most hostile to the invaders of Russia. A dose of Communism induces a desire in any population to welcome any other form—even the harshest—of civilized authority. With the arrival of the German "steel-helmets" life again became tolerable. One had only to submit, keep quiet, and obey: thereafter everything was smooth and efficient.

Better the iron heel of the foreign soldier than unresting persecution by a priesthood of blackguards and fanatics.[1]

Bessarabia.

The situation in Bessarabia was curious and painful in a different way. The remnants of the Roumanian army and leading elements of the Roumanian people found a refuge on Russian territory after the conquest of their native land. They were sheltered by the Czar. The revolution and the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk rendered their position desperate. The old affinity between Roumania and Bessarabia, and the unceasing quarrel between Russia and Roumania about this province since the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, revived simultaneously.

On the same day (January 28) that the Red Guards entered Helsingfors in the north the Bolsheviks declared war upon Roumania. The Roumanians were in no condition to resist, but German authority intervened, and a peace was signed six weeks later. Then in the depth of her suffering, Roumania, captive and ruined, attained her heart's desire. On April 9 Bessarabia proclaimed her unity with Roumania subject to autonomy. The ceaseless advance of the German forces in southern Russia forced the Soviet to content themselves with an empty protest.

Such was the vast panorama of anarchy and confusion, of strife and famine, of obligation and opportunity presented to the western conquerors on Armistice Day.

[1] A moving account of this phase is found in *Once I had a Home, The Diary of Madejda, Lady of Honour to the late Empress of Russia.*

CHAPTER LXXXIV

THE FOURTEEN POINTS

The Impartial Judge—The Fourteen Points—The Armistice Negotiations—Colonel House's Commentary—The Meeting of October 29—Mr. Lloyd George's Refusal—Colonel House's Threat—The Prime Minister Obdurate—Allied Reservations—The Freedom of the Seas—Agreement Reached—The French Plan—The Preliminaries of Peace—President Wilson's Mission—Danger of Delay—The Gap.

PRESIDENT WILSON reached at the Armistice the zenith of his power and fame.

The Impartial Judge.

Since the United States had entered the War in its thirty-second month he had proclaimed more vehemently, and upon occasion more powerfully, than anyone else the righteousness of the Allied cause. Coming into the struggle fresh and cool, he had seemed to pronounce the conclusions of an impartial judge upon the terrible and frantic disputation. High above the swaying conflict, speaking in tones of majesty and simplicity, deeply instructed in all the arts of popular appeal, clad with power unmeasured and certainly unexhausted, he had appeared to the tortured and toiling combatants like a messenger from another planet sent to the rescue of freedom and justice here below. His words had carried comfort to every Allied people, and had been most helpful in silencing subversive peace propaganda in all its forms.

The Fourteen Points.

From time to time during the war the various Allies had declared their war aims. In the bleak January of 1918 both Great Britain and the United States had sought to restate their case in the most reasonable terms. In particular on January 8 President Wilson had delivered a speech to Congress in which he had mentioned fourteen points which should in his opinion, guide American aspiration. These " Fourteen Points," admirably, if vaguely, phrased, consisted in the main of broad principles which could be applied in varying degrees according to the fortunes of war. They included, however, two perfectly definite conditions—the reconstitution of an independent Poland and the retrocession to France of Alsace-Lorraine. The adhesion by the United States to these profoundly important war-objectives, involving as it did a fight to a finish with Germany, was very satisfactory to the Allies. None of them was concerned to examine the whole speech meticulously or felt committed except in general sympathy. In the meanwhile the President's declaration played an important part in holding the Western Democracies firmly and unitedly to the prosecution of the war, and also encouraged defeatist and subversive movements among the enemy populations.

The Armistice Negotiations.

When on October 1 Ludendorff made his panic demand that the German Government should immediately ask for an armistice, it was on the basis of these Fourteen Points that Prince Max of Baden addressed himself to President Wilson. Wilson seized the opportunity of keeping the negotiations in his own hands in their first and all-important phase. He exploited the advantages of his position energetically both against the enemy and against the Allies, so as to engross to himself the whole task and its responsibility. He refused to transmit the appeals of the despairing enemy to the Allies until he was himself satisfied

of their sincerity. He dealt with the suppliant Germans in the sternest manner. He used the weapon of delay with masterly skill.

No armistice was possible, he declared, without "absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of its Allies." The terms of the armistice must be settled by the Allied Commanders. There could be no question of discussing peace until Germany had deprived herself of all power of resuming the war. The Germans were to deliver themselves naked and defenceless to the discretion and judgment of their conquerors. The month occupied by these parleyings had been one incessant gigantic battle on the whole front. The armies of the United States had lost over 100,000 men killed and wounded, and the French, British and Italians about 380,000. Their advance had been continuous. German resistance had crumpled under the double pressure of the terrors of war and the hopes of peace. At the end they had fallen prostrate at the Presidential footstool.

Wilson's conduct of these negotiations had been so strong and skilful that France and Britain, though at first startled by his self-assertion, were content to leave them in his hands. Even the most rigorous against the enemy could find no fault with his sword-play. He had thus been in the closing stages of the war the spokesman, for all purposes, not only of the United States but of the Allies. He had enunciated the highest principles; he had driven the hardest of bargains. It was now important to see exactly what this bargain was.

When it became evident that the Central Powers were actually in dissolution and were stretching desperate hands towards the Fourteen Points, these propositions suddenly acquired intense practical significance. It became imperative towards the end of October to make sure what the Fourteen Points meant and would be understood to mean by friend and foe. Had the Germans, instead of asking for an armistice, sought a peace by negotiation and meanwhile fought on, the interpretation placed upon the Fourteen Points by them and by each of the Allies might have been reduced to an exact and concrete form. But their collapse was so rapid that they could only sue for an armistice, and in the mere process of the correspondence they became utterly prostrate and finally submitted to conditions which left them henceforward helpless. This development, which far transcended the highest expectation of the Allies, left the victors sole judges of the interpretation which should be placed upon the Fourteen Points, while the vanquished naturally construed them in their most hopeful and generous sense.

Colonel House's Commentary.

Through the foresight of Colonel House a Commentary on the Fourteen Points was prepared by the American representative in Paris and approved by the President. This has now been published by Colonel House. It was the brief from which he spoke on all occasions and certainly an accommodating document.

Point III, for instance, prescribed "*the removal so far as possible of all economic barriers, and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations.*" The American Commentary prudently explained that this was not intended to prevent tariffs or special railroad rates or port restrictions, so long as they were equally maintained against all. Upon Point IV, "*Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety,*" it was explained that "domestic safety" clearly implied not only internal policing but the protection of territory against invasion.

Point V prescribed "*A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all Colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.*" On this it was made clear that the German colonies would not be returned to

Photo: Graphic Photo Union.

HALL OF MIRRORS: VERSAILLES.

The Palace of Versailles originated in a château built by Louis XIII in 1627. Around and about this building Louis XIV, in the year 1661, caused work to be begun upon the great palace which since his day has been the scene and centre of so many events of historic interest. In the Hall of Mirrors, shown here, William I was proclaimed Emperor of Germany, and here too, in 1919, was signed the Peace Treaty of Versailles.

Germany, but that whatever power managed them, must act as "*trustee for the natives*," and be subject to the supervision of the League of Nations. Point VI, "*The evacuation of all Russian territory*" and "*an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy.*" However, it was explained that "Russian territory" did not mean all the territory belonging to the former Russian Empire. And so on.

The Meeting of October 29.

A meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay in the afternoon of October 29 between the representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States. The principals were M. Clémenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour, Baron Sonnino and Colonel House. The question was how the Allies should reply to President Wilson's note.

Mr. Lloyd George said that there were two closely connected questions. First there were the actual terms of an armistice. With this was closely related the question of terms of peace. If the notes which had passed between President Wilson and Germany were closely studied, it would be found that an armistice was proposed on the assumption that the peace would be based on the terms in President Wilson's speeches. The Germans had actually demanded an armistice on these conditions; consequently, unless something definite was said to the contrary, the Allies would be committed to President Wilson's peace terms. Hence, the first thing to consider was whether these terms were acceptable. He asked Colonel House directly whether the German Government were counting on peace being concluded on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points and his other speeches. Colonel House said this was undoubtedly so. Mr. Lloyd George said that unless the Allies made their attitude clear, they would in accepting the armistice be bound to these terms.

M. Clémenceau asked whether the British Government had ever been consulted about President Wilson's terms. France had not been. If he had never been consulted, he did not see how he could be committed. He asked if the British Government considered themselves committed. Mr. Lloyd George replied that they were not committed yet, but if he accepted an armistice without saying anything to the contrary, he would undoubtedly regard the British Government as committed to President Wilson's terms.

Photo: E.N.A.

PRINCE MAX OF BADEN.

The last Chancellor of Imperial Germany, Maximilian, Prince of Baden, was born on July 10, 1867. He entered the German Army, and in addition took an active part in the public life of Baden. In the political activities of Imperial Germany, however, he had little share until on October 3, 1918, in the hour of the Empire's extremity, he became Imperial Chancellor and conducted the negotiations with President Wilson which preceded and led up to the Armistice.

Mr. Balfour confirmed this. Then said Clémenceau, "I want to hear the Fourteen Points."

The first Point was read.

"*Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.*"

Colonel House then read an extract from a later speech made by President Wilson, pointing out that this would not prohibit secret conversations on confidential and delicate matters, provided that the final results were made public. Mr. Balfour said this really amounted to a prohibition of secret treaties rather than secret conversations.

The second Point was then read.

"*Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.*"

This point about what is called the "Freedom of the Seas" naturally aroused British concern. It sounded well intentioned, but what did it mean? Did it mean that the right of blockade in time of war was abolished? We were emerging from a struggle in which blockade had played an important part in preserving the liberties of Europe and the rights of the United States. The British Navy had just crushed the submarine. British ships had just carried the greater part of the American Army to Europe. We had saved ourselves from invasion and maintained our population unstarved by sea power. It certainly seemed hard to be told, in the moment of common victory, by the friend we had aided, that this great weapon of defence was to be blunted if not broken.

Photo: Elliott & Fry.

COLONEL HOUSE.

Edward Mandell House was born at Houston, Texas, on July 26, 1858. He was a close friend of President Wilson, and during the war years, and later at Versailles, exercised a powerful influence over the course of events.

It did not follow that the conditions which would prevail in the future would not require and also render possible a review of the whole question of belligerent rights at sea. But now that the enemy's front was being battered down by French and British armies after horrible cost in life and blood, now that Britain under the shield of the Royal Navy was coming safely out of the greatest convulsion of mankind, was hardly the moment when we should be asked, at a few days', almost a few

hours' notice, to subscribe to a formula in a matter of life and death which might mean everything or nothing.

Mr. Lloyd George's Refusal.

Mr. Lloyd George said he could not accept this clause under any condition. If it had been in operation at the present time we should have lost the power of imposing a blockade. Germany had broken down almost as much from the effects of the blockade as from that of the military operations. . . . He would like to see the League of Nations thoroughly established and proved before any discussion on Clause II took place. Even after the establishment of the League of Nations he would only be prepared to begin discussing it. He was not prepared to discuss this question with Germany. It was impossible to make an armistice, if doing so committed us to these conditions.

Clémenceau and Sonnino agreed with Lloyd George.

Colonel House's Threat.

Colonel House then said that the discussions were leading to this, that all the negotiations up to this point with Germany and Austria would have to be cleaned off the slate. The President would have no alternative but to tell the enemy that his conditions were not accepted by his Allies. The question would then arise whether America would not have to take up these questions direct with Germany and Austria.

M. Clémenceau asked if Colonel House meant to imply that there would be a separate peace between the United States and the enemy? Colonel House said it might lead to this. It would depend upon whether America could or could not agree to the conditions put up by France, Great Britain and Italy.

Now this was assuming a great responsibility for the United States. The armies were still in full battle. Even in this month of extreme American effort, nearly four British, French and Italian soldiers were falling every day to one American. The stake of the United States in the European scene was incomparably small, yet here was a direct threat that if Great Britain, France and Italy did not swallow the Fourteen Points whole, whatever they might be, or be claimed to be, the United States would withdraw from the line, make a separate peace with Germany and Austria, leave the scene in perfect confusion and condemn the world to another year of war. It is a measure of Lloyd George's quality when acting for his country that he did not quail before this unwarrantable pressure.

The Prime Minister Obdurate.

The Prime Minister replied that it was impossible for the British Government to agree to Point II. If the United States were to make a separate peace we should deeply regret it, but nevertheless should be prepared to go on fighting. (Clémenceau here interjected "Yes.") "We could never give up the one power which had enabled the American troops to be brought to Europe. This was a thing we were prepared to fight for and could not give up. Great Britain was not really a military nation; its main defence was its Fleet. To give up the right of using its Fleet was a thing no one in England would consent to. Moreover, our sea power had never been exercised harshly. . . . Apart from the question of Freedom of the Seas, there was no word in President Wilson's speech about reparation for the wanton destruction of property in Belgium and France, and the sinking of ships. Otherwise he had no objection to the President's Fourteen Points. He suggested that a reply should be sent to the President in the sense that the Fourteen Points must include reparation; that we believed reparation was included in the President's speeches, but that we wished to be perfectly clear about it, and that we could not accept the interpretation which we understood Germany put upon the point about the Freedom of the Seas."

Colonel House agreed that the first step was for the Allied Governments to get together and make their exceptions to President Wilson's terms. He said later, after other points had been mentioned, that the President's conditions were couched in very broad terms. In the case of Alsace-Lorraine, for ex-

ample, he did not say specifically that it would go back to France, but he intended it positively. M. Clémenceau said the Germans did not place that interpretation on it. Colonel House continued that the President had said so much [i.e. made this clear] on other occasions. He had insisted on Germany accepting all his speeches, and from these you could establish almost any point that anyone wished against Germany. Reparation for Belgium and France was certainly implied in Clauses VII and VIII, where it was stated that these invaded countries must be evacuated and "restored." The same principle applied to illegal sinkings at sea, and to the sinking of neutrals.

It was then agreed that the reservations of the Allies should be formulated.

Nearly a week passed in tension. President Wilson armed Colonel House with an ultimatum, which his representative decided to hold in reserve. On October 30: "I feel it my duty to authorize you to say that I cannot consent to take part in negotiations of a peace which does not include the Freedom of the Seas, because we are pledged to fight not only Prussian militarism but militarism everywhere. Neither could I participate in a settlement which does not include the League of Nations, because such a peace would result within a period of years in there being no guarantee except universal armaments, which would be disastrous. I hope I shall not be obliged to make this position public."[1]

Allied Reservations.

Meanwhile a British draft of reservations was prepared.

"The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of statements enunciated in subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that Clause II, relating to what is usually described as the Freedom of the Seas is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve for themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.

"Further, in the conditions of Peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt should be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. They understand that compensation would be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the forces of Germany, by land, by sea and from the air."

The Italians had other reservations, but it was pointed out that the present negotiation only applied to Germany, and did not govern the treatment of Austria - Hungary. M. Clémenceau accepted the British draft, and this became the crucial document.

The Freedom of the Seas.

A third meeting was held on November 3 in Colonel House's residence, when House read a message from President Wilson in conciliatory amplification of the formula "Freedom of the Seas."

"The President says that he freely and sympathetically recognizes the necessities for the British and their position with regard to the seas both at home and throughout the Empire. Freedom of the Seas, he realizes, is a question upon which there should be the freest discussion and the most liberal exchange of views. The President is not sure, however, that the Allies have definitely accepted the principle of the Freedom of the Seas and that they are reserving only the limitation and free discussion of the subject. . . . The President insists that Terms I, II, III and XIV are essential American terms in the programme and he cannot recede from them. The question of the Freedom of the Seas

[1] House, *Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 173.

THE GERMAN

After the surrender of the ships of the German Navy in November, 1918, they were conducte
until June 22, 1919, when the majority of the ships were scuttled by their officers and crev
work has been carried out in face of problems and difficulti

need not be discussed with the German Government provided we have agreed amongst ourselves beforehand. . . . Blockade is one of the questions which has been altered by developments in this war, and the law governing it will certainly have to be altered. There is no danger, however, that it will be abolished."

Mr. Lloyd George said that the formula adopted by the Allies simply provided for free discussion [on Point II] and did not challenge the position of the United States, who were perfectly free to go into the Conference and urge their own point of view.

Colonel House asked if Mr. Lloyd George could not accept the principle of the Freedom of the Seas. The Prime Minister replied that he could not. "It had come to be associated with the idea of the abandonment of the blockade. He did not want to bind the American Government in their discussion, he only wanted to have a free hand for the British Government." On Colonel House again asking that the principle should be accepted, Mr. Lloyd George repeated his refusal. "Were he to accept," he said, "it would only mean that in a week's time a new Prime Minister would be here, who would say that he also could not accept the principle. The English people would not look at it. On this point the nation was absolutely solid. Consequently it was no use for him to say that he could accept when he knew he would not be speaking for the British nation." And again, according to Colonel House (whether at this meeting or at some other is not clear), Mr. Lloyd George said that "Great Britain would spend her last guinea to keep her navy superior to that of the United States or any other power, and that no Cabinet official could continue in the Government in England who took a different position."[1]

Agreement Reached.

Colonel House then modified his position; all that he wanted was "the principle that the question could be discussed." No one could object to that. Mr. Lloyd George replied at once, "We are quite willing to discuss the Freedom of the Seas in the light of the new con-

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

EET AT SCAPA.

to Scapa Flow, the principal war-time base of the British Grand Fleet. They remained there Since that date a firm of contractors has been successful in salvaging many of the ships. This of divers kinds, and the hulks disposed of to the ship-breakers.

ditions which have arisen in the course of the present war." According to House the actual conversation was—

"I wish you would write something I could send to the President," said House.

"Will he like something of this kind?" returned Lloyd George: "We are quite willing to discuss the Freedom of the Seas and its application." He confirmed this by letter to Colonel House the same afternoon. House contented himself with this, and has rather naïvely informed us that he reported a diplomatic victory to the President.[1]

These matters being adjusted, President Wilson on November 5 forwarded to the Germans the Allied Memorandum accepting with reservations the Fourteen Points as the basis of peace, and informed them that Armistice terms could be received from Marshal Foch. The Germans had, therefore, a right to claim that they surrendered and disarmed themselves on President Wilson's Fourteen Points and other speeches except in so far as these were modified by the formal reservations of the Allies. They were not, however, accorded—nor were they in a position to request—any share in the interpretation. This left a latitude to the victors certainly wide enough for misunderstanding and reproach in after years.

* * * *

The sharp interchanges which had taken place within the councils of the Allies, the vague character of many of the Fourteen Points, and the President's speeches which were to be read with them, to say nothing of the Commentary, made it especially desirable to frame without delay a more precise instrument. But nothing was possible for some weeks. The slaughter had to stop. The drawing up of the Armistice terms for land and sea, the vast surrender by Germany of her whole remaining powers of self-defence, the internal convulsions in Germany and in other defeated countries, and the celebrations of victory by the Allies filled the compass of human nature. When these overwhelming events and emotions had passed, one fact dominated the scene. It was above all things important to make Peace soon.

[1] House, *Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 190.

Photo: Daily Mirror.

PRESIDENT WILSON ARRIVES IN EUROPE.

On December 13, 1918, President Wilson, accompanied by his wife, landed at Brest after crossing from the U.S.A. in the *George Washington*. The occasion was one of exceptional interest, because never before had a President of the United States, in his official capacity, visited Europe. He was received in France with the greatest enthusiasm, his journey to Paris being in the nature of a triumphal progress.

The French Plan.

M. Clémenceau, as usual, had clear-cut plans. On November 29 the French Ambassador in Washington laid these in writing before Mr. Lansing.

"The arrival of President Wilson in Paris in the middle of December will enable the four Great Powers to agree among themselves upon the conditions of the peace preliminaries to be imposed severally on the enemy without any discussions with him.

"The examination will first apply to Germany and Bulgaria. . . .

"After reaching an agreement as to the peace preliminaries, the representatives of the Great Powers will have to come to an agreement on the principles of the representation of the several belligerent, neutral and enemy states at the Peace Congress. . . . The great victorious powers alone will attend all its sessions, the small powers being called only to sessions designated for their special affairs. As for the neutrals and states in formation, they may be called when their own interests are at stake. . . .

"It seems that the labours of the Congress should be divided into two main series: the settlement of the war properly so-called, and the organization of the Society of Nations. The examination of the second question no doubt calls for the settlement of the first. Furthermore, the settlement of the concrete questions should not be confounded with the enforcement of the stipulations of general public law. Besides, that distinction is made necessary by the fact that the enemy has no right to discuss

the terms that will be imposed upon him by the victors, and that the neutrals will only be called in exceptional cases to attend the sessions where the belligerents will fix the peace terms, while all the peoples, whether belligerents, neutrals or enemies, will be called to discuss and take part in the principle of the Society of Nations.

"The procedure of the Congress will also be determined at the preliminary meetings in the second half of December. . . .

"The Congress finally could place itself, as has sometimes been done in the past, under the invocation of some of the great principles leading to justice, morals and liberty, which would be proclaimed at its very opening and even before fixing the procedure (concerning which an unofficial agreement only would have been reached): right of self-determination of the peoples, rights of [the] minorities, *suspension of all previous special agreements arrived at by some of the Allies only, with a view to the fullest freedom*[1] of [the] examination by the Congress, declaration that the metropolitan and colonial territory held by the Allies on August 1, 1914, shall not be touched, solemn repudiation of all [the] violations of international law and of humane principles, and disqualification of enemy delegates who have signed violated instruments or are personally guilty of violations of the law of nations or of [the] crimes against humanity."

[1] Author's italics.

The Preliminaries of Peace.

There is no doubt that the French plan was at once logical, practical and speedy. It placed the settlement of all main questions and all procedure definitely in the hands of the four great victorious powers who had made the chief exertions in the war; it drew a line between the past and the future; above all by the "suspension of all previous special agreements arrived at by some of the Allies only," it swept away the whole network of secret

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE PRESIDENT AT DOVER.

On December 26, 1918, President Wilson landed at Dover, where he was received by H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught and the Mayor and Corporation of the town. He is seen here with the Mayor and the Duke of Connaught shortly after disembarkation.

treaties contracted in the stress of the war. It brought together the four authorities who alone could settle everything, and secured for them an absolutely free hand.

The mature reflections of Colonel House have led him to believe that a preliminary peace should have been negotiated with Germany at the earliest moment. There would have been no difficulty in grafting on to the foundation proposed by the French a preliminary peace. This was a device which had often been found helpful in the past. In a preliminary peace only the main essentials are settled between the belligerents, and they then meet together no longer at war to argue at leisure about details and their application. Nothing in the French procedure would have prevented President Wilson from striving, had such been his inclination, for the most lenient terms towards the conquered enemy, or for any disposition of the captured territories which he thought would in the long run be best. Grave conflicts of opinion were inevitable in any case. But they would have arisen in their natural order, and each decision would have made the treatment of secondary problems easier. An agreement between the "Big Four," as they afterwards came to be called, was the indispensable prelude to a smooth and speedy peace.

President Wilson's Mission.

The French plan, however, did not at all commend itself to Mr. Wilson. It thrust on one side all the pictures of the peace conference which his ambition and imagination had painted. He did not wish to come to speedy terms with the European Allies; he did not wish to meet their leading men around a table; he saw himself for a prolonged period at the summit of the world, chastening the Allies, chastising the Germans, and generally giving laws to mankind. He believed himself capable of appealing to peoples and parliaments over the heads of their own governments, and he had, as we have seen, already hinted a willingness to try.[1] No doubt the French proposal was injudiciously framed; in parts it wore an air almost of cynicism. It seemed to treat high ideals as if they were a mere garnish to agreements on sound policy. The President understood that the over-strained European Allies would be above all things anxious for swift settlement; and that delaying procedure would increase his bargaining power. So no answer was returned either by him or by Mr. Lansing to the French Note of November 29; and no notice whatever was taken of the French proposal to sweep away the secret treaties. All Old World affairs, therefore, hung in suspense; and instead of leaders meeting together in goodwill and good faith to make a lasting settlement, the governing forces in each country drifted into an intensive development of their own points of view.

[1] Page 1351.

Danger of Delay.

The French soon began to reconcile themselves to this delay. If President Wilson was coming to Europe not only to punish the Germans but to discipline them, it perhaps was not regrettable that their armies were getting a firm grip on the Rhine, and that the Peace Conference, whenever it should assemble, would be confronted with accomplished facts. Great Britain was still in the throes of the election, the results of which were not yet known. The Imperial War Cabinet sat almost daily and surveyed the whole future field of the peace. The only inter-Allied discussion which took place in this interval was the meeting in London on December 2 and 3 between Lloyd George, Clémenceau and Orlando, House being absent through illness.

This meeting, apart from various matters arising out of the Armistice, decided only that an inter-Allied commission should be set up to report on the amount the enemy countries could pay for reparations and indemnities; that the Kaiser and his accomplices should be brought to trial before an international court, and that before preliminaries of peace should be signed an inter-Allied conference should be held in Paris or Versailles and the date thereof be settled after the arrival of President Wilson.

Here, when time is vital and strength in all its forms is ebbing from the victors, we have a ready acceptance of delay. No doubt all these leading men were too easily persuaded that the world would remain at their feet indefinitely and that they could settle its future fortunes at leisure.

Most of all did this illusion dwell with President Wilson. He now wished to preside himself over the Peace Conference. When House tactfully explained that only a Frenchman could preside over a conference held in Paris, he made it clear that he would sit as a delegate. His best friends in the United States advised him strongly not to descend into the arena. To visit Europe to discuss the main issues in private with the European statesmen was permissible and even desirable; but to quit the lofty isolation of his Presidential chair for the rough and tumble of a prolonged peace conference, was to sacrifice solid advantages.

This American advice was at first strongly reinforced by the wishes of the three European Prime Ministers. They were disturbed at the idea of the head of a State, a personage of sovereign rank, sitting with them nominally on equal terms but with inalienable superiority of status. They were alarmed by much that they had heard of Wilson's autocratic temper and airs. But the desires of the President overrode his own advisers, and the Allied chiefs gradually realized that perhaps the President's mistake would conduce to their advantage.

If he chose to step down from his pedestal, why were they the losers? House assured them that he was affabel in personal relations. So the President had his way.

The Gap.

In these discussions and in the immense press of events, November and December soon slipped away, and it was not until the middle of January that the representatives of the twenty-seven States which had either fought in the war or ultimately joined the winning side assembled in Paris.

The most cumbrous procedure had been adopted. But the one feature which would have redeemed it had somehow or other been omitted. All depended upon a serious discussion at the outset between Great Britain. France, Italy, Japan and the United States, at which the main principles could be settled. But this discussion never took place. The two months that followed the Armistice had produced no progress of any kind towards the systematic discussion of the peace settlement. By the beginning of January the world was restive; everyone asked what had happened to the Peace; the representatives of all the smaller States were already congregated in Paris, where they found assembled all the journalists of the world. The second stage, or general meeting, of all the Powers, overtook and overwhelmed the first. Further delay could not be tolerated, and the conference sprang into being before the fundamental question had even been surveyed in common by those who alone had the power to decide.

CHAPTER LXXXV

THE PEACE CONFERENCE

1814–1919 — The Literature — A Film Production — Wilson at his Zenith — The Congressional Elections—The Adverse Senate—Wilson's Misconceptions—The Consequences—The "Plain People"—The Secret Treaties—Under Duress—The Disclosure—The True American View—The Defence of the Allies—The British Peace Delegation—The British Empire Delegation—The Composition of the Conference—President Wilson's Compromise—The Press—The Official Languages.

HOW wide is the contrast between the conditions of the Peace Conference in 1919 and those in which the Congress of Vienna had met in 1814!

1814–1919.

In 1814 the victorious Allies were in effective possession of practically the whole of Europe. They had the physical power to impose their will. In 1919 the dangers were more acute and the victors were much more exhausted; large regions and cardinal factors remained outside their control. In 1814 a group of aristocrats, life-trained as statesmen or diplomatists, utterly wearied of war and hating change, met together in elegant and ceremonious privacy to re-establish and fortify, after twenty years of tumult, a well-understood conservative system of society. In 1919 the orators and mass leaders who had risen to the dizzy summits of power and victory in the rough and tumble of the struggle all balanced themselves precariously upon the unsure shifting platform of public opinion, and claimed to be guiding mankind to higher destinies. Public opinion was, it is true, focused and steadied to some extent by the Parliaments.

But it was also vehemently swayed by the Press. In 1814 calm, deliberate conclaves of comfortable and firmly established personages: in 1919 a turbulent collision of embarrassed demagogues who were also great men of action, each of whom had to produce a triumph for himself and his Party and give satisfaction to national fears and passions well founded or not. In these circumstances the historian of the future must judge, much less their shortcomings and failures, than their substantial achievements.

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The Literature.

The literature upon the Peace Conference, represented in almost every known language, is large, and that upon the Peace itself far larger. The first place must be assigned to Dr. Temperley's monumental work. Although Dr. Temperley did not feel at liberty to publish all the information and documents at his disposal, his six volumes hold their place as the unique and indispensable guide for any student. Of French books, M. Tardieu's *The Truth about the Treaty*, is the most important, partly because he was one of those who acted for France at the Conference, and partly because he publishes many documents which have not appeared elsewhere. M. Mermeix has also in his *Combat des Trois* printed important extracts from the secret minutes of the Supreme Council and from those of the Council of Four. The principal Italian contribution is comprised in three volumes from Signor Nitti. The American point of view is represented first by Mr. Stannard Baker's *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement*, of which more later; secondly, in Colonel House's Papers, edited by Mr. Seymour; and thirdly by Mr. Lansing's *Peace Negotiations*. There is also the



Imperial War Museum.

A PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY.

This fine study by Sir William Orpen, R.A., is one of several executed by that great artist during his sojourn in Paris for the Peace Conference of 1919. The figures included in the canvas are as follows: Left to right (seated): Signor Orlando (Italy); Mr. Robert Lansing, President Woodrow Wilson (United States); M. Georges Clémenceau (France); Mr. D. Lloyd George, Mr. A. Bonar Law, Mr. Arthur J. Balfour (Great Britain). Standing: M. Paul Hymans (Belgium); M. Eleutherios Venizelos (Greece); The Emir Feisal (Syria); Mr. W. F. Massey (New Zealand); General Jan Smuts (South Africa); Col. E. M. House (United States); General Louis Botha (South Africa); the Marquis Saionzi (Japan); Mr. W. M. Hughes (Australia); Sir Robert Borden (Canada); Mr. G. N. Barnes (Great Britain); M. Ignace Paderewski (Poland).

admirable and scholarly *Drafting of the Covenant*, by Mr. David Hunter Miller; and on the Russian aspect Dennis's *Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia* and *Russian-American Relations*, compiled by Messrs. Cumming and Pettit.

Mr. Stannard Baker's work is distinguished from all these publications,

both by the wealth of secret information at his disposal and the peculiar manner in which he has used it. President Wilson at the end of 1920 placed at the disposal of this gentleman, formerly the head of his Press Bureau while in Paris, two trunks and three steel boxes containing all his records of the Peace Conference. "I plunked them into the trunk in Paris," he wrote, "and have not had time or physical energy even to sort or arrange them." Mr. Baker lost little time in presenting these treasures to the world in the form of a sustained defence of the President's conduct and policy. In his object of vindicating his honoured chief Mr. Baker will be supported by the sympathy of the Allied nations; and certainly it is not from them that much harsh criticism has come.

Photo: Central News.

ARRIVAL OF THE DELEGATES AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY.

The Peace Conference was opened by President Poincaré on January 18, 1919, at three o'clock, in the Clock Room of the French Foreign Office. Outside the building, as shown above, a company of French infantry was drawn up as a guard of honour during the arrival of the delegates, some of whom are shown in this photograph ascending the steps leading to the entrance.

Everyone recognizes the high motives which inspired Mr. Wilson's actions, his remarkable abilities, his comprehensive goodwill and his readiness to arrive at practical solutions. He was a good friend, not only to the Allies but to Europe. He faced the real facts as he gradually got to know them, not only with lofty idealism but with sympathy and common sense. The part he played in the making of the treaties was marked by the strictest loyalty and good faith; and the last remnants of his life and strength were freely expended in trying to make good the obligations into which he had entered and to which he had pledged his country. His

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN WAR STAFF IN PARIS.

A group of members of President Wilson's War Staff taken during the Peace Conference in Paris. Seated second from the left is Mr. Newton Diehl Baker, U.S. Secretary for War. Other members of the party are as follows: Standing (left to right): Captain de Marches, French Army; Col. Carl Boyd, Chief of Staff; Lt.-Col. Brett; Colonel Connor; Commander White, U.S. Navy; Ralph A. Hayes, Secretary to Mr. Baker. Seated: General Pershing; Ambassador Sharp and Major-General Black, Chief U.S. Engineers.

memory should long command the sympathy of Europe.

A Film Production.

But Mr. Baker detracts from the vindication of his hero by the absurd *scenario* picture which he has chosen to paint. Wilson's share in the Peace Conference, his hopes, his mistakes, his achievements, his compromises and his disasters are worthy of something better than the Hollywood setting with which we are provided. In conventional film style all the lights are heightened and all the shadows darkened. The apparatus of lurid contrast is lavishly employed. A plot suited to the more fruity forms of popular taste is chosen; and the treatment of facts, events and personalities is compelled to conform to its preconceived requirements. For this purpose the President is represented as a stainless Sir Galahad championing the superior ideals of the American people and brought to infinite distress by contact with the awful depravity of Europe and its statesmen. Mr. Baker's film story is, in short, the oldest in the world. It is nothing less and nothing more than the conflict between good and evil, between spiritual conceptions and material appetites, between generosity and greed, between moral earnestness and underhand intrigue, between human sympathy and callous selfishness.

The plot is certainly sensational, but it hardly represents what actually happened. It is difficult to believe that the European emigrants by whom America has been populated took away with them all the virtues and left behind them all the vices of the races from which they had sprung; or that a few generations of residence on the other

side of the Atlantic Ocean is sufficient to create an order of beings definitely superior in morals, in culture and in humanity to their prototypes in Europe. The American sense of humour, it is hoped, will itself supply to such claims the necessary correctives. It would seem probable that on both sides of the Atlantic men find it easy to be disinterested upon questions which do not affect them directly ; that they are often inclined to prescribe high principles for others to follow ; that they can resist austerely other people's temptations.

However, let us allow Mr. Stannard Baker to open his tale in his own fashion :

" Three weeks and three days after the last victorious shots of the Great War had been fired by Yankee doughboys in the French Argonne, the American peace argosy—the *George Washington*, with accompanying warships—dropped down through the bedecked and beflagged harbour of New York, a new *Santa Maria* on its extraordinary voyage of discovery to an unknown world. The great ship passed majestically out through the Narrows, with airplanes cutting the sky above and the forts on either hand roaring with unprecedented salutes of twenty-one guns ; for never before had a President of the United States set sail for a foreign land."

Wilson at His Zenith.

Modern technical conditions have given so great an extension to publicity that comparisons with other times are vitiated. It seems probable that no human being has ever centred in himself more hopes or enjoyed a greater, if transient, prestige than President Wilson as he paced the decks of the " American peace argosy." But the reverse of the medal bore sinister emblems. Mr. Baker has depicted the difficulties which awaited the President in Europe, and the tragic contrast between his noble outlook and the degradation of the old diplomacy. He has not dwelt sufficiently upon the difficulties he left behind him in the United States. Here, too, the old Adam manifested itself in recalcitrant forms, and the spirit of Party politics had raised its unregenerate head. But for this aspect we must turn to other authorities.

The Republican Party view has been explained by Mr. Hollis[1] in terms which, though disfigured by bias, undoubtedly described a widespread American opinion.

The Congressional Elections.

" The world was before him like a class. The sight of it turned the head of the pedagogue made prince. In November, 1918, took place the elections to Congress. As the summer drew to an end there began to trickle in from Democratic candidates throughout the country requests that the President give them a letter of endorsement. It was decided that the best plan would be for him to make a speech at some central Middle Western town such as Indianapolis, in which he would appeal to the country not to favour one Party rather than the other but to give him a Congress which would support him in his leadership of the national effort of war. . . . Burleson, the Postmaster-General, had advised this plan, and went off to Texas for ten days at the end of September assured that his advice would be followed. On his return he found that behind his back the party politicians had brought pressure upon Wilson to cancel his speech at Indianapolis and instead to write a letter appealing for a Democratic Congress. This letter Burleson found had already been given to the Press. It was interpreted, as Burleson foresaw that it would be, as an abominable slur upon the loyalty of Republicans ; and its publication made certain an overwhelming Democratic defeat. Wilson was at the time, according to Mr. White's explanation, ' in the upper spiritual zones of idealism,' and therefore not at leisure to correct the popular impression that the letter was sent on Burleson's responsibility."

The Adverse Senate.

European opinion upon this episode is not important. But its consequences were formidable. The Republican party, who had given much patriotic support to the President's war policy, deemed them-

[1] *The American Heresy*, by Christopher Hollis Sheed and Ward, Paternoster Row.

selves "gratuitously and outrageously insulted." The November election gave them a majority in Congress, and they already possessed a substantial majority in the Senate. The American Constitution requires the ratification of all treaties by the Senate. It seemed to British and French eyes very curious that in the war crisis President Wilson did not seize the opportunity of becoming a National rather than a Party leader. It is still more remarkable that, confronted with the fact of a hostile majority in the Senate, he did not endeavour to associate that body as a whole with the Treaty negotiations.

It would have been impossible, if the President had forced the issue, for Republican senators to refuse to form part of a Senatorial delegation to the Peace Conference; on the contrary, they would probably have been delighted to go; and Wilson could then have been assured that what he promised would not be repudiated. His strong Party feeling and his sense of personal superiority led him to reject this indispensable precaution. The "American peace argosy" wended on across the waters bearing a man who had not only to encounter the moral obliquity of Europe, but to produce world salvation in a form acceptable to political enemies whom he had deeply and newly offended. Upon him centred the hopes of the world. Before him lay the naughty entanglements of Paris; and behind him, the sullen veto of the Senate.

Nevertheless, it was with no sense of personal inadequacy that the President surveyed his task.

"Three days before the *George Washington* sailed into Brest Harbour in a blaze of glory the President called together a group of the delegation for a conference. There were two members of the Peace Commission itself on the ship, Secretary Lansing and Mr. White (Colonel House and General Bliss being already in Europe), but the great body of the delegation was made up of geographers, historians, economists, and others upon whom the President was to depend for the basic facts to be used in the coming discussions."[1]

[1] Stannard Baker, Vol. I, p. 9.

"After a few introductory remarks to the effect that he was glad to meet us," writes Dr. Isaiah Bowman, who alone kept a record of this meeting, ". . . the President remarked that *we would be the only disinterested people* at the peace conference, and that *the men whom we were about to deal with did not represent their own people.*"[1]

Wilson's Misconceptions.

The first of these two statements can best be judged in the light of ultimate events. The second reveals an undoubted misconception. The European statesmen whom President Wilson was about to meet represented only too well, in the assertion of national claims and in severity to the beaten enemy, the views and wishes of their own peoples. They ceased and failed to represent them only in so far as they diverged from these hard standards, and guided by experience, tolerance and detachment sought to mitigate the misfortunes of the vanquished, or to disappoint their own national expectations. Orlando, in making the most extreme claims, fell short of Italian aspirations. The iron Clémenceau, the prop of France, was throughout and is to-day condemned by the French for weakness in championing his country.

As for Lloyd George, he was not only fortified by an overwhelming majority but actually embarrassed by the demands of the multitude for the unsparing punishment of the guilty. So far from these national leaders thrusting forward upon their own impulse a ruthless claim against the defeated, they were every one of them in danger of censure for lukewarmness. The Parliaments and Press of every country stood vigilant to detect the slightest symptoms of tender-heartedness or philosophic indifference. Even the prestige which sprang from absolute victory did not protect them from constant scrutiny and suspicion. In every victorious State there rose the cry: "Our soldiers have won the war; let us make sure our politicians do not throw away the peace." These European leaders represented their democracies

[1] *The Drafting of the Covenant*, by David Hunter Miller, p. 41. The italics are Mr. Miller's.

Photo : Central News.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE AT FOLKESTONE.

The majority of the Peace Delegates representing the British Empire left Folkestone for Paris on January 11, 1919. The party travelling by this route included the Prime Minister and the Premiers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Newfoundland. The party included also Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Delegates of the Indian Empire. Mr. Lloyd George is seen here at Folkestone a few moments before embarking for France.

best in all in which they differed from President Wilson most.

And where was he ? He had pledged and was about to recommit the United States to the service of mankind. "We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them."[1] And again, on the deck of the *George Washington* to Mr. Creel : "It is to America that the whole world turns to-day, not only with its wrongs, but with its hopes and grievances. The hungry expect us to feed them, the roofless look to us for shelter, the sick of heart and body depend upon us for cure. All of these expectations have in them the quality of terrible urgency. There must be no delay. . . . Yet you know, and I know, that these ancient wrongs, these present unhappinesses, are not to be remedied in a day or with a wave of the hand. What I seem to see —with all my heart I hope that I am wrong—is a tragedy of disappointment."[1]

[1] Speech, April 2, 1917.

The Consequences.

The misgiving was justified. The American populace fell as far short of their Chief in disinterested generosity to the world, as the peoples of the Allied countries exceeded their own leaders in severity to the enemy. The President himself was without a majority both in the Senate and in the newly elected Congress. Already ex-President Roose-

[1] *The War, the World and Wilson*, by George Creel, p. 163.

velt had brutally proclaimed, " Our Allies and our enemies and Mr. Wilson himself should all understand that Mr. Wilson has no authority whatever to speak for the American people at this time." Much lower and cruder views than his were to prevail on both sides of the Atlantic. The Allies were destined to settle their affairs among themselves. The agreements to which President Wilson sought to commit the United States, for which the Allies would be asked to concede many grave things, were to be swiftly repudiated by the American Senate and electors. After immense delays and false hopes that only aggravated her difficulties, Europe was to be left to scramble out of the world disaster as best she could ; and the United States, which had lost but 125,000 lives in the whole struggle, was to settle down upon the basis of receiving through one channel or another four-fifths of the reparations paid by Germany to the countries she had devastated or whose manhood she had slain.

The " Plain People."

To write thus is not to blame peoples or their leading men. It is only to recognize the comparatively low level upon which the intercourse of vast communities can proceed at the present stage in human development. How could the peoples know ? Through what channel could they receive their instruction ? What choate and integral conviction could they form ? How could they express it ? Vague, general ideas, some harsh, some noble, attracted them from day to day. But in the main they were so glad the war had stopped that each individual family was thinking of nothing so much as reunion, and building up again the home, the business, the old life. Wilson created world democracy in his own image. In fact, however, the " plain people " of whom he spoke so much, though very resolute and persevering in war, knew nothing whatever about how to make a just and durable peace. " Punish the Germans," " No more War," and " Something for our

Photo : L.N.A.

DELEGATES OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

The group of Delegates that represented India at the Peace Conference included Sir S. P. Sinha (second from the left) and the Maharajah of Bikanir (third from the left). This photograph, like that on the page opposite, was taken on January 11, 1919.

own country," above all " Come Home," were the only mass ideas then rife.

If Wilson had been either simply an idealist or a caucus politician, he might have succeeded. His attempt to run the two in double harness was the cause of his undoing. The spacious philanthropy which he exhaled upon Europe stopped quite sharply at the coasts of his own country. There he was in every main decision a party politician, calculating and brazen. A tithe of the fine principles and generous sentiments he lavished upon Europe, applied during 1918 to his Republican opponents in the United States, would have made him in truth the leader of a nation. His sense of proportion operated in separate watertight compartments.

The differences in Europe between France and Germany seemed trivial, petty, easy to be adjusted by a little good sense and charity. But the differences between Democrat and Republican in the United States! Here were really grave quarrels. He could not understand why the French should not be more forgiving to their beaten enemy; nor why the American Republicans should not expect cold comfort from a Democratic Administration. His gaze was fixed with equal earnestness upon the destiny of mankind and the fortunes of his party candidates. Peace and goodwill among all nations abroad, but no truck with the Republican Party at home. That was his ticket and that was his ruin, and the ruin of much else as well. It is difficult for a man to do great things if he tries to combine a lambent charity embracing the whole world with the sharper forms of populist party strife.

* * * *

The Secret Treaties.

The first shock which the President and his Delegation is said to have received was confrontation with the secret Treaties made between the Allies during the war. Mr. Baker in lurid pages has gloated upon their unmoral character. " The old diplomacy—What it stood for " ; " The Secret Treaties " ; " The Turkish Empire as booty " ; " The Slump in Idealism," form the headings of chapters which reveal to the American public European baseness and their own correctitude. But let us see what had actually occurred. The American thesis after the United States entered the war was that the Germans represented the most violent form of military aggression recorded by history. England and France had been fighting against this monster since August 4, 1914.

In the spring of 1915 Italy had shown a disposition to come and help them. The accession to their side of a nation of thirty-five millions mobilizing an army one and a half millions strong seemed to be a matter of the highest consequence. But Italy appeared to have a move either way; and the Germans were eagerly displaying to Italian eyes the advantages to Italy of playing a true part in the Triple Alliance. Instead of seeking the Trentino from Austria, why not take Savoy from France? And so on; bid and counter-bid. We should wrong the Italians by suggesting that their decision was taken on these material grounds. But who can blame the Allied statesmen for dwelling upon the superior advantages which Italy could obtain at the expense of Austria and of Turkey? The Treaty of London, upon which Italy entered the war on the Allied side, embodied the belief that to France and Britain the aid of Italy spelt speedy victory, and that her hostility might mean their total defeat.

In the same way Roumania, who had equally great prizes to gain by adhering to either combination provided it emerged victorious, was the subject in 1916 of every form of threat and inducement which States at desperate leaguer could present. Such were the secret Treaties entered into by the Allies in their distress and jeopardy in order to secure reinforcements.

Under Duress.

Another series of secret agreements had been made among the Allies themselves—to keep themselves in good temper with each other. In 1914, 1915 and 1916 Russian assistance was vital. France was bleeding to death; the British armies were only just becoming a prime factor in the field. To keep the

struggling Russian Colossus in good heart, to avoid all excuses for estrangement, was the first duty of British and French diplomacy. Turkey, which had been offered territorial integrity on the guarantee of France, Britain and Russia, had joined the Germans and had made an unprovoked assault upon Russia.

No one was going to shed many tears about the break-up of the Turkish Empire or the end of Turkish domination over Christian or Arab races. The assignment of spheres of interest over the non-Turkish provinces of Turkey became at once a necessity and a convenience to the Allies. England, abandoning the policy of generations, consented to the prospect of a Russian Constantinople and dwelt upon her own interests in the Persian Gulf and in Mesopotamia. France asserted her historic claims to Syria. Italy was assured that none of her Allies would obstruct her ambitions in Adalia nor indeed upon the Alps and in the Adriatic. An understanding about Persia had for many years been an indispensable foundation of good Anglo-Russian relations. These arrangements had to be recast on the assumption of a general victory in which the Turkish Empire would have disappeared. Mr. Baker pretends that all these inter-Allied agreements represented the inherent cynical wickedness and materialism of old-world diplomacy. They were in the main simply convulsive gestures of self-preservation.

The greater part of these secret Treaties was found to be conformable to the principles laid down by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points and was consented to by him in the ultimate settlement. There were features in all of them which nothing but duress could explain and excuse; but Mr. Baker and the United States Delegation had no grounds for taking a lofty and judicial view of these transactions. If the United States had entered the war—a war, as they subsequently described it, of right and justice against unspeakable wrong and tyranny—on the 4th of August, the world would never have come into this plight. American statesmen could have judged for themselves in concert with the Ministers of England, France, and Russia what conditions, if any, might fittingly be offered to procure the adherence of Italy. If the United States had entered the war after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, they could have judged for themselves how far it was right to go to prevent Roumania being drawn into the orbit of the Central Powers. If even two years after the outbreak of war they had joined the Allies, they could have regulated at their pleasure any arrangements made with Japan about Shantung and China generally.

One has a right to stand on the bank; but if one has exercised the right for a prolonged and agonizing period without even throwing a rope to a man struggling in the rapids, some allowance should be made for the swimmer who now clutches at this rock and now at that in rough or ungainly fashion. It is not open to the cool bystander, who afterwards becomes the loyal and ardent comrade and brave rescuer, to set himself up as an impartial judge of events which never would have occurred had he outstretched a helping hand in time.

The Disclosure.

Mr. Baker produces his first film tableau when he shows us the hearty, whole-souled American Delegation suddenly confronted on their arrival with this "labyrinth" of secret Treaties. The President had never heard of their existence. Mr. Lansing, with all the resources of the State Department at his disposal, had never dreamed of them. But here they were, naked and horrible, now flung on the table of the Peace Conference and blotting the fair lay-out of the Fourteen Points. Can we wonder that the moral sense of the American people recoiled? No such effect had been produced since Fatima opened the secret chamber of Bluebeard.

The True American View.

In fact, however, the Government of the United States (we cannot speak for individuals) had been made aware of the gist of each of these secret Treaties, and could at any time after their entry into the war have obtained every detail

by merely asking. Most remarkable of all, in their memorable despatch of November 29, 1918, the French Government as we have seen had formally proposed to the American State Department that all secret agreements should be abrogated forthwith before any Peace negotiations were begun. And Mr. Lansing had left this note without an answer. But here Mr. Baker shall speak for himself. He speaks very fairly.

" . . . In America we knew little and cared less about these European secret Treaties. Our national interests were at no point affected by them. . . . Everyone knew indeed that Italy had driven a hard bargain when she came into the War on the side of the Allies. But this was war, and in war anything may be necessary. . . . Even the State Department of the United States, which is the organization especially charged with the duty of knowing about foreign affairs, seems to have had no interest in these secret Treaties, and if Secretary Lansing is to be believed, little or no knowledge of them. . . . While the President must have known in general of these secret agreements, for he often excoriated the practice of 'secret diplomacy,' he apparently made no attempt to secure any vital or comprehensive knowledge. . . ."

" . . . When Mr. Balfour came to Washington as the British Commissioner in 1917 he explained certain of these Treaties to Col. House. Col. House, however, said he was not particularly interested, because it seemed to him more important to bend all energies to the winning of the war; and he finally told Mr. Balfour that they were 'dividing the bearskin before the bear had been killed.' The President's advisers thus underestimated the importance of the whole matter, and felt that to waste any



Photo: Central News.

PRESIDENT POINCARÉ'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

The first meeting of the Peace Conference was inaugurated by the President of the French Republic, M. Poincaré. At 3 p.m. on January 18, 1919, he delivered an eloquent address to the delegates, during which the assembly remained standing. The photograph reproduced above shows the historic scene at the opening of a Conference which, embarked upon with such high hopes, appears in some respects to have failed of its purpose.

Photo : Topical Press.

A MEETING OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

This photograph, taken during the Peace Conference, is remarkable for the excellent study of the grim M. Clémenceau. The "Tiger" is seen facing the camera, while on his left are seated Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Bonar Law.

time on it would only interfere with the energetic prosecution of the war, which they believed was the most important consideration of the moment. They trusted, as did the whole country, that all would come right in the end once we had 'licked the Kaiser.' . . ."

* * * *

". . . If our diplomatic service lacked a background of comprehension of the significance of the secret Treaties, what should be said about public opinion? Venturing into a totally unfamiliar scene, driven blindly by a blast of war feeling, a few leaves of secret engagements in the wind meant absolutely nothing to it. . . ."

But surely all this was masculine good sense. And if these excuses for carelessness or indifference are valid for the United States Government and people, how much more do they protect the Allies? If America can be pardoned for being "driven blindly by a blast of war feeling" into underrating or ignoring the significance of such transactions, surely England and France, streaming with blood, seared in the flame of battle, with their dearest dead and national life at stake, may be excused for setting them in a similar twilight.

The Defence of the Allies.

It is at once silly and unjust to pretend that these partitions of possible war gains had any substantial relation to the causes for which the Allies were fighting the war. When wars begin, much is added to the original cause of quarrel and many results follow never aimed at or cared for at the beginning. When the United States in 1898 declared war upon Spain, it was with no thought of taking the Philippine Islands and subjugating the Philippine Islanders; yet both these events followed inevitably or incidentally



Photo: Vandyk.

GENERAL SMUTS.

Jan Christaan Smuts was born at Bovenplaats, Cape Colony, on May 24, 1870. Twenty-five years later he was admitted as advocate and practised at the Transvaal Bar. At the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899 Smuts was State Attorney, but later fought in many actions against the British. After the Peace of Vereeniging Smuts worked hard for the prosperity of his country, and during the Great War of 1914–18 lent incalculable aid to the cause of the Allies, both in connection with the conquest of German South-West Africa and German East Africa and at the council table in London and in Paris. Years must elapse before any adequate appreciation of this great and loyal South African can be written. It may be said that he was a tower of strength to the Allied cause during many a dark hour.

from their victory. It is no less a calumny upon France and England to say that they fought "for the booty of Turkey" than to say that the United States picked a quarrel with Spain in order to annex and conquer the Philippines; and it is perhaps a good thing to clear these calumnies out of the way even if it somewhat mars the film effects in which Mr. Stannard Baker delights. However, here were the secret Treaties to which the faith of great countries was pledged and their signatures appended; and they ran criss-cross, not in the main, but in some important instances, to the broad and simple theories of the Fourteen Points.

* * * *

The British Peace Delegation.

Mr. Lloyd George and the British Peace Delegation had crossed the Channel on January 11. They were accompanied by naval and military authorities. They had been preceded by a large and elaborate staff of experts and officials who filled to overflowing one of the largest hotels in Paris. The competence of this staff, the fund of knowledge of history, law and economics which it commanded, and its methods of conducting business have gained the respect both of Ally and enemy observers. "As for the slim white booklets of the English experts," says a German writer, "dealing with Belgian neutrality, with the Rhine problem, with the Danube, with the possible future of little Luxemburg, and Heaven knows what besides, the number of these books was legion. Of all the rival guides to the maze of the troubled earth which awaited reshaping, the English collection was the amplest and was generally felt to be more systematically and concisely arranged than either the American or the French. Even members of the American and French delegations frequently consulted the little white books in their search for enlightenment on obscure subjects on which they were called upon to pronounce or prophesy."[1]

The great machine was directed and focused for business by the comparatively small instrument of the War Cabinet Secretariat which had been perfected during the preceding four years by the organizing insight and measureless industry of Maurice Hankey.

[1] Nowak, *Versailles*, p. 34.

This officer of Marines, while still a young Captain, had become in 1912 the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence. He had been responsible for the War Book which had been the key to the whole transition of Britain from peace to war in 1914. He had kept and arranged the records of all the great business which had come first before the War Committee of the Cabinet and later before the War Cabinet during the war and the Armistice. He knew everything; he could put his hand on anything; he knew everybody; he said nothing; he gained the confidence of all; and finally he became by the natural flow of their wishes the sole recorder for the decisive six weeks of the conversations between President Wilson, M. Clémenceau and Mr. Lloyd George by which the Peace was settled.

The British Empire Delegation.

The British Plenipotentiaries were reinforced by the British Empire Delegation consisting of the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions, the representatives of India, and four or five Ministers in charge of the great executive Departments, of whom I was at this time one. This body was purely consultative. It assembled in Paris only when required by the Prime Minister, and its members were widely dispersed in other activities. In contrast to President Wilson's isolation from the Senate, it was Lloyd George's policy to fortify himself at important moments by the counsel and agreement of the leaders of the whole British Empire. This was *his* Senate, and he moved through the darkness and confusion of the Paris firmament always surrounded by numerous and shining satellites.

At his side, with matchless experience and a calm imperturbable wisdom, stood Arthur Balfour; and (must we not add?) Louis Botha. Were Labour questions raised, Barnes, the veteran Trade Unionist,

Photo: E.N.A.

GENERAL BOTHA.

One of the greatest figures in the history of South Africa, Louis Botha was born at Greytown, Natal, on September 27, 1862. Although the son of a Boer farmer Botha did what he could to smooth over the difficulties which led to the South African War. When war did break out, however, Botha fought with distinction for the cause of the Boers. On the outbreak of the Great War Botha, then holding office as the first Premier of the Union for which he had worked so hard, brought South Africa into line with Great Britain and the Dominions. Throughout the struggle this staunch South African met and overcame every difficulty that confronted him. He held South Africa, a land peopled by men and women whose political views, not unnaturally, show at times a wide divergence, loyal to the cause and to the Empire. In 1919 Botha attended the Peace Conference and signed the Treaty with Germany. A few weeks later, on his return to South Africa, he died at Pretoria, August 27, 1919.

could speak as a working man. Did he require exponents of the Liberal creed in international affairs, General Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil could meet President Wilson on his own ground and speak his language to Wilson's surprise and gratification. Was there a moment when the robust instincts of youthful conquering pioneer states deserved expression, Mr. Hughes of Australia and Mr. Massey of New Zealand were at hand, with Sir Robert Borden of Canada not far away. If the panorama of the East or Middle East should be lighted, Maharajas and Emirs of a thousand years' historic descent advanced in glittering gravity. Himself singularly free from that perversion of the historic sense which degenerates into egotism, the Prime Minister parcelled out great functions and occasions among his colleagues and those whom he wished to persuade or conciliate ; and by modesty in good fortune preserved intact his own controlling power. Thus he was well fitted in himself for the impending ordeal and equipped with a fine apparatus.

On the other hand he reached the Conference somewhat dishevelled by the vulgarities and blatancies of the recent General Election. Pinned to his coat-tails were the posters, " Hang the Kaiser," " Search their Pockets," " Make them Pay " ; and this sensibly detracted from the dignity of his entrance upon the scene.

* * * *

The Composition of the Conference.

The actors had arrived : the stage was set : and the audience already clamoured for the curtain to rise. But the play and its method of presentation were still unsettled. We have seen how President Wilson had rejected the original French plan of November 29, 1918, for a preliminary settlement upon essentials by the four or five principal partners in the war, and how he had wished for a general assembly of the victors, over which he should himself preside and before which he could lay his schemes for the better government of mankind. His mere unspoken dissent from the French proposals had been sufficient to delay all prior consultation between the Allied Powers. But now everyone met face to face and practical decisions must forthwith be taken.

The President came immediately into contact with personalities who were certainly his equals in force and experience, and who guarded the vital interests of mighty nations which in the long-drawn-out struggle had staked their all and won. The glowing if nebulous ideas he may have cherished of haranguing the Old World into a nobler way of life and of marshalling to his support—if necessary over the heads of their own chosen leaders—the public opinions of the various countries, must now give place to silk and steel conversations with Clémenceau and Lloyd George.

From January 12 onwards meetings were held of the five principal Powers, each with two representatives. These meetings were at first intended only to settle procedure and inaugurate the Plenary Conference ; but as they succeeded one another day after day, the body assumed an impressive shape and came almost at once to be called " The Council of Ten."

The Council of Ten first discussed the constitution of the Peace Conference and its control. Wilson was in favour of the whole twenty-seven States meeting together upon more or less equal terms. Clémenceau demurred :

" Am I to understand from the statement of President Wilson that there can be no question, however important it may be for France, England, Italy or America, upon which the representative of Honduras or of Cuba shall not be called upon to express his opinion ? I have hitherto always been of the opinion that it was agreed that the five Great Powers should reach their decisions upon important questions before entering the halls of Congress to negotiate peace. If a new war should take place, Germany would not throw all her forces upon Cuba or upon Honduras, but upon France ; it would always be upon France. I request then that we stand by the proposals which have been made, proposals to the effect that meetings be held in which the representatives of the five countries mentioned shall participate, to reach decisions upon the important questions, and that the study of secondary questions

be turned over to the commissions and the committees before the reunion of the Conference."

President Wilson's Compromise.

He was supported by Mr. Lloyd George, and evidently commanded the agreement of Italy and Japan. Lansing thought that Wilson should insist. He contemplated apparently the President forming a block or lobby of small States and outvoting the Great Powers. Wilson's inherent good sense saved him from this folly. He proposed as a compromise that informal conversations should be held among the Great Powers simultaneously with the Plenary Conferences of all the nations. This was no compromise at all. It was a recognition of facts. The Council of Ten were to converse and not to confer, but they were to continue. This was readily agreed to.



Photo: Vandyk.

LORD RIDDELL.

George Allardice, Baron Riddell, the well-known newspaper proprietor and Chairman of the Newspaper Proprietors' Association, who acted as liaison officer between the Press and the Government departments during the war and represented the British Press at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919. Lord Riddell was knighted in 1909, at the age of forty-four, made a baronet in 1918, and a peer in 1920. He has recently published his "War Diary" and "Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After."

The Press.

The next problem was the Press. No less than five hundred special correspondents had gathered in Paris — the most able, competent writers in every country, representing the most powerful newspapers and the largest circulations. The sense of history was strong upon all of these men, and also the importance of getting it in first. Every day the cables and the wireless had to be charged with tens of thousands of words directed to every printing office in the globe, describing how the great peace was going to be made. Except from the French Press, which was carefully looked after, all the gag of war censorship had been removed. The whole five hundred stood together in the truest comradeship and the keenest rivalry; and all chanted aloud in chorus the first of the Fourteen Points which seemed specially drafted for their benefit, namely, "Open covenants of peace openly arrived at."

Mr. Wilson was seriously embarrassed at this application of his doctrine. He hastened to repeat that he had not intended that every delicate matter must at every stage be discussed in the newspapers of the world. Obviously one had

Photo: Central Press.

AFTER THE RIOTING IN BERLIN.

On Christmas Eve, 1918, a body of sailors calling themselves "the People's Naval Division" attacked the Kaiser's Palace in Berlin. The central gateway and the balcony from which, in more peaceful times, the Kaiser delivered speeches were damaged by shell-fire. The more portable contents of the palace were looted but little damage was done to tapestries or pictures. The photograph reproduced here was taken shortly after the event and shows the extensive nature of the damage inflicted upon the fabric of the building.

to draw the line somewhere. But this made no impression. The people of the United States must have news, or at least copy, day by day; and the British and French could scarcely be expected to be fed only through American channels. The great question was, said Mr. Stannard Baker, "What would democracy do with diplomacy?" On the one hand, one hundred million strong, stood the young American democracy. On the other cowered furtively, but at the same time obstinately, and even truculently, the old European diplomacy. Here young, healthy, hearty, ardent millions, advancing so hopefully to reform mankind. There, shrinking from the limelights, cameras and cinemas, huddled the crafty, cunning, intriguing, high-collared, gold-laced diplomatists. Tableau! Curtain! Slow music! Sobs: and afterwards chocolates!



Photo: Topical Press.

THE SPARTACUS RIOTS IN BERLIN.

The Spartacus group of extreme Socialists was responsible for serious disturbances in various parts of Germany. The name Spartacus was adopted by Karl Liebknecht and his followers, known as Spartacists, and became numerous during the years 1916–18. Opposed to the war, to the Empire and to the Government, the unrest which followed upon the Armistice was seized upon by this group as a suitable moment to disclose its intentions. Rioting on a serious scale took place in Berlin and pedestrians are seen here running for shelter under a hail of Spartacist bullets.

"Open covenants of peace openly arrived at!" If this meant anything it surely meant a vast world debate upon the war settlement; and that all the "plain people" in all the lands, the plain blacks as well as the plain whites, should consciously and intelligently participate in the grand solution. But how to bring this about? The plain people were busy getting their daily bread. They had no time to listen to all the frantic pleadings and protests which arose. One tale was good until another was told, and probably both were untrue and certainly very difficult to understand. Nevertheless, here were the plain people represented by a highly coloured Press; and here was Point One of the Fourteen, which said that the covenants of peace were to be "openly arrived at."

However it is curious that the Press fared a good deal worse in the peace than they had in the war. In fact their fortunes were unexpectedly reversed. They had begun the war brushed contemptuously aside by the Generals, excluded from the war zone, and straitjacketed by the Censorship. They had soon compelled generals and politicians to come to heel. They emerged from the war at the highest point of their power and influence. They were still in the mood to break Governments and dictate policy. But war conditions had passed; and as the Parliaments and the platform revived, the newspapers and

their proprietors were gradually brought to a more reasonable view of their function. Their first experience of the horrors of Peace was to learn that none of the Fourteen Points applied to them, and that the Council of Ten would meet in secret.

* * * *

The Official Languages.

A discussion at times rather heated then took place upon what was to be the official language. France claimed that French was by long custom the official language of diplomacy, that the French were the hosts of the Conference and that France had suffered more than anyone else. Britain, with her Dominions, and the United States, all acting together, said as opportunity offered that they represented a hundred and sixty millions of English-speaking people and were in a large majority. Neither side would agree to abate its claims, so both languages were declared official; and an Italian attempt for the recognition of a third language was not successful. The way was then clear for business; and on January 18 the first Plenary session of the Peace Conference opened.

It was time. More than two months had passed since the Armistice. The interval had been filled by the British General Election, by President Wilson's journey to Europe and by the French preparations — certainly not unduly hurried—for the greatest international gathering that has ever taken place. Meanwhile the armies had advanced into Germany and taken possession of the Rhine bridgeheads. Allied officers and missions, clad in the brand-new authority of conquest, had moved freely about through Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria, giving such directions as they thought necessary or thought fit to these entirely submissive populations.

The French, with the Greeks at their side, had landed at Odessa (of which more later). British divisions had occupied the railway across the Caucasus, and British flotillas rode the Caspian as well as the Rhine. Allenby's armies had effectively occupied all Syria and joined hands with the Anglo-Indian armies in Mesopotamia. But these purely military measures, although for the moment they seemed effective, only masked the deepening chaos in which so many vast defeated communities were involved. The greater part of Europe and Asia simply existed locally from day to day. Revolutions, disorders, the vengeance of peoples upon rulers who had led them to their ruin, partisan warfare, brigandage of all kinds and—over wide areas—actual famine lapped the Baltic States, Central and Southern Europe, Asia Minor, Arabia and all Russia in indescribable confusion.

But behind these tribulations new and often inordinate hopes and ambitions everywhere reared their heads. The Baltic States sought their independence, and each strove desperately to erect some form of ordered government. Germany was in actual revolution. A Communist uprising, eventually choked in blood, taught Munich a lesson never to be forgotten. Hungary was soon to fall under the oppression of Bela Kun, an offshoot of the Moscow fungus sprouting independently at Buda-Pesth. The Austrian Empire was in utter dissolution. Poland was rising again out of the wreck of the three Empires by whom she had been partitioned a hundred and fifty years before. Bohemia, under the shield of Masaryk and Benes, was accepted as an ally by the victors. The remnants of Roumanian society and army which had straggled back to their devastated country after the withering Treaty of Bucharest, now rapidly overran Transylvania.

The Italians poured into the Tyrol, and passing the Adriatic soon came face to face with fierce, gaunt, unconquerable Serbs who now called themselves Yugo-Slavs. The Arabs under Feisal, with the fiery Lawrence bound in blood brotherhood to their cause, had settled down in Damascus and dreamed of a great Arabia from Alexandretta to Aden, and from Jerusalem to Bagdad. Not only the victors but the vanquished, not only the peoples but parties and classes, proclaimed their ambitions. Appetites, passions, hopes, revenge, starvation and anarchy ruled the hour; and from this simultaneous and almost universal welter all eyes were turned to Paris. To this immortal city—gay-tragic, haggard-triumphant, scarred and crowned—more than half mankind now looked for satisfaction or deliverance.

CHAPTER LXXXVI

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Three Phases—A Defective Procedure—The Supreme Council—A Dual Association—The League of Nations' Commission—Origin of the Covenant—The British Contribution—Scepticism—The President's Credentials—The Question of Mandates—The Dominions' View—The President and the Dominions' Prime Ministers—The Period of Commissions—"Make them Pay"—Mr. Keynes's Book—The Solution—War Criminals—The Ladder of Responsibility—The Kaiser—Growing Impatience—The Covenants Achieved—The Foundation Stone.

THE story of the Peace Conference divides itself naturally into three well-marked phases, which the reader would do well to keep in mind as the narrative proceeds.

Three Phases.

First, the Wilson period, or the period of Commissions and of the Council of Ten, culminating in the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This lasted for a month, from the first meeting of the Council of Ten on January 14 down to the first return of President Wilson to America on February 16. Secondly, the Balfour period, when President Wilson had returned to Washington and Mr. Lloyd George to London, and when M. Clémenceau was prostrated by the bullet of an assassin. In this period Mr. Balfour, in full accord with Mr. Lloyd George, induced the Commissions to abridge and terminate their ever-spreading labours by March 8 and concentrated all attention upon the actual work of making peace. Thirdly, the Triumvirate period, when the main issues were fought out by Lloyd George, Clémenceau and Wilson in the Council of Four and finally alone together. This Triumvirate, after tense daily discussions lasting for more than two months, framed preliminaries of peace which were accepted by all the Allied States, great and small, and then presented to the enemy in the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly.

A Defective Procedure.

To understand the Conference the reader must grasp both the procedure and how it arose. The logical French scheme of November 29 had not been accepted by President Wilson. Nevertheless, there was general, if tacit, agreement that in the first instance the victors should meet together alone. They would then draw up preliminary peace terms, and after thrashing these out among themselves would present draft treaties unitedly to the enemy. The French had proposed, and the British, Italians and Japanese expected that from among the victors the leaders of the five Great Powers would confer privately beforehand and would settle all the largest questions and principles among themselves before the crowd of small States were admitted to the discussion. However, except for the questions of procedure mentioned in the last chapter, this all-important, and as it proved indispensable, stage never had its proper place. The main Conference overlapped and overlaid the vital preparatory discussions. The first Plenary Session of January 18 saw the whole twenty-seven States represented and no agreement on any fundamental matter among the five principal Allied Powers.

Of course the five Great Powers from the beginning to the end settled everything as they chose, and nothing could have prevented them from doing so. But these primordial facts only became

apparent and dominant after a prolonged period of uncertainty and confusion. Decisions were taken not as the result of systematized study and discussion, but only when some individual topic reached a condition of crisis. Throughout there was no considered order of priority, no thought-out plan of descending from the general to the particular. All sorts of thorny, secondary questions were discussed and fought over by chiefs who had not agreed upon the primary foundations. There was no mutual confidence between the five Great Powers, and no achievement of a common point of view. Two months of discussion took place while all the burning issues were hidden in the breasts of the leading plenipotentiaries. In fact, so far as I have been able to ascertain, right down to the end of March there never was any heart-to-heart and frank conversation between the three men on whom ultimately everything rested: Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clémenceau and President Wilson. This is the dominating fact of the Wilson and Balfour stages.

The Supreme Council.

These chiefs were, however, continually in official contact. Not only were there frequent sessions called "conversations" of the Council of Ten, but the same men (or some of them) often sat together as the Supreme War Council.[1] This instrument had reached a very high development during the concluding months of the war. The meetings of the Supreme War Council were not concerned with the terms of peace. Many practical and urgent matters pressed upon them from week to week: for instance, the whole economic situation; the continuance of the terms of the Armistice; the relations with Russia. And then from time to time the disorders of Europe rose to explosion point.

The newly founded Republic of Poland found itself in a state of war with the people of East Galicia; and the Supreme War Council had to interfere. They sent out a special Commission to Poland, and we saw the spectacle of an international train starting on an adventurous journey with its five heavily guarded carriages each for a separate nation. In spite of hazards the international Commission reached Warsaw and patched up some kind of truce between the Poles and the Ukrainians. Then similar difficulties arose in Teschen. The Allies had to intervene to prevent the outbreak of fighting between the Poles and the Czecho-Slovaks. In April again they had to intervene in consequence of the Bolshevik revolution of Bela Kun in Hungary and the great dangers which it involved. The situation was indeed difficult and dangerous in the last degree.

There was serious peril that the whole continent might lapse into anarchy. Everyone turned to the principal Allies, looking for help; but in many cases the help could not be given. They wanted food, but there was still a shortage of food even in the Allied countries. They wanted military occupations; but the British, whose soldiers were in the greatest demand as pacifiers, could not spare many troops and could not risk sending small detachments to remote districts far from the sea. All these consequential war measures occupied during the first months much of the time and the energy of the principal powers.

A Dual Association.

This dual association exercised an irresistible effect upon the making of the Peace. The five Great Powers found themselves continually together for one cause or another. In the morning they "conversed" as a Council of Ten about the Peace settlements; in the afternoon they sat as a Supreme Council taking important executive decisions. The rest of the twenty-seven States, who according to the fiction originally adopted were of equal status, were from time to time assembled in Plenary Sessions where under conditions of the fullest publicity nothing of any importance could ever be done.

President Wilson yielded himself inevitably and almost insensibly to these developments. He saw that they did not arise from the evil nature of European diplomacy, but from practical and phy-

[1] The word "war" was gradually dropped.

sical causes against which it was vain to strive. How could any thorny question affecting the main interests of nations, great or small, be helpfully debated by twenty-seven Powers in public? If platitudes and honeyed words alone were used, the proceedings would be a farce. If plain speaking were indulged in, they would become a bear-garden. Even the Council of Ten, solely composed of the leading statesmen of the greatest Powers and meeting in secret, was too unwieldy. With its attendant experts it rarely numbered less than fifty persons of very various rank and status. Even secrecy was doubtful, apart from calculated leakages. We shall see the President presently, guided by common sense and the force of facts, lock himself up with Clémenceau and Lloyd George, and with only Maurice Hankey to record and give precise shape to the decisions, settle every question of crucial importance.

If such meetings had taken place in December or even in January, the whole course of the Peace Conference would have been smooth and coherent. He had begun by rejecting the obvious and the easy. He welcomed them warmly when they returned to him upside down after many days.

The moment at length came for the President to launch his main policy. He declared that a League of Nations must become an integral part of the Treaty of Peace and must have priority over all territorial or economic settlements. It was upon the structure of the League that the whole Treaty should be built, and with its general principles all must be in harmony. This would have been admirable if a preliminary understanding had been reached on the main issues between the leading men, and if they had known where they stood with one another in essentials and had not felt that very serious conflicts impended. But now it seemed that the Conference was to dive into interminable academic discussions upon a new Constitution for mankind, while all the practical and clamant issues had to drum their heels outside the door.

The League of Nations' Commission.

It was agreed that a special Commission upon the Constitution of the League of Nations should be appointed by a Plenary Session of the Conference. The discussions in the Council of Ten, at which this procedure was settled, are instructive reading. President Wilson, hitherto the champion of the smaller Powers, had already realized that no business would be done if any large number of them were allowed to sit upon the Commission of the League. He therefore argued for the smallest possible body composed of representatives of the highest responsibility. Clémenceau and Lloyd George, on the other hand, somewhat ironically voiced the claims of the smallest nations. The League was to be their shield and buckler. Ought they not to be there? Would this not open to them a useful sphere of activity instead of leaving them to loaf morosely about Paris waiting for the decisions of the Council of Ten? All the Great Powers except the United States were profoundly disquieted at the total lack of progress, and their representatives had to face a rising menace of impatience at home. While the main questions were unsettled, every aspect of the League of Nations Constitution would have to be vigilantly scrutinized. They regarded with despair the prospect of so many weeks' or even months' delay.

In the end a very good Commission was appointed which included some of the smaller nations and yet was not unmanageable in numbers. The two foremost British champions of the policy, Lord Robert Cecil[1] and General Smuts, were appointed delegates. Wilson himself decided to preside, and the immense task was vigorously taken in hand.

The history of the Peace Conference, edited by Dr. Temperley and published under the auspices of the Institute of Foreign Affairs, attributes the origin of the League of Nations to three reasons. First, the need of some settled Council of Nations which would be responsible for the maintenance of peace; secondly, the need for a more comprehensive guarantee of the safety of small nations as proved by the fate of Belgium; and, thirdly, a growing belief in the advantages of economic co-operation. An additional argument might be found in the

[1] Now Viscount Cecil of Chelwood.

fact that twenty million men had been blowing each other to pieces for more than four years, that this process had now stopped, and most people hoped it would not begin again.

Origin of the Covenant.

It is sometimes pretended that the League of Nations was an American inspiration forced and foisted upon Europe against its froward inclination. The facts are different. The idea had stirred in most civilized countries during the last three years of the war, and various societies had been formed to propagate it both in America and in England. Lord Robert Cecil was the first Englishman to put something down in writing, and he wrote a paper on this subject at the end of 1916. His thesis, though necessarily undeveloped, amounting indeed only to a rough draft of what now forms Articles XV and XVI of the Covenant, provided a basis for a Committee set up in 1917 under Lord Phillimore's presidency to work upon. This Committee produced draft statutes of a League in a document circulated to the United States among other Governments early in 1918.

In the summer of 1918 President Wilson deputed Colonel House to work upon the Phillimore draft and House's suggestions reached him on July 16. The main addition made by House was the positive guarantee of the territorial integrity and independence of the States members of the League. Phillimore's draft

Photo: DailyMail.

MEN WHO DRAFTED THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT.

At a meeting of the Peace Conference in Paris on February 14, 1919, President Wilson read the text of the proposed League of Nations Covenant. The members of the committee appointed to draft the covenant were, reading from left to right (seated in front): Viscount Chinda (Japan); next but one M. Léon Bourgeois (France); Lord Robert Cecil (Great Britain); Signor Orlando (Italy); and, next but one, M. Venizelos (Greece). Standing behind, in the second row: Colonel House (U.S.A.); next but one M. Vesnitch (Serbia); General Smuts (Great Britain); President Wilson (U.S.A.); M. Hymans (Belgium); and his Excellency Wellington Koo (China) Other members of the Committee, not identified in the group, are M. Larnaude (France); Senator Scialoia (Italy); M. Ochiai (Japan); M. Epitacio Pescoa (Brazil); and M. Jayme Batalha Reis (Portugal).

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE COUNCIL OF FOUR.

The delegates sent to Paris to confer upon the Peace Treaty, seventy in number, representing twenty-seven States, would as a body have been much too cumbrous for the expeditious consideration of the many questions at issue. First of all there was formed a Council of Ten, but this was thereafter reduced to five. Japan's representative ultimately withdrew, leaving the four statesmen shown here: Signor Orlando; Lloyd George; Clémenceau and Wilson.

had been content merely to provide guarantees for the execution of arbitration agreements. When Wilson came to revise this he omitted the clause providing for an International court but added tremendous words, indeed such words as Lord Robert Cecil had advocated in his early draft, that violation should be punished by lethal force.

Meanwhile General Smuts produced independently on December 16, 1918, his own draft of a League which embodied detailed suggestions of an organization, proposed to set up a Council as well as the Assembly, included a provision for the abolishment of conscription and for the limitation of military equipment, and recommended a mandatory system for backward territories or States in tutelage.

Of Wilson's share in the task his chronicler, Mr. Baker, says: "Practically nothing, not a single idea, in the covenants of the League was original with the President. His relation to it was mainly that of editor or compilist, selecting or rejecting or compiling the projects which came in to him from other sources."[1]

The British Contribution.

This in no wise detracts from the magnitude of Wilson's contribution. He embodied all helpful amendments in his own draft, and also added one draft Article designed to ensure fair hours and humane conditions for labour, and another requiring new States to grant equal rights to minorities. This was the draft which the Americans presented on January 10, 1919, at the Peace Conference, and ten days later the British Delegation also produced the most up-to-date version of the British ideas on the subject. The British and American drafts, which in all essentials "meant

[1] Vol. I, p. 242.

the same thing," were consolidated by Sir Cecil Hurst representing Great Britain, and Mr. Hunter Miller the United States. They were considered and amended by the League Commission during the latter part of January and beginning of February, and eventually laid before a Plenary Session of the Conference on February 14. Thus the League of Nations was an Anglo-Saxon conception arising from the moral earnestness of persons of similar temperament on both sides of the Atlantic.

Scepticism.

President Wilson had made this great idea his own, and when all the vexations of these days and his own mistakes are forgotten it is in the establishment and ascendancy of a new international society that his memory will be enshrined. The British were throughout his chief supporters. In our island all liberal elements clung and cling to the plan. All other right-minded persons realized the advantages which such a League might confer upon the widely dispersed communities of the British Empire. Criticism arose only from scepticism. Was it not too good to be true? Could it be a substitute for national armaments? Might it not turn out in the hour of need to be an illusion and those who had counted on it perish in some future earthquake? It seemed to these critics more prudent to retain the old proved safeguards while the new were a-building. But the support given by Great Britain to President Wilson's League of Nations plan was whole-hearted, positive, and, above all, practical. Without it he could never have succeeded.

It was natural that the smaller or weaker States of the world should acclaim a Reign of Law which would protect them from overlordship or aggression. France and Italy and, on the other side of the globe, Japan, received the new gospel with goodwill; but being much closer anchored to the grim realities, they reproduced in more stubborn forms the misgivings of British sceptics. The real opposition came from the United States. The whole tradition of the American people had been separation from the tribulations and antagonisms of the Old and Older Worlds. The Atlantic pleaded three thousand and the Pacific seven thousand reasons against entanglement in these far-off affairs. All the teachings of the Fathers of the American Union from Washington to Monroe had ingeminated Non-intervention. Science has to march perhaps another fifty years before the gulfs of ocean space are rendered politically meaningless. This is no long period in human history, but it far exceeded the life of the Paris Conference in the Year of Grace 1919.

Moreover, as has been seen, President Wilson had taken no measures to conciliate or disarm the inveterate and natural aversion of his own countrymen. It was as a Party, not as a National leader, that he sought to rule the United States and lecture Europe. His native foundations broke beneath him. While his arm was lifted in rebuke of the embarrassed and respectful Governments of the Old World he was unceremoniously hauled out of the pulpit by his hefty Party opponents at home. Some of the most gifted Americans whom I have met —"men of light and leading"—as the saying goes, have said "European politicians ought to have understood the Constitution of the United States. You ought to have known that the President without the Senate could do nothing. You have only yourselves to blame if you have suffered through counting on his personal decisions or undertakings. They had no validity."

The President's Credentials.

There were from the very beginning serious doubts about the credentials of President Wilson. The supreme efficacy of the League of Nations depended upon the accession of the United States. Here was the great new external balancing factor. Was it at the command of President Wilson? If it were not, no surge of liberal sentiment in the various countries could replace it. It would, on the other hand, have been highly imprudent to canvass his credentials. What would have happened if, for instance, Lloyd George and Clémenceau had said across the table: "We know we speak for the overwhelming mass of

our two countries. Test it any way you will. But is it not true that nothing but your fixed and expiring tenure of office prevents you from being thrown out of power? Your constitutional authority is not complete. Where is the Senate of the United States? We are told that you have lost control both of the Senate and Congress. Are you just a well-meaning philosopher, eager to reform others; or do you carry the faith and will of the American nation?"

Probably the Americans would have been deeply offended. They would have replied: "You were glad enough to have our troops and money on President Wilson's authority. Now that you are out of your troubles you flout the supreme magistrate of the Republic. Whatever Party we belong to, we resent that. It is an insult to suggest that we shall not make good all our undertakings; and in the face of that insult, we will quit the scene." So no one questioned the President's title. Moreover, in spite of a hundred irritations and anxieties, there was an underlying and true conviction in English and French minds that he was the most forthcoming friend of Europe who up to that moment had crossed the Atlantic.

The Question of Mandates.

The composition of the League of Nations Commission was determined by a meeting of the Council of Ten on January 22 and by a Plenary Session of the Peace Conference on January 25. It began its labours on February 2. But meanwhile an acute tension had developed between Great Britain and the Dominions upon the question of the mandatory principle in regard to conquered territory. This principle owed its birth to General Smuts. Its application has now to be extended to limits the General had not contemplated. The theory that the conquered German colonies, or parts of Turkey, would be held by the victors not as their own property but in trust for all mankind under the League of Nations and with formal international supervision of the treatment of the natives seemed to meet all requirements. It was welcomed by President Wilson on the highest grounds.

But the General had only intended it to apply to ex-Russian, ex-Turkish or ex-Austro-Hungarian territory. He had never thought it suited to the regions conquered in the course of the war by the various British Dominions. Least of all had he expected it to be applied to the case of German South-West Africa, which the Union Government had occupied and intended to annex. This was carrying a sound principle too far. The self-governing Dominions all took the view that the mandatory principle should not apply to the places they had taken.

The British Government could not be indifferent to territorial gains. The nation looked for some compensation for its awful losses. As the result of long and costly campaigns the British armies held Palestine, Mesopotamia, the Cameroons and German East Africa. The mandatory system imposed no conditions which had not for many years been strictly observed throughout the British Colonial Empire Alone among all the Colonial possessions of the Great Powers, the immense tropical domains of the British Crown had been free to the trade of all nations. The ships of all countries used British Colonial ports as freely as their own. There had never been any discrimination in favour of British nationals. As for our treatment of the natives, we had nothing to fear from fair international scrutiny. On the contrary we were proud to explain and expose our system.

The Dominions' View.

Mr. Lloyd George therefore stood forward at once and declared the British acceptance of the mandatory principle unreservedly for all territory which the British fleets and armies had wrested from the Turks or the Germans. We could not however speak for the self-governing Dominions. Australia, New Zealand, South Africa were to us precious entities from which we could not separate ourselves, but which we could not control. Of course, the King was supreme. Cession or annexation of territory like peace or war resided in the Crown.

But what Minister, except in the face of unutterable wrong, would invoke this

abstract and almost mystic function against a beloved member of the family? Australia had captured New Guinea; New Zealand, Samoa; and the Union, German South-West Africa. They did not mean to give them up. Nor ought they to be pressed to do so. To speak of these places as "communities shoved hither and thither as pawns in a diplomatic game" is an abuse of language.

These territories, sparsely populated by primitive races, had been part of the brand-new outfit of less desirable Colonies which Great Britain had in the nineteenth century willingly seen accorded to the growth of the German power. Every one of them presented to each of these remote Dominions an inroad upon their own Monroe Doctrine; and every one had been found to be a menace and the cause of bloodshed in the recent conflict. They had taken them; they would not give them up. But their title-deeds did not depend on local conquests. They were consecrated by sacrifice in the common cause. These three Dominions, aggregating together less than a twelfth of the white population of the United States, had lost nearly as many lives on the battle-fields of Europe—six, eleven or twelve thousand miles from home—in a cause which the United States had made its own. Whatever happened, we could not quarrel with them.



Photo: Haines.

WILLIAM FERGUSON MASSEY.

This great New Zealand statesman was born in Co. Derry, Ireland, on March 26, 1856. His parents emigrated to New Zealand when he was six years of age, and he himself joined them there eight years later. For many years he worked on the land, but his many fine qualities brought him into prominence, and in 1894 he entered the New Zealand Parliament. During the Great War, Massey, at the head of a Coalition Ministry, led his country with courage and ability, and later he represented the people of New Zealand at the Peace Conference.

The President and the Dominions' Prime Ministers.

Accordingly, on January 23, Mr. Lloyd George introduced to the Council of Ten the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. There they stood, armed in the panoply of democracy, of war service, and of young nationhood. Borden with wide Canada—French and English—behind him; Massey of New Zealand, fearless and faultless in all that touched the common cause; Hughes the vibrant Australian Labour Premier the grand and rugged Botha; the gifted, philosophical, persuasive Smuts. There they stood, and with them stood not only the modern age but the future. These figures and what they represented were not to be lightly put aside. No George the Third England this; no smooth-phrased European diplomatists; no benighted Old World aristocrats! Here were the Pilgrim Fathers, with tongues as plain

in speech and lands as vast to till. Wilson was not unmoved by their insignia. This at any rate was not what he had crossed the Atlantic to chastise. But he had his cause to defend; and it was a great one.

A jagged debate ensued. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa said they meant to keep the colonies they had taken from the Germans; and Canada said she stood with them. "And do you mean, Mr. Hughes," said the President, "that in certain circumstances Australia would place herself in opposition to the opinion of the whole civilized world?" Mr. Hughes, who was very deaf, had an instrument like a machine gun emplaced upon the table by which he heard all he wanted; and to this challenge he replied dryly, "That's about it, Mr. President." The statesmanship of Borden and of Botha behind the scenes eventually led the Dominion leaders to agree to veil their sovereignty under the name at any rate of Mandate; and this Mr. Wilson was willing to accept.



Photo: Elliott & Fry.

WILLIAM MORRIS HUGHES.

Another great figure of the war years was William Morris Hughes, the war-time Premier of Australia. Hughes was born in Montgomeryshire, Wales, in 1864, and like Massey was a tower of strength to the Allied cause. He represented Australia at the Peace Conference, and many were the piquant passages in council upon which this grand but blunt Dominions statesman embarked.

This discussion had been very gratifying to M. Clémenceau; and for the first time he had heard the feelings of his heart expressed with unbridled candour. He beamed on Mr. Hughes, and punctuated his every sentence with unconcealable delight. "Bring your savages with you," he said to Mr. Lloyd George beforehand; and to the Australian, "Mr. 'Ughes, I have 'eard that in early life you were a cannibal." "Believe me, Mr. President," said the Commonwealth Prime Minister, "that has been greatly exaggerated." This day's meeting was an event in the proceedings of the Council of Ten.

The Period of Commissions.

The Ten now entered the period—indispensable but undefinable—of Commissions. Here were the crucial questions, here were the real differences; but first let us know the facts. Accordingly Commissions were appointed. At one time or another fifty-eight Commissions were formed to find out all about everything; and to enable the masters of the

Photo: E.N.A.

SIR ROBERT LAIRD BORDEN.

Born at Grand Pré, Nova Scotia, on June 26, 1854, Robert Laird Borden was trained for the law, was called to the Bar in 1878, and eight years later entered the Canadian House of Commons as Conservative member for Halifax. In 1911 the Conservative party came into power, and Borden became Premier. During the Great War, in common with the representatives of the other Dominions, he lent himself whole-heartedly to the common cause. The aid extended to Great Britain by her self-governing Dominions, bound to her by no visible ties, is something that is never likely to be forgotten.

world—if masters they remained—to decide wisely and justly and tolerably how the maps of the world should be redrawn and how its depleted riches should be apportioned. In this domain the most effective step was probably the creation as an executive department of the Supreme Council of the Supreme Economic Council, to which was later assigned for instance the feeding of Austria and all such matters. Thus was averted in Vienna and elsewhere the final catastrophe of mass deaths from starvation which was otherwise imminent.

But besides this vital executive function, Commissions were set up in every sphere to prepare proposals for the Treaty: Commissions upon the Financial Arrangements; upon the Economic Clauses; upon Reparations; upon the punishment of War Criminals and Hanging the Kaiser; upon all the territorial issues, the frontiers of Poland, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia; upon the future of Turkey and Arabia; upon colonies in Africa and Asia and islands in the Pacific Ocean. In all fifty-eight Commissions, great and small, upon objects wise or foolish!

Even at the cost of some anticipation of the narrative it will be convenient to dispose of some of the less serious of these topics at this stage.

* * * *

"Make them Pay."

We have seen to what extent Mr. Lloyd George had yielded to the newspaper and popular demand that he should use the strongest language about "Make them pay"; and how he had tried to do this while at the same time safeguarding himself as far as possible by "ifs" and "buts." For instance, in effect, "They shall pay to the utmost farthing—if they can do so without delaying the economic revival of the world." Or, "They shall pay the maximum possible—but what is the maximum possible must be ascertained by financial experts." When the election was over and I had asked the Prime Minister how he was going to meet the expectations of the public that all the damage of the war would be paid for by Germany, he had replied: "It will all have to be settled by an Inter-Allied Commission. We will put on this Com-

mission the ablest men we can find, men not mixed up in politics or electioneering; they will examine the whole matter coolly and scientifically, and they will report to us what is feasible." Now that the time had come, he chose Mr. Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia; Lord Cunliffe, the Governor of the Bank of England; and Lord Sumner, one of the ablest judicial authorities and greatest legal intellects at our disposal.

It was to be expected that the Inter-Allied Commission with its powerful American element would reduce the clamour of the election and the claptrap of the popular Press to hard matter-of-fact business. But the Commission on Reparations was never able to reach agreement. Lord Cunliffe's sub-committee on capacity to pay, which reported in April, cautiously avoided any figure. The Governor had begun apparently to feel some misgivings. At any rate he did not wish to be committed publicly. His sub-committee declared that the factors were too fluctuating to render a forecast possible.

Enormous figures, however, still continued to rule in authoritative circles. Mr. Lamont, one of the American representatives, has in a published article stated that subject to certain important conditions, he was willing to go as high as a capital sum of seven thousand five hundred millions, that the French asked for ten thousand millions, and that the British would not accept less than twelve thousand. The Prime Minister was not, therefore, ever to receive that substantial but at the same time reasonable figure, vouched for by the highest authority, of which he stood greatly in need. His various semi-official conversations with the British representatives gave him no comfort. They spoke always in extremely optimistic terms of German capacity to pay; and on no occasion was any lower figure mentioned than 8,000 millions. Invited formally on March 6 to name a figure "on the assumption that it was to be insisted on even at the point of breaking off the Peace negotiations," they promised to report separately by March 17.

But of this report there is no record. The oracle was mute; and the embarrassed Prime Minister was left to bear the burden himself with the choice either of infuriating the public by mentioning a low figure for which no authority could be cited or a high figure, which his instinct and reason alike convinced him could never be obtained. So no figure of German reparations was fixed by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr. Keynes's Book.

Other Commissions laboured upon the economic clauses of the Peace, and whole chapters of the Treaty were filled with provisions — mostly temporary in character—for making sure that the trade of the Allies would be restarted ahead of that of enemy countries. This separate work was never brought into relation with the financial clauses. Thus the draft Treaty imposed upon Germany at one and the same time an unspecified and unlimited liability and every conceivable impediment upon the means of payment.

Mr. Keynes, a man of clairvoyant intelligence and no undue patriotic bias, was a member of the staff which Great Britain transported to Paris for the Peace Conference. Saturated in the Treasury knowledge of the real facts, he revolted against the absurd objectives which had been proclaimed, and still more against the execrable methods by which they were to be achieved. In a book[1] which gained a vast publicity, particularly in the United States, he exposed and denounced "a Carthaginian Peace." He showed in successive chapters of unanswerable good sense the monstrous character of the financial and economic clauses. On all these matters his opinion is good. Carried away, however, by his natural indignation at the economic terms which were to be solemnly enacted, he wrapped the whole structure of the Peace Treaties in one common condemnation. His qualifications to speak on the economic aspects were indisputable; but on the other and vastly more important side of the problem he could judge no better than many others.

The Keynes view of the Peace of

[1] *The Economic Consequences of the Peace.*

Versailles, justified as it was on the special aspects with which he was acquainted, greatly influenced the judgment of England and America on the whole settlement. It is, however, of high importance for those who wish to understand what actually happened, that the economic and general aspects of the Treaty of Versailles should be kept entirely separate.

The Solution.

When Mr. Lloyd George was reproached or rallied in private during the Peace Conference upon the economic and financial clauses he was accustomed to make the following answer: "It is too soon to expect the peoples who have suffered so much to regain their sanity. What does it matter what is written in the Treaty about German payments? If it cannot be carried out, it will fall to the ground of its own weight. We have to give satisfaction to the view of the multitude who have endured such frightful injuries. We will, however, insert in the Treaty clauses which provide for the recurrent review of these provisions after a few years have passed. It is no good fretting about it now; we must let them all calm down. All I am trying to do now is to insert the machinery of revision in the text of the Treaty."

This may not have been heroic, but it is very largely what has come to pass. The main economic clauses of the "Carthaginian Peace" have either lapsed or have been revised under the machinery provided in the Treaty; and, in fact, the Dawes Agreement claims no more from Germany than the 2,000–2,500 millions indemnity which the well-instructed British Treasury mentioned as a reasonable figure on the first occasion when their opinion was invited.

* * * *

War Criminals.

Another Commission laboured upon the punishment of War Criminals. Horrible things had been done in the war, and while it raged the fighting fury of millions had been inflamed by the tale. The victors were now in a position to lay down their own view of these events. Certainly in military executions, in organized "frightfulness" as distinct from spontaneous or uncontrollable brutality in actual fighting, the case was black against the Germans. They had stood throughout the war on conquered soil. The Allies had with difficulty defended their own invaded lands. Germany had held for four years writhing populations in her grip. To British minds the execution of Edith Cavell, and still more of Captain Fryatt, were crimes for which somebody should be held rigorously accountable. But France and Belgium had long and hideous indictments to unfold. A thousand atrocious acts committed by privates, by sergeants, by captains, by the orders of generals, marshalled behind them a cloud of witnesses.

There were also dark tales from the sea—not wholly one-sided; but here also was the German submarine campaign—sinking merchant ships at sight; and the *Lusitania* with some munitions but also with its forty babies; and hospital ships with their helpless, nerve-shattered patients and faithful nurses, sinking and choking in the cold sea. This found no counterpart in any of the reprisals, fierce and ferocious as some of them were, which these deeds extorted from seafaring men.

The conduct of the Bulgarians in Serbia excited the extreme indignation of the investigators. As for Turkish atrocities: marching till they dropped dead the greater part of the garrison at Kut; massacring uncounted thousands of helpless Armenians—men, women and children together; whole districts blotted out in one administrative holocaust—these were beyond human redress.

But a passionate demand arose in Belgium, France and England that certain definite deeds, contrary to such laws of war as men have tried to make and keep, should be brought home to individuals. No one could deny that this held justice? But how was it to be carried out? The submarine lieutenant could plead the orders of his superiors; these he had to obey upon his life. Whether hospital ships should be sunk or not was a matter for governments. A naval lieutenant could only do what he was told. The executions had behind them whatever sanctions the military tribunals of warring nations

could give. As for the brutality in the zone of the armies, obscure people could be indicated who had done vile things; but they said they had not; or alternatively, that their officers had told them to do it. The officers said they had not, or would have said so if they could have been found. Or thirdly, that they could match these incidents with others done against themselves which they had seen and in respect of which there was no lack of testimony.

The Ladder of Responsibility.

Commissions were appointed to probe these matters. Material was plentiful, but where lay the responsibility? The captain had ordered the platoon to fire the volley. He had received his orders from the military governor. The military governor had acted under the authority accorded him by his commission. The corps commander could say he obeyed the Army Group, and the Army Group was but the servant of main headquarters. Above all, was the German Government supported by the German People, and at the summit, the Emperor? Led on by logic the commission climbed this ladder. How could they condemn the sergeant or the captain for actions for which the general bore responsibility? How could they condemn the general when the Government and the Parliament had approved, or at least acquiesced? So if anyone was to be punished it must not be the small people, but the big. Thus after months of toilsome argumentation, a list was drawn up which included all the greatest men in Germany: all the army commanders, all the most famous generals, most of the princes, and, above all, the Kaiser. An article of the Peace Treaty obliged the Germans to stigmatize all their greatest men and potentates as war criminals. The mere inscribing of all these names upon the list was sufficient to bring the whole business to futility.

The Kaiser.

The one practical measure was to hang the Kaiser, who was the "All-Highest," and who was constitutionally responsible for everything that his armies had done. Much vitality still remained in the trial of the Kaiser. Mr. Lloyd George persisted and persevered. He was not only committed to this aim, he was ardent for it. The Americans disinterested themselves in the matter; the French mildly scandalized, but at the same time amused, gave a gay assent. The law officers elaborated their processes.

However, the Kaiser was outside Allied jurisdiction. He had been driven out of France; he had fled from Germany; he had found refuge in Holland. A demand for the extradition or surrender of the Kaiser was formally made to Holland. Mr. Lloyd George, at the height of his triumph after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, announced to Parliament that the Kaiser was to be tried by an international tribunal in London. What followed might have been foreseen. Field-Marshal von Hindenburg declared that he took full personal responsibility for all the acts done by the German armies from 1916 onwards, and offered to deliver himself to judgment. All the Kaiser's sons wrote by the hand of Prince Eitel Fritz, offering themselves collectively as rams taken in the thicket. The fugitive at Doorn saw before him a martyr's crown without much likelihood of the usual physical inconveniences. There can hardly have been a moment in history when martyrdom stood at so high a premium.

But the Dutch are an obstinate people and, more important still, Holland is a small country. Small countries were very much in fashion at the time of the Peace Conference. "Gallant Little Belgium" was being evacuated, reparated, compensated and congratulated. The war had been fought to make sure that the smallest State should have the power to assert its lawful rights against even the greatest, and this will probably be for several generations an enduring fact. Holland came to the rescue of the Allies—she refused to surrender the Kaiser. Whether or not the subterranean intrigues of old-world secret diplomacy may have conveyed to the Dutch Government some assurance that they would not be immediately fallen upon with armed

violence by all the victorious nations, will never be ascertained. Mr. Lloyd George was genuinely indignant, but by this time among responsible people in England he was alone. The victorious States therefore submitted to the Dutch refusal, and the Kaiser still dwells in Holland.

* * * *

Growing Impatience.

We have now disposed of a number of much-talked-of issues which beset the Peace Conference. None of them, excepting the League of Nations and the disposal of German colonies, touched essentials, and the rest dispersed themselves in a comparatively short time. Many people will be quite surprised to remember how strongly they once felt about them. The idealism of America has now definitely made its contact with the wickedness of Britain and of Europe. Absurd ideas about what the Germans should pay are being embodied in clauses which will never be put into execution and which indeed are safeguarded by other clauses from ever being put into execution. The War Criminals have found shelter under the shields of the most renowned warriors of Germany, and the Dutch will not give up the Kaiser for Lloyd George to hang. Having thus cleared the ground of many encumbrances and trivialities, we are free to approach the central problems of race and territory, of the balance of power in Europe and of the foundations of a world state. These dominate the future, and there is no cottage or hut in which a white, brown, red, black or yellow family is now dwelling which may not some day find itself directly and quite unpleasantly affected by them.



Photo: Manuel.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD.

Born September 14, 1864, the third son of the third Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Robert Cecil was called to the Bar in 1887. He entered Parliament for Marylebone in 1906, resigning his seat in 1910 on account of his opposition to Tariff Reform. During the Great War he became a member of the Coalition Government, but since the cessation of hostilities has exerted a powerful influence upon the conduct of the League of Nations, the Covenant of which he assisted in drafting and in which he has a devout belief. He was raised to the peerage as Viscount Cecil of Chelwood in 1924.

Meanwhile, temper was rising in all the countries. The British public demanded to know when peace was going to be signed and how soon Germany would be made to pay and what had happened about the Kaiser. The Republican Party in America spoke in scornful terms of the President's scheme for world improvement, and stridently called for the return of the American troops and the collection of the American debts. The Italians clamoured for a settlement of their territorial and colonial requirements; and France was boiling with rage and anxiety about her future security. Behind all, the defeated nations waited paralysed with anxiety and incertitude to learn their fate.

The Covenants Achieved.

It had been hoped that the acceptance by the British Dominions of the mandatory principle, and the agreement reached with President Wilson on this issue, would clear the way for practical decisions about frontiers and jurisdictions. But he remained determined that

the drawing-up and adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations should precede all territorial settlements. The Council of Ten was spurred to action by the fears and growing impatience of the countries they represented; and in the earliest days of February there occurred the first crisis of the Peace Conference. Mr. Lloyd George, voicing the opinion of all, demanded that practical issues should no longer be shelved. How was it possible to frame this new world instrument while everyone was waiting for the answers to urgent questions? An immense task lay before them. It was their duty to make peace. They had gathered together for that. They would fail in their duty if they did not give it speedily to the world.

It was known that the President had to return to the United States on February 14 in order to discharge certain imperative constitutional duties. How was it possible to decide the Covenant of the League before then? The President however declared to an audience at once incredulous and relieved that all should be settled by that date. This was in fact accomplished. The Commission was driven forward at breakneck speed; and by an extraordinary effort, in which the British Delegation staff played a decisive part, the draft Covenant of the League was actually finished and presented in full Conference on February 14.

Three months had now passed since the firing stopped, and so far no agreement had been reached on any one of the definite and all-important issues upon which the immediate peace and recovery of Europe depended. In many regions the power of the victors to enforce their decisions had obviously diminished. A heavy price in blood and privations was in the end to be paid by helpless and distracted peoples for the long delay. But here at last was a majestic constitution to which all the Allied States had given provisional but earnest assent.

The Foundation Stone.

Many minds had made their contribution to the Covenant of the League. Phillimore, Robert Cecil, Smuts and Hurst are names which for ever link the British Empire with its institution. Some errors and imperfections arose inevitably from the haste and pressure under which the Covenant was prepared. Nevertheless the base of the new building was set upon the living rock; and the mighty foundation stone, shaped by the innumerable chisellings of merciful men the world over and swung into position by loyal and dexterous English pulleys, will bear for all time the legend: "Well and truly laid by Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America." Who can doubt that upon and around this granite block will ultimately be built a dwelling-place and palace to which "all the men in all the lands" will sooner or later resort in sure trust?



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GRAND-ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ AND THE U-BOATS.

CHAPTER LXXXVII

THE UNFINISHED TASK

" Bolshevism threatened to impose by force of arms its domination on those populations that had revolted against it, and that were organized at our request. If we, as soon as they had served our purpose and as soon as they had taken all the risks, had said, 'Thank you, we are exceedingly obliged to you, you have served our purpose. We need you no longer. Now let the Bolsheviks cut your throats,' we should have been mean—we should have been thoroughly unworthy . . ." [LLOYD GEORGE, *Speech, House of Commons, April* 16, 1919.]

" If Russia is to be saved, as I pray she may be saved, she must be saved by Russians. It must be by Russian manhood and Russian courage and Russian virtue that the rescue and regeneration of this once mighty nation and famous branch of the European family can alone be achieved. The aid which we can give to these Russian Armies—who we do not forget were called into the field originally during the German war to some extent by our inspiration and who are now engaged in fighting against the foul baboonery of Bolshevism —can be given by arms, munitions, equipment, and technical services raised upon a voluntary basis. But Russia must be saved by Russian exertions, and it must be from the heart of the Russian people and with their strong arm that the conflict against Bolshevism in Russia must be mainly waged." [CHURCHILL, *Speech, Mansion House, Feb.* 19, 1919.]

Commitments at the Armistice—Lord Balfour's Memorandum of November 29—British and French Spheres of Interference—The French at Odessa—At the War Office—Prinkipo—The Conference in Paris—My Proposals—Correspondence with the Prime Minister—The Bullitt Mission—The Situation Worsens—Koltchak—Advance of the Siberian Army—The " Big Five " Question Koltchak—Note to Koltchak—His Reply—Decision of the Great Powers to Support Him.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S departure and the interlude which followed at Paris afford the opportunity for placing the reader once more in contact with the gaunt realities which prowled outside.

Commitments at the Armistice.

The Armistice and the collapse of Germany had altered all Russian values and relations. The Allies had only entered Russia with reluctance and as an operation of war. But the war was over. They had made exertions to deny to the German armies the vast supplies of Russia; but these armies existed no more. They had set out to rescue the Czechs; but the Czechs had already saved themselves. Therefore every argument which had led to intervention had disappeared.

On the other hand, all the Allies were involved physically and morally in many parts of Russia. The British commitments were in some ways the most serious. Twelve thousand British and eleven thousand Allied troops were actually ice-bound in North Russia at Murmansk and Archangel. Whatever was decided, they must stay there until the spring. Naturally the position of such detachments against whom the Bolsheviks might concentrate very large forces was not free from anxiety. Colonel John Ward, M.P., and the two British battalions, together with some sailors from the cruiser *Suffolk*, were in the heart of Siberia playing a remarkable part by arms and counsel in sustaining the Omsk Government. The new Siberian army was being rapidly created. It had received from British sources alone 100,000 rifles and 200 guns. It was largely dressed in British uniforms. Training schools under British management had been established at Vladivostok, and were in process of turning out 3,000 Russian officers of indifferent quality.

In the south Denikin, who had succeeded to the command when Alexeiev died, had been encouraged to expect the

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

GENERAL IRONSIDE INSPECTING THE SLAVO-BRITISH LEGION.

One of the most notable among the British generals employed during the Great War was Sir William Ironside. He greatly distinguished himself whilst in command of the small expeditionary force sent to Archangel towards the end of the campaign. The skill which he displayed in this forlorn enterprise and the confidence which he inspired in those under his command went far to obviate a disaster. General Ironside is reputed to be one of the finest linguists in any army in the world.

help of the Allies at the earliest possible moment. With the opening of the Dardanelles and the entry of the British Fleet into the Black Sea, it had become possible to send a British military commission to Novorossisk. On the reports of this commission the War Cabinet decided on November 14, 1918, to assist Denikin with arms and munitions; to send additional officers and military equipment to Siberia and to grant *de facto* recognition to the Omsk Government.

Lord Balfour's Memorandum of November 29.

Lord Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, in a Memorandum of November 29 set forth to the Cabinet the policy which should be pursued.

"This country," he wrote, "would certainly refuse to see its forces, after more than four years of strenuous fighting, dissipated over the huge expanse of Russia in order to carry out political reforms in a State which is no longer a belligerent Ally.

"We have constantly asserted that it is for the Russians to choose their own form of government, that we have no desire to intervene in their domestic affairs, and that if, in the course of operations essentially directed against the Central Powers we have to act with such Russian political and military organizations as are favourable to the Entente, this does not imply that we deem ourselves to have any mission to establish or disestablish any particular political system among the Russian people.

"To these views His Majesty's Government still adhere, and their military

policy in Russia is still governed by them. But it does not follow that we can disinterest ourselves wholly from Russian affairs. Recent events have created obligations which last beyond the occasions which gave them birth. The Czechoslovaks are our Allies and we must do what we can to help them. In the south-east corner of Russia, in Europe, in Siberia, in Transcaucasia and Transcaspia, in the territories adjacent to the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean, new anti-Bolshevik administrations have grown up under the shelter of Allied forces. We are responsible for their existence and must endeavour to support them. How far we can do this, and how such a policy will ultimately develop, we cannot yet say. It must largely depend upon the course taken by the associated Powers who have far larger resources at their disposal than ourselves. For us no alternative is open at present than to use such troops as we possess to the best advantage; where we have no troops to supply arms and money; and in the case of the Baltic provinces, to protect as far as we can the nascent nationalities by the help of our Fleet. Such a policy must necessarily seem halting and imperfect to those who on the spot are resisting the invasion of militant Bolshevism, but it is all that we can accomplish or ought in existing circumstances to attempt."

On November 30 our representatives at Archangel and Vladivostok were informed that the general lines of policy towards Russia which the Government proposed to follow were:

"To remain in occupation at Murmansk and Archangel for the time being; to continue the Siberian Expedition; to try to persuade the Czechs to remain in Western Siberia; to occupy [with five British brigades] the Baku-Batum railway; to give General Denikin at Novorossisk all possible help in the way of military material; to supply the Baltic States with military material."

This was a far-reaching programme. It not only comprised existing commitments, but added to them large new enterprises in the Caucasus and in south Russia. Of these some account must be given.

British and French Spheres of Interference.

A year before, on December 23, 1917, an Anglo-French Convention had been agreed at Paris between Clémenceau, Pichon and Foch on the one hand, and Lord Milner, Lord Robert Cecil, and British military representatives on the other, regulating the future action of France and Britain in southern Russia. This Convention contemplated the support of General Alexeiev, then at Novo Tcherkask, and divided geographically the spheres of action of the two Powers so far as they might be able to act at all.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

TRANSPORT OF THE NORTH RUSSIAN FORCE.

The attempt to combat Bolshevism by landing an Allied force under British leadership at Archangel proved abortive, due in main to the loyal Russians' conversion to the new creed. In the photograph reproduced above a transport column of the North Russian Force is paraded ready to move off.

French action would develop to the north of the Black Sea "against the enemy," i.e. Germany, and hostile Russians; that of England to the east of the Black Sea against the Turks. It followed from this, as set out in Article 3, that the French zone would consist of Bessarabia, the Ukraine, and the Crimea; and the English zone, of the Cossack territories, the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia, and Kurdistan. The War Cabinet on November 13, 1918, reaffirmed their adherence to these limitations.

In consequence the British landed at Batum and rapidly occupied the Caucasian railway from the Black Sea to the Caspian at Baku. Here our troops found a friendly and, on the whole, a welcoming though agitated population. They settled down along the 400-miles' stretch of railway and acted as "big brothers" to the inhabitants and their various fluctuating governments, and developed a flotilla which soon secured the effective command of the Caspian Sea. This sea is larger than the British Isles. The British forces, about 20,000 strong, were, by the end of January, 1919, in possession of one of the greatest strategic lines in the world, and both flanks rested securely on superior naval power on the two inland seas. What the British Government was going to do with it was never clearly thought out. Behind this shield the peoples of Georgia, of Armenia, and of Azerbaijan were to be free to develop their independent existence; and incursions by the Bolsheviks, whether into Turkey (at that time entirely submissive), or Kurdistan, or Persia, were prevented. There was never any fighting and no lives were lost; but it was with the greatest difficulty, on account of our diminishing forces, that this protecting line was maintained intact for about a year.

Disastrous fortunes attended the French incursion into their assigned sphere. A condition of the Armistice had prescribed the immediate evacuation by the Germans of the Ukraine. This seemed reasonable enough to those whose minds were inflamed by the conflict with the Central Powers, and the Germans themselves had no wish but to comply and go home. In fact, however, it withdrew from south Russia the only strong, sane, effective element by which the daily life of twenty or thirty million people was maintained. As the once-hated and dreaded "steel-helmets" swiftly evacuated the towns and cities of south Russia, the Red Guards followed apace, and rousing the dregs of the population against the bourgeoisie and against all who had been friendly

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

BOLSHEVIK PRISONERS OF WAR.

A somewhat pathetic picture of Russian Bolsheviks taken prisoners by the Allied force at Archangel. Many of these men not so many months before had been fighting gallantly in the Allied cause on the Eastern Front. The Russian débâcle will be remembered as one of the most tragic episodes in military history, an episode in which brave men from Tannenberg to the end endured sufferings intolerable, their only reward the destruction of all for which they had fought and suffered.

either to the German invader or to the cause of the Allies, celebrated their assumption of power by horrible massacres and prolonged, insatiate proscriptions.

The French at Odessa.

While these lamentable events were in progress, the French on December 20 landed with about two divisions, supported by a powerful fleet, at Odessa. Their strength was swelled by two Greek divisions furnished by Venizelos, at the request of the Supreme Council of the Allies. Thereupon occurred the first real collision between the victors and the Bolsheviks. It was not decided by the ordinary implements of war. The foreign occupation offended the inhabitants: the Bolsheviks profited by their discontents. Their propaganda, incongruously patriotic and Communist, spread far and wide through the Ukraine.

On February 6, 1919, they reoccupied Kiev, and the population of the surrounding districts rose against the foreigners and the capitalists. The French troops were themselves affected by the Communist propaganda, and practically the whole of the fleet mutinied. Why should they fight now that the war was over? Why should they interfere in Russian affairs? Why should they not go home? Why should they not indeed assist those Russian movements which sought to level all national authority and establish the universal régime of soldiers, sailors and workmen? The well-tempered weapon which had served with scarcely a failure in all the clashes of Armageddon now broke surprisingly in the hands which turned it to a new task. The mutiny in the French fleet was suppressed, and its ringleaders were long in prison; but a shock was sustained in Paris which promptly terminated the whole adventure. On April 6 the French evacuated Odessa, and the Greek divisions, which had been unmoved by these occurrences, were simultaneously withdrawn to their own country. Hard on their heels the Bolsheviks entered the city and inaugurated a second fierce revenge.

This brief recital of the salient episodes is necessarily incomplete. The same kind of ebullitions and confusions were repeated with varying features wherever Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik forces were in the field. A welter of murder and anarchy, of pillage and repression, of counter-revolt and reprisal, of treachery and butchery, of feeble meddling and bloody deeds, extended in a broad belt from the White Sea to the Black. In all this zone no one knew what to do or whom to follow. No organization seemed proof against the universal decomposition, and cruelty and fear reigned in chaos over a hundred million people.

Marshal Foch had on January 12 brought the Russian-Polish situation before the Supreme War Council. He proposed to add to the Armistice terms, then requiring to be renewed, a condition that the Dantzig-Thorn railroad should be put in good order by the Germans, and should, together with the port of Dantzig, be available for the movement of Allied troops. He contemplated forming a considerable army principally of American troops, together with Polish forces and well-disposed Russian prisoners of war, for the protection of Poland and operations against the Bolsheviks. The Americans had however no intention of being used for such a purpose however desirable. It was certain that no British troops would be available. The Marshal therefore fell back on minor expedients, and the statesmen took refuge in platitudes.

* * * *

At the War Office.

I entered the War Office as Secretary of State on January 14, 1919, and became an heir to the pledges and tragedies of this situation as well as to those domestic difficulties recounted in a previous chapter. Up to this moment I had taken no part of any kind in Russian affairs, nor had I been responsible for any commitment. I found myself in the closest agreement on almost every point with Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the policy which we advised and, so far as we had the power, pursued to the end, had at any rate the merit of simplicity. Our armies were melting fast. The British people would not supply the men or the money for any

large military establishment elsewhere than on the Rhine. It was highly questionable whether any troops raised under compulsion for the war against Germany would consent to fight anybody else in any circumstances, or even to remain long in occupation of conquered territory. We therefore sang one tune in harmony: contract your commitments; select your obligations; and make a success of those to which you are able to adhere.

We then urged the following measures: first, to wind up the Batum-Baku adventure in the Caucasus and bring our substantial forces out of danger and responsibility without delay; secondly, to make a peace with Turkey that would show her that England was her friend; thirdly, to discharge our pledges faithfully and fully by arming and equipping the anti-Bolshevik forces from our own immense surplus of munitions, and help them with expert officers and instructors to train efficient armies of their own. Naturally it followed that we should try to combine all the border States hostile to the Bolsheviks into one system of war and diplomacy and get everyone else to do as much as possible. Such was the policy we consistently pursued—and such were its limitations.

But an alternative policy of which there were powerful advocates competed and clashed with these simple conceptions. The British Government had enquired as early as December, 1918, of its allies and associates whether some sort of peace proposals could not profitably be made to Russia.[1] Although this scheme was frowned upon by the French, and its rumour caused an outcry in England, Mr. Lloyd George,[2] raised the question again on January 16, 1919, and suggested that representatives of Moscow and of the various generals and States with which Moscow was at war should be summoned to Paris "in the way that the Roman Empire summoned generals of outlying tributary states to render an account of their actions."

Prinkipo.

President Wilson adopted Mr. Lloyd George's suggestion, and on January 21, 1919, it was decided that the United States should draft the invitations. But the rendezvous was changed. Instead of Paris, the island of Prinkipo in the Sea of Marmora was chosen. Very near to Prinkipo lay another island to which the Young Turks before the war had exiled all the pariah dogs which had formerly infested the streets of Constantinople. These dogs, shipped there in tens of thousands, were left to devour one another and ultimately to starve. I saw them with my own eyes, gathered in troops upon the rocky shores, when I visited Turkey in 1909 in a friend's yacht. The bones of these dogs still whitened the inhospitable island, and their memory noisomely pervaded the neighbourhood. To Bolshevik sympathizers the place seemed oddly chosen for a Peace Conference. To their opponents it seemed not altogether unsuitable.

The invitation was accepted by the Bolsheviks in ambiguous terms on February 4. The white Governments of Siberia and Archangel, as well as Nabokov, Sazonov and other representatives of the anti-Bolshevik groups, refused it with contempt. The whole idea of entering into negotiations with the Bolsheviks was abhorrent to the dominant elements of public opinion, both in Great Britain and in France.

It was at this stage that I was for the first time involved in the Paris discussions about Russia. Having directly on my hands the Archangel, Koltchak and Denikin military commitments, I had repeatedly pressed the Prime Minister for a definite policy. In long anxious conversations he showed his customary patience and kindness in dealing with the anxieties of a colleague. He finally suggested that I should go to Paris and see what could be done within the scope of our limited action.

The Conference in Paris.

Accordingly, on February 14, I crossed the Channel on this mission, and sat in the seats of the Mighty. Then I saw the scene which has been so often described of the Peace Conference at work: Clémenceau presiding, grim, rugged, snow-white with black skull-cap;

[1] *The Foreign Relations of Soviet Russia*, by A. L. P. Dennis.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

RUSSIAN MILITARY TYPES.

Taken in 1918 on board a transport, the photograph reproduced here shows Russian officers and men typical of those who during the four years of the war opposed the German armies on the Eastern Front.

opposite him Marshal Foch, very formal, very subdued, grave, illustrious, lovable. On either hand, in sumptuous chairs, sat the representatives of the victorious Powers. Around Gobelin tapestries, mirrors, gilding and glittering lights! This was the only occasion when I had any official contact with President Wilson, and I shall recount what occurred.

The Conference had sat long that day, and it was past seven o'clock when the Russian item on the agenda was reached. It was the very night that President Wilson was leaving on his first return journey to the United States. He had only a short time to get his dinner and catch his train to Cherbourg. He had actually risen from his place to leave the Conference, and there could not have been a less propitious moment for raising an extra, disagreeable and baffling topic. However, with the persistence born of my direct responsibilities upon the various Russian fronts, and with all sorts of cruel realities then proceeding, present in my mind, I stood up and made my appeal. "Could we not have some decision about Russia? Fighting was actually going on. Men were being killed and wounded. What was the policy? Was it peace or was it war? Were we to stop or were we to go on? Was the President going away to America leaving this question quite unanswered? What was to happen while he was away? Was nothing to go on except aimless unorganized bloodshed till he came back? Surely there should be an answer given."

The President, contrary to my expectation, was affable. He turned back to the table and, resting his elbow on Clémenceau's chair, listened without sitting down to what I had to say. Then he replied frankly and simply to the following effect: "Russia was a problem to which he did not pretend to know the solution. There were the gravest objections to every course, and yet some course must be taken—sooner or later. He was anxious to clear out of Russia altogether, but was willing, if necessary, to meet the Bolsheviks alone (i.e. without the National Russians) at Prinkipo. Nevertheless, if Prinkipo came to nothing, he would do his share with the other Allies in any military measures which they considered necessary and practicable to help the Russian armies now in the field." Then he left us.

It seemed to me obvious that what-

ever the Russian policy of the Allies might be or by whatever measures it might be executed, some central body should be set up to study and concert it. To the fifty-eight Commissions there might at least be added a fifty-ninth for Russia.

My Proposals.

Next day, at a special meeting at the Quai d'Orsay on the Russian situation, I proposed, with Mr. Balfour's approval, the setting up of an Allied Council for Russian Affairs with political, economic and military sections, and with executive power within the limits of the policy defined for it by the Allied Governments ; and that the military inquiry into what resources were available and how they could best be co-ordinated should proceed forthwith.

I reported the course of the discussion to the Prime Minister, and added :

" If Prinkipo fell through, the Supreme War Council could be presented immediately with a complete military plan and an expression of opinion from the highest military authorities as to whether within the limits of our available resources there is a reasonable prospect of success. The Supreme War Council would then be in a position to take a definite decision whether to clear out altogether or to adopt the plan."

The following were the actual proposals :

DRAFT WIRELESS MESSAGE.

Feb. 15, 1919.

The Princes Island proposal of the Allied Powers has now been made public for more than a month. The Bolsheviks have replied by wireless on the 6th instant offering to meet the wishes of the Allied Powers as regards the repayment of loans, the grant of concessions for mineral and forest rights, and to examine the rights of eventual annexation of Russian territories by the Entente Powers.

The Allies repudiate the suggestion that such objects have influenced their

Photo : Associated Illustration Agencies.

MACHINE GUN INSTRUCTION IN ESTHONIA.

Esthonia, formerly part of the Russian Empire, is bounded on the north by the Gulf of Finland and on the east by Russia. After the Revolution Esthonia claimed independence and a national government was set up. Before, however, this comparatively small country found itself in a position to manage its own affairs without interference it had, perforce, in common with other small communities, to suffer from the depredations of its powerful neighbours. At the end of 1918 Finland and Britain came to the aid of Esthonia, and in February, 1920, peace was made with the Soviet Government. The photograph reproduced above, taken at the end of 1918, shows a British Marine giving instruction to Esthonians in the use of the machine gun.

intervention in Russia. The supreme desire of the Allies is to see peace restored in Russia and the establishment of a Government based upon the will of the broad mass of the Russian people.

It is solely with this object that the Princes Island proposal has been made. It is not essential to that proposal that any conference should be held or that representatives of the various Russian forces in the field should meet around a common table. But what is imperative is that fighting should stop, and stop forthwith. The Bolshevik Government while verbally accepting the invitation to Princes Island have, so far from observing a truce of arms, taken the offensive in many directions and are at the present time attacking on several fronts. In addition they have called up new classes and expedited and expanded their military preparations.

It is therefore necessary to fix a precise time within which the Princes Island proposal must be disposed of. Unless within ten days from the 15th instant the Bolshevik forces on all fronts have ceased to attack and have withdrawn a distance of not less than five miles from the present position of their adversaries' outpost lines, the Princes Island proposal will be deemed to have lapsed. If, however, within five days a wireless notification is received from the Bolshevik Government that they have so ceased attacking, so ceased firing and so withdrawn, and if this is confirmed by the reports received from the various fronts, a similar request will be addressed by the Allies to the forces confronting them.

It is in these circumstances only that a discussion at Princes Island can take place.

Photo: E.N.A.

PRINKIPO.

The Turkish island in the Sea of Marmora upon which it was proposed that a meeting between the representatives of Moscow and the various generals and States with which Moscow was at war should meet. No meeting, in fact, was held. Prinkipo is the largest of the Princes Islands group.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

RUSSIAN VILLAGE AFTER CAPTURE BY THE ALLIES.

The intermittent hostilities which flared up like heath fires in various parts of the vast territory of Russia, and which persisted long after the Great War had come to an end, resulted in much loss of life and damage to property. A typical Russian village is shown here bearing marks of fighting which, if not on the devastating scale common on the Western Front, was yet sufficient to cause damage enough to the homes of the helpless and forlorn Russians.

PROPOSAL FOR A COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES OF ALLIED MILITARY INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA.

In anticipation of the Soviet Government refusing to accept the allied terms and continuing hostilities, it is suggested that suitable machinery should be set up forthwith to consider the practical possibilities of joint military action by the Associated Powers acting in conjunction with the independent border States and pro-Ally Governments in Russia.

The machinery in question might take the form of a Commission comprising military representatives of the American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese Governments. This Commission would make it its business, among other things, to examine competent representatives of Russia, Finland, Esthonia, Poland and the other border States, in order to form an estimate of the actual military assistance which these States and Governments are in a position to supply, and to prepare a plan for the utilization of the joint resources.

It is considered that the existing organization at Versailles, with certain necessary additions, would be suitable for the purpose, but in this case it should be understood that the military representatives would be acting as the mouthpieces of the Chiefs of the Staff of their respective nationalities.

The Committee should endeavour to furnish their report within ten days, or whatever time limit is set in the ultimatum that it is now proposed to send to the belligerent Governments in Russia.

Correspondence with the Prime Minister.

Mr. Lloyd George's view is well set forth in the following telegram :

Prime Minister to Mr. Philip Kerr.

February 16, 1919.

See Churchill and tell him I like the cable which it is proposed to send Bolsheviks. As to alternative programme. I trust he will not commit us to any costly operations which would involve any large contribution either of men or money. The form of his cable to me looks rather too much like this. I had understood from his conversation with me that all he had in mind was to send expert details who volunteer to go to Russia together with any equipment we can spare. I also understand our volunteer army has not to be drawn upon for that purpose and that effort made to secure volunteers would not be on such a scale as to arouse vehement opposition in this country involving us in heavy expenditure and interfere with growth of our own volunteer army.

All these things ought to be made clear to all the other Powers before an agreement is arrived at otherwise they might either depend too much on us or subsequently upbraid us with having failed in our promises. The main idea ought to be to enable Russia to save herself if she desires to do so ; and if she does not take advantage of opportunity, then it means either that she does not wish to be saved from Bolshevism or that she is past saving. There is only one justification for interfering in Russia—that Russia wants it. If she does, then Koltchak, Krasnov and Denikin ought to be able to raise much larger force than Bolsheviks. This force we could equip, and a well-equipped force of willing men would soon overthrow Bolshevik army of unwilling conscripts especially if whole population is against them.

If, on the other hand, Russia is not behind Krasnov and his coadjutors, it is an outrage on every British principle of freedom that we should use foreign armies to force upon Russia a government which is repugnant to its people.

I replied that, in accordance with his views, the limited character of our assistance would be clearly stated. It was not, however, possible to obtain any measure of agreement between the Powers. Perhaps if President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George had both been present, some conclusion either in one sense or the other might have been reached.

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

This afternoon I proposed the formation of a military commission to enquire into what measures were possible to sustain the Russian armies we had called into being during the war with Germany and to protect the independence of the border States.

Fears were expressed that even setting up a commission to enquire into the military situation might leak out and cause alarm.

Mr. Balfour, therefore, proposed that no formal commission should be set up, but that the military authorities might be allowed informally to talk together and, instead of presenting a report to the Conference as a whole, might individually hand to their respective representatives on the Conference a copy of the results of their informal and unofficial conversations.

After Clémenceau had commented on the strange spectacle of the victorious nations in this great struggle being afraid even to remit to the study of their military advisers at Versailles a matter admittedly of vital importance to Europe, this project was agreed to.

You are therefore committed at some date in the near future to receiving an informal document embodying certain military opinions bearing upon Russia. You are committed to nothing else. . . .

In the circumstances it was useless for me to remain in Paris, and I therefore returned to London on the 18th. I am sure the procedure I proposed was reasonable and practical. The one chance of success and safety for the National Russians lay in the united countenance of the Allies, and the proper concerting of any action they could take. The Allies had not much to give them, but they might at least have given it in a manner likely to be useful.

* * * *

The Bullitt Mission.

Both the Prinkipo proposals and the study of the military and diplomatic possibilities having been reduced to nullity, the Americans with the assent of Mr. Lloyd George sent a certain Mr. Bullitt to Russia on February 22. He returned to Paris in a week or two with proposals for an accommodation from the Soviet Government in his pocket. The moment was unpropitious. Koltchak's armies had just gained notable successes in Siberia, and Bela Kun had raised his Communist rebellion in Hungary. French and British indignation against truckling to the Bolsheviks was at its height. The Soviet proposals to Mr. Bullitt, which were, of course, in themselves fraudulent, were treated with general disdain; and Bullitt himself was not without some difficulty disowned by those who had sent him.

Thus again we reached the void.

The Prime Minister, nettled by repeated War Office requests for decisions of policy, retorted by demanding exact estimates of the cost in money of the various alternatives open.

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

February 27, 1919.

I send you herewith a statement of British assistance given to Russia, which as you will see, is considerable. The criticism that may be passed is that it is related to no concerted policy, and that while it constitutes a serious drain on our resources, it is not backed with sufficient vigour to lead to any definite result. There is no "will to win" behind any of these ventures. At every point we fall short of what is necessary to obtain real success. The lack of any "will to win" communicates itself to our troops and affects their morale: it communicates itself to our Russian allies and retards their organization, and to our enemies and encourages their efforts.

With regard to your complaint that the War Office have not furnished you with information, I must point out to you that the War Cabinet have long been accustomed to deal direct with the Chief of the Staff and other military authorities, and they know as well as I do the difficulties of obtaining precise plans and estimates of cost from military men in regard to this Russian problem. The reason is that all the factors are uncertain and that the military considerations are at every point intermingled with political decisions which have not been given. For instance, to begin with what is fundamental, the Allied Powers in Paris have not decided whether they wish to make war upon the Bolsheviks or to make peace with them. They are pausing midway between these two courses with an equal dislike of either. . . .

The Situation Worsens.

And a fortnight later:

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

March 14, 1919.

The four months which have passed since the Armistice was signed have been disastrous almost without relief for the anti-Bolshevik forces. This is not due to any great increase in Bolshevik strength, though there has been a certain augmentation. It is due to the lack of any policy on the part of the Allies, or of any genuine or effective support put into the operations which are going on against the Bolsheviks at different points in Russia.

Prinkipo has played its part in the general discouragement and relaxation which has set in. The fact that the German troops were commanded to withdraw from the Ukraine without any provision being made to stop the Bolshevik advance, has enabled large portions of this rich territory full of new supplies of food to be overrun, and the Bolsheviks are now very near the Black Sea at Kherson. There are many signs of weakness in Koltchak's forces, and, as you have observed, many Bolshevik manifestations are taking place behind the Siberian front, in one of which the Japanese have had quite severe fighting.

* * * *

Koltchak.

It will be convenient at this stage somewhat to anticipate the fortunes of Admiral Koltchak and the march of events in Siberia.

Koltchak, a vigorous man in the early forties, was in many ways the naval

counterpart of Kornilov. On the outbreak of the revolution, after a mutiny of his fleet in which he had proved his personal courage and physical strength, he had been advised by the Provisional Government to take refuge in Japan, for they would probably have need of him at a later stage. On their fall he had entered Siberia from the east and had for some months been serving in the curious rôle of Minister of Marine in the Omsk Government, which was at no point less than 1,000 miles from the sea. Koltchak was honest, loyal and incorruptible. His outlook and temperament were autocratic; but he tried hard to be liberal and progressive in accordance with what he was assured was the spirit of the times. He had no political experience, and was devoid of those profound intuitions which have enabled men of equal virtue and character to steer their way through the shoals and storms of revolution. He was an intelligent, honourable, patriotic admiral. He took no part in the movement or conspiracy which overthrew the civil power; but when the necessities of the time and the general demand of those with whom he was in contact thrust upon him the responsibilities of dictatorship, he accepted the duty.

Photo: E.N.A.

ANTON IVANOVITCH DENIKIN.

Denikin was born on December 4, 1872. Entering the Russian Army in 1887, he served throughout the Russo-Japanese War, and during the Great War of 1914–18 was promoted General. One of the outstanding figures of post-revolutionary Russia, Denikin, recognized by the Peace Conference, fought the Bolsheviks until his army collapsed and his cause was finally lost. More fortunate than Kornilov and Alexeiev, he survived the campaign and came to England.

He proclaimed himself "Supreme Ruler" and Commander-in-Chief for Siberia, the Cossack territories, and Orenburg. He stated that his chief aims were "the revival of the fighting power of the army, the triumph over Bolshevism, and the restoration of law and order so that the Russian people may without hindrance select its own form of government." There is no doubt that this programme met the needs of the moment. In practice, any vigorous policy involved the total exclusion of the anti-Bolshevik Socialists from the Siberian government. These auxiliaries, hampering in council, feeble to help but powerful to embarrass, became henceforward definite opponents. On the other hand, the principal trading and industrial circles, the co-operative societies, the municipal institutions, and above all the indispensable military power, rallied at once and increasingly in Koltchak's support. The mass remained sunk in Russian apathy and fatalism. He was the best man available; his programme was the right programme; but he possessed neither the

authority of the Imperial autocracy nor of the Revolution. He was destined to fail in investing with fighting strength those intermediate conceptions which are the commonplaces of civilized society.

Advance of the Siberian Army.

Under his direction General Gaida, now commanding the Siberian army, numbering about 100,000 men, for the time being advanced rapidly, reforming the whole front from which the Czechs had been withdrawn. By the end of January they had reconquered a belt of territory 150 miles wide. On March 1, encouraged by these successes, they resumed the offensive, with the object of gaining in the centre and south the line of the Volga, and in the north of joining hands through Viatka and Kotlas with the Russian and inter-allied forces at Archangel. An advance on a front of 700 miles with only 100,000 men could not succeed if any serious resistance was encountered. Nevertheless, by May 1 the Siberians had further advanced on their enormous front to a depth of 125 miles in the north and 250 miles in the centre. In the south also they had achieved appreciable successes. Meanwhile, in the Black Sea region, the Russian volunteer army under Denikin, now joined to Krasnov's 100,000 Cossacks, had become a considerable military factor, less imposing but more solid than the Siberian forces. In this theatre there was much more real fighting, and actual trials of strength took place from time to time between the combatants.

Such was the position on which the Supreme Council of the Allies in the end of May, 1919, came at last to take its decision.

Photo: E.N.A.

ADMIRAL KOLTCHAK.

This distinguished Russian sailor was Rear-Admiral of the Black Sea Fleet at the outbreak of war in 1914. When the revolution broke out the fleet at Sevastopol mutinied and Koltchak was arrested, but was subsequently released. In the following winter he organized a force in East Siberia, and in 1918 set up an anti-Bolshevik government. An upright and honourable man, he was destined to share the fate of so many of those others who resisted the revolutionary power, and in February, 1920, having fallen into the hands of the Bolsheviks, he was shot at Irkutsk.

The "Big Five" Question Koltchak.

Clémenceau, Lloyd George, President Wilson, Orlando, and the Japanese delegate, Saionji, set forth their views on May 26 in a note addressed to Admiral Koltchak. This document is so important that it must be printed textually.

Note to Koltchak.

NOTE FROM THE SUPREME COUNCIL TO ADMIRAL KOLTCHAK, MAY 26TH, 1919.

The Allied and Associated Powers feel that the time has come when it is necessary for them once more to make clear the policy they propose to pursue in regard to Russia.

It has always been a cardinal axiom of the Allied and Associated Powers to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Russia. Their original intervention was made for the sole purpose of assisting those elements in Russia which wanted to continue the struggle against German autocracy and to free their country from German rule, and in order to rescue the Czechoslovaks from the danger of annihilation at the hands of the Bolshevik forces.

Since the signature of the Armistice on November 11th, 1918, they have kept forces in various parts of Russia. Munitions and supplies have been sent those associated with them at a very considerable cost. No sooner however did the peace conference assemble than they endeavoured to bring peace and order to Russia by inviting representatives of all the warring governments within Russia to meet them in the hope that they might be able to arrange a permanent solution of the Russian problem.

This proposal and the later offer to relieve the suffering millions of Russia, broke down through the refusal of the Soviet government to accept the fundamental condition of suspending hostilities while negotiations for the work of relief were proceeding.

Some of the Allied and Associated Governments are now being pressed to withdraw their troops and to incur no further expense in Russia on the ground that continued intervention shows no prospect of producing an early settlement. They are prepared, however, to continue their assistance on the lines laid down below, provided they are satisfied that it will really help the Russian people to liberty, self-government, and peace.

The Allied and Associated Governments now wish to declare formally that the object of their policy is to restore peace within Russia by enabling the Russian people to resume control of their own affairs through the instrumentality of a freely elected constituent assembly, and to restore peace along its frontiers by arranging for the settlement of disputes in regard to the boundaries of the Russian State and its relations with its neighbours through the peaceful arbitration of the League of Nations.

They are convinced by their experience of the last twelve months that it is not possible to attain these ends by dealing with the Soviet Government of Moscow. They are therefore disposed to assist the government of Admiral Koltchak and his associates with munitions, supplies, and food to establish themselves as the government of all Russia, provided they receive from them definite guarantees that their policy has the same object in view as the Allied and Associated Powers.

With this object they would ask Admiral Koltchak and his associates whether they would agree to the following as the conditions under which they would accept continued assistance from the Allied and Associated Powers.

In the first place as soon as they reach Moscow that they will summon a constituent assembly elected by a free, secret, and democratic franchise, as the supreme legislature for Russia, to which the government of Russia must be responsible, or, if at that time order is not sufficiently restored, they will summon the Constituent Assembly, elected in 1917, to sit until such time as new elections are possible.

Secondly—that throughout the areas which they at present control they will permit free elections in the normal course for all free and legally constituted assemblies, such as municipalities, Zemstvos, etc.

Thirdly—that they will countenance no attempt to revive the special privilege of any class or order in Russia. The Allied and Associated Powers have noted with satisfaction the solemn declaration made by Admiral Koltchak and his associates, that they have no intention of restoring the former land system. They feel that the principles to be followed in the solution of this and other internal questions must be left to free decision of the Russian Constituent Assembly. But

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

RUSSIAN ARMY WATER CART.

From first to last the Russians were handicapped and ultimately driven to defeat and collapse by reason of poor equipment and a grave shortage of munitions of all kinds. The water cart shown here is not, of course, of standard pattern, but it indicates the shifts to which that sorely tried army of gallant men were put. Had they been equipped as were the western armies, vastly different would have been the duration and outcome of the war.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

R.E. CABLE CART: NORTH RUSSIA.

The case of the British Expeditionary Force at Archangel was never at any time too happy. Nevertheless in equipment it was upon an entirely different plane from that of the Russian Army. Comparisons of the two pictures on this page tell their own tale. In one case brave men had to fight with such poor weapons as they possessed; in the other, equally fine troops were equipped and supported by every device which science could devise and which money could buy.

they wish to be assured that those whom they are prepared to assist stand for the civil and religious liberty of all Russian citizens and will make no attempt to re-introduce the régime which the revolution has destroyed.

Fourthly—that the independence of Finland and Poland be recognized, and that in the event of the frontiers and other relations between Russia and these countries not being settled by agreement, they will be referred to the arbitration of the League of Nations.

Fifthly—that if a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Caucasian and Trans-Caspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement, the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made, the government of Russia agrees to recognize these territories as autonomous and to confirm the relations which may exist between their *de facto* Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.

Sixthly—that the right of the Peace Conference to determine the future of the Roumanian part of Bessarabia be recognized.

Seventhly—that as soon as a government for Russia has been constituted on a democratic basis, Russia should join the League of Nations and co-operate with other members in the limitation of armaments and military organization throughout the world.

Finally—that they abide by the declaration made by Admiral Koltchak on November 27th, 1918, in regard to Russia's national debt.

The Allied and Associated Powers will be glad to learn as soon as possible whether the government of Admiral Koltchak and his associates is prepared to accept these conditions, and also whether in the event of acceptance they will undertake to form a single government and army command as soon as the military situation makes it possible.

G. CLÉMENCEAU.
LLOYD GEORGE.
ORLANDO.
WOODROW WILSON.
SAIONJI.

His Reply.

Naturally Koltchak did not delay his reply. "I should not retain power one day longer than required by the interests of the country; my first thought at the moment when the Bolsheviks are definitely crushed will be to fix the date of the election of the Constituent Assembly. . . . I shall hand over to it all my power in order that it may freely determine the system of government; I have, moreover, taken the oath to do this before the Supreme Russian Tribunal, the guardian of legality. All my efforts are aimed at concluding the civil war as soon as possible by crushing Bolshevism in order to put the Russian people in a position to express its free will." He then proceeded to answer satisfactorily all the specific questions which the Council of Five had asked.

Decision of the Great Powers to Support Him.

This answer was dated June 4, and on June 12 Lloyd George, Wilson, Clémenceau, and the representative of Japan welcomed the tone of the reply, which seemed to them "to be in substantial agreement with the proposition they had made, and to contain satisfactory assurances for the freedom and self-government of the Russian people and their neighbours." They were therefore "willing to extend to Admiral Koltchak and his Associates the support set forth in their original letter."

If this far-reaching and openly proclaimed decision was wise now in June, would it not have been wiser in January? No argument existed in June not obvious in January; and half the power available in January was gone by June. Six months of degeneration and uncertainty had chilled the Siberian Armies and wasted the slender authority of the Omsk Government. It had given the Bolsheviks the opportunity of raising armies, of consolidating their power and of identifying themselves to some extent with Russia. It had provided enough opposition to stimulate and not enough to overcome the sources of their strength. The moment chosen by the Supreme Council for their declaration was almost exactly the moment when that declaration was certainly too late.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

THE TRIUMVIRATE

" To you all three,
The senators of this great world."
ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA, II, 6.

Wilson and Preliminary Terms—Mr. Baker's Second Film Effect—A German Version—The Garbled Extract—President Wilson's Second Voyage—A Change of Mood—Mr. Balfour's Achievement—The Polish Report—End of the Council of Ten—The Threatened Exodus—Mr. Lloyd George's Memorandum of March 25—M. Clémenceau's Rejoinder—Mr. Baker's Blunder—The Triumvirate—The German Revolution—Germany's Survival.

IT is pleasant to return to Paris after these Russian snows. Unluckily we have also to return to Mr. Stannard Baker.

Wilson and Preliminary Terms.

Before President Wilson had departed, the question of the renewal of the Armistice on February 12 had directly raised the issue of a preliminary peace. How much longer were we all to go on officially bound to hate the Germans, and indeed, since the blockade was still in operation, to starve them? How much longer were schemes for regenerating the world and the daily round of business to take precedence of the commonplaces of good sense and humanity? There must be peace, the armies must demobilize and the troops come home. It was, therefore, necessary to fix the final limits of German martial power while time remained. It was agreed that a preliminary treaty, containing military, naval and air terms, should be drafted forthwith by an expert committee. The records show that Wilson said " He did not wish his absence to stop so important, essential and urgent a work as the preparation of a preliminary peace. He hoped to return by March 13 or 15, allowing himself only a week in America; but *he did not wish that during his unavoidable absence such questions as the territorial questions and questions of compensation should be held up.* He had asked Colonel House to take his place while he was away." This statement was inconvenient for Mr. Stannard Baker. It threatened to spoil his second film effect, which was as follows:

Mr. Baker's Second Film Effect.

" No sooner had the President left Paris, on February 15, than the forces of opposition and discontent began to act. On February 24, resolutions were adopted by the Council of Ten which, if carried through, would wreck the entire American scheme for the peace.

" It was exceedingly shrewd strategy these skilled diplomatists played. They did not like the League as drafted and they did not want the Covenant in the Treaty, but they made no direct attack on either proposal. The League was scarcely mentioned in the conferences until just before the President returned.

" Their strategy was as simple as it was ingenious. They had been left . . . with resolutions which the President had strongly supported, to make quickly a preliminary peace treaty, including only military, naval and air terms. What was easier or more obvious than to generalize that treaty, put into it also all the other terms that really mattered to them—boundaries, reparations, colonies: in short crowd the whole peace into the preliminary treaty without any reference to the League. . . . If the League got squeezed out in the process, or was consigned to some innocuous future

conference after all the settlements were made, who cared ?

" Thus while it is too much to say that there was a direct plot, while Wilson was away, to kill the League or even cut it out of the Treaty, one can affirm with certainty that there was an intrigue against his plan of a preliminary military and naval peace—which would have indirectly produced the same result.

" It seemed that every militaristic and nationalistic force came instantly to the front when Wilson had departed. Lloyd George had gone home, but instead of leaving the Liberal leaders in control in Paris, men who were imbued with the purposes laid down in the League—Cecil, Smuts, and Barnes—who were indeed Lloyd George's associates on the British Peace Commission, he sent over Winston Churchill, the most militaristic of British leaders. Churchill was not a member of the peace delegation and had had nothing before to do with the Peace Conference. Moreover, he was a rampant opponent of the League. . . ."

He proceeds to argue that Lloyd George, who " began to think he had gone too far with this League business," gave instructions to Mr. Balfour to take advantage of President Wilson's temporary absence for the purpose of rupturing the policy of the League of Nations, and to further these evil ends he sent specially to Paris the very wicked author of this book.

A German Version.

This charge has had a wide currency. The German writer Nowak repeats it.

" Lord Balfour had actually forestalled President Wilson in proposing that the Armistice terms should be renewed without laying fresh obligations on the Germans. But that was already a week ago. Since then Winston Churchill had arrived in Paris, Churchill the Bolshevik-hater, still filled with thoughts of war, filled with the same ideas as Marshal Foch for a promising campaign in the East; full also of contempt for the League of Nations, which, he declared with conviction, was useless to his country and no substitute for a navy. . . . Subsequently there had been an interchange of views between Winston Churchill and Marshal Foch, and now Lord Balfour proposed that after all it would be better at once to incorporate the essentials of the peace terms in the Preliminaries of Peace."[1]

The correspondence printed in the last Chapter will have sufficiently apprised the reader of the reasons which sent me to Paris. They were the only reasons. The only matter which concerned me at the three sessions which I attended of the Supreme Council was the quest for some policy in Russia. Absorbed in my own work, I was never even aware of these more spacious issues. I went to Paris on Russian business, and when it was clear no business could be done, I went home.

The Garbled Extract.

Mr. Stannard Baker's mettle is, however, best judged from his own pages. It is necessary to his effect that President Wilson should be depicted as leaving Europe in the sure confidence that territorial and reparations questions would not be dealt with in his absence, and that such dealing would be a breach of faith. Yet there in the *procès-verbal* of February 12 stood the awkward words of President Wilson, " He did not wish that during his unavoidable absence such questions as the territorial questions and questions of compensation should be held up." But what of that ? A stroke of the pen will cut it out. It does not fit the story. High ideals must be supported at all costs and by all methods. So the man to whom President Wilson entrusted all his most secret papers, with leave to publish as he pleased, in breach of all faith between the parties concerned, first garbles the record by omitting the vital sentence and last perverts it by inserting after the words preliminary peace " as to military, naval and air terms." The American author of " Colonel House's Papers " has summed up this discreditable performance in some salt sentences.

" The papers of Colonel House, like the British Foreign Office Memorandum, furnish clear indication that in making his charge of an intrigue, Mr. Baker has

[1] *Versailles*, p. 84.

Photo: Graphic Photo Union.

VERSAILLES DURING THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

For a period in the year 1919 the eyes of the world were turned upon Paris, and in Paris itself Versailles was the centre of attention. Quite apart from the fact that the victorious allied nations were seeking to frame a document that would put an end to war for all time, their representatives, among whom were numbered many of the most illustrious living statesmen and soldiers, together with their advisers and staffs, were actually to be seen by the multitude of interested onlookers that descended upon the French capital during those eventful months.

advanced assumptions and insinuations without a tittle of evidence. The House papers show Wilson discussing with House the very plans which Mr. Baker asserts 'would wreck the entire American scheme for the Peace.' They show House cabling to Wilson the progress of those plans through the Balfour resolutions, and in his cables of February 27 and March 4 (cited above) explaining how he hoped to push the future of the League. They show that in order to maintain a semblance of probability in his charges against the British Mr. Baker has been forced to omit essential passages from the official record."[1]

* * * *

[1] Mr. D. Hunter Miller also writes of Mr. Baker's thesis, "The effort to prove a plot where none existed could not well go further."—The Drafting of the Covenant, I, 98.

President Wilson's Second Voyage.

It was a different President Wilson that crossed the Atlantic in the *George Washington* for the second time. He had had a rough time in the United States. The White House Dinner to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had revealed to him the implacable Party rancour which he had provoked and by which he was pursued. "Senators Knox and Lodge remained perfectly silent, refusing to ask any questions or to act in the spirit in which the dinner was given."[1] The Republicans had raised the spirit of Monroe against the League of Nations. If a quarrel arose between Spain and Brazil, or between England and Venezuela, and the League of Nations said Brazil or Venezuela were in the wrong,

[1] House, p. 401.

were the United States to be compelled to take sides with a European Power, simply because of impartial justice? This was a hard blow, and the President bent under it. He felt like General Smuts, who saw clearly that the Mandatory System for colonies was of universal application except in regard to German South-West Africa.

At the Opera House in New York, the President, vexed by the unpitying opposition which he knew he must encounter, had used an almost naked threat. The Covenant of the League of Nations, he had suggested, would be so intertwined with the Treaty that the two could not be separated. The American reaction to this had been distinctly hostile. The *George Washington* this time carried to Europe a man who had learned much. He now knew that the wicked Old World statesmen were backed by even more deplorable Old World nations and that the American idealist would be repudiated by his own. The "Teach the world" theme was over; the immediate need was to emerge without discredit from exceedingly delicate and responsible transactions.

A Change of Mood.

On his first voyage all his moral indignation had been concentrated upon the Old World, on the second at least two-thirds of it was generously distributed to the New. Then his purpose had been to compel the policies of Europe to his views; now it was the Senate of the United States which stood in need of discipline. Indeed he had almost a fellow-feeling for those European Statesmen and diplomatists who, like him, were at grips with unfair intractable forces. Was it not time they should help each other? How could any solutions of world affairs be reached if mobs and senates and five hundred gifted journalists interfered? Three or four men talking quietly on the dead-level might avert breakdown and chaos if they acted quickly. After all, Lloyd George and Clémenceau, the trusted, acclaimed leaders of immense Parliamentary and Democratic majorities, were not unworthy comrades. He had met them now and he understood their quality and the causes of their strength. He envied them their national credentials. They were conciliatory, considerate, earnestly desirous of his goodwill, and yet resolute in their countries' cause. He might not be able to give Justice to the world, or even to define it in set terms, but the three of them together could give Peace.

There is no authority for saying that these were the reflections of President Wilson on his voyage; it is mere surmise; all that is known is that on his arrival he was far from pleased with Colonel House. House had already adapted himself to the relaxing atmosphere of Europe. All sorts of hitherto unauthorized ideas like "We *must* settle something," "We *must* face facts," "Everyone must concede a lot," had laid hold of the Colonel's calm, benevolent, and extremely practical mind. Wilson had not wished to see on his second arrival at Brest, House's finger pointing the path which he had probably already himself resolved to tread. So he said to House, "Your Dinner [i.e. the Dinner you suggested] to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was a failure as far as getting together was concerned."

* * * *

What had happened while he had been away? Mr. Lloyd George had gone home. M. Clémenceau was, on February 19, fired at and wounded by an Anarchist. He was for some weeks incapacitated.

Mr. Balfour's Achievement.

The Commission appointed in February, on President Wilson's motion, to draw up preliminary naval, military and air terms for Germany had been expected to report "within 48 hours." They had, however, found the task vastly more difficult than the President had expected. A whole month had passed and the Generals and Admirals were still in the midst of their labours. Meanwhile, however, Mr. Balfour who in the absence of the three Heads of Governments became naturally the leading figure at the Conference, had made an immense effort to hasten and conclude the work of the Commissions upon the rest of the Peace Treaty. On February 22

he told the Supreme Council that "a general feeling of impatience was now becoming manifest in all countries on account of the apparent slow progress the Conference was making in the direction of final peace." Supported by Lansing and House and with the assent of the still prostrate Clémenceau he obtained from the Conference a resolution of which the first clause ran :

i. "Without prejudice to the decision of the Supreme War Council to present naval, military and air conditions of peace to Germany at an early date, the Conference agrees that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of other preliminary peace terms with Germany and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed."

He also carried a motion that the work of the Territorial Commissions should be completed and presented by March 8.

The whole of the real work of the Conference, driven forward insistently from above, now began to advance with remarkable rapidity. The Commissions which in the lack of steady control had hitherto been ambling off indefinitely into inquiries and discussions, now rallied to precise commands to produce conclusions forthwith. From every quarter early in March they began to present reports. By the time Wilson returned (March 13), most of the great territorial issues had reached the point when final decisions could be taken by the chiefs. But the military terms which were to have been so speedily disposed of were still lagging on the road. It therefore became possible again to contemplate bringing the whole of the work on the treaty to a common and simultaneous conclusion. There is no doubt that Mr. Balfour had during his three weeks of virtual ascendancy achieved an extraordinary transformation in the whole position. Whereas in the middle of February the work of the Conference was drifting off almost uncontrollably into futility, all was now brought back in orderly fashion to the real. The decks were cleared for action and the long-looked-for conflict of wills could now at last begin.

President Wilson at no time challenged the decisions taken in his absence. On the contrary he approved with increasing cordiality the work of the "Balfour period"; he saw how scrupulously his own position had been safeguarded by the steady and dexterous hands into which the Conference had fallen. He realized that all the main issues were now presented uncompromised, intact, and ripe for decision.

The Polish Report—
End of the Council of Ten.

But the Council of Ten (or Council of Fifty as it had become) was no instrument to settle or even discuss the crucial questions between the Great Powers. An organism more compact, more secret, more intimate, was imperatively demanded, and to this the minds of all the chiefs were driven by the steady pressure of facts. The actual crisis arose upon the report of the Commission on the future frontiers of Poland and Germany. The Commission among other things had assigned the whole of Upper Silesia to Poland as well as Dantzig and the Polish corridor. Mr. Lloyd George at once stigmatized the report as "unjust," since according to the statistics of the Commission itself the number of Germans to be assigned to Polish sovereignty was too great. He therefore moved that the report should be sent back to the Commission. The Commission reconsidered it, but refused to alter their recommendations. The French championed the Commission. Tension rose and leakage followed. Lord Northcliffe bitterly attacked the Prime Minister in the Paris *Daily Mail*, urging that he had no right to override the opinion of the experts upon the Commission and revealing passages from his statements in the secret discussions of the Council of Ten.

According to present-day opinion, Mr. Lloyd George was, of course, entirely in the right. The proposals of the Commission were indefensible. The members of the Commission were not in any real sense of the word experts ; but whether or no, it is for experts to advise and for Ministers and Heads of Governments to decide. Angered by the leakages and Lord Northcliffe's attacks, the Prime

Photo: Graphic Photo Union.

GENERAL PERSHING AT VERSAILLES.

The United States of America, due to this reason and to that, made a belated appearance upon the battlefields of France. Her actual losses at the front were insignificant when compared with those of her allies, but the very presence of American troops in France was in itself decisive. General Pershing, seen above arriving at Versailles, commanded an army which, although at first neither fully trained nor equipped, would in a brief space of time have brought about the utter defeat of the Central Powers.

Minister successfully broke up the Council of Ten. From March 20, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clémenceau and Signor Orlando met regularly in secret conversations, at which not even secretaries were present. For the first time since the conclusion of the Armistice there began that thorough and frank discussion which should have taken place three months before. The Council of Ten (or Fifty) was now reduced to the Five Foreign Ministers and still continued for a while to meet; but deprived of all important business and of all the men who had the power to settle, it perished painlessly of inanition.

The Threatened Exodus.

We now reach a page of the Peace Conference story which may well be called Exodus. As a prelude to acceptance of the brutal fact that they must agree, every one of the "Big Four" threatened to quit the Conference. Mr. Lloyd George was first and far the most artistic. He assigned no specific point of disagreement. He was distressed at the slow progress of the Treaty. He feared he was merely wasting his time in Paris. Meanwhile he had direct and urgent responsibilities in England. The Cabinet, the House of Commons, the industrial situation—all required his immediate personal attention. Since no progress seemed likely in Paris, he must return home and get on with his job. He could come back later if there was any sign of some practical work being done upon the Treaty. He fixed March 18 as the date of his departure. This prospect and the suggestion that there was more important work to be done in London than in Paris, filled his compeers with alarm. They knew well that no progress could be made in his absence. Yet the ground he had chosen was unassailable. Every effort was made to persuade him to remain. But it was not until he had received on March 17 a joint letter (since published by Colonel House) signed by Wilson, Clémenceau and Orlando, begging him to remain if only for another

two weeks, that he was pleased to yield. He consented to remain, but in a strengthened position.

Clémenceau and Wilson had long been ripening for a trial of strength. House has made us aware of the striking interchange which arose on March 28 out of the discussions about the Saar Valley coalfields. "'Then if France does not get what she wishes,' said the President, 'she will refuse to act with us. In that event do you wish me to return home?' 'I do not wish you to go home,' said Clémenceau, 'but I intend to do so myself,' and left the house."

In this rough fashion did the Tiger deal with his opponent. Moreover, he had only to go round the corner. But Wilson's position was very different. To recross the Atlantic was final and irrevocable. Nevertheless, in the face of Clémenceau's continued threat to withdraw the French delegation from the Conference, and in the despondency following an attack of influenza, the President telegraphed on April 7 for the *George Washington* to return to France. His faithful secretary, Mr. Tumulty, who remained on guard at home, warned the President in the bluntest terms that his exodus would be looked upon by friends and foes in America as "an act of impatience and petulance . . . not accepted here in good faith . . . most unwise and fraught with most dangerous possibilities . . . a desertion." This was decisive. He could not quit; he must go through with it. And meanwhile Clémenceau had said no more about withdrawal and continued his daily attendances upon the Conference.

The last exodus was that of Orlando. When upon the question of Fiume President Wilson threatened to appeal over his head to the Italian people, and on the strength of his three-days' visit to Italy exclaimed, "I know the Italian people better than you do." Orlando went straight to the railway station and actually departed in voluble indignation to Rome. He at least carried out his threat. But this only consolidated the others. The Triumvirate found a common ground in standing together against him. After waiting a fortnight for appeals to his higher nature which never

Photo: Graphic Photo Mirror.

PADEREWSKI: GENIUS AND PATRIOT.

At a Conference at which figures of international renown were present in numbers greater, probably, than at any other assembly in the world's history, few commanded more respect than Ignace Jan Paderewski. The career of this remarkable man has been distinguished by changes of a nature sufficiently striking to stamp him as an individual of extraordinary parts. To attain complete mastery of one of the great arts and to desert it for a time to lead his country during a critical hour denotes the possession of an elasticity of mind which few mortals could claim to possess.

arrived, he came back of his own accord in time to sign the Treaty.

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Mr. Lloyd George's Memorandum of March 25.

Mr. Lloyd George had remained in France, but while the Council of Ten were fading away and the meetings of the Four were gradually assuming a formal character, he paid a brief visit to Fontainebleau.[1] There he wrote his famous Memorandum of March 25. This document has already been published, but since it expresses more completely and explicitly Mr. Lloyd George's sentiments about the Peace Settlement, and since the views he expressed corresponded very fairly with those of the people in whose name he spoke, it will be well to give some typical extracts here :

" *Some considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally draft their terms.*

" When nations are exhausted by wars in which they have put forth all their strength and which leave them tired, bleeding and broken, it is not difficult to patch up a peace that may last until the generation which experienced the horrors of the war has passed away. Pictures of heroism and triumph only tempt those who know nothing of the sufferings and terrors of war. It is therefore comparatively easy to patch up a peace which will last for thirty years.

" What is difficult, however, is to draw up a peace which will not provoke a fresh struggle when those who have had practical experience of what war means have passed away. . . .

" To achieve redress our terms may be severe, they may be stern and even ruthless, but at the same time they can be so just that the country on which they are imposed will feel in its heart that it has no right to complain. But injustice, arrogance, displayed in the hour of triumph, will never be forgotten or forgiven.

" For these reasons I am, therefore, strongly averse to transferring more Germans from German rule to the rule of some other nation than can possibly be helped. I cannot conceive any greater cause of future war than that the German people, who have certainly proved themselves one of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world, should be surrounded by a number of small States, many of them consisting of people who have never previously set up a stable government for themselves, but each of them containing large masses of Germans clamouring for reunion with their native land. The proposal of the Polish Commission that we should place 2,100,000 Germans under the control of a people which is of a different religion and which has never proved its capacity for stable self-government throughout its history must, in my judgment, lead sooner or later to a new war in the East of Europe.

" What I have said about the Germans is equally true of the Magyars. There will never be peace in South-Eastern Europe if every little State now coming into being is to have a large Magyar Irrendenta within its borders. I would therefore take as a guiding principle of the peace that as far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and that this human criterion should have precedence over considerations of strategy or economics or communications, which can usually be adjusted by other means. Secondly, I would say that the duration for the payments of reparation ought to disappear if possible with the generation which made the war. . . .

" The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw in her lot with Bolshevism and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of the revolutionary fanatics whose dream it is to conquer the world for Bolshevism by force of arms. This danger is no mere chimera. The present Government in Germany is weak ; it has no prestige ; its authority is challenged ; it lingers merely because there is no alternative but the spartacists, and Germany is not ready for spartacism as yet. But the argument which the spartacists are using with great effect at this very time is that they alone can save Germany from the intolerable conditions which have been

[1] Actually twenty-four hours only.

bequeathed her by the war. They offer to free the German people from indebtedness to the Allies and indebtedness to their own richer classes. They offer them complete control of their own affairs and the prospect of a new heaven and earth. It is true that the price will be heavy. There will be two or three years of anarchy, perhaps bloodshed, but at the end the land will remain, the people will remain, the greater part of the houses and the factories will remain, and the railways and the roads will remain, and Germany, having thrown off her burdens, will be able to make a fresh start.

"If Germany goes over to the spartacists it is inevitable that she should throw in her lot with the Russian Bolsheviks. Once that happens all Eastern Europe will be swept into the orbit of the Bolshevik revolution and within a year we may witness the spectacle of nearly three hundred million people organized into a vast Red army under German instructors and German generals equipped with German cannon and German machine guns and prepared for a renewal of the attack on Western Europe. This is a prospect which no one can face with equanimity. Yet the news which came from Hungary yesterday shows only too clearly that this danger is no fantasy. And what are the reasons alleged for this decision? They are mainly the belief that large numbers of Magyars are to be handed over to the control of others. If we are wise, we shall offer to Germany a peace, which, while just, will be preferable for all sensible men to the alternative of Bolshevism. I would, therefore, put it in the forefront of the peace that once she accepts our terms, especially reparation, we will open to her the raw materials and markets of the world on equal terms with ourselves, and will do everything possible to enable the German people to get upon their legs again. We cannot both cripple her and expect her to pay.

"Finally, we must offer terms which a responsible Government in Germany can expect to be able to carry out. If we present terms to Germany which are unjust, or excessively onerous, no responsible Government will sign them; certainly the presently weak administration will not. . . .

"From every point of view, therefore, it seems to me that we ought to endeavour to draw up a peace settlement as if we were impartial arbiters, forgetful of the passions of the war. This settlement ought to have three ends in view. First of all it must do justice to the Allies by taking into account Germany's responsibility for the origin of the war and for the way in which it was fought. Secondly, it must be a settlement which a responsible German Government can sign in the belief that it can fulfil the obligations it incurs. Thirdly, it must be a settlement which will contain in itself no provocations for future wars, and which will constitute an alternative to Bolshevism, because it will commend itself to all reasonable opinion as a fair settlement of the European problem. . . .

"To my mind it is idle to endeavour to impose a permanent limitation of armaments upon Germany unless we are prepared similarly to impose a limitation upon ourselves. . . .

"I should like to ask why Germany, if she accepts the terms we consider just and fair, should not be admitted to the League of Nations, at any rate as soon as she has established a stable and democratic Government. Would it not be an inducement to her both to sign the terms and to resist Bolshevism? Might it not be safer that she should be inside the League than that she should be outside it?

"Finally, I believe that until the authority and effectiveness of the League of Nations has been demonstrated, the British Empire and the United States ought to give to France a guarantee against the possibility of a new German aggression. France has special reason for asking for such a guarantee. She has twice been attacked and twice invaded by Germany in half a century. She has been so attacked because she has been the principal guardian of liberal and democratic civilization against Central European autocracy on the Continent of Europe. It is right that the other great Western democracies should enter into an undertaking which will ensure that they stand by her side in time to

protect her against invasion, should Germany ever threaten her again or until the League of Nations has proved its capacity to preserve the peace and liberty of the world.

" If, however, the Peace Conference is really to secure peace and prove to the world a complete plan of settlement which all reasonable men will recognize as an alternative preferable to anarchy, it must deal with the Russian situation. Bolshevik imperialism does not merely menace the States on Russia's borders. It threatens the whole of Asia and is as near to America as it is to France. It is idle to think that the Peace Conference can separate, however sound a peace it may have arranged with Germany, if it leaves Russia as it is to-day. I do not propose, however, to complicate the question of the peace with Germany by introducing a discussion of the Russian problem. I mention it simply in order to remind ourselves of the importance of dealing with it as soon as possible."

M. Clémenceau's Rejoinder.

Clémenceau replied with asperity in writing. He suggested that Lloyd George's magnanimity was achieved exclusively at the expense of France and the Continental States, while England had received all the advantages and securities which were of interest to her.

" But what would be the results of following the method suggested by the note of March 26 ? A certain number of total and definitive guarantees will be acquired by maritime nations which have not known an invasion. The surrender of the German colonies would be total and definitive. The surrender of the German navy would be total and definitive. The surrender of a large portion of the German merchant fleet would be total and definitive. The exclusion of Germany from foreign markets would be total and would last for some time. On the other hand, partial and temporary solutions would be reserved for the Continental countries ; that is to say, those which have suffered most from the war. The reduced frontiers suggested for Poland and Bohemia would be partial solutions. The defensive agreement offered to France for the protection of her territory would be a temporary solution. The proposed régime for the coalfields of the Saar would be temporary. Here we have a condition of inequality which might risk leaving a bad impression upon the after-war relations between the Allies, more important than the after-war relations between Germany and the Allies."

Mr. Baker's Blunder.

Mr. Stannard Baker had the Lloyd George Memorandum before him when he wrote his History. He admired it greatly. " A peace resting upon military coercion could never," he felt, " be anything but a curse to the world." " No finer expression of this feeling," he wrote, " based on a far-sighted perception of the verities of the situation can be found than in a memorandum sent to President Wilson by General Tasker H. Bliss on March 25." It was called " Some Considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally draft their Terms." A few pregnant sentences may be quoted, etc. . . . " General Bliss," he continues, " was one of the few Members of the Conference that never lost his sense of perspective and who saw that there was a great danger of ruining the whole work of peace if the Conference should produce a treaty against which the mass of German opinion would at once revolt."

This is probably the most astonishing blunder which any man claiming to write a standard history, and armed for that purpose with a mass of exclusive official and authentic information, has ever committed. Little did Mr. Baker dream when he penned his tributes to General Bliss that they should really have been directed to another address. Bitter must have been his chagrin when he realized that his praise belongs not to the distinguished American soldier whom all respect, but to an unregenerate Old World politician.

This is the concluding specimen of Mr. Baker's fidelity in the search of Truth with which the reader will be troubled. I have dwelt upon his work with attention because of the solemn character of the mission entrusted to him and the stream of precious knowledge placed in

his charge by President Wilson. It is disquieting to think how many conscientious citizens of the United States must have drunk from his infected fountain. But fortunately it has not been left to English writers to discredit Mr. Baker. The pages of Dr. Hunter Miller and of the Editor of Colonel House's Papers have remorselessly exposed his errors, and indeed vices, to the alert, critical faculty of the American public and to their inherent desire for Truth and Justice.

* * * *

The Triumvirate.

It is not the purpose of these Chapters to re-tell the story of the Peace Conference, but only to guide the reader to some of its salient features. We have, nevertheless, surveyed the general scene and its actors. Nearly five months have passed since the fighting ended and it is only now that the real making of the Peace begins. Four men, for a time to be reduced to three, each the responsible head of a great victor State, are all that are left. The five hundred gifted journalists, the twenty-seven eager nations, the Council of Ten (or Fifty), the fifty-eight Commissions, so rich in eminent personages, have all melted down to three men. Henceforward they will stand together. They have learned to respect each other and to trust each other; they have become colleagues and comrades in an adventure of much danger and unequalled difficulties. Each knows he must make serious concessions to reach agreement. Each knows that agreement must be reached; and all resolve to give a speedy peace to the world and answer unitedly, promptly, and to the best of their ability, for good or for ill, the hundred hard questions which stand open.

We shall see in the next Chapter what some of these questions were and how they were decided. For a month (March 20–April 19) they argue and consult alone, all speaking English. Much common ground is won: but it is not entrenched each night. Even the rendezvous of the Four sometimes fail. One goes to M. Clémenceau's rooms and one to President Wilson's. Organization now alone is needed. Then they admit as secretary, Maurice Hankey. He listens to all that is said and keeps his record and tells them at the end of every day what they have settled. From that moment their decisions flow out to jurists and officials in a swiftly growing stream. By May 7 the Treaty of Versailles is printed and on the 9th a Plenary Session of the Conference accepts with resignation or resentment the accomplished fact.

* * * *

It was now time to summon the enemy. Early in May the German envoys presented themselves in the Palace of Versailles to receive the volume in which the preliminary terms of Peace were incorporated; and at the end of June, peace in substantial accordance with these terms was duly signed.

The German Revolution.

Meanwhile Germany had been travelling fast. German writers are prone to dwell upon the humiliations their people endured at the hands of the conquerors in this period. But their own country was all the while the scene of events most important and helpful to them and to civilization. Some brief account has been given in these pages of the Russian revolution. The German revolution was the paroxysm of an incomparably stronger and more highly-nerved organization. It passed across our anxious, satiated, jaded consciousness with no more attention than surviving troops just withdrawn into rest quarters after battle would pay to a distant cannonade.

The story requires a book to tell. The interest is enhanced by comparison with what happened in Russia. So many of the conditions and episodes and their sequence are exactly reproduced. The nation is beaten in war, the Fleet and Army mutiny and dissolve, the Emperor is deposed, and Authority bankrupt is repudiated by all. Workmen's and soldiers' councils are set up, a Socialist Government is hustled into office; upon the famine-stricken homeland return millions of soldiers quivering from long-drawn torment, aching with defeat. The Police have disappeared; industry is at a standstill; the mob are hungry; it is

winter. All the agencies which destroyed Russia are ready. They are organized; each individual knows his task; the whole procedure of Communist revolution is understood and scheduled. The Russian experiment stands as a model. In Karl Liebknecht, in Rosa Luxemburg, in Dittmann, in Kautsky and a score of others are the would-be Lenins and Trotskys of the Teutonic agony. Everything is tried and everything happens; but it does not happen the same way.

The Communists seize the greater part of the capital; but the seat of government is defended. The would-be constitutional assembly is attacked; but the assailants are repulsed. A handful of loyal officers—loyal to Germany—disguised as privates, but well armed with grenades and machine-guns, guard with their lives the frail nucleus of civic government. They are only a handful; but they win. A naval division infected with Bolshevism seizes the Palace; they are expelled, after bloody fighting, by faithful troops. In the mutinies which overturned authority in almost every regiment, the officers were deprived of their epaulettes and swords; but not one was murdered.

Germany's Survival.

In the midst of all we discern a rugged, simple figure. A Socialist workman and Trade Unionist—Noske by name. Appointed Minister of National Defence by the Social-Democratic Government, furnished by them with dictatorial powers, he does not fail the German people. A foreign opinion of German heroes is necessarily very detached and can only be expressed with diffidence; but in the long line of kings, statesmen and warriors which stretches from Frederick to Hindenburg it may be that Noske has his place—a son of the people, amid universal confusion acting without fear in the public cause.



Photo: E.N.A.

HERR NOSKE.

The German Socialist workman and Trade Unionist whose services to his country will be remembered in history. Upon him deserved tribute is bestowed in the text which appears on this page.

The fibre and intellect of "all the German tribes" enabled the Provisional Government to hold elections. Always the reader will see in these pages the same tactics by the same forces: their one object—to prevent the people from choosing a Parliament. In Russia they have succeeded: in Germany they fail. Presently we shall see them fail in Ireland.

Representative government being still alive, thanks to shot and steel, machine-guns, trench mortars, and *flammenwerfer*, thirty millions of German men and women, 90 per

Photo: Manuel.

GERMANY'S CHIEF DELEGATES.

The photograph reproduced here was taken on May 7, 1919, at the Trianon Palace Hotel as the six chief delegates of Germany were about to leave for Versailles to learn the terms of the Peace Treaty. Their names, reading from left to right, are: Herr Leinert, President of the Prussian Assembly; Dr. Carl Melchior, a financial expert; Herr Giesberts, German Minister of Posts; Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Foreign Minister and head of the delegation; Dr. Landsberg, Minister of Justice; and Professor Schücking, an authority on international law.

cent. of the electorate, recorded their votes, and from that hour a free and supreme Parliament became the central fact in German life.

It was therefore as a united nation which in the hour of disaster had risen superior to despair that Germany came to Versailles.

CHAPTER LXXXIX

THE PEACE TREATIES[1]

" Though we had Peace, yet 'twill be a great while ere things be settled. Though the Wind lie, yet after a Storm the Sea will work a great while."—SELDEN'S *Table Talk.*

The Outstanding Features—National Self-determination—Its Application—Alsace-Lorraine—Schleswig—The Rebirth of Poland—The Eastern Frontier of Germany—Upper Silesia—The British Empire Delegation—Its Moderation—Mr. Lloyd George's Handicap—The Upper Silesian Plebiscite—What Britain Risked—The Case of France—The French Demand for Security—The Rhine Frontier—The Disarmament of Germany—The Demilitarized Zone—The Joint Guarantee—Its Sequel—The Fate of Austria-Hungary—The Innocent and the Guilty—Czechoslovakia—Yugo-Slavia—Roumania: Hungary—Austria—The Anschluss—Bulgaria—The General Design.

HOWEVER keen may be the feelings excited by the distribution of tropical colonies, of compensation in money or in kind and of retributive justice; high as are the hopes centred in the League of Nations, it is by the territorial settlements in Europe that the Treaties of 1919 and 1920 will finally be judged. Here we are in contact with those deep and lasting facts which cast races of men into moulds and fix their place and status in the world. Here we stir the embers of the past and light the beacons of the future. Old flags are raised anew; the passions of vanished generations awake; beneath the shell-torn soil of the twentieth century the bones of long dead warriors and victims are exposed, and the wail of lost causes sounds in the wind.

The Outstanding Features.

The treaties with which we now have to deal take their place in the great series which includes the Treaty of Westphalia, the Treaty of Utrecht and the Treaties of Vienna. They are at once the latest and the largest link in the chain of European history. They will be memorable for three events of the first magnitude: the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; the rebirth of Poland; and the preservation of united Germany. Even the short distance we have travelled since the Conference in Paris reveals the scale of these monarch-peaks, and how they tower above the range and dominate the wide regions of mountainous and hilly country. Already through the clearer air we can discern the proportions of the vast landscape and its massive simplicity. The Empire of Charles V, and with it the Hapsburg Monarchy, the survivor of so many upheavals, the main structure of central and southern Europe, is represented only by a chasm. The three sundered parts of Poland are re-united into a sovereign independent Republic of thirty million souls; and Germany, beaten and disarmed upon the field of battle, defenceless before her outraged conquerors, rises the largest and incomparably the strongest racial mass in Europe.

These dominant facts in the life of Europe did not spring solely, or even mainly, from the volcanic violence of the war. They were the result of the methodical application of a principle. If the treaty makers of Vienna in 1814 were ruled by the principle of Legitimacy, those of Paris in 1919 were guided by the principle of Self-determination. Although the expression " Self-determination " will rightly be forever connected with the name of President Wilson, the ideal was neither original nor new. The phrase itself is Fichte's " *Selbst bestimmung.*" The conception has never been more forcefully presented than by Mazzini.

[1] See Appendix for Map of Europe.

Throughout the British Empire it had long been known and widely practised under the somewhat less explosive precepts of "Self-government" and "Government by Consent." During the nineteenth century the rise of Nationalism made it increasingly plain that all great Empires must reckon with this principle and increasingly conform to it, if they were to survive united and vital in the modern world. The almost complete exclusion of religion in all its forms from the political sphere had left Nationalism the most powerful moulding instrument of mankind in temporal affairs.

National Self-determination.

The Fourteen Points embodied and proclaimed the principle of Self-determination. In his speeches the President had declared that "national aspirations must be respected. Peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase." "Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty. . . . Every territorial settlement must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned. . . . All well-defined and national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism." The Allies had earnestly identified their war aims with this declaration. The Germans had accompanied their requests for an armistice by the conditions that the peace settlement should be based upon the Fourteen Points of President Wilson and his other speeches. They had even claimed that they laid down their arms and rendered themselves defenceless upon this understanding. Therefore the principle of Self-determination was at once what the victors had fought for and the vanquished claimed.

Here was one clear guiding principle upon which all the peoples so cruelly sundered, so torn with wounds and hatreds, were united, and to which all were bound both by faith and interest. The main and imperative duty of the Peace Conference, in all matters comprised in their task of making peace between the belligerents, was to give effect to this principle; or in words which I venture to requote, "to liberate the captive nationalities, to reunite those branches of the same family which had long been arbitrarily divided, and to draw frontiers in broad accordance with the ethnic masses."

All being agreed upon the fundamental principle, it remained to apply it. But if the principle was simple and accepted, its application was difficult and disputable. What was to be the test of nationality? How were the wishes of "national elements" to be expressed and obtained? How and where were the resulting frontiers to be drawn amid entangled populations? To what extent should the main principle override every other consideration—historical, geographical, economic or strategic? How far could the armed and vehement forces which were everywhere afoot be brought to accept the resulting decisions? Such were the problems of the Peace Conference, and in particular of the Triumvirate.

Its Application.

In the main it was decided that language should be adopted as the proof of nationality. No doubt language is not always its manifestation. Some of the most nationally conscious stocks can scarcely speak their own language at all, or only with the greatest difficulty. Some oppressed races spoke the language of their oppressors, while hating them; and some dominant breeds spoke the language of their subjects, while ruling them. Still matters had to be settled with reasonable dispatch, and no better guide to the principle of nationality in disputed cases could be found than language; or, as a last resort, a plebiscite.

It was inherent in the realities that the scheme of drawing frontiers in accordance with nationality as defined by language or with the wish of the local inhabitants could not in practice be applied without modification. Some of the new States had no access to the sea through their own populations, and could not become effective economic

units without such access. Some liberated nationalities had for centuries looked forward to regaining the ancient frontiers of their long vanished sovereignty. Some of the victors were entitled by treaty to claim, and others of the victors bound by treaty to accord them, frontiers fixed not by language or the wish of the inhabitants, but by Alps. Some integral economic communities lay athwart the ethnic frontier; and at many points rival and hostile races were intermingled, not only as individuals but by villages, by townships and by rural districts. All this debatable ground had to be studied and fought over mile by mile by the numerous, powerful and violently agitated States concerned.

Nevertheless all these reservations and impingements upon the fundamental principle affected only the outskirts of peoples and countries. All the disputable areas put together were but a minute fraction of Europe. They were but the exceptions which proved the rule. Fierce as were and are the irritations which have arisen wherever these sensitive and doubtful fringes of nationality have been roughly clipped by frontier scissors, they do not impair the broad essence of the treaties. Probably less than 3 per cent. of the European population are now living under Governments whose nationality they repudiate; and the map of Europe has for the first time been drawn in general harmony with the wishes of its peoples.

* * * *

Let us now test these assertions by examining the actual frontiers of Germany fixed by the Treaty of Versailles. Let us begin with the western and northern frontiers.

Alsace-Lorraine.

Point VIII of the Fourteen stated that "*the wrong done to France by Prussia in* 1871 *in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted.*" This had become one of the prime objects of the Allies after the war had broken out. It was explicitly accepted by Germany when she asked for peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points and signed the Armistice accordingly. There was therefore no dispute about Alsace-Lorraine. These two provinces, after being French for nearly two hundred years, had been wrested from France in 1871 against the wishes of their inhabitants. They had been, to use the words embodied in the Treaty, "separated from their country in spite of the solemn protests of their representatives at the Assembly of Bordeaux." The retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine was the repairing of a breach in the principle of Self-determination committed within living memory.

Apart from an insignificant alteration of the Belgian frontier around Eupen and Malmédy, no other change was made in the western frontiers of Germany. The French had vehemently claimed in addition to Alsace and Lorraine the annexation of the district of the Saar with its very valuable coalfields. They founded their claim at first upon historical grounds. President Wilson's refusal to endorse it, against the reputed wish of the inhabitants, led to one of the notable crises in the discussions of the Triumvirate. The French then fell back upon a demand for the temporary use of the coalfields in the Saar Valley to compensate them for the destruction of the French mining districts at Lens and Valenciennes. They themselves proposed that the ultimate destination of the Saar Valley should be determined by the vote of the inhabitants themselves taken in the year 1935. There are no grounds whatever of principle upon which the resulting agreement of the Conference can be assailed.

Schleswig.

Upon the northern or Danish frontier one other cession of territory was required of Germany. When, after the defeat of Denmark by Prussia in 1864, Schleswig and Holstein were surrendered by Denmark to Prussia and Austria, a clause had been inserted at the instance of Napoleon III in the Treaty, that the inhabitants of Northern Schleswig should be consulted upon whether they desired to be Danish or German. This only accorded with justice. The Duchy of Holstein was and

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE IN THE HALL OF MIRRORS: VERSAILLES, JUNE 28, 1919.

Sir William Orpen's impression of the final scene at Versailles. The figures portrayed are:—Front: Dr. Johannes Bell (Germany) signing, with Herr Hermann Müller leaning over him. Middle row (seated, left to right): General Tasker H. Bliss, Colonel E. M. House, Mr. Henry White, Mr. Robert Lansing, President Woodrow Wilson (United States); M. Georges Clémenceau (France); Mr. D. Lloyd George, Mr. A. Bonar Law, Mr. Arthur J. Balfour, Viscount Milner, Mr. G. N. Barnes (Great Britain); the Marquis Saionzi (Japan). Back row (left to right): M. Eleutherios Venizelos (Greece); Dr. Affonso Costa (Portugal); Lord Riddell (British Press); Sir George E. Foster (Canada); M. Nikola Pachitch (Serbia); M. Stephen Pichon (France); Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, Mr. Edwin S. Montagu (Great Britain); the Maharajah of Bikaner (India); Signor Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (Italy); M. Paul Hymans (Belgium); General Louis Botha (South Africa); Mr. W. M. Hughes (Australia).

had always been purely German. The south of Schleswig had been gradually Germanized, but the north remained Danish in speech and Danish in sentiment. The stipulation of the Treaty had never been carried out. The inhabitants of Northern Schleswig were never consulted, and Prussia had at a later date freed herself from the legal obligation. Now was clearly the time to repair this injustice and the permanent estrangement between Denmark and Germany which had resulted from it.

There were some who would have desired that the whole of Schleswig should be separated from Germany, in order so to arrange the frontier that the Kiel Canal should cease to run entirely through German territory. The prudence of the Danish Government set all such designs at one side. They desired to receive into the Danish nation only those districts whose people felt themselves to be Danes. They rejected all suggestions that a German-speaking population should be unwillingly incorporated in Denmark. Accordingly it was agreed that the future frontiers should be drawn by the free vote of the population given in a plebiscite.

The Rebirth of Poland.

Let us now turn to the eastern frontier of Germany. Here we encounter one of the great new facts. Only a prodigy could have brought about the rebirth of Poland. Before that event could come to pass, it was necessary that every single one of the three military Empires which had partitioned Poland should be simultaneously and decisively defeated in war, or otherwise shattered. If the Powers which had devoured Poland stood together in a *Drei-Kaiserbund,* there was no force in the world which would or could have challenged them. If they warred on opposite sides, at least one would emerge among the victors and could not be despoiled of its possessions.

But the astounding triple event had occurred: Russia had shattered Austria; the Bolsheviks, aided by Germany, had destroyed Russia; and Germany herself had been overpowered by France and the English-speaking world. So all three parts of sundered Poland were free at the same moment; and all their chains —Russian, German and Austrian—fell to the ground in a single clash. The hour of Destiny had struck; and the largest crime of European history, triumphantly persisted in through six generations, was now to pass away. Point XIII had declared that "*an independent Polish State should be erected, which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea.*" Germany had accepted this. Indeed her own claim for ethnic integrity was based upon the very principle which recreated the ancient State of Poland.

But with the best will in the world the drawing of a frontier between Germany and Poland could not be free from anomaly and injustice. The great plain which stretched from Warsaw to Berlin was marked by no physical barrier. Along a belt of four hundred miles the population was mixed in varying proportions. It had been the policy of Germany to colonize Poland with German settlers. German capital, science and ability had created a vigorous industrial life. Their culture, thrust forward with the power of an armed and militant Empire, had everywhere made its impression upon the conquered and partitioned population. The Germans pointed to the obvious benefits which their rule had conferred on Prussian Poland; the Poles declared this was the mere usufruct of a stolen inheritance. It was the task of the Peace Conference, of the Poland Commission, and finally of the Triumvirate to draw the line.

The Eastern Frontier of Germany.

The problem divided itself into three sections: the centre, the north and the south. The task of the Poland Commission was to determine which districts were inhabited by an indisputably Polish population. Plebiscites were convenient for well-marked districts, but no plebiscite was possible throughout this great belt of country whose boundaries were indefinite. To seek such a plebiscite would have involved occupying the whole area by impartial British, French and American troops. But the Americans

were going home; the British had demobilized so fast that they could scarcely spare half a dozen battalions; and the French avowed themselves Polish champions. In the centre, therefore, which broadly comprised the Prussian province of Posen, the only basis was the German statistics. No doubt these were more than discounted by the not unnatural anti-German bias of the victors. But upon the whole the line was drawn with the desire to assign to Germany the fewest possible number of Poles, and to Poland the fewest possible number of Germans.

More difficulty arose in the north. The province of East Prussia, though originally in the nature of a German colonial conquest, had become a purely German land whose population was animated above all other parts of Germany by the spirit of intense Nationalism. This province was separated from the rest of Germany by a strip or corridor running down to the sea, in which from all accounts there appeared to be a Polish-speaking majority. The Poles demanded large portions of East Prussia from Germany, and for the rest suggested that this small island of German people should be made a republic with its capital at Königsberg. This demand was rejected. But the Polish-speaking corridor was joined to Poland, not only on grounds of language but as the most obvious means of giving Poland that access to the sea which had been accepted by all parties to the Fourteen Points.

Adjoining the corridor was the great city of Dantzig inhabited by two hundred thousand Germans, which was the natural outlet to the sea for the whole trade of the Valley of the Vistula. The Commission originally proposed to transfer Dantzig absolutely to Polish sovereignty, so that the inhabitants of Dantzig would be subject to Polish legislation and to compulsory service in the Polish Army. Through Mr. Lloyd George's exertions a solution was found by which Dantzig was restored to the old position it had held for five hundred years as a self-governing civic State, united by close ties with Poland but with autonomous sovereign control over its whole internal administration and government. Dantzig was to be a free city, but it was to enter the Polish Custom system and the Poles were to have the administration of the great harbour. This ingenious and complicated expedient did not give complete satisfaction to either side. But it is not easy to see what better method could have been adopted.

In this northern section of the frontier two minor points of difficulty must be mentioned. East Prussia had been preserved to Germany, but certain districts on its southern borders contained considerable Polish-speaking populations and were claimed by Poland. For these districts of Allenstein and Marienwerder a plebiscite was prescribed. The majority voted to remain with Germany, and their wish was law. Lastly, the small port and district of Memel, situated on the other side of the river Niemen, was the only means by which Lithuania could obtain that outlet to the sea without which it could not exist as an independent State. It was hoped that the Lithuanians would voluntarily join themselves once more to Poland. This they refused, and could not be compelled. Thus eventually Memel, a German town of about 30,000 inhabitants, surrounded by rural districts largely Lithuanian-speaking, was eventually assigned to Lithuania, under elaborate securities for local autonomy.

Upper Silesia.

We have still to consider the southern section of the German-Polish frontier; and here upon the question of Upper Silesia another of the great disputes of the Conference occurred. The draft Treaty presented to the Germans prescribed the absolute cession of Upper Silesia, after the Ruhr the richest iron and coal district in the German Empire, to the Poles. This was the greatest blot upon the draft Treaty with Germany. The rest was implicit in the acceptance of the Fourteen Points; but the enforced cession of the whole of Upper Silesia was received with vehement German resentment and indeed with general surprise.

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The conflicts of the Triumvirate, now rejoined by Italy, which had marked the framing of the preliminary peace terms

Photo: L.N.A.

IN THE HOUR OF VICTORY: SIR DOUGLAS HAIG.

Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig leading representatives of the British Military Forces in the procession in London arranged to celebrate the signing of the Peace Treaty. This impressive progress took place on July 19, 1919, and was witnessed by thousands of spectators drawn from every part of the Empire.

did not end with their presentation to Germany. The Germans protested by every means in their power against the Financial and Economic clauses, against the clauses compelling their avowal of war guilt and the surrender of war criminals. In the territorial sphere they complained chiefly of the cession of Upper Silesia. It seemed possible that they would refuse to sign the Treaty, and thus force the Allies into a military occupation of Berlin and other important centres, or a prolongation of the blockade, or both. Such a course presented no immediate military difficulty but very grave political dangers. No one could tell how long an occupation would last. Until it ended very large numbers of soldiers must be kept under arms and further demobilization indefinitely suspended.

The British Empire Delegation.

On June 1 Mr. Lloyd George, wishing to strengthen himself in his efforts to obtain a mitigation of the peace terms, convened a meeting in Paris of the British Empire Delegation. The whole Empire was represented together with the principal British Departments of State. General Smuts made a powerful appeal for clemency. When my turn came, I supported him by arguments of a different character. As Secretary of State for War I had a special point of view.

I stated that

" there were the most serious difficulties either in re-imposing the blockade or in governing the whole territory of Germany and undertaking the solving of local political problems. A foreign garrison would never make the Germans work unitedly and effectively. The weapons of blockade and occupation were mutually exclusive. If you occupied the country, you would have to feed the

Photo: L.N.A.

MARSHAL FOCH.

The Generalissimo of the Allied Forces came to London for the Peace March at the special request of Sir Douglas Haig. He had previously declined the invitation on the ground that in London the leading military figure present should be the British Commander-in-Chief.

people in the territory held and this could not be done under blockade. If the Allies entered Germany and occupied the country, it would be necessary to have conscription indefinitely. It was impossible to control the internal life of Germany without maintaining compulsory service [for Great Britain]. The pressure to obtain the release of men from the Army was already indescribable. The very classes who were calling most loudly for extreme terms to be imposed upon Germany were those who were the most anxious to get men out of the army."

Accordingly I urged that further negotiations should take place and "implored the Delegation to cast their opinion in the direction of giving their plenipotentiaries the greatest possible liberty to make a 'split the difference' Peace" [on the points outstanding]. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Chamberlain, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead and others spoke to the same purpose.

Its Moderation.

Although there were many gradations of opinion the will of the Delegation was unanimous. It was resolved that the Prime Minister in his negotiations should press for concessions to be made to the enemy in the treaty of peace. In particular: Amendment of the proposals for the eastern frontier of Germany, leaving to Germany districts preponderantly German and providing for a plebiscite in doubtful cases: Extension to Germany of the right to enter the League of Nations at an early date: Reduction in the numerical strength of the Army of Occupation: Modification of the reparation clauses and the fixing of the German liability at a definite amount.

The Delegation in a mood of strong conviction further authorized the Prime

Minister in the event of resistance on the part of any of his colleagues on the Council of Four, " to use the full weight of the entire British Empire even to the point of refusing the services of the British Army to advance into Germany, or the services of the British Navy to enforce the blockade of Germany."

This seemed to be a memorable occasion.

Mr. Lloyd George's Handicap.

Mr. Lloyd George was thus strongly armed for all the future discussions : and he would probably have succeeded in improving the Treaty in an even greater degree but for his burden of reparation pledges. The crazy echoes of the General Election were a humiliating handicap both to the Prime Minister and Great Britain. Clémenceau, Wilson and Orlando understood the position perfectly. When Wilson was rallied with placing Germans under Polish, Czecho-slovak or Italian rule ; when Clémenceau was reproached for vindictiveness or Orlando for territorial appetite, each had his retort. A sarcastic smile, a shrug of the shoulders, some reference to the difficulties of democratic electioneering were quite sufficient to place the Big Four upon an equality, and at a lower level.

All the time the odd fact was that however many thousand millions Germany paid, Great Britain was only to receive a very small fraction, less than half the share of France and subject to Belgian priority ; and that, scarcely two years later, she was to proclaim the principle, revived from the wisdom of an aristocratic past, that all war debts ought to be simultaneously extinguished by universal consent with consequent reactions upon reparations.

A prolonged conflict ensued about Silesia. President Wilson and the French championed the claims of Poland. England asserted the rights of Germany and invoked the principle of Self-determination. The President's bias in favour of Poland was as marked as his prejudices against the Italians. Cynics pointed to the fact that Italian emigrants to America usually return to Italy without acquiring voting rights, while the Polish vote was a formidable factor in the domestic politics of the United States. Be this as it may, Mr. Wilson had made up his mind that Poland should have Upper Silesia and he resented all opposition. However, in this field Mr. Lloyd George was unhampered by British electioneering, and in spite of the persistent attacks of the Northcliffe Press his efforts and persuasion prevailed. The principle of a plebiscite was conceded to the Germans in the final Treaty, which is thus cleared from reproach in this respect.

It is worth while to describe briefly the outcome.

The Upper Silesian Plebiscite.

A plebiscite was eventually held in 1920 under the authority of British and French troops. While these were occupying the disputed zones and preparing for the voting, a violent incursion of Poles under one Korfanty, a former Polish deputy of the Reichstag, was organized with the object of preventing the election. The Germans were not slow to retaliate with a similar inroad. A sort of civil war broke out in which British troops sympathized with the Germans and the French with the Poles. Matters thus came to a dangerous and ludicrous pass. However, law and good sense prevailed. The plebiscite was duly taken, and a German majority of 6 to 4 declared itself.

When these results were brought before the Supreme Council no agreement could be reached. The Americans had gone home, and England and France were in obstinate equipoise. The deadlock was resolved by an agreement to refer the issue to the Council of the League of Nations. This was the first occasion upon which a dispute between two of the greatest Powers had been relegated to the new instrument. The Council, sundered by the differences between England and France, in its turn devolved the decision upon a Commission consisting of the representatives of the smaller States, who though on the Council of the League were not involved in the discussions of the Supreme Council of the Allies. A Belgian, a Spaniard, a Brazilian and a

Chinese were entrusted with this delicate and thorny problem. Under all the pressures which were brought to bear this body took refuge in a compromise. Their decision was bitterly resented by Germany, but accepted as binding by England and France. It is not easy to see what other procedure could have been followed.

Judged by Gladstonian standards, Germany issued from the war and the peace with many positive advantages. She had in fact realized all the main objectives of British Liberal policy in the Victorian era. Defeat has given the German people effective control of their own affairs. The Imperialist system has been swept away. A domestic self-determination has been achieved. A parliamentary system based on universal suffrage to which the rulers of Germany are effectively responsible may be some consolation for the loss of twenty-two kings and princes. The abolition of compulsory military service has always seemed to British eyes a boon and not an injury. The restriction of armaments enforced by treaties upon Germany is to-day extolled as the highest goal to which all nations should aspire. The absurd and monstrous economic and financial chapters of the Treaty of Versailles have already been swept almost entirely into limbo; they have either lapsed or have been superseded by a series of arrangements increasingly based on facts, on good sense and on mutual agreement.

The sufferings of the German bourgeois and rentier classes, the humble pensioner, the thrifty annuitant, the retired toiler, the aged professor, the brave officer—which resulted from the act of repudiation involved in the destruction of the mark largely by the German Government themselves—are piteous. They may affront the justice of the German State; they have not weakened the pulsations of the German heart, nor the productive vitality of German industry, nor even the credit and saving power of the German people. Germany has lost her colonies, but she was a late-comer on the colonial scene. She possessed no territory over-seas in which the German race could live and multiply. "Foreign plantations," to quote the old-fashioned English phrase, in tropical lands might be a source of pride and interest and certainly of expenditure. They were in any case hostages to a stronger sea-power. Their alienation in no way impaired the German strength and very doubtfully improved the fortunes of their new possessors.

What Britain Risked.

Contrast for a moment the position which Germany occupies to-day with the doom which would have fallen upon the British Empire and upon Great Britain itself had the submarine attack mastered the Royal Navy and left our forty millions only the choice between unconditional surrender and certain starvation. Half the severity meted out by the Treaty of Versailles would have involved not only the financial ruin of our ancient, slowly built-up world organization but a swift contraction of the British population by at least ten million souls and the condemnation of the rest to universal and hopeless poverty. The stakes of this hideous war were beyond all human measure, and for Britain and her people they were not less than final extinction. When we consider the fate of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, of Austria itself, and of the overcrowded city of Vienna, we may measure in miniature the risks we were forced to run.

In these blunt paragraphs there is an appeal to the intellect of Germany.

* * * *

The Case of France.

How stood the case of France?

The disproportion of national power between Germany and France was and is the main problem of the Peace. A stationary population of forty millions under-inhabiting the fairest portion of the globe, in contact along hundreds of miles of land frontier with a multiplying, progressing German race and State of sixty or seventy millions, is a proposition inherent with explosive quality. It is well always to talk about peace and to strive and suffer for peace; but it is better at the same time to understand the causes which lead to wars. How is a forty-million France to be defended from

THE SCENE IN T

A fine photograph, taken from the roof of Buckingham Palace, which embraces the scene fro
the Royal Navy are passing the Queen Victoria Memorial. Facing the Mall and partly obscure
the salute. From the saluting-point t

Photo: Sport & General.

ALL: JULY 19, 1919.

the Palace to the Admiralty Arch. As the picture was taken representative units drawn from by the Memorial stands the Pavilion from which H.M. the King witnessed the March and took long column proceeded up Constitution Hill.

invasion and destruction in the next generation against a sixty, seventy, eighty-million Germany? There was the root problem of the Peace Conference.

We need not dive into elaborate statistics. It should be sufficient to state that after 1940 Germany will have about twice as many men of military age as France. How was France to find security against that? France was victorious. Germany was utterly defeated. But every intelligent Frenchman and German knew that though these conditions might rule for twenty or thirty years, they embodied no finality. It would have been impossible for France to fight Germany without the aid of Russia; but Russia had gone. No one could say whether, when, or in what mood Russia would reappear. It seemed at least as likely as not in the days of the Peace Conference that the resurgence of Russia would find her on the German side. England had the Channel and the United States the ocean between them and these issues. "There is nothing in the long run," said the French, "to stand between us and invasion but the bayonets and breasts of our soldiers."

The French Demand for Security.

Here was the fear and the peril. It broods over Europe to-day. Even as I write, we see the French devoting fifty millions of their thriftily accumulated money to building a line of concrete and steel defences to preserve their country against a renewal of what happened in August 1870 and in August 1914. Here was the root issue of the Peace Conference! the fear of France that she would be destroyed by Germany and her evident determination not to be guilty of imprudence in a matter of life and death.

But, it was said, the growing moral sense of mankind will prevent such a downfall of civilization ever happening again. The Covenant of the League of Nations guarantees to each member State the independence and integrity of its territory. To which the French replied, "Did treaties protect Belgium?" But, it was urged, the world has learned its lesson; the Germans have learned their lesson. No one is going to fight any more. To which the French said, "*We* have already had enough." Finally it was asserted that men had become wiser, nobler, more humane in consequence of four years of butchery and impoverishment; that one had only to look around to see how much better all were than their fathers. Trust to Democracy. Trust to the mass mind. Trust to Parliamentary institutions. Trust to the sting of old wounds. But the French continued mournfully to reiterate, "We want Security." On this the United States, being perfectly safe, and England, being fairly safe, remarked philosophically, "There is no such thing as absolute security." And the French said, "In that case we will have the best we can get."

The Rhine Frontier.

Marshal Foch, with the laurels of unfading splendour on his brow and recent experiences being present in all minds, declared: "We must have the left bank of the Rhine. There is no English or American help which could be strong enough and which could arrive in sufficient time to prevent disaster in the plains of the north; preserve France from defeat; or, if she wants to spare her armies from this, to free her from the necessity of drawing them back behind the Somme or the Seine or the Loire in order to await help from her Allies. The Rhine remains therefore to-day the barrier which is indispensable to the safety of Western Europe and thereby the safety of civilization."

Then the English and the Americans said: "But the Germans live on both sides of the Rhine, and how can you rule over them?" So Marshal Foch went back to Napoleon and his Confederation of the Rhine. "It would be the duty," he said (March 31), "to settle the political condition of the left bank of the Rhine and to endow this district with a conception that would be compatible with the freedom of nations. As a matter of fact these countries have never been anything but independent states or odd parts of

states of Central Germany." The discussion was tense. Mr. Lloyd George asked two questions: "If the Germans knew that Great Britain and the United States of America were bound to support France, do you think they would nevertheless attack?" Marshal Foch answered that if they were assured that there was no danger from Russia, they would not hesitate to do so. Again, "If the German Army had been reduced to the same size as the British Army, would they attack?" Foch replied that they would, because, in fact, the German Army would not be reduced. He also said that the existence of a Channel Tunnel would not make much difference.

At the same time it was apparent that the population who dwelt by the Rhine would far rather belong to defeated Germany than to victorious France. Neither did they wish to be made into a buffer state. So that at the very outset the Conference was at a complete deadlock.

Both President Wilson and Lloyd George were deeply conscious of the dangers and fears of France. Wilson had hoped that the League of Nations would give France with all other nations security against invasion. But the French, while quite willing to have the League's protection for what it was worth, sincerely disbelieved in its power. When the sanction of armed force was withdrawn from the draft of the covenant and financial and economic boycott of the aggressor alone remained, French scepticism could hardly be challenged. President Wilson's visit to the United States and the reservations which he had felt himself forced by American public opinion to make, still further weakened the resources of the League. Thenceforward it became clear that if France was to be induced to withdraw from the Rhine, some other additional assurance of safety must be found for her. Mr. Lloyd George had for some time foreseen that this was inevitable. He was even more convinced than Wilson of the dangers of subjecting German populations to alien rule. Both he and Wilson refused to contemplate confining Germany behind the Rhine; both felt increasingly the obligation to find alternative securities.

The Disarmament of Germany.

The first and most obvious precaution was the disarmament of Germany. Marshal Foch and the French military men were curiously apathetic on this point. In the Armistice terms the Marshal had not included any provision for the demobilization of the German army, nor for its disarmament except the surrender of a large number of guns. It has been stated on his behalf that he did not believe that any general disarmament could be enforced for a prolonged period, and that he did not wish to put his name to terms the execution of which he could not guarantee. He profoundly distrusted all German assurances, and believed that whatever promises were made, Germany would as soon as she recovered her freedom of action in some way or other create and arm new military forces.

Under the vigorous impulsion of the Prime Minister the British delegates on the Disarmament Commission pressed for the most drastic measures. Mr. Lloyd George insisted that the German army should not be stronger than the British; that it should not be raised by compulsion and should not be maintained upon a short service basis. It was to be a volunteer, professional army, each soldier serving on a minimum engagement of twelve years. Thus it would not have the power of developing a mass of trained reserves. The total strength of those serving with the colours was not to exceed 200,000 men. Similar proposals were made for the German Navy. The French yielded themselves with some hesitation to this strong initiative. The scheme was entirely contrary to all Continental ideas. It seemed to impugn the principle of "a nation in arms," which was the inheritance of the Revolution and the supreme guarantee of the life and liberties of the French Republic. Nevertheless, they saw its merits so far as Germany was concerned. They stipulated that if the German Army was to be thus highly professional, it should

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

MEN OF A WARRIOR RACE.

Sikhs passing along the Mall. The services rendered by all ranks of the Indian Army during the Great War, and in particular on the fronts of France, Gallipoli, Mesopotamia and Palestine, will ever be remembered to the credit of the illustrious Indian regiments who fought in those theatres. Their achievements were in accordance with the highest traditions of that fine service.

not exceed 100,000 men. To this Mr. Lloyd George raised no objection.

The military terms finally agreed to are astonishing. A nation of sixty millions, hitherto the first military power in the world, was forbidden for all time to have an army of more than 100,000. The whole basis of the former military organization by which the German nation had been built up was swept away. The General Staff which had so powerfully swayed the policy of the German State was abolished. Rifles, machine guns and field artillery were strictly limited; and the making of armoured cars, tanks or poison gases was prohibited. No military aeroplanes or airships were to be made or kept, and the manufacture of arms, munitions and war material was limited to a small number of named factories.

The work of destroying the surplus munitions was pressed forward with singular energy by the Prime Minister. I received at the War Office his repeated directions to enforce and accelerate it. In all 40,000 cannon were blown to pieces and all other military materials destroyed in like proportion. Thus mainly by British exertions Germany was almost completely disarmed; and the whole military caste, that vast vested interest and also type of national virtue which had been the permanent agency of German might, must fade in the passage of a generation out of German life. The streams of youth and patriotism, of valour and ability which flow perennially from the German race would henceforward follow new channels, and as in England or the United States find other forms of national or social service. This was, and is, a fact of prime importance.

But the French still remained incredulous and inconsolable. How long

would all this last? What would happen twenty or thirty or forty years on? No one expected a renewal of war in the lifetime of the generation that had known its horror and its squalors. These disarmament provisions would be effective in the years when there was no danger; they would cease to act at the very time when they were needed. The left bank of the Rhine, reiterated the French, was the only enduring defence.

The Demilitarized Zone.

The second measure of reassurance proposed both by Great Britain and the United States, and welcomed by France, was the demilitarization of a broad zone between France and Germany. The Treaty accordingly prescribed that all fortified works and fortresses situated in German territory west of a line traced 50 kilometres east of the Rhine should be disarmed and dismantled. All new fortifications within this zone were forbidden. Inhabitants of this zone would not be permitted to bear arms or receive any military training or be incorporated in any military organization, voluntary or compulsory; and no depôts, establishments, railways or works of any kind adapted to military purposes would be permitted to exist within the area. The permanent enforcement of these conditions would be supervised by such means and by such organs as the Allied and Associated Powers might decide to employ or to create.

The British members of the Drafting Committee were impressed with the difficulty of thus disarming Germany while leaving, for instance, Poland free to develop her forces to any extent and while Russia remained entirely outside the scope alike of the Peace Conference and the League of Nations. It was therefore suggested it seems by the British delegation that a preamble should be inserted to these chapters of the Treaty by which the permanent disarmament of Germany was connected with a general process of disarmament throughout the world. This was fathered by President Wilson, and readily adopted. It is from this preamble that the prolonged and, as they have proved, disturbing labours of the Disarmament Commission at Geneva have originated.

The Joint Guarantee.

The French continued to argue that admirable as these safeguards might be in theory, real as they might be in tranquil periods, they would break and fail in the generation for whose protection they were needed. One final security was therefore sought, and the idea of a British and American guarantee to France against a future German invasion rose and gradually became definite. This was, of course, as far as human arrangements extend, an absolute safeguard. It was inconceivable that any German Government would invade France if such an act involved war with both the British Empire and the United States. The strength of the English-speaking world in combination was irresistible, and the experience of the war had proved that that strength could certainly be applied in Europe, or indeed elsewhere, in a military, naval, or economic form to any extent necessary—though only after an uncertain interval of time.

Foch, however, continued irreconcilable; and the choice before Clémenceau was poignant. How could the dwindling, or at best stationary manhood, of France, bled white by the war, hold the Rhine by military force alone, in defiance not only of Germany, but of the English-speaking world? How could he reject the all-sufficing guarantee which the two overseas giants so freely offered?

On the other hand, he knew that the abandonment of the Rhine would never be forgiven by the strongest elements in France. Not even his services to France in her mortal peril would avail him. But his courage and wisdom were equal to the ordeal. He accepted the British and American guarantee and the Treaty was framed on the basis of the inviolability of the German Rhinelands subject only to an interval of military occupation.

Its Sequel.

The sequel dwells with us to-day. The British Parliament duly approved their treaty of guarantee. The Senate of the United States repudiated the signature of

President Wilson. The joint guarantee was therefore void. The British obligation depended upon the American acceptance and fell simultaneously with the American refusal. Thus France having bound herself by treaty to give up the Rhine was deprived of her compensating security. Isolated and, as they claim, deceived and deserted, the French people have fallen back on their own military force, upon technical equipment, upon African reserves, upon fortifications and military conventions with Poland and other new European States. There will be more to be said on the general question when we come later on to the Treaty of Locarno: but those who deplore these developments and criticize their evil features would do well to study their causes as well as their effects.

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The Fate of Austria-Hungary.

The fierce stresses of the settlement of the German peace terms had exhausted for the time being the energies of the Triumvirate. It was natural that they should shrink from immediately plunging into the less crucial but none the less important and even more complicated problems of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its fate. Some lassitude was inevitable and perhaps excusable. Numerous Commissions had long been working upon the various aspects. It seemed sufficient at the moment to give a general direction to these Commissions and to the Drafting Committee of jurists to apply the principles of the treaty with Germany in framing the treaties with the other defeated States.

But the principle of Self-determination which had preserved Germany as the greatest united branch of the European family was finally fatal to the Empire of the Hapsburgs. Moreover, in this vast scene the decisive events had already taken place. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had in fact shivered into fragments in the last fortnight of the war. On October 28, 1918, Czechoslovakia had proclaimed itself and had been recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers as an independent sovereign State. Strong in the memories of the Czechoslovak army corps and in the influence upon the allies of Masaryk and Benes, the Czechoslovaks successfully presented themselves at the Peace Conference, not as part of an enemy empire defeated by the Allies, but as a new State technically at war with Germany and Austria and awaiting peace settlements with both these countries.

A similar metamorphosis had accompanied the creation on December 1, 1918, of Yugo-Slavia, formed from the union of the victorious Serbians and the defeated Croats and Slovenes into a Southern Slav Kingdom of approximately 13,000,000 souls. This new State was also promptly recognized by Great Britain, France and the United States. Italy, however, demurred. The Croats, they complained, were enemies who had fought hard and well against Italy throughout the war. Whatever might be said of Bohemia and the Czechoslovaks, the Croats had no right to change sides in the moment of defeat and by a judicious dive emerge among the victors. However the force of events prevailed. The Croats sought, and the Serbians accorded shelter and status as a friendly people forced into war against their will by a defunct and guilty Imperialism. Their claims were recognized by Italy in April, 1919.

The Innocent and the Guilty.

Hungary had also seceded from the Empire and proclaimed herself an independent monarchy. Austria isolated with the ancient and cultured capital of Vienna in her midst endeavoured to tread a similar path. The Austrians proclaimed a Republic, declared that they were a new State which had never been at war with the Allies and pleaded that its people ought not to be penalized for the misdeeds of a vanished régime.

These transformations confronted the re-united Council of Four with novel problems. The representatives of Czechoslovakia and Yugo-Slavia were ensconced as friends and in part as allies within the charmed circle of victory. The Austrians and the Hungarians who had fought at their side on the same fronts and in the same armies sat outside under the shadow of defeat and the stigma of

Photo: Daily Mirror.

PEACE HERALDS IN THE CITY.

The fanfare blown by trumpeters before the reading of the King's Proclamation of Peace from the steps of the Royal Exchange in London on July 2, 1919. The Proclamation was read at various points in London, including St. James's Palace, the Statue to Charles I at Charing Cross, Chancery Lane, Wood Street, and finally, as stated above, at the Royal Exchange. In each case the reading was carried out in accordance with traditional ceremony.

war-guilt. Although the ruling class in Austria and Hungary bore an exceptional responsibility, it was absurd to regard the mass of the populations of any of these four States as peculiarly innocent or culpable. All had been drawn by the same currents irresistibly into the vortex. Yet one half were to be cherished and the other half to be smitten.

Two soldiers have served side by side, sharing in a common cause the perils and hardships of the war. The war is ended and they return home to their respective villages. But a frontier line has been drawn between them. One is a guilty wretch lucky to escape with life the conquerors' vengeance. The other appears to be one of the conquerors himself. Alas for these puppets of Fate! It is always unlucky to be born in the central regions of any continent.

Czechoslovakia.

It was to this strange and tumultuous scene that the Peace Conference endeavoured to apply the principle of Self-determination which had governed the German Treaty, and thus redraw the map of Central Europe. The word "Czechoslovakia" was new to British ears; but the ancient kingdom of Bohemia and Moravia, where the Czechs lived, stirred popular memories of King Wenceslas on the Feast of Stephen, of blind King John of Bohemia at the Battle of Crécy, of the Prince of Wales's Feathers with its German motto "Ich Dien," and perhaps of John Huss of Prague. Here were time-honoured tales. For several hundred years we had lost sight of Bohemia. The personal union of the Crowns of Austria and Bohemia, effected in the sixteenth century, had

made the head of the Hapsburgs Austrian Emperor and King of Bohemia. The torment of the Thirty Years' War scarred for ever the history of the two countries. Bohemia, persecuted for Protestantism, became partly Catholicized under duress. From 1618, after the total defeat of the Bohemians in the Battle of the White Mountain, the Hapsburgs ruled a conquered kingdom with autocratic power.

The Bohemian people were never reconciled. Their national sentiment slumbered during the eighteenth century ; but memories were long and tradition powerful. The latter half of the nineteenth century saw the rebirth of Bohemian nationalism embodied in the Czech movement. Popular education revived here as elsewhere a long-forgotten national language. The schools became the centres of strife between the Czech population and the Imperial Government. Lingual self-consciousness and national aspirations rose together. The Emperor Francis Joseph had been crowned King of Hungary at Budapest ; but the Czech desire that he should come to Prague and be crowned King of Bohemia was obstinately and, as it now seems, insensately, refused.

During the war the Czech movement developed into the demand for autonomy and thence into independence. The Czechs had been accustomed to look to Russia for sympathy. After the Russian Revolution they turned under the guidance of Masaryk to the United States and to the Western Powers. Their independence had been already recognized. It remained to define their frontiers. But here were stubborn complications. Bohemia and Moravia contained at least three millions of German-speaking population, often concentrated, usually in the ascendant, a strong, competent stock holding firmly together like the Ulstermen in Ireland. To exclude the German-speaking population was deeply and perhaps fatally to weaken the new State ; to include them was to affront the principle of Self-determination. The Peace Conference in this dilemma decided to adhere to the ancient frontiers of Bohemia, well defined by mountain ranges, and consecrated by five hundred years of tradition. Apart from some vexatious but petty alterations on the frontier towards Austria, this decision became effective.

The Czechs of Bohemia had joined hands with the Slovaks. This tribe dwelt upon the southern slopes of the mountains on the north of Hungary, and stretched some distance into the Danubian plain. The Slovaks had for centuries been under a Magyar rule which they regarded as oppressive. They were a Slav people akin to the Czechs. They spoke a dialect of the same language. They wished to escape from Hungary and join the new State. President Wilson towards the close of the war had agreed with Professor Masaryk that the United States would support the inclusion of the Slovaks in the new Bohemia ; and on this Czechoslovakia had, as we have seen, proclaimed itself a sovereign State. The drawing of the frontier between the Slovaks and the Magyars was in any case a task of difficulty. No line could have been drawn to which there were not valid objections. The natural bias of the Commission was in favour of the Slovaks, and in the result about a million Magyars found themselves included against their will within the limits of Czechoslovakia.

Yugo-Slavia.

The Kingdom of Yugo-Slavia had formed itself by the union of the old Kingdom of Serbia, augmented by the Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the Croats and Slovenes. The Croats had for centuries been under the Hungarian crown. They were not downtrodden like the Slovaks, but a home rule movement was in progress among them by constitutional and legal methods before the war. The Dalmatians and the Slovenes, who inhabited the mountainous country south and south-east of Venice and Trieste, were subject to the Austrian crown. Both these populations sought a new allegiance ; and the new Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, denoted by the initials S.H.S., entered upon the troubles of existence.

Again the limits of the new State had to be determined. The frontiers of Yugo-Slavia with Hungary presented little difficulty ; with Austria they were

more difficult, and at least one plebiscite was required to mitigate the sharpness of decisions. The frontiers with Italy were the most difficult of all; and here victorious Allied Governments faced each other in armed menace. The Italian frontiers of Yugo-Slavia were eventually settled by separate negotiations between the two countries.

Roumania : Hungary.

Roumania, like Serbia, was to gain a great accession of population and territory. The crescent moon of the Roumanian map waxed to full by the incorporation of Transylvania. The problem of Transylvania was insoluble by the principle of Self-determination. It presented the feature of a considerable Hungarian population isolated within a Roumanian border belt. The peoples of the Roumanian zone wished to join Roumania; those of the Magyar nucleus to adhere to their kinsmen in Hungary. Either decision would have conflicted with Self-determination. The issues of principle being thus physically excluded and the integrity of Transylvania being an important factor, the Peace Conference transferred the whole country to Roumania and thus alienated at least another million Magyars from Hungary.

The new limits of Hungary and Austria were the result of these events. Hungary lost Slovakia to Bohemia, Croatia to Serbia, Transylvania to Roumania. She was also required to cede to Austria a considerable German-speaking area near Vienna, which was essential to the food supplies of that forlorn capital. It happened unluckily for the Magyars that they had lost command of their own government in the critical period of the Paris Conference. A Communist revolution had erupted in Budapest. Bela Kun, a disciple of Lenin, and a paid tool of Moscow, had seized power and had used it with cruel violence and tyranny. The Supreme Council could only expostulate. It therefore expostulated. But the Roumanian army was in Transylvania. Attacked by Communist rabble this army advanced as invaders of Hungary, and were at first welcomed in the guise of deliverers by the Hungarian population, whom they mercilessly pillaged. The Hungarian people were, therefore, at their weakest when the crucial issues of their future were to be decided. Not only were the various subject races, which Hungary had in the course of centuries incorporated, liberated from her sway, but more than two and a-half million Magyars, a fourth of the entire population, dwell to-day under foreign rule.

Austria.

Austria is the final remnant. With Hungary she bore the whole blame and burden of the once mighty Hapsburg Empire. Reduced to a community of six millions around Vienna and in the Alpine lands, with the Imperial capital of two millions in its midst, the state of Austria was pitiful indeed. The frontier had still to be drawn between Austria and Italy. The Secret Treaty of London had promised Italy the line of the Alps. But in the South Tyrol, the land of Hofer, four hundred thousand German-speaking people of the upper valley of the Adige lived south of the Alps. Italy claimed her treaty rights, and England and France were bound. President Wilson was free, and his problem was painful. On the one hand stood the principle of Self-determination; on the other, the Alps, the treaties and the strategic security of Italy. In April, President Wilson withdrew the opposition he had hitherto maintained, and the Southern Tyrol passed to Italian sovereignty.

It should be added that in all the treaties constituting the frontiers of the new States, precise and elaborate provisions were inserted and accepted providing for the protection of minorities, their good treatment and equal rights before the law. Italy, as one of the victorious Great Powers, was not called upon to assume a treaty of obligation for the protection of minorities. She, instead, voluntarily declared her solemn resolve to accord them the consideration and fair play which were their due. The inhabitants of the South Tyrol may, therefore, base themselves directly and in a peculiarly personal sense upon the faith and honour of the Italian nation.

Photo: Alfieri.

AT ADMIRALTY ARCH.

Dense crowds lining the route of the column as the troops taking part in the Peace March pass under the Admiralty Arch on their way to the saluting point. Contemporary records pay tribute to the behaviour of this vast assembly, which, as is usual in London, was orderly and good-humoured and in discipline almost equal to the veteran troops it had assembled to acclaim.

The Anschluss.

In her miserable plight Austria turned to Germany. A union with the great Teutonic mass would give to Austria a vitality and means of existence from which she was cut off by a circle of resentful neighbours. The new Austrian Government, appealing at once to the right of Self-determination and of nationality, claimed to become a part of the German Republic. Theoretically, upon Wilsonian principles this demand —the Anschluss, as it is called—was difficult to resist. In practice it was loaded with danger. It would have meant making the new Germany larger in territory and population than the old Germany, which had already proved strong enough to fight the world for four years. It would have brought the frontiers of the German realm to the summits of the Alps and made a complete barrier between Eastern and Western Europe. The future of Switzerland and the permanent existence of Czechoslovkia alike appeared to be affected. A clause was, therefore, inserted both in the German and Austrian Treaties forbidding such a union except with the unanimous consent, presumably unattainable, of the Council of the League of Nations.

The exclusion of this alternative for the gravest reasons of European peace made it the more necessary to improve the conditions in the new Austria. This required a speedy recognition of the Republic, and the greatest care to lighten the financial burden imposed upon it. Notwithstanding the urgent representations made by those Englishmen who were actually in Vienna, the

whole Austrian question was for months completely neglected. When at last the drafting of the Austrian Treaty began, the different Commissions endeavoured to apply to it the terms of the German Treaty. This meant that the whole financial burden was to be laid upon the small Austrian Republic, together with Hungary. The Reparation clauses technically imposed the onus of paying reparations for the whole of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy upon these two small derelict States. This pure nonsense could, of course, never be applied. But a needless and dangerous delay arose. The complete financial collapse of Austria followed, and a social collapse was only averted at a later stage by the intervention of the League of Nations at the instance chiefly of Mr. Balfour.

Bulgaria.

Bulgaria was better treated; she missed the hiatus and inertia which followed the Treaty of Versailles. She profited by the recoil from the decisions of the Treaty of St. Germain. Her population was scarcely at all reduced; her economic and geographical needs were studied; she was assured of commercial access to the Aegean. Yet the griefs of the Allies against the Bulgarians were not light. The cold-blooded entry of Bulgaria into the war; the historic ingratitude which this act involved to Russian liberators and English friends; the stabbing of struggling Serbia in the back; the frightful injury inflicted thereby upon the allied cause; the war crimes committed on Serbian soil—all these made a long and dark account.

Dr. Temperley states in his History of

Photo: Central Press.

THE SALUTING BASE.

H.M. The King taking the salute. This photograph was taken as Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig rode past the Royal Pavilion. After each of the Allied commanders passed this point he left the procession, was received by the King, and took up his position in the Pavilion. This honour was accorded in succession to General Pershing, Marshal Foch, General Montuori, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig and Admiral Beatty.

the Peace Conference that the Bulgarian delegation was surprised on their arrival at Paris by the fact that no one wished to shake hands with them, and a pregnant footnote sets forth many gruesome explanations of this coolness. Yet the Bulgarian Treaty was drafted in a far more instructed and careful mood than that which had regulated the fate of Austria and Hungary. The experts were becoming adepts in the work of treaty making; the best and ablest officials were acquiring control. The passions and interests of the Great Powers were not involved; they were, indeed, benevolently indifferent. The worst complaint of the Bulgarians was that they were forbidden to have a conscript army and that their people would not become professional soldiers. For the rest they were a warrior race, industrious and brave, apt to till and defend their soil or take the soil of others. They sat on the ground-floor of life's edifice, with no great risk of falling further. It was accepted they had been driven into war by King Ferdinand, and with his departure into luxurious exile the wrath of the Allies had been sensibly appeased.

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The General Design.

It is with the general aspects of the territorial settlements with the Central Powers, and the principles underlying them, that this chapter is mainly concerned. The Peace with Turkey and the Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne require separate treatment. The dispute between Jugo-Slavia and Roumania about the Banat of Temesvar; the quarrel between the Poles and Czechs about the Duchy of Teschen, the problem of the Carpathian Ruthenes, and the larger difficulty of Eastern Galicia, are complications with which this brief account cannot deal.

It is obvious how many points of friction remained to cause heart-burnings to the populations affected, and anxiety to Europe. But a fair judgment upon the whole settlement, a simple explanation of how it arose, cannot leave the authors of the new map of Europe under any serious reproach. To an overwhelming extent the wishes of the various populations prevailed. The fundamental principle which governed the victors was honestly applied within the limits of their waning power. No solution could have been free from hardship and anomaly.

More refined solutions in the disputed areas could only have been obtained if Britain, France and the United States had been prepared to provide considerable numbers of troops for lengthy periods to secure a far more elaborate and general adoption of plebiscites, to effect transferences of population such as were afterwards made in Turkey, and meanwhile to supply food and credits to those whose destinies would thus be held in suspense. The exhaustion of the war forbade such toilsome interferences, nor would the scale of the remaining grievances have justified their hazards. The moulds into which Central and Southern Europe has been cast were hastily and in parts roughly shaped, but they conformed for all practical purposes with much exactness to the general design; and according to the lights of the twentieth century that design seems true.

CHAPTER XC

THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR

A Ghost War—The Peasants—Their Suitors—Half Policies—Lord Curzon's Criticism—North Russia—The New Brigades—The Rear-guard—Evacuation—A Parting Blow—Obligations Discharged—Collapse of Koltchak—Withdrawal of Aid—The Czechs—The Imperial Treasure—Betrayal of Koltchak—His Execution—Denikin's Effort—Vast and Precarious Conquests—Poland—Denikin's Responsibilities—His Failure—Anti-Semitism—Ruin of Denikin—Lack of Concert—Situation in December, 1919—The Refugees—The Final Horrors.

DURING the year 1919 there was fought over the whole of Russia a strange war[1]; a war in areas so vast that considerable armies, armies indeed of hundreds of thousands of men, were lost—dispersed, melted, evaporated; a war in which there were no real battles, only raids and affrays and massacres, as the result of which countries as large as England or France changed hands to and fro; a war of flags on the map, of picket lines, of cavalry screens advancing or receding by hundreds of miles without solid cause or durable consequence; a war with little valour and no mercy. Whoever could advance found it easy to continue; whoever was forced to retire found it difficult to stop.

A Ghost War.

On paper it looked like the Great War on the Western and Eastern Fronts. In fact, it was only its ghost: a thin, cold, insubstantial conflict in the Realms of Dis. Koltchak first and then Denikin advanced in what were called offensives over enormous territories. As they advanced they spread their lines ever wider and ever thinner. It seemed that they would go on till they had scarcely one man to the mile. When the moment came the Bolsheviks lying in the centre, equally feeble but at any rate tending willy-nilly constantly towards compression gave a prick or a punch at this point or that. Thereupon the balloon burst and all the flags moved back and the cities changed hands and found it convenient to change opinions, and horrible vengeances were wrecked on helpless people, vengeances perseveringly paid over months of fine-spun inquisition. Mighty natural or strategic barriers, like the line of the Volga River or the line of the Ural Mountains, were found to be no resting places; no strategic consequences followed from their loss or gain. A war of few casualties and unnumbered executions! The tragedy of each Russian city, of loyal families, of countless humble households might fill libraries of dreary volumes.

[1] See map on pages 1448–1449.

The Peasants.

But the population of Russia is a village population. The peasant millions dwell in scores of thousands of villages. There was always the land, and Nature brought forth her fruits. What was the life of these villages in this period? Savinkov gave a convincing account of it when we lunched together one day with Lloyd George. It was in some ways the story of the Indian villages over whose heads the waves of conquest swept and recoiled in bygone ages. They had the land. They had murdered or chased away its former owners. The village society had flowed over into new and well cultivated fields. They now had these long coveted domains for themselves. No more landlords: no more rent. The earth and its fullness—no more—no less. They did not yet understand that under Communism they would have a new landlord,

the Soviet State—a landlord who would demand a higher rent to feed his hungry cities. A collective landlord who could not be killed but who could and would without compunction kill them.

Their Suitors.

Meanwhile they were self-supporting. Their rude existence could be maintained apart altogether from the outer world or modern apparatus. From the skins of beasts they made garments and footwear. The bees gave them honey in place of sugar. They gave them also wax for such lights as might be needed after sundown. There was bread; there was meat; there were roots. They ate and drank and squatted on the land. Not for them the causes of men. Communism, Czarism; the World Revolution, Holy Russia; Empire or Proletariat, civilization or barbarism, tyranny or freedom—these were all the same to them in theory; but also—whoever won—much the same in fact. There they were and there they stayed; and with hard toil there they gained their daily bread.

One morning arrives a Cossack patrol. "Christ is risen; the Allies are advancing; Russia is saved; you are free. The Soviet is no more." And the peasants grunted, and duly elected their Council of Elders, and the Cossack patrol rode off, taking with it what it might require up to the limit of what it could carry. On an afternoon a few weeks later, or it may be a few days later, arrived a Bolshevik in a battered motor-car with half a dozen gunmen, also saying, "You are free; your chains are broken; Christ is a fraud; religion is the opiate of democracy; Brothers, Comrades, rejoice for the great days that have dawned." And the peasants grunted. And the Bolshevik said, "Away with this Council of Elders, exploiters of the poor, the base tools of reaction. Elect in their place your village Soviet, henceforward the sickle and hammer of your Proletarian rights." So the peasants swept away the Council of Elders and re-elected with rude ceremony the village Soviet. But they chose exactly the same people who had hitherto formed the Council of Elders and the land also remained in their possession. And presently the Bolshevik and his gunmen got their motor-car to start and throbbed off into the distance, or perhaps into the Cossack patrol.

Half Policies.

Moscow held the controls of Russia; and when the cause of the Allies burnt itself out in victory, there were no other controls: just chatter and slaughter on a background of Robinson Crusoe toil. The ancient capital lay at the centre of a web of railroads radiating to every point of the compass. And in the midst a spider! Vain hope to crush the spider by the advance of lines of encircling flies! Still I suppose that twenty or thirty thousand resolute, comprehending, well-armed Europeans could, without any serious difficulty or loss, have made their way very swiftly along any of the great railroads which converged on Moscow; and have brought to the hard ordeal of battle any force that stood against them.

But twenty or thirty thousand resolute men did not exist or could not be brought together. Denikin's forces foraged over enormous areas. They boasted a superficial political sway. They lived on the country and by so doing soon alienated the rural population which at first had welcomed them. Had he collected the necessary supplies at one spot in the south for a direct dash to Moscow, and had he seized the psychological moment just before the Siberian armies began to fade away, he would have had a good chance of success. Master of Moscow and its unequalled railway centre with a corps of trustworthy troops, his power and prestige might have been unshakable. But there never was a thrust; no Napoleon eagle-swoop at the mysterious capital; only the long thin lines wending on ever thinner, weaker and more weary. And then finally when the Bolsheviks in the centre of the circle were sufficiently concentrated by the mere fact of retirement, they in their turn advanced and found in front of them—nothing!—nothing but helpless populations and scores of thousands of compromised families and individuals.

The fitful and fluid operations of the Russian armies found a counterpart in

the policy, or want of policy, of the Allies. Were they at war with Soviet Russia? Certainly not; but they shot Soviet Russians at sight. They stood as invaders on Russian soil. They armed the enemies of the Soviet Government. They blockaded its ports, and sunk its battleships. They earnestly desired and schemed its downfall. But war—shocking! Interference—shame! It was, they repeated, a matter of indifference to them how Russians settled their own internal affairs. They were impartial—Bang! And then—at the same time—parley and try to trade.

The reader might well have supposed that the decision of the Big Five to support Koltchak, which was finally taken in June, marked the end of doubt and vacillation. They could send no troops; they could not spend much money. But they could give a steady aid in surplus munitions, in moral countenance and in concerted diplomacy. Had they acted together simply and sincerely within these limitations, they might have reached a good result. But their decisions to support Koltchak, and later to support Denikin, represented only half a mind. The other half had always been, and was throughout the summer of 1919, uncertain of itself, sceptical about the prospects of the anti-Bolsheviks, ill-informed about the true nature of the Soviet Government and the Third International, and anxious to see whether the extremists in Moscow would not respond to the exercise of reason and patience.

Lord Curzon's Criticism.

A draft memorandum of Lord Curzon's, dated August 16, 1919, describes in severe terms the weakness and confusion of Ally proceedings.

"It cannot be said that an altogether consistent policy has been pursued. Even now the principles upon which that policy rests in the last resort are in some respects in dispute. Action is taken sometimes by the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments sitting in Paris or by the institutions which they have set up, sometimes by the Governments themselves. The situation is so complex, and the difficulties of arriving at a decision which is acceptable to all are so great that, in some instances, it would be no exaggeration to admit that there is no policy at all.

"In these circumstances, the Great Powers when they meet—and too often it must be confessed that refuge is taken in inaction—adopt an uncertain line of conduct; the financial burden tends to fall almost exclusively on the shoulders of those who either have the greatest capacity or the least unwillingness to pay; the independent States or groups of communities, with the fortunes of which we have associated ourselves, do not always make the best use of the help which they get, and are constantly clamouring for more; it remains a matter of almost weekly disputation whether recognition shall or shall not be extended to this or that community; Allied missions despatched in every direction endeavour to produce something like order out of the prevailing chaos; advice is accepted where it is supplemented by substantial material assistance, elsewhere it is apt to be ignored. . . .

"On the Western Russian front, Poland and the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia are conducting military operations against the Russian Soviet Government. So far as the Baltic States are concerned, continuance of their resistance depends largely on the amount of material assistance which they may be able to obtain, as well as upon the attitude which the Allied Governments may decide to adopt in regard to their national aspirations.

"Politically the present situation is in the highest degree unsatisfactory. His Majesty's Government have recognized the *de facto* authority of the Provisional Governments of Esthonia and Latvia established at Reval and Libau respectively, and the Allied representatives in Paris have, in the fifth condition attached to the recognition of Admiral Koltchak, laid down that 'if a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement, the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that, until such settlement is made,



MILITARY SITUATION IN RUSSIA: 1919.

Sketch map showing position of Anti-Bolshevik Armies as at May 20, 1919, and October 13, 1
the farthest advances made by the armies of Koltchak and Denikin.



ines indicate

the Government of Russia agrees to recognize these territories as autonomous and to confirm the relations which may exist between their *de facto* Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.' Yet no further steps have been taken to endeavour to secure the co-operation of the Border States of Russia in the policy laid down by the Allied Powers, and no communications have been addressed to the representatives of these States in Paris, in spite of their repeated requests to be informed of the intentions of the Allied Governments. Grave dissatisfaction has consequently resulted in Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia. . . .

"The lack of a clear and decisive policy has been not less manifest in the dealings with the Border States on the Caucasian front. . . . Here as elsewhere, the policy of the Allied Powers has hovered between recognition and polite indifference. . . . All is in a flux and uncertainty, and with the withdrawal of the only Allied forces to the south of the Caucasus, serious disturbance, if not worse, may be expected to ensue.

"It would perhaps be an unjustifiable deduction from the untoward developments that I have described, to argue that they have been mainly due to lack either of political vision or harmony on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers. But it would not be unfair to attribute the set-back in part to the fact that single Powers have, to a considerable extent, dissipated on various theatres such resources as they have been in a position to give to the whole, instead of pursuing an organized policy whereby effort could be concentrated and a due co-ordination established between political, military, and financial measures." . . .

* * * * * *

North Russia.

Meanwhile I had a direct and definite duty to perform.

Our first object was to withdraw from Archangel and Murmansk without disaster and without dishonour. This was a military and political problem both difficult and delicate. I gave the following account of it to the House of Commons[1]:—

"Before the German resistance was broken and the Armistice signed, the winter had settled down on the north Russian coast, and the port of Archangel was ice-bound, or practically ice-bound, and our men were forced to spend the whole of the winter in this bleak and gloomy spot in circumstances which caused the greatest anxiety. It was evident that the Bolsheviks with whom they had been in collision, could, if they chose, have concentrated against this particular sector of the circle by which they were invested, a force of indefinite size; and our men were utterly cut off from the outer world except as far as small parties were concerned. Therefore their position was one of much anxiety. They were men mostly of the C3 class, but they had a fine spirit, and once they were promised that they should be brought home before another winter occurred, they discharged their duty with great determination, and maintained the position against some quite serious attacks, and others which might well have become very serious had they been allowed to proceed, and thus the situation has been maintained throughout this dark period. Not only was there considerable unrest amongst these troops throughout their

[1] July 29, 1919.

imprisonment on this coast during the winter, but also . . . in the exhaustion and prostration of the public mind which followed the triumph in the main struggle . . . there was the greatest difficulty in sending out any form of relief or assistance to those troops for several months."

And again :—

". . . Whatever may be the policy decided upon by the Allies in Paris, our forces in Archangel and Murmansk which . . . are inter-dependent, will have to stay there until the summer is far advanced. Since they have got to stay, they must be properly supported. They must be sustained with the reinforcements necessary to their safety, which can reach them within the limit I have described, and must be supplied with everything they may require. It is no use people raising prejudice against these expeditions. Everyone knows why they were sent. They were sent as part of our operations against Germany. . . . That reason has passed away, but the troops sent in obedience to it are still on these wild northern coasts, locked in the depth of winter, and we must neglect nothing required for their safety and well-being. . . .

"Further, we have incurred heavy commitments towards the people of these districts who have espoused our cause, and to the Russian armies, which were encouraged and called into being largely by the Allies and largely for our own purposes during the period of the German war. It has been the custom in this country to pay particular attention to matters of this kind and always to endeavour, to the very best of our ability, to do our duty by those who have put their trust in us, and who have run into danger in consequence of action which we have advised them to take."

In order to secure the safe and respectable withdrawal of the allied troops from North Russia, it was necessary to reinforce them. All our Allies wished to quit this melancholy scene as quickly as possible, and the British being in command and constituting more than half of the expedition, had in practice to bear the responsibility and form the rear-guard. The bulk of our own troops were entitled to be brought home and discharged under the terms of our demobilization scheme. It was therefore necessary to raise a special volunteer force to relieve the tired and impatient conscripts and to wind up the affair. On March 4 the War Cabinet decided to press the Allied Representatives in Paris to agree to the early evacuation of North Russia by the Allied troops. To prepare for this, and to meet the dangerous situation existing at Archangel, the War Cabinet authorized me to make any necessary arrangements.

The New Brigades.

In pursuance of this decision I therefore raised two new brigades each of 4,000 men, composed of volunteers from the great armies which were demobilizing. The officers and men came forward readily, and in a few days the lists were closed. These fine, war-hardened soldiers rapidly assumed coherent formations. They were despatched to Archangel as soon as the port was open. We thus had a strong, efficient and well-equipped force at this most critical point, from which everyone else was making haste to flee. These troops had no sooner arrived and relieved the worn-out garrison than a dangerous and widespread mutiny broke out in the friendly Russian force. This treachery was said to be characteristic of the Russians ; but the explanation is simple. From the moment when we had been compelled by parliamentary and political pressure to proclaim our intention to withdraw, every friendly Russian knew that he fought under a death sentence, and his safest course was to make terms with his future masters at the expense of his departing Allies. This reaction, however unpleasant, was inherent in the wise, and indeed inevitable, policy of evacuation.

The Rear-guard.

The mutinies, except on the Onega sector, which went over bodily to the Bolsheviks, were checked and quelled by the spirited action of a Polish battalion and a company of British infantry ; but thenceforward the 25 to 30,000 armed and trained local troops whom

the Allies had organized could not be trusted as an aid, and must indeed be reckoned as a peril. Fortunately, veteran volunteers had gone out with this very job clearly explained to them. Totally immune from the general disintegration but comprehending it, and technically superior in every form of warfare, they occupied the wide, depleted front, gripped the treachery in the rear, and easily smote down the attack in front.

We had been bitterly attacked by the Socialist and the Liberal Oppositions, and also in some Conservative newspapers, for sending any fresh troops to North Russia, and had we not been deaf to these irresponsible counsels and strong enough to take unpopular action, no fresh troops would have been sent. But for their timely arrival, a general landslide and disaster of a peculiarly shameful character, and on a considerable scale, would certainly have taken place in July. Behind this tempered shield, the withdrawal of the American, French, Italian and British conscripts, and the removal of masses of stores, proceeded rapidly, without cessation. This was the first phase of our North Russian operations after the Armistice.

Evacuation.

The second is at once more complicated and more disputable. Again, I cannot improve upon the account I gave to Parliament on July 29 :—

" In the first week of March the War Cabinet decided that Archangel and Murmansk should be evacuated before another winter set in, and they directed the War Office to make arrangements accordingly. But they also prescribed that whatever support, nourishment, succour, reinforcements or aid might be required or needed by our troops for their safe extrication from this position should be used and despatched by the War Office ; and, further, that due regard should be had to the obligations which we had inevitably contracted with every class of the population of Archangel and Murmansk, and with the local Russian Army and local Russian Government we had called into being. . . .

" This decision of policy was communicated to the Russian leaders. On April 30, Admiral Koltchak was informed that all the Allied troops would be withdrawn from North Russia before the next winter ; but in the meantime we hoped to make it possible for the North Russian Government and the Russian army to stand alone after the Allied troops had left. It will readily be seen that if such a solution could have been reached, if this local government and local army could have maintained itself or joined up with the main anti-Bolshevik Russian army, that would have relieved us of the extremely anxious and painful operation of carrying away a portion of the population and troops who were now there, and affording them asylum and refuge, and of settling a most terrible problem for all those loyal Russians who elected to remain on that shore. . . .

" Although to us who sit here at home in England it may seem very easy to say, ' Clear out, evacuate, cut the loss, get the troops on board ship and come away '—and to arrive at that intellectual decision, yet on the spot, face to face with the people among whom you have been living, with the troops by the side of whom you have been fighting, with the small Government which has been created by our insistence, with all the apparatus of a small administration with all its branches and services—when you get our officers and men involved like that on the spot, it is a matter of very great and painful difficulty to sever the ties and quit the scene. I do not disguise from the House that I had most earnestly hoped and trusted that it would be possible in the course of events for the local North Russian Government to have a separate life and existence after our departure ; and with the fullest assent of the Cabinet and the Government, and acting strictly on the advice of the General Staff, we have been ready to hold out a left hand, as it were, along the Dvina River to Admiral Koltchak in the hope that he would be able to arrive in this district, and, by joining the local Russian forces, stabilize the situation and enable our affairs there to be wound up in a thoroughly satisfactory manner."

A Parting Blow.

There was, however, a third phase in the North Russian campaign. When eventually it became certain that the Czech troops had no longer the will nor Admiral Koltchak the power to form any contact with the North Russian area, the final act of evacuation began. So grave was our apprehension of its difficulty and danger that we decided to send a commander of the highest rank to conduct the operation. On August 4 General Lord Rawlinson, the famous chief of the old Fourth Army, embarked for Archangel. At his disposition were placed: three additional infantry battalions, one marine battalion, one machine-gun battalion, two batteries of artillery, a field company of engineers and five tanks. Powerful naval forces, including monitors which could ascend the Dvina river, lay at hand with ample shipping. The North Russian Government, seeing that our decision was irrevocable, resolved with the assent of a substantial proportion both of their army and their people, to continue their resistance to the end. They received imperative orders to this effect from Koltchak. This forlorn hope excited a strong wave of sympathy among the British volunteers, and it was Rawlinson's unpleasant task to repress these chivalrous instincts by a sharp reminder that obedience was the first of military duties.

The evacuation was to be covered by a sudden offensive against the enemy. He was to be given a blow so severe that before he could recover not a British soldier, nor a loyal Russian who claimed asylum, would remain on shore. This operation, elaborately planned, was carried out under General Ironside's orders by the volunteer brigade of Sadleir-Jackson and Russian troops. On August 10 the Bolshevik position astride the Dvina river was attacked. The assault was completely successful. All the objectives were taken, and six enemy battalions annihilated. Over 2,000 prisoners, 18 guns and many machine guns were captured. The advance ended with the occupation of the villages of Puchega and Borok, twenty miles from our original position. One may measure the quality of the Red Army by the fact that our losses did not exceed 120 officers and men.

Obligations Discharged.

The naval flotilla advancing with the troops mined the river at the farthest point, thus barring it for some time to hostile vessels. The enemy having been temporarily paralysed, a swift and unmolested withdrawal was made, first to the defences at Archangel and thence to the ships. Food and arms were left with the Russian General Miller and his troops. Six thousand five hundred Russians, who elected to go were removed by sea to the liberated Baltic States and South Russia. By September 27 the evacuation of Archangel was completed; that of Murmansk followed on October 12. The withdrawal was carried out practically without loss, and for the moment the loyal Russian forces were left in so favourable a position that they actually assumed an offensive of their own.

The total pre- and post-Armistice casualties—killed, died, wounded and missing—sustained by the British forces in North Russia from the spring of 1918 to October 1919, were 106 officers and 877 other ranks, including 41 officers and 286 other ranks killed.

This successful extrication, first of the Allies and secondly of our own troops and the Russian refugees, was only rendered possible by treating with necessary indifference socialist partisanship, opposition mischief making, and newspaper clamour. To the best of their ability the British had discharged their obligations. Safety was provided for every Russian man, woman and child who wished to leave. Those who remained to continue the civil war did so of their own free will. Short of remaining there and waging war indefinitely against the Russian Soviet, no better solution was possible; but nevertheless the sequel was melancholy. In a few weeks General Miller's resistance was extinguished; the Soviet Government re-established its rule on the shores of the White Sea, and mass executions, in one case of 500 officers, quenched the last hope of Russian life and freedom in these regions.

I can see now the pale faces and staring eyes of the deputation of townsfolk from Archangel who visited me at the War Office at the end of July, 1919, to beg for further British protection, to whom I had to return "a dusty answer." All these poor work-people and shopkeepers were soon to face the firing parties. The responsibility for their fate rests upon the mighty and resplendent nations who had won the war, but left their task unfinished.

* * *

Collapse of Koltchak.

No sooner had the correspondence between Koltchak and the Big Five terminated satisfactorily on June 12, 1919, than his collapse began. In the early part of June General Gaida's Northern Army made some slight progress round about Glazov. But this did not disguise from our representative, General Knox, that the situation of Koltchak's forces was very unfavourable. The Siberian Western Army had been heavily defeated at the beginning of May in front of Ufa, and at the end of June the Northern Army was involved in its rout. By the end of the month therefore the Western and Northern Armies had fallen back over a hundred and fifty miles to Perm. At the beginning of July the line here ran approximately as follows: East of Perm—Kungar—Krasnoufimsk—Simsk—Sterlitimak—Orenberg.

During July the retreat of the Siberian armies continued without interruption; by the end of the month they had evacuated Ekaterinberg and Chelyabinsk, and had lost the line of the Urals. At the beginning of August the Supreme Council decided to give no further help to Koltchak, who was evidently fast losing his grip of the situation. General Knox said of the Siberian armies: "The men are listless and slack, and there is no sign of their officers taking them in hand. The men do not want rest, but hard work and discipline. . . . The enemy boasts he is going to Omsk, and at the moment I see nothing to stop him. As it retires the army melts, the men desert to their villages or to convey their families to safety."

NORTH RUSSIA: 1919.

Sketch map indicating the limit of the British occupation in 1919.

The retirement of the Siberian army continued throughout August. At the beginning of September they still had a numerical superiority over the Bolsheviks, but having retired since May their morale was very bad. Nevertheless, at the beginning of September General Dietrichs struck back at the enemy and recovered nearly a hundred miles. The success was short-lived, and Petropavlovsk was occupied by the Bolsheviks on October 30. The Southern Army continued to retreat, broke up and ceased to be a factor in the military situation. There was nothing therefore between the Bolsheviks and Omsk, which was evacuated on November 14. The Government moved to Irkutsk on November 17. General Gaida attempted a *coup d'état* at Vladivostock, which appeared for the moment to galvanize the Irkutsk Government into life. Such public opinion as existed in Siberia was, however, becoming increasingly estranged from Koltchak; and Bolshevik propaganda grew daily more seductive.

Withdrawal of Aid.

While all this was in progress I had done my best in pursuance of the decisions of the Supreme Council to guide and encourage Koltchak. On May 28 I had telegraphed to General Knox, telling him to use his influence in order to get the Admiral to "accentuate all the broad principles of a constituent assembly and a democratic franchise whose decrees shall settle the future government of Russia." General Knox was instructed to do his utmost to secure compliance by Koltchak with all the conditions prescribed by the Big Four. Knox was to avail himself of the services of Colonel John Ward in every possible way, for no one could express better the feelings of "patriotic British Labour men equally opposed to autocracy and anarchy." Advice was accompanied by aid. British ships with stores continued to arrive at Vladivostok up till October, 1919, and during that year the total amount supplied or carried in British vessels to the Siberian armies amounted to nearly a hundred thousand tons of arms, ammunition, equipment and clothing. In pursuance of the undertaking given to Parliament and the declared policy of the Cabinet, Colonel Ward and his Middlesex Regiment sailed from Vladivostok for England on September 8, 1919. They were followed by the Hampshires on November 1. Thereafter only the British Military Mission and the Railway Mission represented Great Britain in Siberia.

The withdrawal of the symbols of Allied and British support, and the ceaseless retreat of his forces, consummated the ruin of Koltchak. On December 24 a revolution took place at Irkutsk, and on January 4 the Admiral placed himself under Czech protection.

The Czechs: The Imperial Treasure.

But what had happened to the Czechs? We have seen them already in October, 1918, "wearying somewhat in well-doing" and exasperated by White Russian mismanagement. The end of the Great War relaxed the bonds which had made them so serviceable to the Allies. Henceforward their only and most natural wish was to get back to their homes. The Allied victory had liberated Bohemia. The Czech troops were no longer mutineers nor traitors to the Hapsburg Empire. They were the victorious soldiers and pioneers of Czechoslovakia. Home, which might have been forever barred and banned to them, now shone in the lights of freedom and of honour. Very brightly did the beacon gleam to their eyes across the vast snows of Russia.

Early in 1919 the Czech Army Corps began to be a source not of help but of positive danger. The Czechoslovak National Council which the troops had evolved was—no doubt with reason—actively critical of the Omsk Government. Committees were formed in the regiments, not unlike those which rotted the Russian armies after the Revolution. Their discipline and their fighting value deteriorated. In the spring they were withdrawn from the front and put to guard sections of the railways. In June it was settled that they should be repatriated as soon as possible, and appropriate steps were taken to this end.

On Christmas Eve Koltchak, still the nominal Director of Siberia, was in

Photo: Dr. Ludovic Grondijs.

RETREAT OF KOLTCHAK'S ARMY IN SIBERIA.

The end of a valiant effort. The text contains a detailed account of the gallant front offered by Admiral Koltchak to the Bolshevik menace, and of his final betrayal and execution. The photograph reproduced here shows the remnants of his army retreating in Siberia. Responsibility for this tragic episode would appear to rest upon General Janin, a French officer in command of the Czechs, but the account given in the text makes it clear that the problems confronting Janin at this juncture rendered his task one most difficult to carry through.

his train at Nijni Udinsk, about 300 miles west of Irkutsk. With him in a second train was the Imperial Russian treasure, consisting first, of gold bricks to the total value of 650 million roubles (sixty-five million pounds), and secondly, about 500 million roubles' worth of valuables and securities, the latter greatly depreciated. Koltchak had been deserted by nearly all his troops and followers. But a "storm battalion" of Czechs, animated by unfriendly feelings towards the Admiral, remained as the safeguard of his life and treasure.

News was received that a Bolshevik force was advancing from the North to capture the gold, and General Janin, a French officer in command of the Czechs, telegraphed to the "storm battalion" to retreat upon Irkutsk and leave Koltchak and the gold to their fate. On January 2, however, the Admiral was informed through the Czechs that "all échelons of the Supreme Ruler will be escorted to a safe zone, and if for any reason it is impossible to escort all échelons, in any case the Admiral . . . is to be safe and escorted to the Far East." In these circumstances, Koltchak, on January 4, telegraphed to Irkutsk that he surrendered his person to the Czechs. His private car, pasted with the flags of Japan, England, France, America and Czechoslovakia, was attached to one of the trains conveying the "storm battalion"; and behind followed the train containing the gold. Although they passed through a territory said to be swarming with hostile insurgents, neither Czechs, nor gold, nor Koltchak were molested on their journey to Irkutsk. Here on a railway siding the Admiral and the treasure halted.

Betrayal of Koltchak.

General Janin's first duty was the extrication of the Czechs; but he had also become responsible for the safety of Koltchak. Both of these tasks could have been easily discharged but for the gold. Everyone in the dissolving social structure of Siberia, Reds, Social Democrats or banditti wanted to see the backs of the Czechs and would have speeded their departure by every means. Koltchak could have accompanied them without difficulty. But the removal of the gold was a different matter. Russians of all colours were prepared to sink their political differences in order to prevent such an alarming occurrence. General Janin on January 4 had accepted responsibility for the gold, and he wasted ten days in parleying and haggling about it. Meanwhile the Bolshevik forces were closing in on Irkutsk and the local Social Democrat Government flushed pinker daily. The situation became definitely menacing. The Red forces, spurred on by news of the gold, though poor in quality, were reaching large numbers.

Such Allied Commissioners as had any troops of their nationality in tow in Siberia sent peremptory telegrams to General Janin that they would not help him out if he tarried any longer in Irkutsk. There is no reason to suppose that the Czechs, if they had been so disposed, were not strong enough to force their way out with both the Admiral and the gold. But the atmosphere was loaded with panic and intrigue. General Janin on January 14 opened negotiations with the local Irkutsk Government. An agreement was made that the Czechs should be assisted to depart and that the gold and the person of Admiral Koltchak should be left behind.

One of the Admiral's staff, Malinovsky, says in his diary, "On January 14 at 6 p.m. two Czech officers stated that they had just received orders from Janin to hand over Koltchak and his staff to the local authorities. The Admiral was always calm, neither by word nor gesture did he allow the Czechs to feel that he was afraid of death. With blazing eyes and a bitter smile the Admiral said: 'So this is the meaning of the guarantee given me by Janin for an unhindered passage to the East. An international act of treachery. I am ready for anything!' He was then incarcerated with his Prime Minister, M. Pepelaiev, in the jail at Irkutsk."

These proceedings staggered the High Commissioners farther east at Harbin. They were not, however, in a strong position, in view of their recent demands to Janin to retreat from Irkutsk. Their remonstrances now received offensive replies. General Janin said that the

Czechs would have been attacked unless they had handed the Admiral over, and that the action of the High Commissioners had never been the slightest help and had always made matters worse, and that he did not recognize their authority. "I consider myself," he said, "under obligation solely to the Czech Government which has ordered the return of its troops to Czechoslovakia, and to the Inter-Allied Council in Paris which has ordered me to carry out this evacuation." And he is reported to have added, with equal insolence and truth: "Je répéte que pour Sa Majesté Nicolas II en a fait moins de cérémonie."

Every allowance must be made for the difficulties of this officer's position, and it may well be that a more detailed analysis would only reveal those difficulties more clearly.

His Execution.

On January 21 the Social Democrat Government of Irkutsk, already almost vermilion, declared itself Bolshevik. Soviet emissaries entered the town, Red guards replaced the pink around Koltchak. On February 7, before it was light, the Admiral and his Prime Minister were murdered in their cells in the customary Bolshevik manner by the discharging of automatic pistols pressed against the backs of their heads. There was no trial of any kind, but neither does it appear that they were tortured.

The fate of the vast mass of gold and treasure is by no means free from mystery. Undoubtedly the bulk fell into the hands of the Soviet Government. But it is by no means clear that they got it all. Six months later the Finance Minister of General Wrangel's Government began to make inconvenient inquiries about a million dollars in gold reported to be deposited in a bank in San Francisco. He did not last long enough, however, to press this very far.

It is a pity that the magnificent record of the Czechoslovak army corps should have been marred by the surrender of Koltchak. It seems that for a while these legionaries forsook the stage of History on which they had hitherto acted and mingled with the ragged and demoralized Siberian audience.

* * * *

Denikin's Effort.

The military effort of Denikin was far more serious and sustained. In accordance with the advice of the General Staff, the main British assistance from June onwards was concentrated upon him. A quarter of a million rifles, two hundred guns, thirty tanks and large masses of munitions and equipment were sent through the Dardanelles and the Black Sea to the port of Novorossisk; and several hundred British officers and non-commissioned officers, as advisers, instructors, store-keepers and even a few aviators, furthered the organization of his armies.

Denikin had as a nucleus the survivors of that heroic band who a year before under Alexeiev and Kornilov had in the Russian Volunteer Army fought for the Russian cause while it was still the cause of the Allies. He had, therefore, at any rate a sprinkling of competent, resolute and faithful officers. He had already, as we have seen, gained great successes; and as the summer wore on his lines advanced rapidly northward till they stretched from the great city of Kieff in the west almost to the Caspian Sea. In his offensive, lasting five months, between April and October, 1919, Denikin took 250,000 prisoners, 700 guns, 1,700 machine guns and 35 armoured trains; and at the beginning of October he reached Tula, within 220 miles of Moscow, with forces approximately equal to those of his opponents, namely, about 230,000 men. The general survey which I gave to the Cabinet on September 22, 1919, while Koltchak was still in the field, stated:

Vast and Precarious Conquests.

"General Denikin has under the control of his troops regions which cannot contain less than thirty millions of European Russians, and which include the third, fourth and fifth great cities of Russia. These regions are readily accessible to British and French trade, which is the main need of the population at the

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

GENERAL LORD RAWLINSON AT ARCHANGEL.

General Lord Rawlinson is seen here disembarking at Archangel on August 11, 1919. This officer, who had previously commanded the British Fourth Army in France, carried out the evacuation of the force at Murmansk and Archangel.

present time. They possess a network of railways, which are in comparatively good working order if rolling stock could be obtained. The inhabitants have been thoroughly sickened of Bolshevism, having either tried it of their own free will or experienced its oppression. There is no doubt whatever that the will of these 30,000,000 people, if it could be expressed by plebiscite, would be overwhelmingly against being handed back again to the Bolshevik Government of Lenin and Trotsky. Moreover, General Denikin disposes of an army which, although raised very largely on a voluntary basis, is rapidly growing, and at the present time certainly amounts to over 300,000 fighting men. . . .

"Our policy should continue to be to keep in friendly touch with Denikin, to complete the despatch of the munitions, to help him in his difficulties with other anti-Bolshevik forces, to guide him as far as possible with political counsel, and to prevent him from falling into the hands of the reactionaries. Above all, it seems most important to develop trade and credit in the great regions which have been liberated, in order that the people there may contrast their conditions with the miseries prevailing in Bolshevik Russia. It is to be observed that General Denikin has never asked for men. One British lieutenant in the last nine months has been slightly wounded in a tank. That is the sole British casualty of which we have information. No further large expenditure of money (other than the questionable value of surplus munitions), no assistance of troops, except a very limited establishment of technical personnel, are needed. Countenance, counsel, commerce—these are the means which are alone demanded. . . .

"On his western flank, General Denikin is in contact with the rather feeble Ukrainian forces under Petlura. The question at issue between Denikin and Petlura is that of a united Russia *versus* an independent Ukraine. The Roumanians, who feel that they can only take Bessarabia from a weak and defeated Russia, will naturally support Petlura. The duty of the Allies should be to try

to reconcile the two conflicting points of view. Why should this be thought impossible? The conception of a Russia consisting of a number of autonomous States, grouped together on a federal basis into a Russian union, is one within which all legitimate aspirations may be comprised. Such a Russian empire would be less of a menace to the future peace of the world than the vast centralized empire of Czarism. And this is the moment when the critical situation of all the Russian parties and forces should make it possible, by a wise exercise of Allied policy, to give such a turn to events.

"A policy of the partition or dismemberment of Russia, although it might be for the moment successful, cannot have permanent results and could only open up an indefinite succession of wars, out of which in the end, under Bolshevik or reactionary standards, a united militarist Russia would arise. Every effort should, therefore, be made to guide affairs into the channel which leads into a federalized Russia, without prejudice either to local autonomy or the principle of general unity.

"The downfall of Bela Kun amid universal execration, and the ease with which that downfall was accomplished, has been a most heavy blow to the prestige of the Bolshevik system of world-wide revolution. Its influence upon the general situation ought not to be underrated.

Poland.

"Coming farther north, on the left of the Ukrainian forces of Petlura, is the Polish battle front. This has also continuously advanced in the last four or five months, involving the Bolsheviks in continual defeats at the hands of the Polish army and in heavy expenditure in men and munitions. The Polish front now stands in most places on Russian soil. The Poles are now inclined to suggest one of two courses to the Allies:

"(*a*) That the Allies should finance a Polish army of 500,000 men which should advance into the heart of Russia and capture Moscow; or

"(*b*) That the Poles should make a peace with the Bolsheviks.

"Either of these courses at the present moment would be injurious. The advance of the hereditary enemy of Russia to Moscow would rouse whatever sense of nationalism is latent in those parts of Russia under the Bolshevik international régime. Moreover, the project is not one for which any of the Allied Powers would be justified by their own public opinion in furnishing funds. On the other hand, if the Poles make a separate and precipitate peace with the Bolsheviks, the Bolshevik army opposite the Polish front, which is the third strongest Bolshevik army now in the field, could swiftly be transferred to the attack of Denikin; and this might fundamentally jeopardize his continued existence. For us to encourage the Poles to make such a precipitate and isolated peace at this juncture, when everything is so critical, would utterly stultify:

"(*a*) The general policy of the Allies in promising support to Admiral Koltchak; and

"(*b*) The special policy of Great Britain in sending great consignments of munitions to Denikin.

"We should be undoing with our left hand what we had done with our right, and by pursuing opposite and contradictory policies on different sectors of the common front, we should have done nothing more than prolong useless bloodshed and prevent the establishment of any form of settled authority. It seems, therefore, clear that our policy at the present moment should be to persuade the Poles to carry on for a few months as they are doing, i.e. fighting and defeating the Bolsheviks on their borders where and when they can, without preparing either for a decisive advance into the heart of Russia or for a separate peace.

"In regard to the Baltic States, the policy here is similar to that which suggests itself in regard to Poland, i.e. the taking of no violent action for which the Allies would have to make great sacrifices or become directly responsible, but, on the other hand, the fostering of the material and moral

strength of such anti-Bolshevik forces as exist, and the co-ordination of their action so far as possible in order to prevent an untimely and inopportune collapse on this sector of the front."

Denikin's Responsibilities.

But Denikin's dangers grew with his conquests. He became responsible for a large part of Russia without any of the resources—moral, political, or material—needed to restore prosperity and contentment. The population, which welcomed his troops and dreaded the Bolsheviks, were too cowed by the terrible years through which they had passed to make any vigorous rally in his support. The responsibilities for the administrative well-being of great cities and provinces in time of dearth and confusion, with crumbling railways and arrested commerce, fell upon a blunt, stout-hearted military man with a newly acquired taste for political affairs, who was already overburdened with the organization of his army and the conduct of the war.

The political elements which had gathered around him were weak, mixed and fiercely divided upon essentials. Some urged him to display the Imperial standards and advance in the name of the Czar. This alone would confront Bolshevism with insignia equally well understood on either side by all. The majority of his advisers and principal officers made it clear that they would not tolerate such a decision. Others urged him to proclaim that the land should be left to the peasants who had seized it. To whom it was replied: "Are we then no better than the Bolsheviks?"

But the worst cleavage arose upon the policy towards the countries or provinces which had broken away from Russia. Denikin stood for the integrity of the Russian Fatherland as he understood it. He was therefore the foe of his own allies in the war against the Soviets. The Baltic States, struggling for life against Bolshevik force and propaganda, could make no common cause with the Russian General who denied their right to independence. The Poles, who provided the largest and strongest army at war with the Soviets, saw that they would have to defend themselves against Denikin on the morrow of a joint victory. The Ukraine was ready to fight the Bolsheviks for independence, but were not attracted by the military government of Denikin.

His Failure.

At every stage these antagonisms presented baffling problems. It was far beyond the power of Denikin to cope with them. But was it beyond the power of the victorious Allies? Could not the statesmen who had assembled at Paris have pursued their task coherently? Could they not have said to Koltchak and Denikin: "Not another cartridge unless you make terms with the Border States, recognizing their independence or autonomy as may be decided." And having applied this superior compulsion to the Russian leaders, could they not have used their whole influence to combine the operations of all the States at war with Soviet Russia? And if not, would it not have been better at a much earlier stage to have left events to take their course? Surely the Inter-Allied Russian Committee, which I had proposed at Paris in February, was an instrument which it was imperative to call into being, if the declarations of the Big Five to Koltchak in May were ever to be made, or to be made good. But everything was partial, disjointed, half-hearted, inconsistent, and sometimes actually contradictory.

Anti-Semitism.

I used what influence I had to prevent excesses and promote concerted action. September 18: "It is of the very highest consequence that General Denikin should not only do everything in his power to prevent massacres of the Jews in the liberated districts, but should issue a proclamation against Anti-Semitism." September 20: "It is very important to bring about an improvement in the relations between the Ukraines and Denikin. . . . It is necessary to avoid a situation which will oblige him to continue to employ troops against Petlura. . . ." "A report from Moscow states that Green Guards

are growing in numbers and organizing in many parts of the country, and that if they were not afraid of reprisals from the Whites, they might easily be made use of against the Bolsheviks. Is this point fully realized by Denikin? . . ." On October 9 I telegraphed to Denikin urging him "to redouble efforts to restrain Anti-Semitic feeling and to vindicate the honour of the volunteer army [by such restraint]." November 7: "I have fostered development of a strong Russian and Anglo-Russian group, hoping thereby to develop trade and credit behind Denikin's front."

The Russian Anti-Bolshevik effort culminated in September. Koltchak was still forming a front in Siberia, and even made a small advance. Yudenitch, with a North-West Russian force based on Reval, was actually at grips with Petrograd. Finland, fully mobilized, awaited only the slightest encouragement from the Great Powers to march also on that city. A flotilla of motor-boats from the British blockading squadron in the Baltic broke into the harbour of Kronstadt, and by a feat of unsurpassed audacity and apparently on the sole initiative and authority of the Admiralty, sank two Russian battleships in the inner basin. The lines of Denikin embraced the whole of South Russia and were moving steadily northward. An arrangement between him and the Ukraine, combined with a steady pressure by Poland, might well have been decisive.

Ruin of Denikin.

But everything fell to pieces. Koltchak petered out. The Finns were chilled and discouraged by the Allies and stood idle. Yudenitch, unsupported, failed. Poland remained inert. Denikin came to blows with Petlura, and his forces had just completely defeated this Ukrainian leader, when his own distended front was pierced by Bolshevik counter-attacks. The immense circle of weak, divided, hesitating and confused armies and States which lapped Soviet Russia, was incapable of exerting a simultaneous pressure. During November Denikin's armies melted away, and his whole front disappeared with the swiftness of pantomime. I cannot describe these disasters and their cause better than in a Memorandum which I wrote on September 15.

Lack of Concert.

"Large sums of money and considerable forces have been employed by the Allies against the Bolsheviks during the year. Britain has contributed the nominal value of nearly 100 millions, France between 30 and 40 millions, the United States have maintained, and are still maintaining, over 8 thousand troops in Siberia, Japan has an army of between 30 and 40 thousand strong in Eastern Siberia, which she is now in process of reinforcing. Admiral Koltchak's armies, equipped mainly with British munitions, reached in May a total of nearly 300,000 men. General Denikin's armies aggregate at the present time about a quarter of a million combatants. Besides these, there were the Finns, who could place 100,000 men in the field. There were also the Esthonians, the Letts and the Lithuanians completely maintaining their fronts from the Baltic to Poland. Lastly, there are the powerful Polish forces, and help could also have been obtained from Roumania and, to a lesser extent, from Serbia and Czechoslovakia.

"It is obvious from the above that the elements existed which, used in combination, would easily have been successful. They have, however, been dissipated by a total lack of combination, and this has been due to a complete absence of any definite or decided policy among the victorious Allies. Some were in favour of peace and some were in favour of war. In the result they made neither peace nor war. If they made war on one part of the front, they hastened to make peace on another. If they encouraged Koltchak and Denikin and spent both money and men in their support, they gave no encouragement to Finland, to the Baltic States or to Poland. Every proposal to establish a unified system of command and direction of the resistance to the Bolsheviks has been vetoed.

"In June, Koltchak was promised, on the word of the five plenipotentiaries, continuance of their support

in supplies. Since that date, the withdrawal of all support from him has been continuous. Finland at two periods of this year was ready to march, in conjunction with the army of Yudenitch and the Esthonians, and occupy Petrograd. Not the slightest countenance or encouragement was given her in such an enterprise. Poland was prepared to maintain strong pressure against the Bolsheviks: she was actually discouraged. As for the small States, they were told that they could make peace or not, as they liked, and that in any case they would get no help.

"All these steps were perfectly compatible with a policy of peace or a policy of strict neutrality. They were certainly not compatible with a policy of war, such as was actually being carried out on other sectors of the immense circle around Bolshevik Russia. Meanwhile the Bolsheviks succeeded in gradually developing their armies. These armies were far weaker than the forces potentially opposed to them; but, as they lay in the centre of the circle, and could, subject to the limits of their transportation, throw their weight from one part of its circumference to the other, they have been able to attack in detail and in many cases to overwhelm the forces opposed to them. Thus, while Denikin was getting on his feet Koltchak was broken and defeated.

"During the last five months Denikin's power has been steadily growing and great successes have been gained by his armies, but the weight against them has steadily accumulated owing to the defeat of Koltchak and the practical cessation of any serious pressure along the whole Western or European Front. During the last three months the very

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

ARRIVAL OF RELIEF FORCE: ARCHANGEL, 1919.

Much had been hoped for from the presence of a force of the Allies in North Russia. Success might have been attained but for Bolshevik propaganda which led to the conversion of the loyal Russians. In the end the situation of the North Russian Force became precarious and, for various reasons, its relief and withdrawal became a question of necessity. This was carried out by Lord Rawlinson's North Russian Relief Force.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

ON THE DVINA FRONT.

General Lord Rawlinson interrogating a Bolshevik prisoner during the operations in North Russia. The photograph was taken in September, 1919.

large numbers of men which the Bolsheviks were able to transfer from in front of Koltchak, from in front of the Poles, and from in front of the Baltic States, and the fact that they were able to throw practically the whole of their reserves on the Southern or Denikin front, have given them a large superiority of numbers over Denikin. His army, which is still the best army, spread out in practically a single line on a front of more than 1,200 miles, has now been thrown back everywhere by these superior forces. Although there are still battles to be fought and the resisting power of his army is still very considerable, he may be overwhelmed and broken up as an effective military factor.

"The declarations which have been made in public of the withdrawal of support, the lack of any moral support or vigorous concerted action, and the feeling of being abandoned by the great Allied Powers may easily produce conditions in his army which will lead to its complete destruction or disappearance. The destruction of Koltchak's army and Government is practically complete, and the whole vast region of Siberia up to Lake Baikal, east of which the Japanese have taken effectual charge, will be submerged either by the Bolshevik armies or sheer anarchy. Turkestan and the provinces of Central Asia are over-run by the Bolsheviks, who already menace Persia and are intriguing with Afghanistan. Whereas concerted efforts could quite easily have sustained Koltchak, carried Denikin to success, and enabled Petrograd to be captured by Yudenitch, with the Esthonians and the Finns, the Bolsheviks are now within measurable distance of complete military triumph on all fronts where they are active.

Situation in December, 1919.

"It is with the situation arising out of these facts that we are now confronted. The inactivity of the Poles has enabled the Bolsheviks to concentrate against Denikin; the destruction of Denikin will enable them, if they choose, to concentrate against the Poles. The growth of Denikin's forces and the efforts of

his armies took the pressure off the Baltic States and enabled Finland to remain inert. What is now happening to Denikin has already produced a significant change in the Baltic area. The Bolshevik negotiators have entirely altered their tone towards the small States, as they are quite justified in doing, in consequence of the changed military situation. The alarm of the Esthonians, the Latvians and the Lithuanians is already apparent and will become increasingly apparent as Denikin's fortunes and strength subside. Finland is now reported by the latest telegrams to be mobilizing a hundred thousand men as a defensive measure. Half that number two months ago would have sufficed, in conjunction with Yudenitch's effort, to have taken Petrograd. The collapse of Denikin will give the Bolsheviks the command of the Caspian and place them in close and effective relation with the Turkish Nationalists under Enver and Mustapha Kemal and others. The pressure on Persia and the danger in Afghanistan will in that event immediately assume a most direct and formidable character.

"We are told that it is idle to speculate about the future, or to indulge in prophecy. But surely certain well-marked and not distant contingencies which will follow upon the destruction of Denikin do require to be thought over in advance. Hitherto it has been a cheap thing to mock at Denikin's efforts and to indulge to the full the easy wisdom of pessimism and indifference. Hitherto the Allies have been fighting Bolshevism mainly with Russian armies. What will happen when these Russian armies are gone? Zinoviev is reported in the latest wireless to have used a most significant expression which reveals clearly the effect upon the minds of the Bolshevik leaders of the intoxicating draught of military success of which they have been made a present. 'The peace,' he is reported to have said, 'which Russia must obtain would not be a Socialist peace but a *bourgeois* peace.' The demands which the Bolsheviks are now to make on Esthonia, the menace which Finland already recognizes, and the situation in Central Asia and towards the frontiers of India, are the first illustrations of what is meant by this.

"Whereas by taking the proper concerted measures we could, without any large additional employment of men or money, have established an anti-Bolshevik and modernized Russia friendly to the Entente, we are now within measurable distance of a Bolshevik Russia thoroughly militarized, with nothing but its militarism to live on, bitterly hostile to the Entente, ready to work with Germany, and already largely organized by Germany. The idea that Poland will serve as a barrier to such dangers is illusory. The idea that by standing on the defensive on the east until every other anti-Bolshevik force has been destroyed, she will be able to maintain a strong attitude towards Germany in the west, is equally ill-founded.

"What is the wisdom of a policy which seeks to strengthen Poland by allied money and munitions and yet calmly acquiesces in the destruction of Denikin and the consequent liberation of the main Bolshevik armies to treble and quadruple the enemies with whom Poland has to contend? What is the justice or logic of recognizing every State, and even to a large extent guaranteeing the independence and security of every State which has torn itself away from the Russian Empire, while refusing to recognize and aid in preserving the great territories and populations in the south of Russia from which General Denikin's armies are drawn and which are unquestionably anti-Bolshevik?

"It is a delusion to suppose that all this year we have been fighting the battles of the anti-Bolshevik Russians. On the contrary, they have been fighting ours; and this truth will become painfully apparent from the moment that they are exterminated and the Bolshevik armies are supreme over the whole vast territories of the Russian Empire."

As Denikin's failure became pronounced, the fitful countenance which the Great Powers had given him was swiftly withdrawn. On February 3, 1920, it became my duty to instruct

General Holman to put the facts plainly before the Russian leader. "I cannot hold out any expectation that the British Government will give any further aid beyond what has been already promised in the final packet. Neither will they use their influence to make an aggressive combination between the Poles, the Baltic States, Finland, etc., with Denikin against Soviet Russia. Their reason is that they do not possess the resources in men or money sufficient to carry any such enterprise to success, and they do not wish to encourage others without having the power to sustain them. . . .

"The British Government in general agreement with the French Government are disposed to offer to the Border States a measure of support in case they are attacked by the Soviet Government. . . . It is no good arguing whether this is a wise or a right policy: it is what I believe is going to happen. It is said the Border States are only fighting for their independence, while Denikin is fighting for the control of Russia. We cannot undertake to make further exertions in support of this last objective, although we sympathize with it. . . . The question which must now be faced is how to save as much as possible from the wreck."

The Refugees—
The Final Horrors.

I now pinned my hopes to finding some asylum, however temporary, for the mass of refugees who fled southward from Red vengeance. The Cossack territories of the Don and the Kuban, where the whole population was passionately anti-Bolshevik, might perhaps be constituted an independent or autonomous region. Failing this, there was the Crimea. Into this fertile peninsula the broken fragments of Denikin's armies and several hundred thousand civilian fugitives were soon crowded in every circumstance of misery and want. Their defence was maintained for a few more months after Denikin's supersession by General Wrangel, a new figure of unusual energy and quality, who thus too late reached the first place in White Russian counsels.

Some moral assistance — in the form of gun-fire — was given by the British fleet, officially engaged in rescue work, in preventing the Bolsheviks from invading the Crimea by sea. But in July the marsh defences dried up and the land defences broke down, the Crimea was overrun, and a hideous flight of refugees to Constantinople ensued. There were not enough ships for half of the panic-stricken multitudes. The savage enemy bore down exultingly their last despairing defenders. Smallpox and typhus epidemics made new alliances with sword and famine. Shiploads of destitute and infected persons—sometimes all dead or moribund—arrived continuously in the already overcrowded, impoverished and straitened Turkish capital. A veil has been drawn over the horrors of this final phase. The British troops and sailors, and some British and American philanthropic agencies in Constantinople gave almost all they possessed in local aid; but the "Allied and Associated Powers" averted their gaze and stopped their ears. They did not wish to know too much, and, like Napoleon at the Beresina, could only reply: "Voulez-vous ôter mon calme?" After all, Death is merciful: it was certainly busy.

Such were the solutions which the victors in the Great War were able to afford to Russian affairs.

CHAPTER XCI

THE MIRACLE OF THE VISTULA

"Our next step on the path to world victory is the destruction of Poland."—TROTSKY.

The Linch-Pin—Poland's Problem—Poland's Dangers—The Bolshevik Concentration—The Polish Advance—The Ukraine—The Invasion of Poland—The Armistice Negotiations—The Deadly Terms—Warsaw: The Miracle—Decisive Results—A Summing Up—Lost Possibilities—A Consolation—An Advantage.

THE gates of new perils were now opened on the world.

The Linch-Pin.

Poland was the linch-pin of the Treaty of Versailles. This ancient State, torn into three pieces by Austria, Prussia and Russia, was at last liberated from its oppressors and reunited in its integrity after 150 years of bondage and partition. The doors of the Bastille had been broken down, its towers and battlements had been overthrown in the supreme convulsion, and from the ruins there emerged this prisoner of the eighteenth century, long cut off from light and air, limbs dislocated by the rack, with a nature as gifted, a heart as proud, and a head as it then seemed as impracticable as ever. Adversity had not broken the spirit of Poland; had it taught her wisdom?

Poland's Problem.

But justice to Poland requires a fair recognition of her extraordinary difficulties. While she was still dazzled by the newly found freedom, before she could brace herself to the atmosphere of this modern age, there rushed upon her a series of perils, perplexities and embarrassments which might well have baffled the sagacity and experience of the most solidly established Government.

To the westward lay quivering Germany, half stunned, half chained, but still endowed with those tremendous faculties and qualities which had enabled her almost single-handed to wage an obstinate war against nearly the whole world at once. Eastward, also prostrate, also in dire confusion, lay the huge mass of Russia—not a wounded Russia only, but a poisoned Russia, an infected Russia, a plague-bearing Russia; a Russia of armed hordes not only smiting with bayonet and with cannon, but accompanied and preceded by swarms of typhus-bearing vermin which slew the bodies of men, and political doctrines which destroyed the health and even the soul of nations. And between these two agonized Empires, reacted upon continually by their distresses, stood Poland, comparatively weak, comparatively small, quite inexperienced, without organization, without structure, short of food, short of weapons, short of money, brandishing her indisputable and newly reaffirmed title-deeds to freedom and independence. A reasonable comprehension of Poland's difficulties was indispensable to a true measuring of Poland's perils.

The intention of those who framed the Treaty of Versailles had been to create in Poland a living, healthy, vigorous organism which should form a serviceable barrier between Germany and Russia and between Russian Bolshevism—as long as as it might last—and the rest of Europe. The ruin and collapse of Poland and its incorporation as a whole in the Russian political group would sweep away this barrier and would bring Russia and Germany into direct and immediate contact. The interests of France must be gravely and even vitally affected by the over-running of Poland by the Bol-

shevik armies, or by the subversion of the Polish State through Bolshevik propaganda and conspiracy.

The French had largely themselves to thank for the alarming situation with which they were now to be confronted. They had derided the efforts of Denikin; they had made no attempt to establish good working arrangements between the National Russians on the one hand and Poland and the frontier States on the other. They had in no way taken the lead, as their interests required them to do, in promoting a definite, concerted action between all the anti-Bolshevik forces and States. Their lethargy had made our own half-hearted efforts useless. They had remained impassive and apparently uncomprehending spectators of Denikin's downfall and of the steady concentration of the Russian armies against Poland. They had made no effort to induce Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania to combine in common action against the common peril. On the contrary, they, like the British, had encouraged these States to make peace, not a general peace but a piecemeal peace, Poland being left, and even urged, to remain practically isolated, but at war.

Photo: Manuel.

MARSHAL PILSUDSKI.

Josef Pilsudski was born in 1867 at Zulov, in the province of Vilna. About the year 1892, after five years in exile in Siberia, he returned to Poland to be leader of the Nationalist-Socialist Party. On the outbreak of the Great War Pilsudski diverted all his energies to the raising of a volunteer force for use against Russia, and thenceforward he became more and more the dominating spirit in Poland.

Poland's Dangers.

Of this new series of dangers I gave the following account on May 21, 1920:

"The difficulties of Poland in dealing with a Government like the Soviet Government of Russia should not be underrated. The same difficulties have been experienced by every other country which is in direct contact with Bolshevik Russia. In no case has anything like a satisfactory peace been arranged by such countries with Soviet Russia. The Bolsheviks do not work only by military operations, but, simultaneously or alternatively with these, they employ every device of propaganda in their neighbours' territories to make the soldiers mutiny against their officers, to raise the poor

against the bourgeois, to raise the workmen against the employers, to raise the peasants against the landowners, to paralyse the country by general strikes, and generally to destroy every existing form of social order and of democratic government. Thus a state of so-called peace, i.e. a suspension of actual fighting with firearms, may simply mean that the war proceeds in a still more difficult and dangerous form, viz. instead of being attacked by soldiers on the frontier, the country is poisoned internally and every good and democratic institution which it possesses is undermined.

"For a country like Poland, newly constituted, struggling to get on its feet on being liberated after over a century of foreign oppression, whose finances are in disorder, and whose resources are so greatly impoverished by the horrors of the war, this second form of attack is particularly dangerous.

"The Bolsheviks, however, while loudly professing a desire for peace, have, since the end of last year, been preparing for an offensive on the Polish front.

"In addition to a steady flow of reinforcements toward the Polish front, there have been numerous indications of an impending attack by the Bolsheviks. The approximate strength of the Bolshevik armies on the Western front has increased from 81,200 in January, 1920, to 99,200 in early March, and to 133,600 by mid-April. These figures are rifles and sabres, i.e. effective fighting strength. The downfall of Denikin liberated a large number of troops. Many statements have been made by Bolshevik leaders to the effect that they would deal with Poland as they have dealt with Denikin and Koltchak, and great anxiety was felt by Poland during the winter as to what the fate of Poland would be if exposed to such an attack.

The Bolshevik Concentration.

"There is no doubt that the Bolsheviks hoped that, what with their propaganda and their reinforced front, they would be able to beat the Polish troops and overthrow the Government behind them, and, if so, a most difficult situation would have arisen. The reactionary Germans would, of course, be delighted to see the downfall of Poland at the hands of the Bolsheviks, for they fully understand that a strong Poland standing between Russia and Germany is the one thing that will baulk their plans for [an Imperialist] reconstruction and for revenge.

"About two months ago (on March 5) the Bolshevik offensive against the Poles began, the main weight of this attack being between the Pripet and the Dniester, a front of 250 miles. It then, however, became apparent that the Polish Army, although ill-supplied and ill-clothed, was nevertheless imbued with a strong patriotic spirit. The Bolshevik attack never made any real progress, in spite of being repeatedly renewed during the rest of the month. The Bolsheviks then initiated discussions regarding the opening of peace negotiations, and invited the Polish Government to indicate the time and place for such negotiations.

"The Poles offered Borisov, a place a short distance within their lines, and suggested April 10 as a suitable date, at the same time expressing their readiness to order a cessation of hostilities on that portion of the front. The Poles also guaranteed that their Army would abstain from offensive action during the negotiations. The Bolsheviks, however, rejected the Polish proposals, and demanded an armistice on the whole front, and the selection of a place either in the interior of Poland or in a neutral or Allied country for negotiations.

"In the meanwhile, fresh Bolshevik reinforcements were being concentrated on the Polish front, and there was every indication that the offensive against the Poles was about to be renewed. The Poles, therefore, naturally assumed that the Soviet Government was only procrastinating, and was endeavouring to create a delay in which to undermine the morale of the Polish troops and population by propaganda, while preparing for the renewed offensive.

The Polish Advance.

"The Polish Government, under Marshal Pilsudski, a former revolutionary against the Czarist régime, of course understand very intimately the Russian political situation, and have shown a profound knowledge of how to tranquillize Russian

territory which they are temporarily administering. Their desire is believed to be to have some sort of buffer between them and Bolshevik Russia, at any rate over a portion of their front. Such a buffer State would be constituted by an independent Ukraine.

The Ukraine.

"The Polish Foreign Office, on April 27, issued a communiqué to the effect that Poland acknowledged the right of the Ukraine to independence, and recognised Petlura's Government. Marshal Pilsudski, on the same day, issued a declaration in which he stated that the Polish Army would co-operate with Ukrainian forces, and would only remain in Ukrainian territory long enough to enable the Ukrainian Government to be established. When this government had been established the Polish troops, he said, would withdraw.

"Petlura also published a declaration on that day urging the Ukrainian people to do all in their power to facilitate the operations of the Polish and Ukrainian forces.

"General Denikin was, of course, entirely opposed either to a strong Poland or to an independent Ukraine, his idea, to which he was always true, being a united Russia on pre-war lines, although willing to recognize a Polish State, the boundaries of which were to be settled by negotiations sanctioned by the Constituent Assembly. With his disappearance the Ukrainians, under Petlura, have driven the Bolsheviks out of a large part of their territory, and are making an effort to establish an independent Ukraine free from Bolsheviks. Simultaneously with the Polish-Ukrainian advance, great popular risings occurred in the Ukraine against the Bolsheviks, and the liberating forces were shown every sign of welcome. Incidentally one Ukrainian-Galician division (impressed by the Bolsheviks for service with the Red Army) laid down their arms and refused to fight against the Polish-Ukrainian forces.

"There could be no greater advantage to the famine areas of Central Europe than the re-establishment of a peaceful state of the Ukraine on a basis which permitted economic and commercial transactions to take place. It is there in the Ukraine, and not in the starving regions of Russia, reduced to destitution under Bolshevik rule, that an addition to the food supply may be hoped for.

"It is not possible to say yet what the outcome will be. The Bolsheviks will no doubt make an effort to overwhelm the Poles, and they will certainly get any assistance from the reactionary Germans which can be given unofficially. It will be very difficult for the Ukrainians to establish order in their own country. But on the assumption that Petlura's Government manages to set up and maintain a separate Government of a civilized type capable of liberating the corn supplies of the Ukraine, and with that territory sheltered and assisted in this task by a strong Poland, it ought not to be impossible to arrive at satisfactory conditions of a general peace in the east in the course of the present summer. If on the other hand Poland succumbs to Bolskevik attacks and the Ukraine is again overrun, the anarchy and disorder destroying all productive capacity which invariably accompanies the establishment of the Soviet régime will prevent all effective export of grain from the Ukraine, and the downfall of Poland will directly involve the vital interests of France and, in a lesser degree, of Great Britain; it will, moreover, materially further the designs for reconstruction on imperialistic lines which the reactionary elements in Germany desire."

Again, on June 26, after the Poles had been forced to evacuate Kieff and when the Bolshevik invasion of Poland was clearly imminent:

"Are we looking ahead at all and making up our minds what we shall do if there is a complete Polish collapse and if Poland is overrun by the Bolshevik armies or its government overturned by an internal Bolshevik uprising? Would it be the policy of the British Government to remain impassive in the face of such an event, which may be conceivably near? If so, what would be the policy of the French Government? In the event of the collapse of Poland, what reaction would this situation entail upon

the German position? It would clearly not be possible to disarm Germany if her eastern frontiers were in contact with a Bolshevised area. . . . We ought at any rate to consider in advance what our line of action should be."

The Invasion of Poland.

By June 30 the situation had become so menacing that a Council for National Defence was formed in Poland, with power to decide all questions concerning war or peace; and the Polish Prime Minister declared to the Diet that the whole nation stood in peril and must realize its responsibilities. At the beginning of July the main Bolshevik advance began on the northern section of the Polish frontier. On the 4th they crossed the Beresina, and on the 5th took Kovno. On the 6th the Polish Government addressed the Supreme Council, which was then sitting at Spa, a note appealing for assistance in Poland's desperate plight. Poland offered to accept a peace based upon the self-determination of the populations between Poland and Russia, and warned the Allies of the consequences if the Polish Army succumbed to Soviet force. On the 14th the Bolsheviks captured Vilna. On the 17th Chicherin refused to admit the intervention of the British Government in his negotiations with the Poles. On the 19th it was reported to us that "There is now nothing but disorderly rabble between Warsaw and the Bolsheviks, and if they continue their advances at the present rate, they will be in front of Warsaw in ten days' time." On the 23rd the Poles sued for an armistice.

These events staggered the Supreme Council. The French saw in jeopardy the whole results of the Great War in Eastern Europe. On August 4 Mr. Lloyd George warned Kamenev and Krassin that "if the Soviet armies advanced further into Poland, a rupture with the Allies would be inevitable"

On that famous anniversary, as we sat in the Cabinet room upon this serious communication, my mind's eye roamed back over the six years of carnage and horror through which we had struggled. Was there never to be an end? Was even the most absolute victory to afford no basis for just and lasting peace? Out of the unknown there seemed to march a measureless array of toils and perils. Again it was August 4, and this time we were impotent. Public opinion in England and France was prostrate. All forms of military intervention were impossible. There was nothing left but words and gestures.

Over a wide area the Red armies rolled forward through Poland. Behind the receding Polish front the Communist germ-cells and organizations in every town and city emerged from their seclusion and stood ready to welcome the invaders and proclaim a new Soviet Republic. Poland seemed to have escaped from her hundred and fifty years' partition among three military Empires to fall beneath the yoke of Communism. Doom closed in upon the new liberated State. On August 13, the Red bayonets stood before the gates of Warsaw, and the Red propaganda rose in a surge within the city. Where would the tides of social dissolution stop?

The Armistice Negotiations.

Feverish efforts by the Poles and by the Allies to obtain an armistice and a peace had meanwhile continued. These were received by the Bolsheviks with elaborate assurances of their willingness to negotiate coupled with repeated delays in fixing a meeting place. Eventually Minsk was chosen. On the 10th, Kamenev handed to Mr. Lloyd George a forecast of the Russian peace terms, which involved the reduction of Poland to a virtually defenceless condition, but offered her a reasonable frontier. He mentioned significantly that there were some subsidiary clauses. The British Labour Party had developed a violent agitation against any British assistance being given to Poland. Under Communist influences and guidance councils of action were formed in many parts of Great Britain. Nowhere among the public was there the slightest comprehension of the evils which would follow a Polish collapse. Under these pressures Mr. Lloyd George was constrained to advise the Polish Government that the Russian terms "do no violence to the

Photo: Illustrations Bureau.

POLISH TROOPS IN WARSAW.

In the course of the present chapter an account is given of the set of circumstances which led to the overthrow of the Bolsheviks, who, in 1920, threatened to overrun Poland and to saturate that country with the poison which had brought about the downfall of Russia. The photograph reproduced above was taken in 1920, and shows Polish troops about to leave Warsaw for the front. The men are wearing helmets of the German type.

Photo: J. H. Hare.

POLISH GUNNERS IN ACTION.

Another photograph taken in 1920 during the struggle of the Poles for freedom. Hostilities between the Poles and the Bolsheviks continued until October 12, 1920, when peace was concluded at Riga. The terms were ratified on March 18, 1921.

ethnographical frontiers of Poland as an independent State," and that if they were rejected, the British Government could not take any action against Russia.

The French on the other hand took the opposite view, dissociated themselves from the British and informed the Polish Government that the terms were totally unacceptable. In these circumstances the Poles continued to rally their forces for the defence of Warsaw, and simultaneously tried to open the armistice proceedings at Minsk —while the Bolsheviks advanced their forces and delayed the parleys.

The Deadly Terms.

It was not until August 17 that the Conference finally assembled. The Soviet representatives, acting on instructions given them some days earlier, put forward their conditions. They recognized the independence of the Polish Republic. They would not demand any indemnities. They agreed that the Polish frontier should be the line fixed by Lord Curzon in his note of July 11. Nothing could be more reasonable. But by Article IV : " Poland will demobilize her Army to 50,000 men. *For the maintenance of order a citizens' militia of workmen will be formed.*" Article VII : " The manufacture of arms and war material in Poland is prohibited." Article XII : " *Poland undertakes to give land for the families of her citizens killed, wounded or incapacitated in the war.*" Thus under a fair-seeming front of paper concessions about independence, frontiers and no indemnities, the Soviets claimed nothing less than the means to carry out a Bolshevik revolution in a disarmed Poland.

The scope of these designs, although hidden from simpletons, was equally comprehensible to every anti-Communist and Communist throughout the world. The establishment of the citizens' militia of workmen, combined with the grants of land for the families of Polish citizens killed or wounded in the war, meant a Red Guard under Communist direction to enforce a policy of land nationalization. Those internal fires were to be lighted, from which the Polish nation would emerge a Communist annex of the Soviet power.

Warsaw : The Miracle.

But meanwhile there had come a transformation—sudden, mysterious and decisive. It produced the same sort of impression upon the mind as had the Battle of the Marne, almost exactly six years before. Once again armies were advancing, exulting, seemingly irresistible, carrying with them measureless possibilities of woe and ruin. Once again for no assignable cause they halt, they falter, become disconnected, become disordered, and begin to retreat under a compulsion seemingly as inexorable as that which had carried them forward. Warsaw, like Paris, is saved. The ponderous balances have adjusted themselves to a new decision. Poland, like France, is not to perish but to live. Europe, her liberties and her glory, are not to succumb to Kaiserism or to Communism. On August 13 the battle for Warsaw had begun at Radzimin less than fifteen miles from the city : and four days later the Bolshevik armies were in full flight leaving 70,000 surviving prisoners in Polish hands. The Miracle of the Vistula had repeated in a different form the Miracle of the Marne.

What had happened ? How was it done ? Of course there are explanations. At the head of Marshal Foch's "*famille militaire*" stood a soldier of subtle and commanding military genius veiled under an unaffected modesty. Weygand had arrived in Warsaw. France had nothing to send to the aid of Poland but this one man. He was, it seems, enough. Through the influence and authority of Lord D'Abernon, the British Ambassador at Berlin, who had been sent to Warsaw at the head of the Allied missions, Weygand was given effective military control. He re-grouped the retreating Polish armies and changed their retirement into a concerted counter-stroke.

The spirit of Poland which had not been quenched through generations of oppression blazed into one last supreme effort for national existence.

Photo: A. W. F.

ON THE ROAD TO MINSK.

The first meeting of the Polish delegation with the representatives of the Bolsheviks on a road crossing the hostile lines. Throughout their journey to Minsk and during the abortive conference itself, the members of the Polish delegation were subjected to every insult and to every possible hardship. The Poles are seen on the left of the photograph and the Bolsheviks on the right. The unusual type of head-dress worn by the Bolshevik commissaries, a conical helmet of black leather, ornamented with a red star, was of Tartan origin and at that time seemed likely to become a distinguishing mark of high Soviet officials.

Decisive Results.

The Bolsheviks, incapable of withstanding or overcoming any resolute opposition, submitted immediately to a new will-power. There was hardly any fighting. The blatant-feeble Terror, which had marched so confidently to carry world revolution into the west, recoiled with the utmost precipitation across the Polish frontier; while the Polish peasants, urged by Pilsudski in a fierce proclamation to arm themselves with scythes and cudgels and cleanse their land, devoured the stragglers.

Alternatively, other accounts explain that all was part of the deliberate plan of the Polish General Staff, sustained by the rugged personality of Marshal-President Pilsudski himself. They had deliberately fallen back, like Joffre before the Marne, until the moment was ripe for the grand right-about turn. They had allowed the invaders to extend themselves, to overrun their supplies, to gain a false confidence from a pretended weakness in the defence, and then struck with the sureness and vigour of a Galliéni. They now were glad that so competent a military eye as that of General Weygand had been the witness of their successful combinations.

The British observers thought that the result was due to Weygand. Weygand however characteristically declared, both publicly and privately on all occasions, that it was the Polish army

which did the work. The reader may choose either explanation, or both together. The more the facts about the Marne are exposed, the more the gap between them and their tremendous consequences is widened. So here now in this petty warfare of raw, ill-organized, dispirited and exhausted levies a study of what happened leaves one still asking : Why ?

But anyhow it was all over. The dangers which I had foreseen and feared had come to pass. But their consequences had been averted. The terrible forfeit due to drift and indecision had been remitted at the very moment when it was claimed.

A Peace Treaty was signed on October 12 at Riga which secured the independence of Poland and her means of self-defence against Russian invasion or subversion. Russia fell back into Communist barbarism. Millions had perished by war and persecution, and many more in future years were to die of famine. The frontiers of Asia and the conditions of the Dark Ages had advanced from the Urals to the Pripet Marshes. But there it was written : " So far and no farther."

* * * *

A Summing Up.

It is perhaps worth while to sum up this Russian story. Unsuccessful intervention in the affairs of another country is generally agreed to be a mistake ; and accordingly all the efforts made by the Allies in Russia after the Revolution and after the Armistice fall under a common condemnation. But the Allies were bound to intervene in Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution if the Great War was to be won.

They had no reason at the end of 1917, nor during the greater part of 1918, to count upon a German collapse in the west. Even in September it was prudent to expect a German retreat to the Meuse or to the Rhine, and every nerve was strained in preparation for a vast campaign in 1919. In such circumstances it would have been criminal negligence to make no effort to reconstruct an anti-German front in the east, and so to deny the vast resources of Russia in food and fuel to the Central Powers. Thus the Allies became committed to the support of the national Russian governments and forces which were struggling against the Bolsheviks and which claimed to have maintained an unbroken steadfastness in the original purpose of the war.

Lost Possibilities.

During the Great War too little was done to achieve decisive results in Russia. Any real effort by Japan or the United States, though made with troops which could never have reached the European battlefields, would have made success certain in 1918. As it was, enough foreign troops entered Russia to incur all the objections which were patent against intervention, but not enough to break the then gimcrack structure of the Soviet power.

When we observe the amazing exploits of the Czech Army Corps, it seems certain that a resolute effort by a comparatively small number of trustworthy American or Japanese troops would have enabled Moscow to be occupied by National Russian and Allied forces even before the German collapse took place. Divided counsels and cross-purposes among the Allies, American mistrust of Japan, and the personal opposition of President Wilson, reduced Allied intervention in Russia during the war to exactly the point where it did the utmost harm and gained the least advantage. In consequence at the Armistice nothing was finished and the Allies were entangled in feeble action in many parts of Russia. Side by side with them, dependent upon them for moral, even more than material aid, were the loyal Russian organizations. Had the Great War been prolonged into 1919, intervention, which was gathering momentum every week, must have been militarily successful.

The Armistice proved to be the death-warrant of the Russian national cause. As long as that cause was interwoven with a world purpose represented by twenty-seven Allied States at war with Germany, victory was certain. But when the Great War suddenly ended and the

victors hurried off to mind their own affairs and exhaustion laid its hands on every Government, the tide that would have borne the loyal Russians onwards ebbed swiftly away and left them forlornly stranded.

Nevertheless there seemed perhaps the chance that with their own strength these Russian national forces might yet save themselves and their country. It was never a very good chance. "These armies of Koltchak and Denikin," Foch is said to have remarked with much discernment, "cannot last long because they have no civil governments behind them." It would not have been right after the Great War was over, even had it been possible, to use British, French or American troops in Russia. Those that were already there must be withdrawn as soon as possible. Intervention after the Armistice could only take the form of money, supplies, munitions, technical instructors, moral countenance and a concerted diplomacy. But even resources thus strictly limited offered a fair chance of success provided they had been skilfully and sincerely applied in good time. Instead, they were frittered away by doubtful or contradictory convictions and disjointed inconsequent actions.

The dualism of policy already described was fatal to success either by peaceful or warlike plans. Either the policy of helping all the anti-Bolshevik forces which encircled Soviet Russia should have been straightforwardly pursued, or a peace should have been unitedly made with the Bolsheviks on terms which assured some hope of life and liberty to the loyal Russians who had been fighting with the Allies in the war, and to whom we were in honour bound. Neither the one nor the other was earnestly attempted. Half-hearted efforts to make peace were companioned by half-hearted attempts to make war. The conflict was thus prolonged without real prospects of peace or victory. The achievements of the National Russians, though inadequate, exceeded what had been expected by Allied statesmen or generals. But deprived of world-wide moral support and separated by antagonistic national aims from the Border States, from Poland and from Roumania, they were one after the other broken up and destroyed.

A Consolation.

I have explained the part I played in these events. I had no responsibility either for the original intervention or for the commitments and obligations which it entailed. Neither did it rest with me to decide whether intervention should be continued after the Armistice or brought to an end. It was my duty in a subordinate though important station to try to make good the undertakings which had been entered into by Great Britain, and to protect as far as possible those who had compromised themselves in the common cause of the Allies and of Russia herself. I am glad to think that our country was the last to ignore its obligations or to leave ill-starred comrades to their fate. Painful as is the story of Archangel and Murmansk, we may claim to have wound up our affairs there without weakness or discredit.

In Siberia our part was always small. But to Denikin we gave substantial assistance. We provided him with the means of arming and equipping nearly a quarter of a million men. The cost of this effort has been loosely stated at a hundred millions sterling; but this is an absurd exaggeration. The actual expense, apart from munitions, was not a tithe as great. The munitions themselves, though they had been most costly to produce, were only an unmarketable surplus of the Great War, to which no money value can be assigned. Had they been kept in our hands till they mouldered, they would only have involved additional charges for storage, care and maintenance.

Although intervention failed, there remained two results of our persistency. The first is moral. We can at any rate say that the Russian forces who were loyal to the Allies were not left without the means of self-defence. There were placed in their hands weapons which, had they been a society of higher quality and with greater comprehension of their cause and of their own countrymen, might have enabled them to conquer.

Here, too, the exploits of the Czechs afford a measure of what was possible in these times in Russia. At least it can be said that the National Russians did not perish for want of arms. It was not the want of material means, but of comradeship, will-power and rugged steadfastness that lost the struggle. Bravery and devotion shone in individuals, ruthlessness was never absent; but the qualities which enable scores of thousands of men to combine and to act for a common purpose even when isolated, were not to be found in the wreckage of the Empire of the Czars. The Ironsides who charged at Marston Moor, the Grenadiers who escorted Napoleon back from Elba, the Red-shirts of Garibaldi and the Black-shirts of Mussolini, were held by widely different moral and mental themes. But in them all there burned a flame. There were only sparks in Russia.

An Advantage.

But there was also a more practical result of intervention. The Bolsheviks were absorbed during the whole of 1919 in the conflicts with Koltchak and Denikin. Their energy was turned upon the internal struggle. A breathing space of inestimable importance was afforded to the whole line of newly liberated countries which stood along the western borders of Russia. Koltchak and Denikin, and those who followed them, are dead or scattered. Russia has been frozen in an indefinite winter of sub-human doctrine and superhuman tyranny. But Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and above all Poland, were able during 1919 to establish the structure of civilized States and to organize the strength of patriotic armies. By the end of 1920 the "Sanitary Cordon" which protected Europe from the Bolshevik infection was formed by living national organisms vigorous in themselves, hostile to the disease and immune through experience against its ravages. In this same period also there first began among the Socialists of France, Great Britain and Italy those disillusionments which have steadily developed into the strong repulsions of the present day.

Photo: E.N.A.

THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT RIGA.

The historic meeting between the Poles and the Bolsheviks at Riga, in October, 1920, at which a Peace Treaty was signed, which secured the independence of Poland and her means of self-defence against Russian invasion. The Polish delegates are on the right of the table, those of Russia on the left.

CHAPTER XCII

THE IRISH SPECTRE

eheu, cicatricum et sceleris pudet fratrumque.
quid nos dura refugimus
aetas ? quid intactum nefasti
liquimus ? unde manum iuventus
metu deorum continuit ? quibus pepercit
aris ?

HORACE, *Odes* I, 35.

O wounds that scarce have ceased to run !
O brothers' blood ! O iron time !
What horror have we left undone ?
Has conscience shrunk from aught of crime ?
What shrine has rapine held in awe ?
What altar spared ?

CONINGTON.

Changing Proportions—The Irish at Westminster—Ireland at the Outbreak of War—The Conscription Question—The Sinn Fein Members—Their Merciful Boycott—The Beginning of Irish Disorder—The New Home Rule Bill—Its Decisive Importance—The Black and Tans—The Military View—Authorized Reprisals—The Prime Minister's Attitude—Cabinet Divergencies—The Craig-De Valera Interview—Sir Nevil Macready's Report—The King's Speech in Ulster—The Response—A Grave Decision—The Truce—Prolonged Negotiations—Within the Dail—The Irish Conference—Stresses in the Unionist Party—Political Tension—Resignation Inadmissible—Acid Hatreds—The Ultimatum—The Agreement Signed—Lloyd George and Ireland.

INTEGRAL communities, like living things, are dominated by the instinct of self-preservation. This principle is expressed in each generation by moral, logical, or sentimental arguments which acquire the authority of doctrine. Children are taught the doctrines which their parents have found useful and which probably were useful in their day. Therefore, the beliefs linger after their need has passed.

But though it is not always apparent at the time, in fact at every stage we rely upon the weapons and lessons of a bygone war. The underlying needs are always changing at varying rates and at uneven intervals. Some large outside shock is necessary from time to time to force a revision of the data and a readjustment of the proportion.

Changing Proportions.

The relations of Britain and Ireland were established during centuries when the independence of a hostile Ireland menaced the life of Britain. Every policy, every shift, every oppression used by the stronger island arose from this primordial fact. In the twentieth century it was a fact no longer. When Britain, counting twelve millions, was sandwiched between a France—for a thousand years her hereditary foe and potential invader—of twenty millions on the one hand, and a hostile Ireland of seven millions on the other, the anxieties of these twelve millions may be pardoned and the resulting measures understood. But when France had been far outnumbered by a united Germany, also her secular antagonist; when Ireland had sunk to four and a quarter millions — without Ulster to three; and when Britain, apart from her Empire, had risen to forty-three millions, the situation was transformed.

Meanwhile, however, Parties with their organized structures, interests, prejudices, and passions persisted on the old basis and judged and fought as their fathers had done before them. The shock and overturn of the world war enforced the realization of the altered statistical scale.

Two other factors, practical and material in character, were also at work. The first was financial. For many years before the war the taxes collected from Ireland were substantially less than the public moneys expended in Ireland by the Exchequer of the United Kingdom.

Ireland was, in fact, continuously a financial gainer from the fact of a joint exchequer. But when, under the undreamed-of expenses of the war and the debts piled up beyond previous imagination, the taxes for Imperial purposes rose out of any relation to the expenses of Irish local administration, the flow of public money from the joint exchequer was no longer westward to the far smaller and poorer island.

The Irish at Westminster.

The second new factor was not less practical. By the Act of Union Ireland was entitled to send 103 members to the Imperial Parliament. The astonishing changes in the relative populations during the nineteenth century had not affected this quota. The Irish contended that the figure had been fixed by Treaty, and the British with continual grumblings acquiesced in the claim. There were, therefore, always at the centre of Imperial Government at least eighty Members of Parliament who boasted that they cared nothing for Britain and her institutions; that England's difficulty was Ireland's opportunity; that they would take all they could extort by parliamentary pressure and would give nothing in return; that they would throw their weight mechanically disciplined upon the side of every subversive movement at home and of every foreign antagonism. By such-like declarations the Irish Nationalist Party, at least from Parnell to the Great War, maintained their ascendancy over the forces of actual rebellion and assassination in Ireland.

Photo: Topical Press.

ARTHUR GRIFFITH.

The stormy period through which Ireland has so recently passed brought into prominence a group of men whose names will not soon be forgotten. Like many another in the story of these islands, they stood for a principle which to them meant everything, a principle for which they were prepared to fight, and if needs be, to die. In the years to come, when history pronounces its verdict upon them, neither their bravery nor their sufferings will be forgotten. One of the most notable among the Irish leaders was Arthur Griffith, first President of the Irish Free State. Born in Dublin in 1872, the son of a printer, Griffith followed his father's calling, but later devoted himself to journalism connected with the movement which, many years before the Great War, was paving the way for that which came to a head in 1916. An able and an upright man, Griffith died in Dublin, August 12, 1922.

However, in practice (such is the emollient influence of parliamentary and democratic institutions) the anti-British doctrines of the Irish Nationalist Party were sensibly modified. If they wrecked the ancient free procedure of the House of Commons by obstruction and disorder, they nevertheless adorned and enlivened its debates. If they declared themselves the sworn foes of British institutions, they played a noteworthy part in the carrying in good time of many of the reforms which were essential to the growth of British social life, and through which these very institutions preserved their perennial vitality. When Irish Nationalist members denounced the jingo character of the South African War, they

were none the less thrilled by the gallant conduct of the Irish regiments. Irish manhood enlisted freely, and Irish leaders comforted themselves in their hearts by remembering that after all it was only a small war, and that they could splash about boisterously without endangering the safety of the whole concern.

Ireland at the Outbreak of War.

The deluge of Armageddon swept away all these minor defences and small ways of carrying on. August 4, 1914, stirred the vast majority of the Irish people to its depths with a generous sentiment. The heart of Ireland did not beat with the same rhythm as that of Britain, but the moral and intellectual decision was the same in both islands. The British nation should never forget, and history will deeply mark the surge of comradeship with the whole British Empire and with the Allies which the news of the invasion of Belgium and the British declaration of war evoked from the mass of the Irish people. Mr. John Redmond, with the assent and in the name of the whole Nationalist Party, pledged Ireland to the conflict in words of noble eloquence. The Irish Members voted the war credits and the taxation they entailed. The quarrels of North and South faded in the glare of the struggle, and throughout the green island Catholics and Protestants alike hastened to the recruiting offices.

Now was the time to strike while the iron was hot. Now was the moment to confer upon Ireland the Constitutional Home Rule she had so long desired. A separate but subordinate Parliament for Ulster could then have been agreed to as a mere incident in the wide and solemn troth plighted among all the peoples of the Empire when for the first time they formed a common line of battle. Such an achievement was not permitted to the Government, nor indeed can we declare it to have been practicable. Few foresaw the long years of jeopardy that lay ahead of us all. All eyes were upon the battlefield. The Liberal Government insisted upon placing the Home Rule Bill upon the Statute Book, but a suspensory clause postponed its application until after the war. Even this was gravely resented by some of those statesmen who afterwards, in circumstances incomparably more disagreeable, signed the Irish Treaty in 1921.

Photo: Topical Press.

EAMON DE VALERA.

Whether in power or in opposition, Eamon de Valera has for many years been, perhaps, the outstanding figure in the political sphere of the Irish Free State. Born in New York, on October 14, 1882, de Valera is responsible for much that has happened in Ireland in recent times. The day has not dawned when any judgment can be passed upon his work for Ireland. That work, whether it be for weal or for woe, is not yet done.

Photo : Central News.

SINN FEIN CONGRESS IN DUBLIN, 1919.

On January 15, 1919, the Sinn Fein Congress met in Dublin and read a Declaration of Independence. A week later, on January 21, a Republican Parliament assembled at the Dublin Mansion House and elected a Cabinet. Although stormy times still lay ahead of Ireland, this meeting was the first open step towards orderly government.

In the building up of the Irish Army other important opportunities were foregone. Irish nationalism sought—and surely it was natural—to emphasize in every way the distinctive Irish characteristics of the swiftly forming battalions and brigades. Banners, badges, uniforms, watchwords of national significance were everywhere in the south of Ireland objects of keen desire, and a bolder indulgence of this wish would have fostered alike recruiting and good will.

Lord Kitchener saw these manifestations from a different angle, and no one can deny the substance behind his misgivings. The history of 1798 stared him in the face, and, born in Ireland himself, he could feel no assurance that Irish armies raised for one purpose might not be used for another. Beneath him the War Office drew its stiff routine, and much native enthusiasm was affronted or even frozen. Old misunderstandings and imperfect sympathies resumed their sway as the war ploughed heavily onward and its excitements evaporated. The forces of hate in Ireland began to regain their control of the national mind ; and with them the desire of youth to dare and suffer—but for something else. There followed the tragedy of Easter week 1916. The attempted German assistance, the mad revolt, the swift repression, the executions, few but corroding. Well was it said, " The grass soon grows over a battlefield but never over a scaffold." The position of the Irish Parliamentary Party was fatally undermined. The keys of Ireland passed into the keeping of those to whom hatred of England was the dominant and almost the only interest.

The Conscription Question.

It was not till this melancholy pass was reached that earnest efforts were made by the Irish national leaders, by Sir

Edward Carson and by the British Government, then a Coalition, to reach a settlement between the two parts of Ireland and between Ireland and Great Britain. The Conferences failed not perhaps by so very much. All this time the Irish divisions fought with traditional bravery wherever the war led them. Voluntary recruitment failed to supply their losses. The war deepened and darkened. With every year the contending nations raised their stakes; voluntary service gave place throughout Great Britain to compulsion. Canada and New Zealand passed Conscription Acts. The United States, coming late into the war, sought to hurl her whole military population by rigorous law into the welter. Finally, boys of eighteen and men of forty-five and even fifty, fathers of families and only sons of widows in Great Britain were taken for active service. "Why," it was sternly asked, "should Ireland remain a favoured area full of men in their martial prime?"

The question of Irish Conscription was handled in such a fashion during 1918 that we had the worst of both worlds, all the resentment against compulsion, and in the end no law and no men. The English demand for compulsory service in Ireland spread disaffection through the whole Irish people. Sixty thousand Irish soldiers were serving at the front, but 60,000 British troops were simultaneously garrisoning Ireland, and on the balance our resources were not increased.

The Sinn Fein Members.

The victory brought no joy to Southern Ireland. The thoughts of its people were now entirely centred upon their own affairs. At the election of 1918 all who had supported the cause of the Allies were swept away. The Nationalist Party, which had represented the Irish democracy for sixty years, vanished overnight. In their place were elected eighty Sinn Fein Members, entirely ignorant of and unaffected by all those assimilating processes which under the peace-time surface of wordy and voting hostility had in fact produced a great body of latent sympathy and comprehension. Here was the old atavistic hatred, pristine and unassuaged. These were the men of single and local purpose, intellectually at any rate reckless of consequences to themselves or to larger interests. Here was the spirit of the Easter rebellion embodied in eighty members of the House of Commons. There were some Parliaments in Europe before the war, there are perhaps some to-day, which present this frightful discordance of a minority.

The Parliament which met in January, 1919, was, as has been shown, in its composition overwhelmingly Conservative. The pressure of eighty deadly foes might have destroyed its debates or even have led to violence in the Chamber itself, but it could not have impeded or changed the march of events. But other Parliaments lay ahead. Any thoughtful man looking to the future must count on Parliaments in which British parties would be in equipoise, and when the balance would be turned against the main well-being of the State by an implacable minority. The franchise had been extended almost to the widest limits. The anti-German passion which the electors had carried to such unreasonable excess would swiftly fade. In its decline, all those forces which work the undoing of states and civilizations were reviving. Within four years, in fact, a Parliament was to come into being in which eighty Sinn Fein members would almost have given an absolute majority to an inchoate, half-organized and less than half-instructed Socialist Party. For a long time in our Parliamentary life and party electioneering, there would be gnawing at the very vitals of the Empire an untamed, untutored, band of haters, carrying into English public life a malignity unknown for generations—even for centuries.

Their Merciful Boycott.

Mercifully the Sinn Feiners themselves spared us these squalid-tragic experiences. Their own sense of what was due to Ireland led them to scorn the execrable function of baffling and distracting the British realm. Without hesitation and following a Magyar example, the Sinn Fein members renounced all representation in the House of

Commons. Not for a moment did they weigh or value the immense influence and leverage they could exert, for ill or for good, upon the decisive affairs of the British Empire. "Sinn Fein," "Ourselves alone," that was the cry, and by an act of self-abnegation, remarkable even when born of hatred, they cut themselves off for ever from an inheritance in the House of Commons which, though invidious, was in a worldly sense inestimable. The two supreme services which Ireland has rendered Britain are her accession to the Allied cause on the outbreak of the Great War, and her withdrawal from the House of Commons at its close.

The reader, prepared by these general but by no means exhaustive observations, must now be recalled to the current of events.

On January 15, 1919, the Sinn Fein Congress met in Dublin and read a Declaration of Independence. On the 21st a Republican Parliament met at the Dublin Mansion House and elected a Cabinet. When on February 4 the new House of Commons assembled at Westminster, scarcely any representatives of Ireland, except from Ulster, were present. So much was going on all over the world and our own affairs pressed upon us so importunately, that the significance of these demonstrations was hardly noticed. Bringing home the army, the reconstruction of peace-time industry, the resumption of civil life, the Peace Conference, the eventual Treaty, and the vast confusion of Europe, completely absorbed the thought and energy of the new administration. The scale and speed of world history had to fall by sharp and continuous gradations before the fact that Ireland still existed rose again in British minds. But as the tumult of the whole world gradually and spasmodically subsided with many reverberations, Southern Ireland was perceived to be crying aloud in a strange voice, and the words she cried were presently understood to be "Independence or Murder."

The Beginning of Irish Disorder.

During the summer and autumn of 1919 occasional but nationally-conceived murders began to be perpetrated upon the humble agents of the British Crown in Ireland, and by the end of the year an organized campaign of assassinations of magistrates, of police and of soldiers, when found in twos and threes, developed progressively through the three provinces of Southern Ireland. The policy of these outrages was not discountenanced by the Sinn Fein Parliament, but the actual work was done by the secret societies called the "Irish Republican Army" and the "Irish Republican Brotherhood."

The form of warfare was repulsive. A constable on his beat in the streets of a town or village is asked some casual question like "What is the time?" As he takes out his watch to give the information, he is shot dead. The perpetrator, although seen by dozens of persons, walks off unpursued, and no one will give evidence against him. Or again, British soldiers returning from Mass are suddenly fired upon from behind a hedge and three or four are shot down. As the year advanced these murders grew in number and in scale. They culminated in a determined attempt on December 19 to murder Lord French. The Viceroy's motor car was held up by gunmen and received several volleys of pistol shots. Lord French himself was uninjured; one of the assailants was killed and one of the escort was wounded. All was, however, on a fairly petty scale. Between May and December, 1919, there were about 1,500 political offences, including 18 murders and 77 armed attacks.

Under the pressure of these events Dublin Castle decided in August to proclaim the suppression of Sinn Fein, and in September they banned its Parliament. In December leading Sinn Feiners were arrested and deported, and the *Freeman's Journal* was prohibited. These modest counter-measures were attended only by increasing disorder. The troops and the police bore the strain of the assassinations, for which, of course, hardly anyone was brought to justice, with exemplary patience for a long time. But at length their distress and indignation led them to take the law into their own hands. Soldiers,

Photo: Daily Mirror.

AFTER THE ASSAULT: THE VICEROY'S CAR.

Even after the assembly of the Sinn Fein Parliament, secret societies, such as the "Irish Republican Army" and the "Irish Republican Brotherhood," continued to prosecute a campaign of assassination directed against the officers of the Crown. The most ambitious enterprise attempted was the murder of Lord French. Happily this affair resulted in failure. The Viceroy was untouched but the bullet mark shown in the photograph reproduced above emphasises the deadly nature of the attack.

whose comrades had been murdered, wrecked the shops and dwellings of persons in the neighbourhood of the crime, and the police began here and there unauthorized reprisals upon suspected persons. Large numbers of people in England, themselves exposed to no danger, were sincerely shocked by such undisciplined conduct. However, it will always be very difficult to persuade armed bodies of men to endure with impassive good humour for any long period being hunted down and murdered one by one. Reinforcements were sent to Ireland and the Constabulary were largely increased. The unauthorized reprisals grew with the increasing provocation.

The New Home Rule Bill.

Meanwhile the British Cabinet had, in September, 1919, decided to introduce a Home Rule Bill. This measure was designed to replace the famous Home Rule Act which had received the Royal Assent but was indefinitely suspended. The Government of Ireland Bill of 1920 was a considerable measure. It gave real and important powers of self-government to Ireland. It came with the authority of a Government and a Parliament based upon an overwhelming Conservative and Unionist majority. Life-long opponents to Home Rule like Mr. Walter Long, who had become a Coalition Minister, sponsored the Bill. He could do this because separate Legislatures were proposed for North and South, and because the matters reserved to be dealt with by the Council of Ireland were of a non-controversial character. Irish representation at Westminster was materially reduced.

After prolonged debates this Bill

received the Royal Assent in December, 1920. It was accepted under bitter protest by the Protestant North. They bowed to the decision of the Imperial Parliament. They used their option to contract out of the Dublin Parliament and set up their own Legislature and Government as prescribed by the Act. Had the powers of this measure been accepted and exercised in a reasonable and friendly spirit by the dominant elements in Southern Ireland there is little doubt that the Irish Nationalist grievance would have been substantially met, and certainly Ireland—escaping a long and painful ordeal—would to-day be more prosperous, more influential and more united. No doubt there had been many occasions since 1886 when such a measure, if it could have been presented by a Conservative Government, would have been accepted with good will. In 1920 it was simply ignored by the ruling Sinn Fein organizations. They refused to put it into operation in Southern Ireland, and the campaign of disorder and systematized murder continued to grow.

Its Decisive Importance.

Nevertheless the Bill of 1920 was a decisive turning-point in the history of the two islands. In important respects it was tantamount to the repeal of the Act of Union after 120 years of friction. As such it profoundly affected the Unionist Party, whose very name lost its meaning. It had a more practical and irrevocable importance. Ulster, or rather its six predominantly Protestant counties, became a separate entity clothed with constitutional form, possessing all the organs of government and administration, including police and the capacity of self-defence for the purposes of internal order.

From that moment the position of Ulster became unassailable. It could never again be said that Ulster Protestants barred the aspirations of their Southern fellow countrymen. They had indeed on the contrary acquiesced in a large disturbance of their own foundations and by their compliance with the decision of the Imperial Parliament exposed themselves to poignant reproaches from the Unionists of Southern Ireland. Every argument of self-determination ranged itself henceforward upon their side. Never again could any British Party contemplate putting pressure upon them to part with the Constitution they had reluctantly accepted. They were masters in their own house, and small though it might be, it was morally and logically founded upon a rock. The Act of 1920 ended for ever this phase of the Irish Problem.

During the whole of 1920 the murder campaign grew and spread in Ireland. The scale of the outrages increased. In one ambush fifteen out of seventeen auxiliary police were killed. On a November morning fourteen officers, believed by the rebels to be engaged in Intelligence work, were shot, unarmed, several in the presence of their wives, in their billets in Dublin. The faithful recital of these deeds would fill a chapter. They must not further darken these pages.

The Black and Tans.

In the same period considerable measures were taken by the British Government. Large numbers of additional troops were sent to Ireland. Armoured cars and motor-cars, forces of police and military were organized upon an important scale, and a special police force was formed entirely of ex-officers and from the wartime armies. These special police, who ultimately amounted to 7,000 men, were nicknamed on account of their dark cap and khaki uniform the " Black and Tans."

It has become customary to lavish abuse upon the Black and Tans and to treat them as a mob of bravos and terrorists suddenly let loose upon the fair pastures of Ireland. In fact, however, they were selected from a great press of applicants on account of their intelligence, their characters and their records in the war. Originally they were intended to supplement the hard-pressed Royal Irish Constabulary; but in grappling with murder they developed within themselves a very strong counter-terrorist activity. They acted with much the same freedom as the Chicago or New York police permit themselves

in dealing with armed gangs. When any of their own men or police or military comrades were murdered they "beat up" the haunts of well-known malignants, or those whom they conceived to be malignants, and sharply challenged suspected persons at the pistol's point. Obviously there can be no defence for such conduct except the kind of attack to which it was a reply.

Liberals who had always supported Home Rule were on strong ground when they dwelt upon the consequences of its denial. They were reinforced by another school of thought which had much less justice or logic behind it. A certain number of high Tories, while rigidly opposing any effective concession to Irish Nationalist demands, were still more violent in their denunciations of the Black and Tans. They demanded that the Government should strictly and inflexibly maintain order by the regular processes of law, and that it should punish unsparingly any of its agents who, no matter what the provocation, departed a hair's breadth from the orthodox procedure of a civilized state in time of peace. "Maintain the Union," they cried, "and do not give way to violence. Adhere with circumspection to the law of the land. Detect and arrest the criminals and bring them to justice before the Courts." This was easy to prescribe but impossible to perform. Where no witnesses would give evidence or could give it only at the peril of their lives, where no juries would convict, the ordinary processes of law were non-existent.

The Military View.

From another angle the military authorities contributed unhelpful counsel. Headed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, they demanded incessantly universal martial law throughout Southern Ireland. How this would have solved the problem was never explained. These military authorities were vehement in repudiating any suggestion of counter-terrorism. They contented themselves with vague assertions that putting rebellious Ireland under martial law "would show that the Government was in earnest."

I never received during my tenure of the War Office any practical or useful advice on this subject from these quarters. My military advisers also naturally complained continuously of the strain on the troops, the bulk of them post-war recruits, in having to live month after month in the constant expectation of being murdered by some apparently inoffensive member of the civil population. They dwelt with insistence, both in my time and in that of my successor, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, on the urgent need of reinforcing the army in Ireland and simultaneously relieving the bulk of the existing garrison. By an occult and unstudied combination between the opinions of the Tory legalists and those of the military martial law men—martial law being no law—the decision was induced and announced in Parliament that "authorized reprisals" such as would have ruled in a war zone, and these only, should be adopted. All unauthorized action on the part of the police or the special police was to be repressed with rigour.

This resolve came with great relief to the Irish secret societies. To do them justice, they were almost the only people in the whole world who were not shocked by the activities of the Black and Tans. They thought it fair that their own measure should be meted out to them. By the end of 1920 they found themselves extremely hard pressed by the activities of the Black and Tans, who, with increasing information and ruthlessness, were striking down in the darkness those who struck from the darkness. Mr. Lloyd George went so far as to say at the Guildhall Banquet on November 9, "We have murder by the throat."

Authorized Reprisals.

The policy of "authorized reprisals" came into force on New Year's Day 1921. It speedily proved far less effective than the rough and ready measures of the special police. On the morrow of an outrage the military sallied forth in a brigade to burn a cottage; in the night the Sinn Feiners padded out and burnt a country house.

Meanwhile, the actual power of the

British forces to go wherever they wished and do whatever they thought proper never encountered appreciable opposition. Sweeps were made by cavalry and motor-cars on 30- or 40-mile fronts, and every male taken into the net was meticulously examined, often without a single person being found accountable. And perhaps that same night an audacious murder took place on the very ground so thoroughly scoured.

It was clear by the early summer of 1921 that Britain was at the parting of the ways. It would have been quite easy to quell the odious and shameful form of warfare by which we were assailed and into which we were being increasingly drawn, by using the ruthlessness which the Russian Communists adopt towards their fellow-countrymen. The arrest of large numbers of persons believed by the police to be in sympathy with the rebels and summary execution of four or five of these hostages (many of whom must certainly have been innocent) for every life taken of a Government servant, might have been a remedy at once sombre and efficacious. It was a course of which the British people in the hour of their deliverance were utterly incapable. Public opinion recoiled with anger and irritation even from the partial measures into which our agents had been gradually drawn. The choice was by now clearly open: "Crush them with iron and unstinted force, or try to give them what they want." These were the only alternatives, and though each had ardent advocates, most people were unprepared for either.

Here indeed was the Irish Spectre—horrid and inexorcizable!

* * * *

No British Government in modern times has ever appeared to make so complete and sudden a reversal of policy as that which ensued. In May the whole power of the State and all the influence of the Coalition were used to "hunt down the murder gang": in June the goal was "a lasting reconciliation with the Irish people." The vivid contrast between these two extremes might well furnish a theme of mockery to superficial judgment. Actually, however, there were only two courses: war with the utmost violence or peace with the utmost patience. Vast argument could be deployed for either course, but nothing in sense or mercy could excuse weak compromises between the two. In ordinary domestic politics these sharp dichotomies are usually inapplicable; but when the sword is bared and the pistol pointed, and blood flows and homes are laid waste, it ought to be one thing or the other.

The Prime Minister's Attitude.

The legend has obtained some credence that this diametrical change of policy arose from a waning nerve power in the Prime Minister. For instance, Sir Nevil Macready has suggested in his published memoirs that he found Mr. Lloyd George concerned about his personal safety. Such insinuations are contrary to fact. Up till the summer of 1921 no one was more resolute or ready to be more ruthless against the Irish rebellion than Mr. Lloyd George. He had constantly to measure the British political situation. This required as a prelude to any form of Home Rule, first the security of Ulster and secondly a clear victory over the gunmen. The first condition was broadly satisfied by the 1920 Act: the second was certainly not yet attained. What then were the causes and incidents which induced him to abandon his policy of repression before it was effective? I shall set them out as I measured them at the time.

Cabinet Divergencies.

By April, 1921, the Irish problem had become the main preoccupation of the Government. The Prime Minister showed himself markedly disposed to fight the matter out at all costs, and to rely for this purpose upon "the age-long loyalties of the Conservative Party." The Cabinet were at one with him in this. Upon the method, however, there were two distinct opinions. It was evident to all Ministers that efforts to restore order in Ireland must be made during the rest of the year upon an extraordinary scale. A hundred thousand new special

troops and police must be raised; thousands of motor-cars must be armoured and equipped; the three Southern Provinces of Ireland must be closely laced with cordons of block-houses and barbed wire; a systematic rummaging and questioning of every individual must be put in force. In order to paralyse the activities of a few thousand persons the entire population must when required be made to account for every hour of their time. There was no physical bar to accomplishing all this. It was a matter of men and money, and both would have been supplied in ample measure by a Parliament which still had three years of constitutional life. These were the kind of projects which came bluntly into view.

Some Ministers, of whom I was one, while ready to undertake the responsibilities and to share the exertions which such a policy involved, held that these drastic processes should be accompanied by the offer of the widest possible measure of self-government to Southern Ireland. "Let us," they said, "lay aside every impediment; let us make it clear that the Irish people are being forced by Sinn Fein to fight not for Home Rule, but for separation; not for an Irish Parliament under the Crown, but for a revolutionary Republic." An impressive debate in Cabinet took place upon this issue. Personally I wished to see the Irish confronted on the one hand with the realization of all that they had asked for, and of all that Gladstone had striven for, and upon the other with the most unlimited exercise of rough-handed

Photo: Topical Press.

THE CASTLE GUARD, DUBLIN, 1921.

Such outrages as that directed against Lord French, together with many others, forced the British Government to take strong measures for the preservation of order. All buildings held on behalf of the Crown were kept under guard and a special force of police was formed from ex-officers and others with service in the war-time armies. This body, soon to be known as the "Black and Tans," composed as it was of men of proved initiative and courage, speedily attained a reputation for the ability displayed by its members in dealing with the Irish terrorists on their own ground and by methods equally uncompromising.

force. I was therefore on the side of those who wished to couple a tremendous onslaught with the fairest offer. It will be sufficient to say that the division of opinion was almost evenly balanced, but that weight, apart from numbers, inclined to those who preferred the dual policy.

The Prime Minister was astonished and indeed startled to find how many Conservatives adhered to this more complicated course. I could see that he was profoundly impressed both by the argument and by the authority behind it. On the question being put "Would you then allow a Dublin Parliament like any other Dominion to levy a tariff against British goods?" the answer was fiercely made, "How can this petty matter be weighed against the grievous action we are preparing?" As usual when there is a deep and honest division in a Cabinet united on main issues, nothing was settled at the moment and everyone went home to chew the cud. I must record my opinion that Mr. Lloyd George reached the conclusion that a policy of unmitigated repression in Ireland would not command wholehearted support even among the Conservatives.

The Craig-De Valera Interview.

The Prime Minister had on several occasions in the name of the Cabinet offered to negotiate for a settlement, provided the Irish rebels were prepared to accept the Crown and the Imperial connection. Renewed efforts were now made to establish contact. In May of 1921 Lord FitzAlan, one of the leaders of the English Catholics, succeeded Lord French as Viceroy. Devotion to public duty alone inspired him to undertake so melancholy a task. Three days later, Sir James Craig, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, at the request of Mr. Lloyd George, met Mr. de Valera in his hiding-place. This meeting, which had been the subject of considerable previous negotiation, was certainly a remarkable episode. The Ulster leader, representative of all that had stood against Home Rule, was conducted by the Sinn Fein gunmen through long devious and secret routes to the headquarters of the leader of the Irish rebellion. His robust outlook and single-minded sense of duty to the well-being of the Empire, joined to disdain of personal risks, capital or political, led Sir James Craig to undertake this mission.

His conversations with the Sinn Fein leader were abortive. At the end of four hours Mr. de Valera's recital of Irish grievances had only reached the iniquities of Poynings' Act in the days of Henry VII.

There were by that time various reasonable excuses for terminating not a discussion, but a lecture. Sir James Craig placed himself again in the hands of his guides and was motored circuitously and erratically back to Dublin. They were three in the little car rattling and bumping over the ill-kept roads—two Sinn Feiners whose lives were probably forfeit, and the Prime Minister of Orange Ulster. Suddenly behind them arrived an armoured lorry filled with Black and Tans. Although Sir James Craig's conductors were not particularly anxious to be scrutinized at close quarters, they judged it prudent to let it pass them. The heavy vehicle ran by within a foot of the little car. When, after inquisitively continuing level for some time, it finally drew ahead and rumbled on, the three Irishmen so differently circumstanced exchanged glances of perfect comprehension.

Although the actual Craig-de Valera conversations were barren, a rope had been flung across the chasm. From that moment British Government agents in Ireland were upon occasion, through one channel or another, in touch with the Sinn Fein Headquarters.

Sir Nevil Macready's Report.

At the end of May Sir Nevil Macready presented a pessimistic report upon the state of Ireland. "While," he said, "I am of opinion that the troops at present in Ireland may be depended upon to continue to do their best under present circumstances through this summer, I am convinced that by October, unless a peaceful solution has been reached, it will not be safe to ask the troops to continue there another winter

under the conditions which obtained there during the last. Not only the men for the sake of their morale and training should be removed out of the 'Irish atmosphere,' but by that time there will be many officers who, although they may not confess it, will in my opinion be quite unfit to continue to serve in Ireland without a release for a very considerable period. . . . Unless I am entirely mistaken, the present state of affairs in Ireland, so far as regards the troops serving there, must be brought to a conclusion by October, or steps must be taken to relieve practically the whole of the troops together with the great majority of the commanders and their staff."

This report was endorsed by Sir Henry Wilson. There could, of course, be no question of giving effect to it. These despairing counsels were not justified by the facts; nor in any case was there any possibility of relief. Not relief, but reinforcement on a large scale—all the old forces with new forces added—was the obvious step; and this, though costly and troublesome, was quite practicable. Still, while the Cabinet did not accept, they were bound to weigh these sweeping and alarmist assertions of the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, endorsed, as they were, by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Photo: Topical Press.

SIR JAMES CRAIG.

A compensating factor in the Irish troubles was the unswerving loyalty of the northern counties. The devotion of the people of Ulster was rewarded by their possession of a leader of the first order. Sir James Craig, at one time member for East Down in the Imperial Parliament, became, in 1921, the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. Throughout the long period of difficulty and danger, dating from before the Great War, during which the liberty of the northern counties was frequently threatened, Sir James Craig held unswervingly to a policy of adherence to the Crown and to inclusion in the British Commonwealth of Nations. He was created a Viscount on January 20, 1927.

The King's Speech in Ulster.

All these pressures and tendencies might have remained subliminal but for the spark of an event. On June 22 the first Parliament of Northern Ireland was to be inaugurated by the King in person. It would not have been right for Ministers to put in the mouth of the Sovereign words which could only appeal to the people of Northern Ireland. It is well known that the King, acting in harmony not only with the letter but with the spirit of the Constitution, earnestly expressed the wish that language should be used which would appeal to the whole of his Irish subjects, South as well as

North, Green as well as Orange. The outlook of the Sovereign, lifted high above the strife of Party, above the clash of races and religions, and sectional divergencies of view, necessarily and naturally comprised the general interest of the Empire as a whole—and nothing narrower. The Prime Minister and leading Members of the Government therefore took the responsibility which rested with them, and with them alone, of inserting in the Royal Speech what was in effect a sincere appeal for a common effort to end the odious and disastrous conflict.

"The eyes of the whole Empire," said the King with evident emotion, "are on Ireland to-day—that Empire in which so many nations and races have come together in spite of ancient feuds, and in which new nations have come to birth within the lifetime of the youngest in this Hall. I am emboldened by that thought to look beyond the sorrow and the anxiety which have clouded of late My vision of Irish affairs. I speak from a full heart when I pray that My coming to Ireland to-day may prove to be the first step towards an end of strife amongst her people, whatever their race or creed.

"In that hope I appeal to all Irishmen to pause, to stretch out the hand of forbearance and conciliation, to forgive and to forget, and to join in making for the land which they love a new era of peace, contentment, and goodwill. It is My earnest desire that in Southern Ireland too there may ere long take place a parallel to what is now passing in this Hall; that there a similar occasion may present itself and a similar ceremony be performed.

"For this the Parliament of the United Kingdom has in the fullest measure provided the powers; for this the Parliament of Ulster is pointing the way. The future lies in the hands of My Irish people themselves. May this historic gathering be the prelude of a day in which the Irish people, North and South, under one Parliament or two, as those Parliaments may themselves decide, shall work together in common love for Ireland upon the sure foundation of mutual justice and respect."

The Response.

No one responsible for the King's speech had contemplated immediate results in action. But in such declarations everything depends upon the sounding-board. The King-Emperor, the embodiment of the common inheritance, discharging his constitutional duty at the peril of his life, had struck a note which rang and reverberated, and which all ears were attuned to hear. The response of public opinion in both islands to that appeal was instant, deep, and widespread, and from that moment events moved forward in unbroken progression to the establishment of the Irish Free State. On June 24 Mr. Lloyd George invited Sir James Craig and Mr. de Valera to a conference in London. On July 11 the invitations were accepted, and a truce, the terms of which had been settled on the 9th, was proclaimed.

No act of British State policy in which I have been concerned aroused more violently conflicting emotions than the Irish Settlement. For a system of human government so vast and so variously composed as the British Empire to compact with open rebellion in the peculiar form in which it was developed in Ireland, was an event which might well have shaken to its foundations that authority upon which the peace and order of hundreds of millions of people of many races and communities were erected. Servants of the Crown in the faithful performance of their duty had been and were being cruelly murdered as a feature in a deliberately adopted method of warfare. It was only possible to say of those responsible for these acts that they were not actuated by selfish or sordid motives; that they were ready to lay down their own lives; and that in the main they were supported by the sentiment of their fellow-countrymen. To receive the leaders of such men at the Council Board, and to attempt to form through their agency the government of a civilized state, must be regarded as one of the most questionable and hazardous experiments upon which a great empire in the plenitude of its power had ever embarked.

Photo: Central News.

OPENING OF THE FIRST ULSTER PARLIAMENT.

On June 22, 1921, H.M. The King, accompanied by The Queen, opened the first Parliament of Northern Ireland at Belfast. On that occasion the King's speech contained an appeal to the people of the South in which the hope was expressed that in Southern Ireland a parallel might soon be drawn to what on that day was passing in Belfast.

A Grave Decision.

On the other hand stood the history of Ireland—an unending quarrel and mutual injuries done to each other by sister countries and close neighbours, generation after generation; and the earnest desire in Britain was to end this hateful feud. During the nineteenth century both England and Ireland had re-stated their cases in forms far superior to those of the dark times of the past. England had lavished remedial measures and conciliatory procedures upon Ireland; Ireland in the main had rested herself upon constitutional action to support her claim. It would have been possible in 1886 to have reached a solution on a basis infinitely less perilous both to Ireland and to Great Britain than that to which we were ultimately drawn. Said Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons before the fateful division on the Home Rule Bill, "Ireland stands at your bar expectant, hopeful, almost suppliant. Her words are words of truth and soberness. She asks a blessed oblivion of the past, and in that oblivion our interest is deeper even than hers. . . . Think, I beseech you—think well, think wisely; think not for the moment but for the years that are to come, before you reject this Bill."

And, after all, we were the victors in the greatest struggle of all time. We did not claim more than our true share in those supreme events, but it was sufficient to make us easy in our minds about a matter so comparatively small in a material sense as Ireland. No one, for instance, could say that the life of the Empire was in danger when every hostile force in the world, including armies of millions of soldiers had passed out of existence, when the German fleet lay at the bottom of Scapa Flow, and when every armed opponent was prostrate. No one could say we were a cowardly or decadent race. There may be no logical relevance for such thoughts, but they contributed an important factor to the national decision. And what was the alternative? It was to plunge one small corner of the Empire into an iron repression, which could not be carried through without an admixture of murder and counter-murder, terror and counter-terror. Only national self-preservation could have excused such a policy, and no reasonable man could allege that self-preservation was involved.

The Truce.

However, the die was now cast. A truce had been proclaimed. The gunmen emerged from their hiding places and strode the streets of Dublin as the leaders of a nation as old and as proud as our own. The troops and police and Black and Tans, but yesterday urged on to extirpate the murder gang, now stood relaxed and embarrassed while parleys on equal terms were in full swing. Impossible thereafter to resume the same kind of war! Impossible to refill or heat up again those cauldrons of hatred and contempt on which such quarrels are fed! Other courses remained at our disposal as a last resort. Ports and cities could be held; Dublin could be held; Ulster could be defended; all communication between Sinn Fein Ireland and the outer world could be severed; all trade between the two islands, that is to say the whole of Irish trade except from Ulster, could be stopped—at a price. But from the moment of the truce, the attempt to govern Southern Ireland upon the authority of the Imperial Parliament had come to an end.

Prolonged Negotiations.

It is no part of this tale to record, except in outline, the course of the negotiations or to recite the documents and records in which their public interchange was embodied. The opening contact was however notable. On July 14 the first of several interviews took place between Mr. de Valera and Mr. Lloyd George in the Cabinet Room at 10, Downing Street. Mr. de Valera had himself introduced with ceremony by "the representative of the Irish Republic in London" (Mr. Art O'Brien). The Prime Minister, never a greater artist than in the first moments of a fateful interview, received the Irish chieftain cordially as a brother Celt.

Mr. de Valera was guarded and formal. He presented a lengthy document in the Irish language, and then for convenience

a translation in English. The Prime Minister's literary curiosity was excited by its heading: "Saorstat Eireann." "Saorstat," he remarked, did not strike his ear as Irish. What was its literal translation? After a pause Mr. de Valera replied that literally it meant "Free State." "I see," said the Prime Minister, "Saorstat means Free State; then what is your Irish word for Republic?"

While the two Irishmen were discussing together in English what answer they should give to this innocent question, the Prime Minister turned to Professor Thomas Jones of the Cabinet Secretariat and conversed with him in Welsh to the evident discomfiture of his English-speaking Sinn Fein visitors. Eventually, as Mr. de Valera could get no further than that Saorstat meant Free State, the Prime Minister observed: "Must we not admit that the Celts never were Republicans and have no native word for such an idea?" A long embarrassed silence followed. This was the first move in a dialogue continued for many hours until, after an exhaustive survey of Irish history in ancient and mediæval times, it became clear that progress could only be made by the British Government tabling its own proposals.

These were handed to Mr. de Valera on July 20. They comprised complete Dominion Home Rule involving, of course, autonomous control of finance and taxation, of the police and the military. Six conditions were attached. Four dealt with the naval and military aspects; one prohibited protective duties between the two islands, and the last imposed upon Ireland a share to be fairly determined of the jointly contracted national debt. These proposals were rejected by Mr. de Valera, who proclaimed the principle of complete independence and repudiated the Crown. The Prime Minister in his replies made it plain that the British Government could discuss no settlement "which involves a refusal on the part of Ireland to accept our invitation to a free, equal, and loyal partnership in the British Commonwealth under one Sovereign."

The correspondence became lengthy and the difficulties no smaller. The Cabinet, at that time scattered in the holiday season, met on September 7 at Inverness. Two courses appeared to be open: to summon Mr. de Valera to a conference conditional on allegiance to the Crown; or to resume the unconditional parleys with him in the presence of other Irish representatives. The reply which was eventually settled asked whether Mr. de Valera was prepared to enter a conference to ascertain "how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire can best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations." If the answer was in the affirmative, a conference at Inverness was proposed for the 20th.

Within the Dail—
The Irish Conference.

On September 12, Mr. de Valera wrote accepting this invitation: but in his letter he stated:—

"Our nation has formally declared its independence and recognizes itself as a sovereign State. It is only as the representatives of that State as its chosen guardians that we have any authority or powers to act on behalf of our people."

On this the Prime Minister dismissed the two Irish emissaries who bore the message to his retreat at Gairloch, and cancelled the arrangements for the conference.

Nevertheless there was a well-founded feeling that neither side wished to see the whole parley break down, and the letters and telegrams continued to pass backwards and forwards perseveringly. Mr. de Valera would no doubt have gone on indefinitely fighting theoretical points without the slightest regard to the resultant misery and material ruin of his countrymen. But meanwhile, behind the tightly closed doors of the Dail, in almost continuous session at Dublin, and in the central conclaves of the Sinn Fein extremists, a definite and resolute movement of opinion grew up against him. Anarchy, stark, sheer and progressively degenerating might at any moment lay its talons upon Southern Ireland.

The genius of the Irish race has a soberly practical side, and men, with forces behind them, stood forth from the confusion, men whose melancholy credentials could not be impugned, but whose aims were sane and whose word was their bond. These men were determined not to throw away what had been gained. No whisper of these divisions in Sinn Fein had yet reached the outer air. But Mr. de Valera's reply to the Prime Minister's cancellation of the conference was appreciably more conciliatory. Eventually he explained that he and his friends had no thought of committing the British Government to any conditions as a prelude to a conference. They could not abandon their national position, but neither did they expect a similar surrender by the British Government. A treaty he suggested between Great Britain and Ireland would end the dispute for ever and enable the two nations, each pursuing its own development, to work together in free and friendly co-operation in affairs of common concern. He invited the Prime Minister to state whether the British Government was demanding a surrender of the Sinn Fein position as a preliminary to conference or whether the conference could open free on both sides.

The Cabinet Committee which met at Gairloch on September 21, in these circumstances, after reiterating their fundamental position, drafted a fresh invitation, sent on the 19th, to a conference in London on October 11 where they could meet the delegates of Sinn Fein "with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire might best be reconciled with Irish aspirations." This invitation, sufficiently vague in character, was accepted, and on the appointed date the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Birkenhead, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, Sir Hamar Greenwood and myself met the Irish representatives, Mr. Griffith, Mr. Michael Collins, Mr. Barton, Mr. Gavan Duffy and Mr. Duggan in the Cabinet Room at Downing Street. It was significant that Mr. de Valera remained in Ireland.

* * * *

Stresses in the Unionist Party.

It is not easy to measure the internal stresses set up in the Unionist Party by these events. Although everyone in every Party had been swept from his political socket by the cataract of world events; although human fortunes still ran in rapids all over the world, and men were baffled and bewildered by all that was going on and exhausted by all that had happened, yet the giving up in these ignominious circumstances of life-long convictions was almost intolerable. Resentment gathered all the deeper because those who felt the most keenly and were among the most tenacious elements of the nation knew that they were powerless. Ulster remained deeply agitated and refused to associate with the Government. The 300,000 Loyalists in Southern Ireland, perfectly helpless in the fighting, raised a lamentable cry in the parley.

At this stage much depended upon the action of individual Ministers. It was easy for Liberals and Home Rulers to support the widest form of Irish self-government, but those whose whole political careers had been absorbed in fighting Home Rule had a disagreeable and hazardous task to accomplish. The chief responsibility fell upon the leader of the Unionist Party, Mr. Austen Chamberlain. He had acted throughout in the closest harmony with the Prime Minister, and he was a man prepared to carry his actions to their conclusion and to face any consequences personal to himself.

When a leader takes a course fundamentally divergent from the whole traditions and even character of his Party, it is often open to some other prominent man to acquire great and possibly dominant political power. No one can impugn his motives; he is only carrying on in the old way, in a straightforward, simple and consistent manner. Such a man will find himself sustained by great numbers of persons of the highest integrity. His actions, however favourable to his ambition, will always appear to be sanctioned by duty and conviction.

The attitude of Lord Birkenhead, then Lord Chancellor, was therefore

at this juncture of the utmost importance. He was prominently and peculiarly connected with the resistance to Home Rule. He had been in comradeship with Sir Edward Carson; he had used to the full those threats of civil war which had played their part in the 1914 phase of the Irish conflict. There was no man who would have gained greater personal advantage by opposing the Irish Settlement; and none who would suffer more reproach by sustaining it. He now appeared, in the teeth alike of his past and his future, as its most aggressive Conservative supporter. The Irish Free Staters have always felt that they owed him their gratitude—and they are right. At this juncture qualities of independent and fearless judgment in the leader of the Unionist Party and in his most powerful lieutenant played their part in history. Political systems can to some extent be appraised by the test of whether their leading representatives are or are not capable of taking decisions in great matters on their merits, in defiance of their own interests and often of their best friends.

Political Tension.

In due course, after many delays and much manœuvring, the Irish Delegates arrived in Downing Street, and those Members of the Cabinet who from their offices or from their personalities were deemed to be the chief actors met across the table those whom they had so recently denounced as "The Murder Gang." All these Irish Delegates had recently been in prison or had been hunted for their lives, and some in varying degrees had been associated with violent crime. The confrontation was not without its shock, and for some weeks the strictest formalities were observed. Not only were the discussions themselves baffling through their vagueness and uncertainty, but they were cumbered with a bulky mass of intricate and highly explosive detail.

The negotiations, private and public, were continued for two months. They were reacted upon at all stages by the internal stresses of the Conservative Party and the convulsions of the newly reassembled Irish Dail. Disorders broke out in Belfast. The Ulster Government declared that they were being betrayed and, although they refused to come to the Conference, complained that they were not even consulted. The political tension was almost as acute as in the months before the war, but without the solvent of catastrophic events. Things merely lagged; the Irish could not say "yes" or "no" to anything. The condition of Ireland degenerated daily, and the Conservative Party with two-thirds of the House of Commons in its ranks stirred with anger and distress.

Resignation Inadmissible.

Although I only played at this time a part of second rank in Irish affairs and therefore did not feel the full pressures, I had as a Member of the Cabinet Committee a decided opinion. We must go through with the business and persevere until we either were dismissed from power, or reached a settlement, or reopened in a new form hostilities against Southern Ireland. I urged that Ministers could not escape from their miseries by resignation. The desire for release was in the early part of November so general that no one could predict the fortunes of a single day. The degree of the crisis can perhaps in after days be as well measured by the following letter—of no particular consequence—as by any other test.

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

Nov. 9, 1921.

The criticism will certainly be made that the Government in resigning have abdicated their responsibility. More especially will this charge be made if the reason given is "we are debarred by honour from coercing the North, and by conviction from coercing the South." It will be said, "Here are men united in principle, knowing what they ought to do and what the interests of the country require, who are possessed of an overwhelming Parliamentary majority, including a majority of their own followers, who nevertheless without facing Parliament throw down the commission and declare themselves incapable of action in any direction."

Photo : Central Press.

MICHAEL COLLINS.

Michael Collins was born at Clonakilty, co. Cork, in 1890. He was the youngest son of a farmer, and at the age of fifteen entered the English Civil Service. This young Irishman, as the text discloses, was destined to play a not ignoble part in the struggles of his country. He was shot by Irish Republican irreconcilables on August 22, 1922, and on that day Ireland lost a great son.

I greatly fear the consequences of such tactics, no matter how lofty may be the motives which prompt them.

2. After this has occurred, Mr. Bonar Law will be invited to form a Government. Why should he not do so? Surely he would be bound in honour to do so, if the members of the present Government have declared themselves inhibited from moving in any direction. Why should he not succeed? . . . In the crisis under consideration, the Conservative Party will have to rally to someone. Obviously they will rally to a Conservative leader, forming a Conservative Government, which has come forward to fill the gap created by the suicide of the Coalition; and which will be entitled to carry the standard forward against Labour at an imminent election, and to receive considerate treatment from ex-Ministers who have just thrown up the sponge. The delusion that an alternative Government cannot be formed is perennial. Mr. Chamberlain thought Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman would be "hissed off the stage." Mr. Asquith was confident that you could not form an administration. But in neither case did the outgoing administration tie its hands in every direction by proclaiming itself honourably bound to do what the situation might require.

On these lines a very great public disaster might easily ensue, in which a reactionary Conservative Government might go forward to the polls against Labour, with the great central mass of England and Scotland remaining without leadership or decisive influence.

3. I wish to put on record that I consider that it is our duty to carry forward the policy about Ireland in which we believe, until we are defeated in the House of Commons, and thus honourably relieved from our duty to the Crown. . . .

Acid Hatreds.

From the outset it became of the utmost importance to convince those who were now accepted as the Irish leaders, of the sincerity and good will of the Imperial Government. The issue was too grave for bargaining and haggling.

We stated from the very beginning all that we were prepared to give, and that in no circumstances could we go any further. We also made it clear that if our offer were accepted, we would without hesitation carry it through without regard to any political misfortune which might in consequence fall upon the Government or upon its leading Members. On this basis, therefore, and in this spirit the long and critical negotiations were conducted.

We found ourselves confronted in the early days not only with the unpractical and visionary fanaticism and romanticism of the extreme Irish secret societies, but also with those tides of distrust and hatred which had flowed between the two countries for so many centuries. An essential element in dynamite and every other high explosive is some intense acid. These terrible liquids slowly and elaborately prepared unite with perfectly innocent carbon compounds to give that pent-up, concentrated blasting power which shatters the structures and the lives of men. Hatred plays the same part in Government as acids in chemistry. And here in Ireland were hatreds which in Mr. Kipling's phrase would "eat the live steel from your butts," hatreds such as, thank God, in Great Britain had not existed for a hundred years. All this we had to overcome.

Mr. Griffith was a writer who had studied deeply European history and the polity of States. He was a man of great firmness of character and of high integrity. He was that unusual figure—a silent Irishman; he hardly ever said a word. But no word that ever issued from his lips in my presence did he ever unsay. Michael Collins had not enjoyed the same advantages in education as his elder colleague. But he had elemental qualities and mother wit which were in many ways remarkable. He stood far nearer to the terrible incidents of the conflict than his leader. His prestige and influence with the extreme parties in Ireland for that reason were far higher, his difficulties in his own heart and with his associates were


months from the date hereof.

13. This Instrument shall be submitted forthwith by His Majesty's Government for the approval of Parliament and by the Irish signatories to a meeting summoned for the purpose of the members elected to sit in the House of Commons of Southern Ireland, and if approved shall be ratified by the necessary legislation.

Dec 6th 1921.

On behalf of the British Delegation.

On behalf of the Irish Delegation

Birkenhead.

Photo: Central News.

SIGNATURES TO THE IRISH TREATY

On December 6, 1921, an agreement was signed between representatives of the British Government and the delegates representing Southern Ireland. The last page of this document is reproduced here showing the signatures of the contracting parties.

far greater. The other delegates were overshadowed by the two leaders. Mr. Duggan, however, was a sober-minded, resolute man. In the background Mr. Erskine Childers, though not a delegate, pressed extreme counsels.

The Ultimatum.

In the end, after two months of futilities and rigmarole, scarred by outrages in Ireland in breach of the truce, unutterably wearied Ministers faced the Irish Delegates, themselves in actual desperation and knowing well that death stood at their elbows. When we met on the afternoon of December 5, the Prime Minister stated bluntly that we could concede no more and debate no further. They must settle now; they must sign the agreement for a Treaty in the form to which after all these weeks it had attained, or else quit; and further, that both sides would be free to resume whatever warfare they could wage against each other. This was an ultimatum delivered, not through diplomatic channels, but face to face, and all present knew and understood that nothing else was possible. Stiff as our personal relations had been, there was by now a mutual respect between the principals and a very deep comprehension of each other's difficulties.

The Agreement Signed.

The Irishmen gulped down the ultimatum phlegmatically. Mr. Griffith said, speaking in his soft voice and with his modest manner, "I will give the answer of the Irish Delegates at nine to-night; but, Mr. Prime Minister, I personally will sign this agreement and will recommend it to my countrymen." "Do I understand, Mr. Griffith," said Mr. Lloyd George, "that though everyone else refuses you will nevertheless agree to sign?" "Yes, that is so, Mr. Prime Minister," replied this quiet little man of great heart and of great purpose. Michael Collins rose looking as if he was going to shoot someone, preferably himself. In all my life I have never seen so much passion and suffering in restraint.

We then went off and drummed our heels and had some food and smoked, and discussed plans of campaign. No one expected that anyone but Mr. Griffith would agree, and what validity would his solitary signature possess?

The British Representatives were in their places at nine, but it was not until long after midnight that the Irish Delegation appeared. As before, they were superficially calm and very quiet. There was a long pause, or there seemed to be. Then Mr. Griffith said, "Mr. Prime Minister, the Delegation is willing to sign the agreements, but there are a few points of drafting which perhaps it would be convenient if I mentioned at once."

Soon we were talking busily about technicalities and verbal corrections, and holding firmly to all these lest worse should befall. But underneath this protective chatter a profound change had taken place in the spirit and atmosphere. We had become allies and associates in a common cause—the cause of the Irish Treaty and of peace between two races and two islands. It was nearly three o'clock in the morning before we separated. But the agreement was signed by all. As the Irishmen rose to leave, the British Ministers upon a strong impulse walked round and for the first time shook hands.

Lloyd George and Ireland.

The event was fatal to the Prime Minister. Within a year he had been driven from power. Many other causes, some at least of which could have been avoided, contributed to his fall; but the Irish Treaty and its circumstances were unforgivable by the most tenacious elements in the Conservative Party.

Yet in so far as Mr. Lloyd George can link his political misfortunes with this Irish story, he may be content. In falling through Irish difficulties he may fall with Essex and with Strafford, with Pitt and with Gladstone; and with a line of sovereigns and statesmen great or small spread across the English history books of 700 years. But Lloyd George falls with this weighty difference, that whereas all these others, however great their efforts and sacrifices, left behind them only a problem, he has achieved—must we not hope it?—a solution.

CHAPTER XCIII

THE IRISH SETTLEMENT

" Tout savoir, c'est tout comprendre."

De Valera's Repudiation—The Debate in the Dail—I become Responsible for carrying out the Treaty—The Main Objectives—The Defence of Ulster—Irish Leaders—A Preliminary Survey—Craig and Collins—The Irish Free State Bill—The Boundary Question—Passage of the Bill—Limerick and Tipperary—Letter to Mr. Collins—Rory O'Connor Seizes the Four Courts—Further Letter to Mr. Collins.

THE relief of the public at the Irish Settlement was manifest. There was a general feeling of awaking from a nightmare. The whole Empire rejoiced, and foreign countries smiled approvingly, if sardonically. The King took the unusual and indeed unprecedented step of receiving the Ministers concerned at Buckingham Palace in the early morning and had a photograph taken with himself in their midst. No one was more delighted than the poor, ordinary people of Ireland who had been so mauled by both sides and who longed for peace and comfort. This, however, they were not to have for some time.

De Valera's Repudiation.

The Sinn Fein Delegates returned to Dublin immediately and presented the result of their labours to Mr. de Valera and the Dail. It would be easy to prove that in logic de Valera was committed by his previous declarations not indeed to the actual form of the agreement but to its scope and principle. Moreover, the Irish Delegates were plenipotentiaries and he was their chief. They had come as his representatives to London. He had been continually kept informed of the whole process of negotiation. They had gained in substance, if not in theory, all that they had striven for and far more than any other Irish leaders had ever demanded. It was therefore generally expected that he would stand by his colleagues, make allowances for their difficulties, and even if not satisfied on this or that theoretical point would throw in his lot with them. After all, Southern Ireland had acquired the whole constitutional position of a Dominion, that is to say, independence under the Crown plus all the good offices of Great Britain.

But we speedily learned that Mr. de Valera was still maundering about Poynings' Act, and that his view of Anglo-Irish relations and of the griefs of Ireland had not yet reached the sixteenth-century part of the story. He now made a passionate endeavour to reopen the conflict, and conceiving himself as head of the only government existing in Ireland, he repudiated the action of the Delegates, who were also his colleagues and had been his fellow-conspirators. These men, reproached as traitors to their cause and to the oaths of their secret societies, were however immediately found to be in possession, even in the ranks of the extremists, of a strong separate power. Two of the Irish signatories out of the five went over to de Valera, but Arthur Griffith, supported by Duggan, acted with energy and conviction, and Michael Collins, carrying with him the principal gunmen and the majority of the inmost circles of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, stood by his friend.

The Debate in the Dail.

While their territory was still in the utmost confusion the Dail proceeded to debate the Treaty for weeks at a time. They adjourned at length to celebrate the nativity of the Saviour, and when

they resumed in January they were cleft in twain. On January 8 the vote was taken and the Treaty was carried by seven votes—64 against 57. De Valera resigned his Presidency and quitted the Chamber. All the Republicans having walked out, Mr. Arthur Griffith was elected President of the Dail, which then was immediately adjourned.

I become Responsible for carrying out the Treaty.

Shortly after the signing of the Treaty I became a principal in British-Irish affairs. In January, 1921, the Prime Minister had asked me to go from the War Office to the Colonial Office for the purpose of settling our affairs in Palestine and Mesopotamia. This work was now nearly done. The Arabs and Colonel Lawrence were appeased by the enthronement of King Feisal at Bagdad; the British Army in Mesopotamia, which had been costing thirty millions a year, had been brought home; and complete tranquillity was preserved by the Royal Air Force under the guidance of the thrifty Trenchard.[1] Apart from ordinary work I was therefore free. Southern Ireland as a Dominion fell constitutionally into the sphere of the Colonial Office. I took over the task from the Chief Secretary, Sir Hamar Greenwood. He had borne the brunt during the most terrible period, showing the utmost courage as a man, and never losing the hope of a statesmanlike solution. In my capacity as Secretary of State I became Chairman of the Cabinet Committee upon Irish affairs. My colleagues gave me generous aid when I required it and a wide freedom of action at other times. Thenceforward I conducted all the negotiations with the Irish leaders, both north and south, and dealt with all the Parliamentary situations in the House of Commons.

The Main Objectives.

Two objectives stood clearly out from the general confusion and uncertainty. The first was to bring and nurse into being in the south a living and responsible organism of government. This could only be done by investing the Provisional Government which we were about to recognize with the authority of a popular election. From the moment of publication of the Treaty, the Irish people had by every means and method open to them loudly expressed their desire that good and peaceful relations should be established with the British people on the basis of that settlement. We therefore impressed upon the Provisional Government the importance and urgency of an election, which alone could give them the status of a national administration and enable them to govern with native authority.

Griffith and Collins were fully persuaded of this; but the difficulties were enormous. Mr. de Valera, knowing himself to be in a minority, and, as it proved, in a small minority, set to work by every means in his power to obstruct, to delay, and if possible to prevent, such an election. For this purpose he had recourse to the Irish Republican Army. This so-called Army had hitherto existed for the object of organizing attacks on the Crown forces ranging from individual murder to ambuscades. It had never been capable of fighting any serious action according to the rules of war. Nevertheless it contained a considerable number of men perfectly ready to suffer imprisonment and execution for what they considered to be their cause. The Irish Republican Army was divided in opinion in the same way and probably the same proportions as the Dail. Yet it was the only organization at the disposal of the Provisional Government for the maintenance of their authority. They were therefore forced into a series of weak and unsatisfactory compromises upon the control of the Republican Army and about the date and character of the elections.

They were soon led as a measure of accommodation with Mr. de Valera to postpone the election for three months, relying upon his promise that then the election should be free, that in the meanwhile the army should act unitedly

[1] Marshal of the Air Force Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff. Those who wish for further information on this long and intricate piece of public business will find a memorandum in the Appendix.—W. S. C.

Photo: Central News.

RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY.

On January 15, 1922, at the Mansion House in Dublin, sixty-five elected members of the Parliament of Southern Ireland ratified the Anglo-Irish Treaty. In the significant absence of Mr. de Valera and his party, the treaty was approved unanimously. In the photograph reproduced here Messrs. Cosgrave, Duggan, Griffith and Lynch are seen on the bench on the Chairman's right. Mr. Michael Collins is seated on that facing the Chairman.

under the orders of the Provisional Government, and that it should not interfere in the election or oppose by force any government returned at the election. But Mr. de Valera had no sooner made this promise to his fellow-countrymen than he proceeded to break it. Everything was done by him and by his friends to weaken and discredit the Provisional Government; to create disorder throughout the country, and to embroil Southern Ireland with Ulster. For this purpose the anti-Free State portion of the Republican Army was always available, and around them and behind them gathered those predatory and criminal elements which in a greater or less degree exist in every society and claim to lead in times of revolution. It was across these difficulties that the British and Irish signatories of the Treaty endeavoured to march to a free election and an Irish national mandate.

The second main objective, equally vital to us, was to sustain the Ulster Government in its indefeasible rights. Two so-called divisions of the Irish Republican Army were located in Ulster and were maintained in intense secret activity in spite of the truce, in spite of the Treaty, and in spite of the fact that the evacuation of the British Army from Southern Ireland was rapidly and steadily proceeding. The Ulster Government therefore found themselves at grips with a conspiracy in their midst, the object of which was to make their task of maintaining a separate government impossible, while at the same time from over the border serious raids

Photo: Topical Press.

IN SACKVILLE STREET, DUBLIN.

No sooner was the Anglo-Irish Treaty ratified than it became obvious that the troubles were not yet at an end. De Valera and his irreconcilables were active, and mass meetings were assembled to hear the views of the contending parties. Mr. de Valera is seen here addressing a huge crowd in Sackville Street, Dublin, on February 12, 1922. At this meeting resolutions were passed renewing allegiance to the idea of a republic.

occurred and hostile forces gathered and threatened.

The Defence of Ulster.

These menaces to Ulster both internal and from without were met in an equally combative and bellicose manner by the Protestant Orangemen of the north. Every outrage committed by the Irish Republican Army or by the Catholic element was repaid with bloody interest. Reprisals and counter-reprisals soon built up a ghastly score on both sides; the Catholics, being numerically the weaker, suffering during the summer about twice as many casualties as the Protestants. It was no doubt natural that the Sinn Fein extremists, having seen the success which attended their attack on British authority, should expect by a continuance of such methods to break down a much smaller and apparently much weaker organism of government in the north. Having, as they thought, humiliated and beaten the mighty British Empire and forced it to make an accommodation with them, they assumed it would be an easy matter to make the position of a separate Ulster Government impossible; and by shooting public men and burning public buildings to create a continuous terror, and so to weary and impoverish the Government and the citizens of the north that for the sake of a quiet life they would be willing to submit themselves to Sinn Fein rule.

"In the north," as I said to the House of Commons at a later period, "the large majority of the people are bitterly opposed to Sinn Fein. They ardently proclaim their loyalty and affection for

this country, for its monarchy, for its constitution, and for its empire. Even if they were deserted by Britain they would fight desperately and rightly to preserve their freedom. But they will not be deserted by Britain; on the contrary, they will be aided and strengthened by money, arms, and men to any extent that may be necessary to help them to maintain their Parliamentary and political rights and to defend themselves."

These were the two separate aims by which I was guided. They appealed very differently to English political Parties. All the strongest elements in the Conservative Party rallied to Ulster, and even while recognizing and accepting the Treaty, recoiled with dislike and scorn from Sinn Fein Ireland. Liberals and Labour men on the other hand watched with tender solicitude the fortunes of the Irish Free State, and took little interest in the welfare of the Northern Government, except to denounce it for the reprisals with which the Orangemen repaid every Sinn Fein murder. But if success in undoubted measure attended our policy, it was due to the fact that we pursued both these separate, and in many respects antagonistic, objectives with equal earnestness. Either alone spelt ruin. Both simultaneously pursued led to safety and peace.

Irish Leaders.

Of course the task of helping both sides in some directions, and of restraining both as far as possible in others, was delicate and liable to be misunderstood. It is easy to declare that the balance should be held even; but when people are actually murdering each other and being murdered, when terror stalks the land and anarchy rises about infant administrations; when you are in constant and intimate and honourable relations with the champions of both sides, when you know many of their secrets and when anything done for one excites the resentment or suspicion of the other, an impartial course is easier to prescribe than to steer. Fortunately for Ireland she did not in this time of tribulation lack chiefs of high and firm qualities. In Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins, and also in two new figures who now appeared, Richard Mulcahy and Kevin O'Higgins, were found realists of the first order; men who feared God, who loved their country, and who kept their word. In Ulster Sir James Craig

Photo: Topical Press.

MR. MICHAEL COLLINS AT COLLEGE GREEN.

On March 5, 1922, Michael Collins outlined the arguments in favour of the Treaty. As in the case of de Valera's meeting, an immense concourse of people surrounded the speaker, who received an ovation. The two photographs reproduced here are evidence of the intense feeling with which the people of Southern Ireland followed every movement in those eventful days.

stood solid as a rock. Imperturbable, sagacious, above hate or anger yet not without a lively sentiment ; steady, true, and untiring, he brought his own people at length out from the midst of indescribable miseries and difficulties back to daylight and civilization.

With this general survey of scene and actors, it will be better to tell the tale selectively by contemporary documents rather than by summarized narrative.

A Preliminary Survey.

I started hopefully on my duties, and endeavoured to outline for the guidance of the Departments concerned the immediate practical steps.

December 21, 1921.

" The Prime Minister having asked me to preside over a Cabinet Committee for the purpose of arranging the details of setting up the Provisional Government in Dublin should a favourable decision be taken by the Dail, I have put down a few draft headings for consideration.

" Should the Dail ratify, the first step should be to get an Irish delegation, comprising Mr. Griffith and Mr. Collins, over here at the earliest moment. We should then tell them that we wish them to form a Provisional Government without delay. This Government should be immediately responsible for the whole internal peace and order of Southern Ireland and would take executive control of the country on the basis arranged. We do not wish to continue responsible one day longer than is absolutely necessary. In my view we should aim at New Year's Day for the definite assumption of power, provided they are willing. When the basis has been worked out, it will be for the Viceroy after consultation in Dublin with such leaders of parties and political personages as he thinks fit, to invite some gentleman to form a Government. Presumably he would invite Mr. Arthur Griffith, and we shall know by then whether this gentleman will accept the commission, and on what basis. Mr. Griffith would then form his Government, his Ministers would sign the declaration prescribed in the Treaty, and take up their duties without delay.

" As a general principle we should not seek to alter the existing machinery more than is absolutely necessary, but should place it in the hands of the new Ministers as it now is. If statutory authority to give directions of any kind is required and such authority cannot yet be obtained, the British authority who now has the power to give such directions should be told to act upon instructions received without personal responsibility except for execution.

" The following special points occur :—

" (1) *The Police.* Every man in the R.I.C., whether English or Irish, should be given the option of resigning on disbandment-terms guaranteed by the Imperial Government. The allocation of expense as between Great Britain and the Irish Free State must be taken into consideration on the general financial settlement which will be made during the present year, so that it is only a question of accounting. All R.I.C. who do not exercise this option will be expected to carry on.

" The Auxiliary Division will be disbanded at once at the cost of the Imperial Government, advantage being taken at the same time of the decision provisionally arrived at to raise a gendarmerie for Palestine.

" (2) *The Army.* The principle we should proclaim is that the whole of our military forces in Southern Ireland should be withdrawn as quickly as convenient. The Provisional Government will be expected to take over the Guard of the Viceroy and of the seat of Government with uniformed troops of their own as the first step. The routine of salutes, Guards of Honour, etc., due to the King's representative must be arranged with the Sinn Fein leaders. The normal Irish garrisons outside Dublin would, I presume, remain until barrack accommodation can be found for them elsewhere and the Free State Government are prepared to dispense with them. But ostentatious preparations to quit should be begun everywhere. It is quite possible that in two or three months very insistent demands will be made for some of them to stay permanently. This, I fear, we shall not be able to accede to except as a matter of convenience for the new Government and for a very limited period.

"All the additional troops in Ireland not accommodated in permanent peace-time barracks should quit at the very earliest moment. All troops remaining in Ireland should, from the date of assumption of office by the Provisional Government, be moved outside their cantonments and immediate stations only in accordance with arrangements agreed upon with the responsible Ministers. They should act in support of the civil power only on requisitions signed by the responsible Ministers. The Provisional Government should be legally authorized to raise forces as may be necessary in the transition period under the Territorial Forces Act. It is not presumed they will wish to raise their full quota until they are definitely established. It is, however, of high importance that there should be at the earliest moment an Irish force uniformed and disciplined and capable of supporting the civil power.

"(3) *Justice.* The necessity for Sinn Fein Courts will presumably have disappeared, as all the Courts will become Free State Courts at the earliest moment. Meanwhile, however, it is presumed the existing Courts would function, the Viceroy being advised on the exercise of the prerogative by the Prime Minister or Home Secretary of the Irish Free State. The Attorney-General will, it is hoped, explain how the transition is to be effected in this sphere.

"(4) *Finance.* No alteration whatever at present in the taxes, nor in the spending of money on the ordinary internal services of the country. The interceptions which have lately been in force should of course cease at once, the full sum for Irish internal administration being made available. . . .

"Funds must also be provided for the raising of the Irish Free State forces for the maintenance of order.

"(5) *Education, Agriculture, and internal administrative services generally.* Full responsibility for these should be placed on the shoulders of a Free State Minister at the earliest moment.

"(6) *Measure relating to Indemnity and Amnesty.* [Must be prepared.]

"The above notes are on the assumption that the Dail ratifies the Treaty. It is possible, however, that they may ratify, but by a majority insufficiently large to afford a lasting basis of settlement. In this case the new Government should still take office, and should themselves ask the Viceroy either for a dissolution or for a plebiscite. A dissolution is infinitely preferable, as it will give a more responsible Dail. The Viceroy would be guided by the advice received from the Ministers on this subject, and in the event of such advice being in favour of a plebiscite, the necessary machinery must be brought into being by the Irish Departments, funds being supplied on the authority of the Treasury in anticipation of Parliamentary sanction. Pending this appeal to the country, all troops and police would stand fast as at present, but otherwise the procedure would be as above, though in a modified form.

"A third alternative is the rejection of the Treaty by the Dail. In this case it is presumed that the Parliament of Southern Ireland would be dissolved and a General Election for a new Dail held immediately. We should, however, before deciding get into touch with the leaders of the ratification party in the existing Dail and ascertain their wishes. It is presumed that the Treaty would be re-submitted to the new Dail as soon as it assembled."

* * * *

Craig and Collins.

On January 11 I was surprised and glad to receive a letter from Sir James Craig, who had been for some time officially out of touch with His Majesty's Government. He offered to come to see me at any time when the interests of Ulster were affected. He added: "I am quite ready to attend a conference between you and the delegates of Southern Ireland . . . in fact I would welcome an opportunity of meeting Mr. Griffith, or whoever may be charged with the administration of the Provisional Government, at an early date, so as to ascertain clearly whether the policy of Southern Ireland is to be one of peace or whether the present method of pressure on Northern Ireland is to be continued."

I lost no time in bringing Craig and

Michael Collins together. On January 21 they met in my room at the Colonial Office which, despite its enormous size, seemed overcharged with electricity. They both glowered magnificently, but after a short, commonplace talk, I slipped away upon some excuse and left them together. What these two Irishmen, separated by such gulfs of religion, sentiment, and conduct, said to each other I cannot tell. But it took a long time and, as I did not wish to disturb them, mutton chops, etc., were tactfully introduced about one o'clock. At four o'clock the Private Secretary reported signs of movement on the All-Ireland front and I ventured to look in. They announced to me complete agreement reduced to writing. They were to help each other in every way; they were to settle outstanding points by personal discussion; they were to stand together within the limits agreed against all disturbers of the peace. We three then joined in the best of all pledges, to wit, "To try to make things work."

Alas, it was not to be so easy. When little more than a week had passed, Craig had to give reassurance to the Ulstermen, and Collins back in the Dublin atmosphere was making violent speeches about the Ulster boundary; and the southern boycott of Belfast, which had been "lifted" on January 24, was soon resumed in full intensity. Early in February Sinn Fein raids took place on the Ulster border, and the simultaneous disturbances which broke out in Belfast left during a single night thirty dead and seventy injured in the streets.

The Irish Free State Bill.

It was, therefore, upon a considerable disappointment that I had to introduce the Irish Free State Bill implementing the Treaty on February 16. All the Ulster members, with their strong influence throughout the Conservative Party, openly declared their opposition. Reading the debate again I see how carefully I had to walk. The general feeling was that the Treaty was necessary, but would it be observed? Had we been hoodwinked or, at the best, had we negotiated with men of straw? Had we not given all we had to give and received in return only a grimace? On the other hand, what else was there to do at the moment? I had to appeal to faith, hope and law.

". . . If you want to see Ireland degenerate into a meaningless welter of lawless chaos and confusion, delay this Bill. If you wish to see increasingly serious bloodshed all along the borders of Ulster, delay this Bill. If you want this House to have on its hands, as it now has, the responsibility for peace and order in Southern Ireland, without the means of enforcing it, if you want to impose those same evil conditions upon the Irish Provisional Government, delay this Bill. If you want to enable dangerous and extreme men, working out schemes of hatred in subterranean secrecy, to undermine and overturn a government which is faithfully doing its best to keep its word with us and enabling us to keep our word with it, delay this Bill. If you want to proclaim to all the world, week after week, that the British Empire can get on just as well without law as with it, then you will delay this Bill. But if you wish to give a fair chance to a policy to which Parliament has pledged itself, and to Irish Ministers towards whom you are bound in good faith so long as they act faithfully with you to give fair play and a fair chance, if you wish to see Ireland brought back from the confusion of tyranny to a reign of law, if you wish to give logical and coherent effect to the policy and experiment to which we are committed, you will not impede, even for a single unnecessary week, the passage of this Bill." . . .

"Ought we to regret having made the settlement and signed the Treaty?" . .

"Contrast the positions. It appears to me as if the tables were turned. Ireland, not Britain, is on her trial before the nations of the world. Six months ago it was we who had to justify ourselves against every form of attack. Now, it is the Irish people who, as they tell us, after 700 years of oppression, have at last an opportunity to show the kind of government that they can give to their country and the position which they can occupy among the nations of

the world. An enormous improvement in the situation, as I see it, has been effected in the last six months. Take the position of Ulster. The position of Ulster is one of great and unshakable strength, not only material strength, but moral strength. There was a time when, as is well known, I and others with whom I was then associated thought that Ulster was not securing her own position, but was barring the way to the rest of Ireland to obtain what they wanted. Those days are gone. Ulster, by a sacrifice and by an effort, has definitely stood out of the path of the rest of Ireland, and claims only those liberties and securities which are her own, and standing on her own rights, supported as she is and as she will be by the whole force and power, if necessary, of the British Empire, I am entitled to say is in a position of great moral and material strength at the present time.

" The position of the Imperial Government has also become greatly improved. It is very desirable that the great affairs of the British Empire should be increasingly detached from the terrible curse of this long internal Irish quarrel, and that the august Imperial authority should stand on a more impartial plane." . . .

The Boundary Question.

The gravamen of the Ulster complaint was the article of the Treaty which prescribed the future regulation of the boundary between North and South.

" Of course, all this trouble in regard to boundaries surrounds the boundaries of Fermanagh and Tyrone. I remember on the eve of the Great War we were gathered together at a Cabinet meeting in Downing Street, and for a long time, an hour or an hour and a half, after the failure of the Buckingham Palace conference, we discussed the boundaries of Fermanagh and Tyrone. Both of the great political parties were at each other's throats. The air was full of talk of civil war. Every effort was made to settle the matter and bring them together. The differences had been narrowed down, not merely to the counties of Fermanagh and Tyrone, but to parishes and groups inside the areas of Fermanagh and Tyrone, and yet, even when the differences had been so narrowed down, the problem appeared to be as insuperable as ever, and neither side would agree to reach any conclusion.

" Then came the Great War. . . . Every institution, almost, in the world was strained. Great empires have been overturned. The whole map of Europe has been changed. The position of countries has been violently altered. The mode and thought of men, the whole outlook on affairs, the grouping of parties, all have encountered violent and tremendous changes in the deluge of the world, but as the deluge subsides and the waters fall we see the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone emerging once again. The integrity of their quarrel is one of the few institutions that have been unaltered in the cataclysm which has swept the world. That says a lot for the persistency with which Irishmen on the one side or the other are able to pursue their controversies. It says a great deal for the power which Ireland has, both Nationalist and Orange, to lay her hands upon the vital strings of British life and politics and to hold, dominate and convulse, year after year, generation after generation, the politics of this powerful country." . . .

I concluded after much argument :—

" Ulster must have British comfort and protection. Ireland must have her Treaty, her election, and her constitution. There will be other and better opportunities of dealing with the difficult boundary question. . . . For generations we have been floundering in the Irish bog, but at last we think that in this Treaty we have set our feet upon a pathway, which has already become a causeway—rather narrow, but firm and far-reaching. Let us march along this causeway with determination and circumspection, without losing heart and without losing faith. If Britain continues to march forward along that path, the day may come—it may be distant, but it may not be as distant as we expect—when, turning round, Britain will find at her side Ireland united, a nation and a friend."

Passage of the Bill.

The debate following was worthy of the issue. The general opinion was well expressed by Mr. Neville Chamberlain :—

"I, for one, am not going to be exasperated by outrages into changing my opinion as to the proper course to pursue. I consider in these difficult times that our business is to keep our heads, not to allow ourselves to be flustered into courses we may regret hereafter, but to give all the powers that are necessary to enable the Provisional Government to establish itself securely and to carry out its proper obligations ; and that in that way we may at any rate save for ourselves the only hope there is of escaping civil war."

The majority was overwhelming—302 to 60. But most of the majority were miserable and all the minority were furious.

It took more than a month to pass the Bill. During this time the dissatisfaction and anxieties of Parliament and the public were continually fanned by cruel and treacherous crimes and by the obvious impotence of the only possible Irish Government.

More serious disturbances had occurred early in February. Raids across the Ulster border resulted in the kidnapping of Northerners. A reinforcement of Northern constabulary, despatched from Belfast to Enniskillen, were by an unlucky forgetfulness of the new frontier sent via Clones in the Free State, instead of by the longer, safer route through the Northern territory. On the arrival of the train at Clones these nineteen men, treated as invaders, were ambuscaded. Without warning or challenge four were killed, eight wounded, and seven captured.

At the same time Mr. Collins flooded me with protests about the vendettas and counter-vendettas proceeding nightly in Belfast.

This merciless episode reduced the border to barbaric conditions. Many other outrages occurred throughout Ireland ; there would have been more, had it not been that throughout Southern Ireland not only the loyalists but the mass of the population subsided abjectly under the terror. In Belfast a foul kind of warfare was maintained fiercely by the dregs of both religions.

Limerick and Tipperary.

It was a long way to Tipperary, but at last apparently we arrived there.

Mr. Churchill to Mr. Cope.[1]
March 7, 1922.

Personal and Secret.

Many questions are asked me about Limerick and Tipperary. You must let me know what the Provisional Government are really doing, telling me whether the information must be kept secret or not. Do they intend to put down the Limerick revolt, or are they just going to parley and continue to be set at defiance ? There are reports in the papers that Irish troops have been despatched from Dublin to an unknown destination. Is this true ? How many ? Are they to be trusted ? The position in Cork seems as bad as ever, and it is reported that a notorious man who had been captured has now escaped. Do you think there is any fighting quality in the Free State Government ? Will anybody die for it or kill for it ? Let me know your view, not your wish.

Letter to Mr Collins.

Mr. Churchill to Mr. Collins.
March 14, 1922.

Private and Personal.

I have read with attention your letter about the Belfast outrages in 1920–21. I note that you are going to send me a statement about more recent events in Belfast. I send you herewith a report from Sir James Craig with which he has furnished me in response to your previous communication of complaints. The state of affairs in Belfast is lamentable. There is an underworld there with deadly feuds of its own, and only the sternest and strictest efforts by leading men on both sides, coupled with ample military and police forces, will produce that tranquillity which is demanded by the interest of Ireland as a whole.

(2) I had long conversations with

[1] Now Sir Alfred Cope, K.C.B. A daring and trustworthy agent of the British Government who was closely involved in all the Treaty negotiations and ardent throughout for settlement.

Photo: Topical Press.

SINN FEIN WEAPONS AGAINST ULSTER.

Not the least of the problems arising out of the disturbances in Ireland was the fierce border warfare which for a time raged along the southern Ulster boundary. Raids and counter-raids were an almost everyday occurrence and anything in the way of a weapon that would kill, maim or destroy, was brought into use. The bombs shown here, four in number, failed to explode in the course of a successful attempt by the I.R.A. to blow up the Moyola bridge in Co. Derry.

Photo: L.N.A.

MEN OF THE IRISH ARMY.

A photograph taken early in 1922, showing men of the newly recognised Irish Army changing guard. Under the Anglo-Irish Treaty the Government of the Irish Free State was authorised to establish and maintain a military force adequate to the needs of defence.

Photo: Sport & General.

SENTRIES IN THE HEART OF BELFAST.

Belfast was the scene of a great deal of faction warfare. At times the city was terrorised by gunmen and rioters. Snipers exacted a heavy toll, and not infrequently innocent spectators were the victims. The photograph reproduced above shows the type of street where disturbances of the kind referred to took place.

Sir James Craig before he returned to Ulster, and I am sure that he will do his very utmost to maintain order impartially. He has so far steadily declined to entertain the idea of a further conference with your Government, on the ground that while you are illegally holding the Clones men as hostages he cannot meet you. So here we are at a deadlock for the moment. I am bound to say that Sir James Craig left me with the impression that he would be glad to see the obstacles removed and to have a further parley. I quite see your difficulties, but I have no doubt whatever that, in spite of them, you ought to put yourself in the right by either effecting the release of these men or bringing them to trial in the regular way on a definite charge before lawfully constituted tribunals. Sir James Craig would be quite satisfied if they have a fair trial and are dealt with according to law. This is surely the only line for Heads of Governments to take. It may be that you do not feel able to do this till the Bill is through and you are formally equipped with lawful powers. If so, there is nothing for it but to wait and keep things as calm and as cool as possible in the interval. This hostage business is more suited to the Balkans than to Ireland, and the sooner we get on to a normal footing, the better.

(3) I am very much obliged to you for having speeded up the transfer of the necessary staff to the North of Ireland; and I hear from Sir John Anderson[1] that the administrative efficiency of your Government is increasing every week, that the Provisional Ministers are getting a good grip, and are appointing good men as their agents, and that in finance particularly, systems, the soundness of which has been proved by experience, are being adopted.

(4) I am very glad you are seeing Lord Midleton, representing the Southern Unionists, to-day; and I hope you will be able to reassure him about land purchase. We are pledged to the hilt to do our part in this matter if the Free State call upon us to do so, and the advantage accrues entirely to Ireland as against the larger and more unlucky island.

[1] A Civil Servant of the highest rank; sent to Dublin in 1920 as Under-Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant and Secretary to the Treasury for Ireland; a man of singular capacity and firmness of character, sagacious and imperturbable amid gathering peril and confusion.

(5) I hear from quite an independent source that the Provisional Government is gaining ground all over the country, and that one of the principal supporters of de Valera has expressed the opinion that they will do well if they get 40 seats in the new Parliament. I hope this is so.

(6) You seem to have liquidated the Limerick situation in one way or another. No doubt you know your own business best, and thank God *you* have got to manage it and not we. An adverse decision by the convention of the Irish Republican Army (so called) would, however, be a very grave event at the present juncture. I presume you are quite sure there is no danger of this.

(7) I read with great interest the full report of the speech delivered by you in Dublin which Lady Lavery sent me. I wish it had been reported more fully in the English papers. I showed it to the Lord Chancellor, who praised its tone and diction and will possibly quote some passages from it in his defence of the Free State Bill this week.

(8) I am much interested in your visit to Cork, and especially in the fact that you appear to have been welcomed by the Irish ex-Service men, with whom I sympathize so much. I shall do my best to get a further extension in regard to Haulbowline [Dockyard] as I am most anxious that the Cork situation shall adjust itself satisfactorily.

Mr. Churchill to Mr. Collins and Mr. Griffith.

March 21, 1922.

The whole position on the border is undoubtedly becoming more dangerous. An explosion would be disastrous, and even a continuance of the present tension tends to stereotype the border line and make it into a fortified military frontier, which is the last thing in the world you want. I cannot think there is the slightest danger of a raid from the North into the South. If such a raid took place those making it would put themselves in the wrong, and the British Government would take every measure in its power. I am certain that you do not need to be alarmed on this score.

Photo: Topical Press.

GUNMEN IN ACTION: YORK STREET, BELFAST.

Taken under fire in Belfast, this photograph of an alarmed crowd running to safety under a hail of bullets is evidence of the dangers which threatened the people of that city at the time of the faction fights. Order was finally restored when troops were drafted into the city.

Even if it happened it would only do harm to those responsible, just in the same way as the kidnapping raids from Monaghan have done harm to Southern Irish interests. I am told that I.R.A. (so-called) are collecting along the border in increasing numbers. Surely this is not necessary. Statements also appear in the papers that Free State troops are stationed at various points. Pray let me know exactly what is happening.

You must understand that I am at the same time making the strongest representations to Sir James Craig to prevent provocative action on the part of his people.

Rory O'Connor Seizes the Four Courts.

On April 13 a high-souled fanatic, Rory O'Connor, with a band of adherents and many sympathizers seized the Law Courts in Dublin. In this venerable and massive building he and his friends proclaimed themselves the Republican Government of all Ireland. Three days later Michael Collins was murderously attacked in Dublin. He escaped, but during the rest of the month the murder of Free State troops and police continued, diversified by a general railway strike.

In these pressures a tormented government and its servants rallied somewhat; their troops began to fire back, and even this slight resistance startled their enemies.

Further Letter to Mr. Collins.

Mr. Churchill to Mr. Collins.

April 12, 1922.

On the whole my impression is that public opinion is increasingly mobilizing and asserting itself in Ireland, and that you will get very strong national support in defending your just and lawful position. I have been speaking in this sense in the House of Commons. I hope that Easter will not belie these anticipations.

The Cabinet instructed me to send you a formal communication expressing their growing anxiety at the spread of disorder in the 26 Counties. Instead of this, however, I write to you as man to man. Many residents are writing to this country tales of intimidation, disorder, theft and pillage. There is no doubt that capital is taking flight. Credits are shutting up, railways are slowing down, business and enterprise are baffled. The wealth of Ireland is undergoing a woeful shrinkage. Up to a certain point no doubt these facts may have the beneficial effect of rousing all classes to defend their own material interests, and Mr. de Valera may gradually come to personify not a cause but a catastrophe. It is difficult for us over here to measure truly, but it is obvious that in the long run the Government, however patient, must assert itself or perish and be replaced by some other form of control.

Surely the moment will come when you can broadly and boldly appeal not to any clique, sect or faction, but to the Irish nation as a whole. They surely have a right to expect you to lead them out of the dark places, and the opportunity is one [the loss of] which history will never forgive. Ought you not to rally round the infant Free State all the elements in Ireland which will wholeheartedly adhere to the Treaty and sign a declaration attaching them to it irrespective of what their former attitudes have been? Would you not find reserves on this basis infinitely more powerful than any you have obtained at the present time? Ought you not to summon your "far flung people"[1] to your aid? In America, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, there must be hundreds of Irishmen intensely devoted to the welfare and freedom of their native land who would come to see fair play over the Elections and make sure that the people had a free vote.

I am greatly impressed by the courage with which such large numbers of Irishmen have attended public meetings to testify to their opinions in spite of so many deterrents, and I feel at the tips of my fingers the growing national strength that is behind you, ready for use when the moment comes for no cause but your own.

I am going into the question of your claim for an inquiry into some post-

[1] Mr. Collins had used this phrase about the Irish race in conversation a few weeks earlier. "We too are a far-flung people."

agreement outrages in Belfast. I will have a talk with Sir James Craig and let you know the result. Things are settling down to some extent, both in Belfast and on the frontier, and there is no doubt that the Ulster Government is making a tremendous effort towards appeasement. They will be greatly helped by the release of the Clones Specials, which I am very glad to see you have achieved.

I am glad to see you have arranged a meeting with de Valera; but I hope you will understand that we cannot go any further in any respect. We have run every risk and made every effort and fulfilled every stipulation according to the agreement we signed with you. But that is the end absolutely so far as we are concerned, and every one of us will swing round with every scrap of influence we can command against a Republic or any inroad upon the Treaty structure.

It would seem to me also extremely dangerous to allow any further delay in the Elections to be extorted from you. Every day that the uncertainty continues must be attended by the progressive impoverishment of Ireland. Nobody can invest or make plans for production while the threat of civil war, or of a Republic followed by a state of war with the British Empire, hangs over the country. I trust the end of May or at the very latest the first week in June will see the issue submitted to the Irish people. We really have a moral right to ask that the uncertainty as to whether our offer is accepted or rejected should not be indefinitely prolonged. . . .

Mr. Churchill to Mr. Collins.

April 29, 1922.

It is now three weeks since I wrote to you last, and it may be well to review a little what has passed in the interval. First, let me congratulate you and Mr. Griffith on the spirit and personal courage which you have consistently shown in confronting the enemies of free speech and fair play. I have no doubt that the development of strong, bold, romantic personalities at the head of the Irish Provisional Government and among the leaders of the Treaty party will be of real value in the general situation. I also sustain the impression that the great swing of Irish opinion is increasingly towards the Free State and the Treaty and those who stand for them; and that for every manly reason large numbers of persons will endeavour to assert their political rights at the poll. From this point of view the delay has not turned out nearly so badly as we in this country feared. You have not lost your hold on public opinion; you have indeed strengthened it. The excesses of the de Valera faction and the consequent inconvenience and impoverishment of Ireland have to a large extent concentrated the discontent, not upon the Government but upon its opponents.

I read with very great interest in the Irish papers the excellent speeches which are made and the courageous and energetic manner in which the Irish Press defends the essentials of social freedom.

Easter is passed without disaster. Your troops are increasing in numbers and appear to stand to their engagements and obey their officers. . . .

Altogether I see many sober reasons for hope. This makes me wonder all the more why you adopt such a very harsh tone in dealing with Sir James Craig. I am sure he has made a very great effort to fulfil the agreement in the letter and in the spirit, and that he is continuously and will continue striving in that direction. Of course, no one expected that everything could be made right immediately or that the terrible passions which are loose in Ireland would not continue to produce their crop of outrages dishonouring to the island and its people, and naturally you have many grounds of complaint against him. He, too, has furnished me with a long set of counter-complaints, and the Protestants also have suffered heavily in the recent disturbances. Belfast goods of very great value, running into millions, have been destroyed, debts owing to Belfast have been collected illegally and intercepted, and the boycott I am assured is more injurious in fact than ever before. Instead of these rough communications, I should have thought that the Irish leaders, North and South, would have found it much better to meet

together, to take stock of the position, to record what has been achieved, to mark what has fallen short in the working of the late agreement, and to decide on new steps to complete its execution.

As I have frequently pointed out, the interest of your opponents, North and South, Orange or Green . . . is to provoke the worst state of feeling between the two parts of Ireland; and they would cheerfully welcome every step and every event which led up to a definite civil war between the two Governments. Your opponents in the North hope to see a Republic in the South because it will bring about *inter alia* such a civil war, in which they know they will have the whole force of the British Empire behind them. Your opponents in the South hope to use antagonism against Ulster as a means of enabling them to snatch the power from the hands of the Provisional Government or else involve them in a series of events so tragical that they will break up under the strain. And on both sides the wreckers dread any approach to the idea of a united Ireland as the one fatal, final blow at their destructive schemes.

All this seems perfectly simple to me, and I think these people judge rightly according to their own tactical view. What I do not understand is why you should let yourself be drawn into the quarrel. I know Craig means to play fair and straight with you, and I do not think you will find such another man in the whole of the North; and it perplexes and baffles me when I see you taking up such a very strong, and even aggressive, attitude against him in your public utterances. Although perhaps you get some political advantage for the moment by standing up stiffly against the North, yet every farthing of that advantage is drawn and squandered from the treasure chest of Irish unity. However provoking it may be, I am certain that your interest and that of the cause you serve demands patience and suavity in all that concerns relations with the North. They are your countrymen and require from you at least as careful and diplomatic handling as you bestow on the extremists who defy you in the South. Moreover, they are in a very strong, and in fact inexpugnable, position; and they hold in their hands the key to Irish unity.

When you feel moved to anger by some horrible thing that has happened in Belfast, it may perhaps give you some idea of our feelings in Great Britain when we read of the murder of the helpless, disarmed Royal Irish Constabulary and now, this morning, of what is little less than a massacre of Protestants in and near Cork. Twenty Constabulary men have been shot dead and forty wounded, together with six or seven soldiers, and now these eight Protestant civilians, within the jurisdiction of your Government since the Treaty was signed.

All these men were under the safeguard of the Irish nation and were absolutely protected in honour by the Treaty. Their blood calls aloud for justice and will continue to call as the years pass by until some satisfaction is accorded. As far as I know, not a single person has been apprehended, much less punished, for any of these cruel deeds. Yet we on our side have faithfully proceeded step by step to carry out the Treaty, have loyally done our utmost to help your Government in every way and have not lost confidence in the good faith and good will of those with whom we signed the Treaty.

But do not suppose that deep feelings do not stir on both sides of the Channel. We, too, are a people not altogether to be treated as negligible in the world. No one can read the history of England without perceiving how very serious some of these matters may easily become. It is the business of statesmen not to let themselves be moved unduly by these feelings, however deep and natural, but to try as far as possible to steer away from these dangerous currents and persevere steadily towards the harbour which they have set out to gain.

At any time when you think it useful to have a further meeting with Sir James Craig, I will endeavour to bring it about. I found him reluctant when I addressed him on the subject this last week, but I know that he sincerely desires a peaceful, decent and Christian solution.

CHAPTER XCIV

THE RISE OF THE IRISH FREE STATE

" Tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner."

The Election Compact—Crumbling Foundations—Reactions in the North—Letter to Sir James Craig—The Whitsuntide Debate—Patience or Credulity ?—Michael Collins—Pettigo and Belleek—The Irish Constitution : The Election—Murder of Sir Henry Wilson—Critical Parliamentary Situation—Intervention of Mr. Bonar Law—Resolve of the Government—Attack on the Four Courts—A Decisive Effort—Letter to Mr. Collins—Letter to Sir James Craig—Deaths of Griffith and Collins—Cosgrave and O'Higgins—The Corner Turned—The Future.

UP till the end of April we seemed to be ploughing our way heavily but surely through all our difficulties. The Free State Government seemed to be functioning fitfully but increasingly, and the Party and Parliamentary situations in England held. All our hopes and aims were directed towards the free election by the Irish people of a representative assembly. There was no doubt whatever that by an overwhelming majority they were for both the Treaty and for the Free State Government.

The Election Compact.

Towards the end of May a new, and to me a most disconcerting, development took place. On May 19 Mr. Griffith had told the Republicans in the Dail that in their violent courses they did not represent two per cent. of the people of Ireland, and that " the course that they were pursuing placed them on the level of the worst traitors in Ireland, namely, those who by their actions were rendering the return of the English troops inevitable."

The very next day, to the astonishment of all, to the dismay of their friends, and to the joy of every enemy, a compact was signed between de Valera and Michael Collins. The compact dealt with the approaching election. It comprised an agreement that the Republican anti-Treaty men (who Mr. Griffith had declared the day before did not represent two per cent. of the Irish people) were to have 57 seats in the new Parliament as against 64 for the supporters of the Treaty. They were not to be opposed by the Provisional Government to the extent of 57 seats. In other words, the existing balance on the question of accepting or rejecting the Treaty was to be preserved in the new Parliament and was not to be disturbed by any contest between members of the Sinn Fein Party. Secondly, this compact prescribed that after this so-called election a Coalition Government should be formed consisting of five pro-Treaty Ministers and four anti-Treaty Ministers, with the President of the Assembly and the Minister at the head of the army additional. On this basis, the two Sinn Fein parties, pro- and anti-Treaty, were to divide the representation and challenge the candidates of every other opinion.

Crumbling Foundations.

I had received news a few days before of what was in the wind, and I wrote immediately to Michael Collins.

Mr. Churchill to Mr. Collins.

May 15, 1922.

I have received information which leads me to believe that among the subjects being discussed between you and the Irregular or Republican party is the proposal that there should be " an agreed election," that is to say, an

election at which there would be no contests, but at which Mr. de Valera would be accorded 40 seats and the Provisional Government 80. I think I had better let you know at once that any such arrangement would be received with world-wide ridicule and reprobation. It would not be an election in any sense of the word, but simply a farce, were a handful of men who possess lethal weapons deliberately to dispose of the political rights of the electors by a deal across the table. Such an arrangement would not strengthen your own position in the slightest degree. It would not invest the Provisional Government with any title to sit in the name of the Irish nation. It would be an outrage upon democratic principles and would be universally so denounced. Your Government would soon find itself regarded as a tyrannical junta which, having got into office by violence, was seeking to maintain itself by a denial of constitutional rights.

The enemies of Ireland have been accustomed to say that the Irish people did not care about representative government, that it was alien to their instincts, and that if they had an opportunity they would return to a despotism or oligarchy in one form or another. If you were to allow yourself to be misled into such an arrangement as is indicated, such action would be immediately proclaimed as justifying to the full this sinister prediction. As far as we are concerned in this country, we should certainly not be able to regard any such arrangement as a basis on which we could build. I do earnestly hope that you will put me in a position to deny these most injurious reports. At any moment questions may be asked in Parliament on the subject. I see already that the *Daily Chronicle* has referred to it in a leading article.

I beg you will show this letter to Mr. Griffith and to Mr. Duggan, to whom as co-signatories of the Treaty I am bound also to address myself.

Photo: Lafayette.

KEVIN O'HIGGINS.

One of the younger figures prominent in Ireland when the newly-born Free State was still threatened with the ills attendant upon extreme youth. Kevin O'Higgins was born in 1892, the son of Dr. T. Higgins of Stradbally, Queen's Co. O'Higgins was an early supporter of Sinn Fein but later, under President Cosgrave, he worked hard for the settlement of affairs in Southern Ireland. Like Michael Collins and others he fell by the bullet.

So we were not, it seemed, to get any foundation after all. It was common ground between Republicans and Free-Staters, regulars and irregulars in the I.R.A., Catholics and Protestants, landlords and tenants, Unionists and Nationalists, from one end of Ireland to the other, that the dominant wish of the Irish people was to take the Treaty, to work it honourably, and to restore under its ægis the dignity and prosperity of Irish life. But they were not to be allowed to express their opinion. The Irish masses, just like the Russian two or three years before, were not to be

Photo : Central Press.

WILLIAM COSGRAVE.

William Thomas Cosgrave was born in 1880, in Dublin, his father being a town councillor and Poor Law Guardian of that city. Cosgrave identified himself with the Sinn Fein movement and was in the Easter rising of 1916 in Dublin. Since those days he has been President of the Irish Free State and has proved himself to be on the side of moderation and a leader of quality.

allowed a voice in their fate. They were to be led by the nose, by a tiny minority making an immoral deal among themselves and parcelling out the nation as if they were cattle. This was more baffling than any of the raids and outrages. It threatened to reduce the whole situation to a meaningless slush.

We were, however, on this issue in possession of the ensigns of Democracy. Until you get a certain distance down the slope these count for much. We invited the Free State leaders over to London. They came immediately; Griffith plainly in resolute dissent from what had been done; Collins half defiant, half obviously embarrassed. It was all right, he said; we did not know their difficulties. These were hideous and indescribable. Nothing was stable under their feet. A contested election was physically impossible. It would mean widespread civil war; no one would dare to vote; they had not the strength to keep even the semblance of order. Nevertheless Collins declared himself unchanged in general intention to stand by the Treaty. It looked as if the wounds of Ireland would not react to any treatment known to science, but would just slough away into mortification.

Reactions in the North.

These events produced their immediate reaction in the north. Protestant Ulster was convinced that Southern Ireland would now sink into chaos, and to wall themselves off from this infection was the only thought. Incessant demands were made for troops and arms. Sir James Craig made an uncompromising statement about the boundary.

Letter to Sir James Craig.

Mr. Churchill to Sir James Craig.

May 24, 1922.

Londonderry will tell you the results of his discussions with the War Office and the arrangements which we have made for the supply of this great mass of material to you. I must say at once,

however, that I do not consider your declaration made without any reference to the Government that in no circumstances would you accept any rectification of the frontier or any Boundary Commission as provided for in the Treaty is compatible with requests for enormous financial aid and heavy issues of arms. While I was actually engaged in procuring the assent of my colleagues to your requests, you were making a declaration which was in effect in one passage little short of a defiance of the Imperial Government whose aid you seek.

Several of my colleagues have communicated with me this morning in strong protest against a statement of this kind being made by you when you are asking for and receiving our assistance and especially at so critical a moment in Irish affairs. All I was able to reply was that de Valera and Collins had made statements in the Dail yesterday of an equally unsatisfactory character. The effect of such a statement on your part is to make it far more difficult for the Imperial Government to give you the assistance you need, and also it robs the Ministers who will meet the Provisional Government representatives of any effective reproach against Mr. Collins for the contemptuous manner in which he has spoken of the Treaty. It has enabled many newspapers in England, on whose support we should have to rely if the worst comes to the worst, to treat the whole Irish situation on the basis of six of one and half a dozen of the other. A very strong effort will undoubtedly be made in favour of a policy of Britain disinteresting herself entirely in Irish affairs, leaving them "to stew in their own juice and fight it out among themselves." Such a disastrous conclusion is rendered more difficult to combat by a statement of the kind you have made.

I know you will not mind my speaking quite plainly, because I am doing my best to support you in all that is legitimate and legal. We could not have complained, for instance, if you had said that the Collins–de Valera agreement rendered all co-operation between you and the South impossible. I should have regretted such a statement, but it was entirely one within your rights to make. But it is not within your rights to state that you will not submit to the Treaty which the British Government has signed in any circumstances, and at the same time to ask the British Government to bear the overwhelming burden of the whole of your defensive expenses. I cannot understand why it was not possible to communicate with me before making a declaration in this sense. I should have thought it would have been quite possible for you to have made a thoroughly satisfactory declaration to your own people in these critical times without taking ground which seems to show you just as ready as Collins or de Valera to defy the Imperial Government if they take a course you do not like. You ought not to send us a telegram begging for help on the largest possible scale and announce an intention to defy the Imperial Parliament on the same day.

P.S.—I have just received your telegram and am very glad to know that you are relieved by the decisions which I have been able to procure on your behalf.

The Whitsuntide Debate.

While not by any means giving up hope, I thought it right to prepare Parliament for a slattern development, and on the motion for the Whitsuntide adjournment I laid the whole story before the House of Commons, repeating the most valid of the explanations which Mr. Collins had offered.

"The Provisional Government could not possibly guarantee the ordinary security of life and property if these securities were challenged by an active, ardent, violent, Republican minority. This Republican minority, it is explained, consists mainly of a comparatively small number of armed men, violent in method, fanatical in temper, but in many cases disinterested or impersonal in motive. But behind these, strengthening these, multiplying these, disgracing these, are a larger number of common, sordid ruffians and brigands, robbing, murdering, pillaging, for their personal gain or for private revenge, or creating disorder and con-

fusion out of pure love for disorder and confusion. These bandits—for they are nothing else—pursue their devastating course under the so-called glamour of the Republic and are inextricably intermingled with bona-fide Republican visionaries.

"The Provisional Government declared that they found themselves unable to deal with these bandits, while at the same time they were engaged in armed struggles with bona-fide Republicans. They declared that the Agreement into which they have entered with the Republicans would isolate the brigands and would enable these brigands to be struck at and suppressed, that a greater measure of liberty and security would immediately be restored, and that such conditions are an indispensable preliminary to any free expression of the political will of the Irish people, to which they look forward at an early date. They say, further, that it is in the power of the extreme minority in Ireland, by murdering British soldiers, or ex-soldiers, or Royal Irish Constabulary men who have retired from the Constabulary, or Protestants in the South, or by disturbing Ulster, to produce a series of episodes which, if prolonged and multiplied would in fact destroy the relationship between Great Britain and Ireland and render the carrying through of the Treaty impossible on both sides."

I urged the House not to underrate this argument. I added this warning:

"Irish prosperity has been seriously affected. Banking and business are curtailed; industry and agriculture are languishing; revenue is only coming in with increasingly laggard steps; . . . stagnation and impoverishment are overtaking the productive life of Ireland; the inexorable shadow of famine is already cast on some of its poorer districts. Will the lesson be learned in time, and will the remedies be applied before it is too late? Or will Ireland, amid the stony indifference of the world—for that is what it would be—have to wander down those chasms which have already engulfed the great Russian people? This is the question which the next few months will answer."

Patience or Credulity?

I strove against a silent tide of scepticism.

"I do not believe that the members of the Provisional Government are acting in bad faith. I do not believe, as has been repeatedly suggested, that they are working hand in glove with their Republican opponents with the intent by an act of treachery to betray British confidence and Ireland's good name. I am sure they are not doing that. They may not have taken the wisest course, or the strongest course, or the shortest course, but they, and a majority of Dail Eireann who steadfastly support them and support the Treaty are, I sincerely believe, animated by an earnest desire and resolve to carry out the Treaty. Not only Mr. Griffith and Mr. Collins, the two leading men on whose good faith we took this memorable departure, but the other Ministers who are in this country, Mr. Cosgrave, Mr. Kevin O'Higgins and others have repeatedly declared their adherence to the Treaty and have renewed their personal assurances while they have been here with us in the strongest manner.

"They have argued vehemently that the course they are taking—questionable and doubtful as it appears to British eyes, as it must necessarily appear to almost any eyes—is the surest way, and indeed the only way open to them of bringing the Treaty into permanent effect. Whether their policy and methods are right may be questioned. Whether they will succeed or not is open to doubt. But that they are still trying to do their best to march forward on that path which alone can save Ireland from hideous disaster we firmly believe. Some here may think us wrong. Some here may think we are being deceived and hoodwinked, and by being deceived ourselves are deceiving others.

"If we are wrong, if we are deceived, the essential strength of the Imperial position will be in no wise diminished, while the honour and reputation of Ireland will be fatally aspersed. Whether you trust or whether you mistrust at this moment, equally you can afford to wait. We have done our part, we are

doing our part with the utmost loyalty before all the world. We have disbanded our police. We have withdrawn our armies. We have liberated our prisoners." (Here there were scornful interruptions.) "Yes, I say it and I boast it! We have transferred the powers of government and the whole of the revenues of Ireland to the Irish Ministry responsible to the Irish Parliament. We have done this on the faith of the Treaty, solemnly signed by duly accredited plenipotentiaries—for such they were—of the Irish nation, and subsequently endorsed by a majority of the Irish Parliament. This great act of faith on behalf of the stronger power will not, I believe, be brought to mockery by the Irish people. If it were, the strength of the Empire will survive the disappointment, but the Irish name will not soon recover from the disgrace."

Mr. Asquith, my old Chief, rising equally above Party and above passion, threw the whole weight of his authority upon the side of the Government. Then the House separated in sombre mood.

On that very day, however, a new incident which I duly reported to the House had occurred. The townships of Pettigo and Belleek had been seized and occupied by Irish Republican forces. Pettigo lay astride the border and Belleek was wholly in Northern territory. This military affront brought into play the other side of the dual policy I was endeavouring to apply. It gave me the opportunity of reassuring Ulster that we were not merely sliding with apologies down the slope, but that whatever else went to wreck, the integrity of their territory would be protected. The Secretary of State for War and my other colleagues on the Cabinet Committee were in full agreement.

Michael Collins.

Immediately after the debate, Michael Collins, who had listened to it, came to my room. I mentioned to him amicably that if any part of the Irish Republican Army, either pro-Treaty or anti-Treaty, invaded Northern soil, we would throw them out. He took it quite coolly, and seemed much more interested in the debate. "I am glad to have seen it," he said, "and how it is all done over here. I do not quarrel with your speech; we have got to make good or go under." We argued a little about Pettigo and Belleek and about Belfast atrocities. Before he left he said, "I shall not last long; my life is forfeit, but I shall do my best. After I am gone it will be easier for others. You will find they will be able to do more than I can do." I repeated the phrase of President Brand which I had learned in the days of the Transvaal Constitution Bill, "Alles zal egt kom" (All will come right). I never saw him again.

Here I will record a few thoughts about this man, Michael Collins. He was an Irish patriot, true and fearless. His narrow upbringing and his whole early life had filled him with hatred of England. His hands had touched directly the springs of terrible deeds. We had hunted him for his life, and he had slipped half a dozen times through steel claws. But now he had no hatred of Engand. Love of Ireland still possessed his soul, but to it was added a wider comprehension. He had come in contact during the Treaty negotiations with men he liked; with men who played the game according to the agreed rules; he had plighted a new faith to act fairly by them. As Griffith seemed to rely especially upon Mr. Austen Chamberlain, so Michael Collins was deeply impressed by the personality of Lord Birkenhead. The transition of his sympathies can be followed in gradations through his speeches by anyone who cares to study them. Whereas he had had only one loyalty, he now had two. He was faithful to both; he died for both. When in future times the Irish Free State is not only the home of culture and of virtue, not only prosperous and happy, but an active, powerful, and annealing force in the British Commonwealth of Nations, regard will be paid by widening circles to his life and to his death.

Pettigo and Belleek.

Large bodies of troops, equipped with all the appliances of war, were now set in motion on the Ulster border. About 7,000 men with cannon and armed launches advanced upon the villages of

Pettigo and Belleek. A demonstration was made of overwhelming force in support of indefeasible rights. For more than ten days a British village having every right to claim protection from the Crown had been continually in lawless occupation of Irish Republican forces. After all, there are occasions when one hundred aggrieved armed men are entitled to expel one wrongdoer in his shirt.

The Prime Minister was disquieted by this development. He feared that we were being manœuvred by the extremists of both sides into giving battle on the very worst ground. " If the Free Staters insist upon a constitution which repudiated Crown and Empire and practically set up a Republic, we should carry the whole world with us in any action we took ; but an issue fought on Ulster would not command united British opinion, still less world-wide support. I understand," he wrote, " we are marching against a rotten barracks at Belleek garrisoned by a friendly blacksmith and a handful of his associates . . . but MacKeown [the blacksmith] is a strong Treaty man and has publicly denounced de Valera and the Pact. If he should be killed at Belleek it would be a disaster to the cause of reconciliation with the Irish race. . . .

" Quite frankly, if we force an issue with these facts we shall be hopelessly beaten. There will be a great Die-Hard shout which will last for a very short time, but we shall have no opinion behind us that will enable us to carry through a costly strangling campaign. Let us keep on the high ground of the Treaty, the Crown, the Empire. There we are unassailable. But if you come down from those heights and fight in the swamps of Lough Erne you will be overwhelmed. You have conducted these negotiations with such skill and patience that I beg you not to be tempted into squandering what you have already gained by a precipitate action, however alluring the prospects may be."

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

I was in train of answering your letter when it was superseded by events. Belleek village and fort were occupied to-day by strong forces. Pursuant to our orders the village was reconnoitred first by an armoured car, and not until this reconnaissance had been fired upon while in Ulster territory and from points in Ulster territory did the troops advance. About 20 shell and 400 rounds were fired. On one shell bursting near the fort its garrison of 40 fled without loss of any kind. The blacksmith to whom you refer had not left Dublin according to Mr. Griffith. As far as we know the " battle " has been almost bloodless. One soldier has been slightly wounded and no enemy casualties have been found or prisoners taken. I am issuing a communiqué explaining that the operations are at an end, that our troops will advance no further, that no further fighting will take place unless they are attacked, that communications are being made to the Provisional Government with a view to establishing peaceful conditions on this part of the border, and that as soon as we are assured there will be no further incursions, the British forces will be withdrawn wholly within the Ulster border-line.

It is always difficult to deal with a small urgent local situation without compromising grave general issues, but I do not think the action will have evil results. I hope, indeed, it may have had good results, and I am quite sure that we could not have met the House of Commons on Monday with the admission that we did not know what was going on in a British village and did not dare go there to find out.

The results of this operation which threaded its way so narrowly between tragedy and ridicule were salutary. Ulster felt that if it came to actual invasion they would certainly be defended. The Irish Republican army realized that we should not hesitate to levy open war, and the Free State Government knew that at any rate one line was drawn which could not be transgressed. Not the slightest ill will was manifested by those Free State leaders with whom we were in relation. On the contrary, they seemed fortified in spirit for the very serious crisis which was soon to supervene.

Photo: Sport and General.

36, EATON PLACE: HOME OF SIR HENRY WILSON.

Many references occur in the text of this narrative relating to the great services rendered to his country by Sir Henry Wilson. A fine soldier and a man of exceptional attainments, his tragic death at the hands of assassins aroused widespread resentment throughout the country. The Field-Marshal was shot dead by two Irishmen, John O'Brien and James Connolly, as he reached the steps of his house after unveiling the Great Eastern Railway War Memorial at Liverpool Street Station. The cowardly attack was carried out about 3 p.m. on June 22, 1922. Both the murderers were captured and paid the penalty of their crime.

The Irish Constitution: The Election.

Meanwhile the terms of the Irish Constitution were being worked out in detail by the Provisional Government in Dublin. There had been many suggestions, open and covert, that the Constitution would not be within the four walls of the Treaty. Extremists in Ireland looked forward to it as likely to provide the occasion for a breach. In England everyone was at his limit and the fires of wrath were double-banked. Fortunately, though not without hard words and much argument, an instrument which both parties were able to accept was produced and the apostles of violence were once more disappointed.

The text of the Irish Free State Constitution was issued on June 15, and the next day the electors of Southern Ireland went to the poll. In spite of the farcical and indecent compact and the absurdities of proportional representation, the voting for the Treaty was heavy. The figures were: Pro-Treaty Sinn Fein, 58; Republicans, 36; Labour, 17; Farmers, 7; Independents, 6; and Unionists, 4. On a plain issue and a free vote hardly any of the opponents of the Treaty would have been returned. The result was masked and confused by the compact, and no sure foundation was established. Nevertheless the form of the Constitution to which the Free State leaders had agreed, was such as to preclude Mr. de Valera and his followers from sharing in the government. A pernicious duality in the executive was thus avoided.

Murder of Sir Henry Wilson.

A few days later a resounding crime

Photo: Sport and General.

LONDON'S LAST TRIBUTE.

Sir Henry Wilson was buried in the Crypt of St. Paul's Cathedral on June 26, 1922. He lies between Lord Roberts and Lord Wolseley. The funeral procession was deeply impressive, as was the scene at the Cathedral. Twelve of the most distinguished war-leaders acted as pall-bearers, including Earl Beatty, Earl Haig, Sir William Robertson, and Sir Hugh Trenchard. Marshal Foch, who crossed from France in order to be present, on first hearing of Sir Henry Wilson's assassination, spoke of him as " my old and trusted comrade and best friend, one of the finest soldiers that ever lived, and one of the greatest patriots I have ever met."

was perpetrated. Sir Henry Wilson, after completing his term as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had been elected a Member of Parliament for an Ulster constituency. It had also been freely stated in the newspapers that he would act as the military adviser of the Ulster forces. He had not, in fact, taken any part in their executive affairs. Two Irishmen, living in London, one of them a messenger in a Government office, regarding him as the commander of the hostile army and personally responsible for the murders in Belfast, waylaid him on his doorstep in Eaton Place and shot him to death with their pistols at three o'clock on the afternoon of June 22. He had just returned from the unveiling of a War Memorial and was in the khaki uniform of a Field-Marshal. He fell, pierced by numerous bullets, on the doorstep of his home.

The murderers took to flight, but every human being on the spot, although unarmed, spontaneously pursued them. They retreated for some distance, firing at the gathering crowds. However, there was no escape. Everyone rushed upon them from all sides. They were seized and hurried to gaol to await the certain and speedy doom of British law. The effect of this murder in the heart of London of a man renowned throughout Europe as a strategist, and also of a Member of the House of Commons, was profound. The murderers do not seem, according to our present knowledge, to have been directed by any Irish organization. They exploded independently; but Great Britain reacted with the same sudden anger as had followed the murders in the Phœnix Park nearly forty years before. The late Field-Marshal was carried to his grave on the following Monday with the highest military honours. All the way to St. Paul's Cathedral dense crowds thronged the streets. I had to face the House of Commons in the afternoon.

Critical Parliamentary Situation.

I had thought out most carefully the arguments to use, and in spite of the intensity of feeling I was allowed to unfold them fully. I surveyed with extreme plainness the good and bad points in the Irish situation. I paid a tribute to the memory of Sir Henry Wilson, the substance of which is embodied at an earlier stage in this account. I described the growing strength of the Ulster Government, and our plans for placing a complete cordon of Imperial troops across Ireland to separate the north from the south. I dwelt upon the will of the Irish people as manifested by the election. But all of this would have been futile apart from the following:

"I should not be dealing honestly and fully with this subject if I left in the minds of the House the impression that all that is required is patience and composure. No, sir. Firmness is needed in the interests of peace as much as patience. The constitution which we have seen, which has been published, satisfactorily conforms to the Treaty. It has now to be passed through the new Irish Parliament. There is no room for the slightest diminution of the Imperial and constitutional safeguards and stipulations which it contains. That is not all. Mere paper affirmations, however important, unaccompanied by any effective effort to bring them into action, will not be sufficient. Mere denunciations of murder, however heartfelt, unaccompanied by the apprehension of a single murderer, cannot be accepted. The keeping in being within the Irish Free State by an elaborate process of duality, merging upon duplicity, of the whole apparatus of a Republican Government will not be in accordance either with the will of the Irish people, with the stipulations of the Treaty, or with the maintenance of good relations between the two countries.

"The resources at the disposal of His Majesty's Government are various and powerful. There are military, economic and financial sanctions—to use a word with which we frequently meet in Continental affairs—there are sanctions of these kinds which are available, and which are formidable. They have been very closely studied, and the more closely they are studied the more clearly it is seen that those measures will be increasingly effective in proportion as the Irish

Government and State become more fully and more solidly organized. . . .

"Hitherto we have been dealing with a Government weak because it had formed no contact with the people. Hitherto we have been anxious to do nothing to compromise the clear expression of Irish opinion. But now this Provisional Government is greatly strengthened. It is armed with the declared will of the Irish electorate. It is supported by an effective Parliamentary majority. It is its duty to give effect to the Treaty in the letter and in the spirit, to give full effect to it, and to give full effect to it without delay. A much stricter reckoning must rule henceforward. The ambiguous position of the so-called Irish Republican Army, intermingled as it is with the Free State troops, is an affront to the Treaty.

"The presence in Dublin, in violent occupation of the Four Courts, of a band of men styling themselves the Headquarters of the Republican Executive, is a gross breach and defiance of the Treaty. From this nest of anarchy and treason, not only to the British Crown, but to the Irish people, murderous outrages are stimulated and encouraged, not only in the twenty-six counties, not only in the territory of the Northern Government, but even, it seems most probable, here across the Channel in Great Britain. From this centre, at any rate, an organization is kept in being which has branches in Ulster, in Scotland, and in England, with the declared purpose of wrecking the Treaty by the vilest processes which human degradation can conceive.

"The time has come when it is not unfair, not premature, and not impatient for us to make to this strengthened Irish Government and new Irish Parliament a request, in express terms, that this sort of thing must come to an end. If either from weakness, from want of courage, or for some other even less creditable reasons, it is not brought to an end and a very speedy end, then it is my duty to say, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that we shall regard the Treaty as having been formally violated, that we shall take no steps to carry out or to legalize its further stages, and that we shall resume full liberty of action in any direction that may seem proper and to any extent that may be necessary to safeguard the interests and the rights that are entrusted to our care."

Intervention of Mr. Bonar Law.

The subsequent debate was marked by the intervention of Mr. Bonar Law, who had retired from the Government and from the leadership of the Conservative party in April 1921, whose health was now restored, and whose political influence was a factor of first importance.

"The Colonial Secretary . . . at the end of his speech did everything which I would say you could ask the Government to do, or any Government to do to-day. . . . His attention was called to what is happening in the Four Courts. I do not think anyone could have read the letter issued from that quarter without the same feeling of abhorrence as was expressed by the Colonial Secretary; but there was something else in it more likely than anything to arose our horror. The reference to Sir Henry Wilson's death in which they said they did not do it, clearly implied that they found no fault with it. . . . Just think of this. . . . There is in Dublin a body which has seized the Four Courts—to make the irony more complete it is the centre of justice in Ireland—and from these Four Courts, undoubtedly, emissaries are going out, trying to carry out in Ulster precisely the same methods which they think succeeded in the South, and are instigating murder in every direction.

"Is that tolerable for a moment? Let the Committee think what it means. Suppose we found out that there was a body occupying an important position in Paris, which was openly subsidizing murderers to come to this country and upset our Government. What would happen? We should not make representations in Paris, and say, 'We must make sure you do not approve of it.' We should say, 'You must stop this or there is war.' Are we to be in a different position, in that respect, towards what appears to me to be one of our own Dominions? . . . I do not think there is any man in this House . . . who does not realize what a terrible thing

it would be if we were reduced again to try to secure order in Southern Ireland by that means. . . . Now the position is clear. Much time cannot elapse before these grave matters—to quote a saying of the Colonial Secretary—are brought to the test. I for one say that I believe the Government means to see this through, but if they do not, I will be against them, and I hope the House of Commons will be against them also."

Later in the evening the Prime Minister and I met Mr. Bonar Law in the Lobby. Although always holding himself in strict restraint, he manifested an intense passion. As far as I can remember, he said, " You have disarmed us to-day. If you act up to your words, well and good, but if not——!! " Here by an obvious effort he pulled himself up and walked away from us abruptly.

Photo: L.N.A.

RORY O'CONNOR.

The Republican leader, whose defence of the Four Courts led to the destruction of the building and to the loss of many papers and manuscripts of historical interest. Rory O'Connor surrendered with his followers, and later, after a term of imprisonment, was shot without trial, together with three of his leading associates, as a reprisal for the shooting by irreconcilables of two members of the Dail.

Resolve of the Government.

The Cabinet, supported by the House of Commons, were resolved that whatever happened Rory O'Connor must be put out of the Four Courts. The only question was when and how; and this must be promptly settled. Orders were actually sent to General Macready. However, this officer prudently, and as it turned out fortunately, counselled delay: and at this darkest hour in Ireland came daybreak. On June 27 Rory O'Connor's band, ranging cheerfully through the streets of Dublin, kidnapped General O'Connell, Commander-in-Chief of the Free State Army. Michael Collins, under the pressure of this event and having doubtless learned that if he did not march, we would, determined to attack the Four Courts at dawn.

Attack on the Four Courts.

All authority in Dublin was quaking, but he had his own following among the I.R.A. He asked for the loan of two eighteen-pounder guns from General Macready, and upon instructions from London these were delivered. He had one capable, resolute officer, Dalton by name, who had seen much service in France. This man fetched the guns from the British camp, and working them with his own hands and half a dozen untrained men, opened fire at 4 a.m. on June 28. Then followed one of those comic-tragic conflicts which were characteristic of the Free State Civil War. Both sides loved and respected each other as dear comrades in arms; both were ready to die if it could not possibly be avoided, but much more ready to expend ammunition than blood. Lavish rifle fire directed at the walls of buildings broke out, interspersed by expostulations and appeals to the higher nature of man. Commandant Dalton, half of whose gunners were wounded, continued to hurl shell into the Four Courts, and this cannonade was in fact the salute which celebrated the foundation of the Irish Free State.

Two more guns were asked for and

Photo: Central Press.

18-POUNDER IN ACTION NEAR THE FOUR COURTS.

The account given in the text of the steps taken to end Rory O'Connor's occupation of the Four Courts refers to the 18-pounders borrowed by Michael Collins from General Macready. Collins had only one trained gunner at his immediate disposal, an officer named Dalton, but Dalton, with the assistance of some untrained men, succeeded in bringing the guns into action.

supplied during the afternoon, and by evening all the ammunition, modestly limited to 200 rounds, was exhausted. It is surprising that at this crisis General Macready, who had so often shown good sense and comprehension, should have professed himself unable to supply any more. The Provisional Government were told they must wait until a destroyer from Carrickfergus could arrive with further supplies of high-explosive shells. On receiving this news, they very nearly collapsed. Frantic appeals and threats were made to me that night over the telephone, and every resource was used to hasten the supply. It appeared, however, that the Commander-in-Chief was unwilling to encroach even for a few hours upon the ample supplies of his defended camp. Two or three hundred rounds would have been ample. His sixteen batteries had nearly 10,000 shells of various natures of which half were high explosive.

On the 30th, the Free Staters having with great circumspection gained a footing in a portion of the Four Courts, Rory O'Connor set it on fire and after an explosion, which caused some loss of life, surrendered with his followers. A mass of papers of legal importance and of historical interest, some of them dating from the thirteenth century, were destroyed, and the dome of the building collapsed amid its ruins. Fighting went on for several days in Sackville Street and became fiercer as it progressed; but by July 5 all rebels actually in arms against the Provisional Government had surrendered.

A Decisive Effort.

This week's fighting was the decisive event in the birth struggles of the Irish Free State. When reduced to the last gasp that infant organism had reacted timorously but violently, and had gained new strength with every effort. A hard line was now drawn between friend and foe, and mortal hatreds were exchanged. The Provisional Government, menaced by imminent assassination, fortified themselves under trusty guards in Merrion Square. They lived together for some

weeks without ever returning to their homes. Mr. Kevin O'Higgins told me some years later how some of them sat one evening in an angle of the roof for a little fresh air; how in lighting a cigarette he inadvertently raised himself for a few moments above the parapet, and how the bullet from a neighbouring house cut the cigarette from his fingers. But these men, although deeply troubled in their souls, were courageous and hot-blooded; and driven as they had been into a corner with their lives at stake—and far more than their lives, the cause they had conducted so far—they hit back with primordial freedom.

On July 12 they issued a proclamation threatening drastic reprisals against all attempts at murder; they nominated a War Council under Michael Collins, and set on foot active aggressive operations against their enemies all over Ireland. Thus began the Free State Civil War. It was a very curious war, conducted by a few people who knew each other extremely well; who knew where to find each other and what the other man was likely to do in given circumstances. Collins and his adherents set to work to hunt down and kill those who knew they were compassing their destruction. In this guerilla most of the best-known gunmen lost their lives.

Letter to Mr. Collins.

Mr. Churchill to Mr. Collins.

Private and Personal.

July 7, 1922.

I have not troubled you during these anxious days and have confined my messages to your practical requirements. But the events which have taken place since you opened fire on the Four Courts seem to me to have in them the possibilities of very great hope for the peace and ultimate unity of Ireland, objects both of which are very dear to your British co-signatories. I feel this has been a terrible ordeal for you and your colleagues, having regard to all that has happened in the past. But I believe that the action you have taken with so much resolution and coolness was indispensable if Ireland was to be saved from anarchy and the Treaty from destruction. We had reached the end of our tether over here at the same time as you had in Ireland. I could not have sustained another debate in the House of Commons on the old lines without fatal consequences to the existing governing instrument in Britain, and with us the Treaty would have fallen too. Now all is changed. Ireland will be mistress in her own house, and we over here are in a position to safeguard your Treaty rights and further your legitimate interests effectually.

As soon as you have established the authority of the Irish Free State throughout the twenty-six Counties, as I do not doubt you will in a short time, and have placed yourself and your colleagues at the head of the great mass of the Irish nation, a new phase will begin far more hopeful than any we have hitherto experienced. In this phase the objective must be the unity of Ireland. How and when this can be achieved I cannot tell, but it is surely the goal towards which we must all look steadfastly. There will be tremendous difficulties, vexations and repulses, and no doubt any premature hope will be disappointed. But I have a strong feeling that the top of the hill has been reached, and that we shall find the road easier in the future than in the past. We must endeavour to use the new strength and advantages which are available to secure broad solutions. Minor irritations, however justifiable, must not be allowed to obstruct us or lead us off the track. Craig and Londonderry are coming over here on the 13th. I have not worried them with the various complaints, some of which are undoubtedly justified, contained in your letter of the 28th June.

The Viceroy has reserved the Bill abolishing Proportional Representation in the North for the Royal Assent, which means that we shall have time to talk it all over. Otherwise I wish to keep the ground clear in the hopes of a general return at the right moment to the governing idea of the Collins–Craig pact. You remember how Mr. Griffith wrote it all over the blotting pad in my room. There is the key to the new situation. We must wait till the right moment comes and not fritter away growing advantages by premature efforts.

Photo: Central Press.

THE FOUR COURTS DURING THE ACTION.

Dublin suffered severely as a result of the frequent outbreaks of street fighting which punctuated the years of the Irish troubles. Many houses and public buildings were destroyed by fire or damaged by bombardment or by rifle fire.

Photo: Central Press.

AND AFTER THE SURRENDER OF THE DEFENDERS.

The Four Courts, as can be judged from the photographs reproduced on this page, were reduced to ruins. Other public buildings destroyed in 1916 or in 1922 included the Post Office and the Customs House. Sackville Street, now O'Connell Street, sustained serious damage in both risings.

I will write to you after I have seen Craig and Londonderry again. I think I can get a better result in friendly conversation about your various complaints than by nagging them in official correspondence.

Meanwhile, in the intervals of grappling with revolt and revolution, I think you should turn over in your mind what would be the greatest offer the South could make for Northern co-operation. Of course, from the Imperial point of view there is nothing we should like better than to see North and South join hands in an all-Ireland assembly without prejudice to the existing rights of either. Such ideas would be vehemently denounced in many quarters at the moment, but events in the history of nations sometimes move very quickly. The Union of South Africa, for instance, was achieved on a wave of impulse. The prize is so great that other things should be subordinated to gaining it. The bulk of people are slow to take in what is happening, and prejudices die hard. Plain folk must have time to take things in and adjust their minds to what has happened. Even a month or two may produce enormous changes in pubic opinion.

Please give my good wishes to Mr. Griffith and show him this letter if you will.

P.S. I hope you are taking good care of yourself and your colleagues. The times are very dangerous.

Letter to Sir James Craig.

Mr. Churchill to Sir James Craig.

Private and Personal.

July 7, 1922.

Very great events have taken place in Southern Ireland since we last met, and I am sure you will have been pondering over their consequences. The framing of a satisfactory Constitution for the Irish Free State; the clear wish of the Irish people recorded at the polls in spite of so many difficulties; the determined suppression by force of arms of the Republicans in Dublin and the campaign against them now being launched all over the country, particularly in Donegal; and lastly, the appeal made to Irishmen generally to come forward in support of the Government—all these constitute a series of stepping-stones towards a far better state of affairs than we had any right to hope for a few weeks ago.

I know you and Charlie[1] will be on the look out on your side for anything that can turn these favourable events to the general and lasting profit of Ireland and of the Empire. We want quiet and we want time, in order that the new situation may sink into people's minds and in order that the superior solutions which may now be possible may occur naturally to many people.

I see all your difficulties over the Boundary Commission, and as you know we have on two occasions got Collins to agree to alternative methods of procedure. It may well be that after he has won his fight in the South he will be in a position to make you a much broader offer which will render the intervention of the Boundary Commission unnecessary, and which will secure the effective co-operation in your Government of all the best of the Catholic elements in Ulster. Meanwhile I trust you will not have to make any references to the subject of the Boundary Commission which might suggest the possibility of a conflict between you and H.M. Government. We really have got to work these things out together, and I feel increasingly hopeful that we shall succeed.

I do not want to hurry you in any way, and I feel that we must see quite clearly what the results of the fighting in the South are going to be. It may carry the Provisional Government very far. Once the position is appreciated and forces are raised with definite aims and principles, people's minds are changed very much; a gulf opens between them and their past. I always live in hopes that we may come back again to your suggestion of the Craig–Collins pact to stand together and settle all the outstanding issues in accord. This seems to me to be all the more possible now that you seem to be getting increasing control of the situation in Ulster and now that Collins has definitely drawn the sword.

I do not bother you with minor matters in this letter, although there are several

[1] Lord Londonderry.

outstanding which cause me anxiety. These we can discuss when we meet, but I feel that we must be on the look out for an opportunity to deal with the situation on much broader lines than have hitherto been possible.

Deaths of Griffith and Collins.

Death was soon to lay its hands upon the two principal signatories of the Irish Treaty. Arthur Griffith died of heart failure, so it is established, on August 13, and Collins himself, moving audaciously about the country rallying and leading his supporters in every foray, was killed in an ambush on August 22. The presentiment of death had been strong upon him for some days, and he only narrowly escaped several murderous traps. He sent me a valedictory message through a friend for which I am grateful: "Tell Winston we could never have done anything without him." His funeral was dignified by the solemn ritual of the Roman Catholic Church and by every manifestation of public sorrow. Then Silence. But his work was done. Successor to a sinister inheritance, reared among fierce conditions and moving through ferocious times, he supplied those qualities of action and personality without which the foundation of Irish nationhood would not have been re-established.

Cosgrave and O'Higgins.

The void left by the deaths of Griffith and Collins was not unfilled. A quiet, potent figure stood in the background sharing, like Griffith, the dangers of the rebel leaders without taking part in all that they had done. In Cosgrave the Irish people found a chief of higher quality than any who had yet appeared. To the courage of Collins he added the matter-of-fact fidelity of Griffith and a knowledge of practical administration and State policy all his own. At his side rose the youthful Kevin O'Higgins, a figure out of antiquity cast in bronze.

These men restored order in Ireland by ancient methods and with no great effusion of blood. The people in their turmoil, confusion, and distress felt the stimulus of a will-power calm, intense, and ruthless. The attempt to break down the Dail by murdering its Members individually was countered in the following way. On two Deputies being shot almost on the steps of the Parliament House, Rory O'Connor and three of his leading associates were awakened and shot without trial on a December morning. They had been residing in easy confinement in Mountjoy Prison since their surrender at the Four Courts. They met their fate with equal astonishment and fortitude. A year before Rory O'Connor had been best man at the wedding of Kevin O'Higgins. It is evident that those who judge these events in future time will have to do so with comprehension of the stresses and strange conditions of this period of convulsion.

The Corner Turned.

Mr. Churchill to Mr. Cope.

August 23.

Following for Cosgrave, Duggan and the Provisional Government :—

I take the earliest opportunity in this hour of tragedy for Ireland and of intense difficulty for the Irish Provisional Government of assuring you of the confidence which is felt by the British Government that the Treaty position will be faithfully and resolutely maintained. The death of the two principal signatories, the retirement of another and the desertion of a fourth, in no way affects the validity and sanctity of the settlement entered into with the plenipotentiaries of the Irish nation. On the contrary we are sure that the Provisional Government and the Irish people will feel it all the more a sacred duty to carry into full effect the act of reconciliation between the two islands which was the life-work of the dead Irish leaders, and with which their names will be imperishably associated. For our part the word of Britain has been passed and is inviolable. We hold ourselves bound on the Treaty basis and will meet good faith with good faith and goodwill with goodwill to the end. You, as acting Chairman of the Provisional Government, and your civil colleagues and your high military officers, may count on the fullest measure of co-operation and support from us in any way that is required.

Another man of distinction, ability and courage fell a victim. Erskine Childers, author of *The Riddle of the Sands*, who had shown daring and ardour against the Germans in the Cuxhaven raid of New Year's Day, 1915, had espoused the Irish cause with even more than Irish irreconcilability. He, too, was shot for rebellion against the Free State. Said Kevin O'Higgins in public with severity, "If Englishmen come to Ireland looking for excitement, we will see that they get it." He died with the utmost composure. Kevin O'Higgins himself was also in after years to fall by the bullet.

The Future.

Before these closing tragedies I had ceased to be connected with Anglo-Irish affairs; but when the Coalition Government resigned at the end of October, 1922, the strength and power of the Irish Free State was firmly erected upon the basis of the Treaty. One of the first decisions of Mr. Bonar Law's Cabinet was that the Treaty should be made good in letter and in spirit; and this has guided all later British Administrations. Who cares to predict the future?

Britain is free and Ireland is lonely. Ireland is poor, and Britain is still ploughing through the sombre consequences of Armageddon. Ireland as a Dominion within the British Commonwealth of Nations has much to give to her neighbour and much to withhold from her. No one can expect that the hatred and prejudices of centuries will pass away in the passage of our short lives. But that they will pass away in the merciful oblivion of time and in the recuperative fruitfulness of nature seems to be a good and fair hope. Fifty years of peaceful association and new growth must bring the study of common interests increasingly into prominence.

In the undying words of Grattan: "The Channel forbids union; the Ocean forbids separation." Two ancient races, founders in great measure of the British Empire and the United States, intermingled in a thousand ways across the world, and with the old cause of quarrel ended, must gradually try to help and not to harm each other. It may well be that a reward is appointed for all and that an Ireland reconciled within itself and to Great Britain will on some high occasion claim to guide the onward march, and offer to the British Empire and perhaps to the English-speaking world solutions for our problems otherwise beyond our reach.

Photo: Central Press.

WHERE MICHAEL COLLINS FELL.

The firing party at a service held in memory of Michael Collins. The service was attended by all the Irish leader's old comrades. They are seen standing in line before the cross which marks the spot where he was killed.

CHAPTER XCV

TURKEY ALIVE

" Vote it as you please. There is a company of poor men who will shed their last drop of blood, before they see it settled so."—OLIVER CROMWELL.

Turkey before the War—The Offer of the Allies—The Pan-Turks—Enver—German-Turkish Plans—The Requisition of the Turkish Battleships—The *Goeben*—Enver's *Coup d'État* : The Final Crash—After the Armistice—American Criticism—President Wilson's Commission—Insurgence and Paralysis—A Deadly Step—The Greek Descent on Smyrna—Turkey Alive—Justice Changes Camps—Headlines—Ferid—The Melting of the Armies—Restrictions and Illusions—Talks About Constantinople—Cabinet Decision—The Treaty of Sèvres—The March of Facts—Attack on the Ismid Peninsula—My Letter of March 24.

NO State plunged into the World War so wilfully as Turkey.[1]

Turkey before the War.

The Ottoman Empire was in 1914 already moribund. Italy, using sea power, had invaded and annexed Tripoli in 1909, and a desultory warfare was still proceeding in the interior of this province, when the Balkan States in 1912 drew the sword upon their ancient conqueror and tyrant. Important provinces and many islands were ceded by the defeated Turkish Empire in the Treaty of London, and the division of the spoils became a new cause of bloodshed among the Balkan victors. Rich prizes still remained in European Turkey to tempt the ambition or satisfy the claims of Roumania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece ; and through all Constantinople glittered as the supreme goal.

But imminent as were the dangers of the Turkish Empire from the vengeance and ambition of the Balkan States, nothing could supplant in the Turkish mind the fear of Russia. Russia was in contact with Turkey by land and water along a thousand-mile frontier which stretched from the western shores of the Black Sea to the Caspian. England, France and Italy (Sardinia) in the Crimean War, the exceptional power of England under Disraeli in 1878, had preserved the Turkish Empire from ruin and Constantinople from conquest. Although before the Balkan Allies quarrelled among themselves, the Bulgarians had marched to the gates of Constantinople from the west, the sense of peril from the north still ou weighed all else in Turkish thoughts.

To this was added the antagonism of the Arab race in the Yemen, the Hedjaz, Palestine, Syria, Mosul and Iraq. The population of Kurdistan and the widely distributed Armenian race were estranged. From every quarter the nations and races who for five or six hundred years had waged war against the Turkish Empire or had suffered the fate of Turkish captives, turned their gaze in a measureless hatred and hunger upon the dying empire from which they had endured so much so long.

The hour of retribution and restoration was at hand ; and the only doubt was how long could the busily spun webs of European diplomacy, and particularly of English diplomacy, postpone the final reckoning. The imminent collapse of the Turkish Empire, like the progressive decay and disruption of the Austrian Empire, arising from forces beyond human control, had loosened the whole foundations of eastern and south-eastern Europe. Change—violent, vast, incalculable, but irresistible and near, brooded over the hearths and institutions of 120 millions of people.

[1] See map of Turkey on page 1577.

It was at this hour and on this scene that Germany had launched her army to the invasion of France through Belgium, and all other quarrels had re-aligned themselves in accordance with the supreme struggle. What was to happen to scandalous, crumbling, decrepit and penniless Turkey in this earthquake ?

The Offer of the Allies.

She received what seemed to British eyes the most favourable offer ever made to any government in history. She was guaranteed at the price merely of maintaining her neutrality the absolute integrity of all her dominions. She was guaranteed this upon the authority not only of her friends, France and Britain, but on that of her enemy, Russia. The guarantee of France and England would have protected Turkey from the Balkan States, and especially Greece ; the guarantee of Russia suspended to indefinite periods the overhanging menace from the north. The influence of Britain could largely allay and certainly postpone the long rising movement of the Arabs. Never, thought the Allies, was a fairer proposition made to a weaker and more imperilled State.

But there was another side to the picture. Within the decaying fabric of the Turkish Empire and beneath the surface of its political affairs lay fierce, purposeful forces both in men and ideas. The disaster of the first Balkan War created from these elements a concealed, slow-burning fire of strange intensity unrealized by all the embassies along the shores of the Bosphorus—all save one. " During this time " (the years before the Great War), wrote a profoundly informed Turk in 1915, " the whole future of the Turkish people was examined by committees down to the smallest details."[1]

The Pan-Turks.

The Pan-Turk Committee accepted the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 as a definite alliance between the Power who had been Turkey's strongest and most disinterested supporter and friend with the Power who was her ancient and inexorable enemy. They therefore looked elsewhere for help in the general European war which they were convinced was approaching.

Their plan, which seemed in 1913 merely visionary, was based upon the re-creation of Turkey on a solely Turkish human foundation : to wit, the Turkish peasantry of Anatolia. It contemplated as a national ideal the uniting of the Moslem areas of Caucasia, the Persian province of Azerbaijan, and the Turkish Trans-Caspian provinces of Russia (the homeland of the Turkish race) with the Turks of the Anatolian peninsula ; and the extension of Turkey into the Caspian Basin. It included the rejection of theocratic government ; a radical change of relationship between Church and State ; the diversion of the " Pious Foundations " endowments to the secular needs of the State, and a rigorous disciplining of the professional religious classes. It included also the startling economic, social and literary changes which have recently been achieved in Turkey. Mustapha Kemal has, in fact, executed a plan decided upon, and to which he may well have been a party, twenty-one years ago. The centre point of all the Pan-Turk schemes was the use of Germany to rid Turkey of the Russian danger. Marschall von Bieberstein, for so many years German Ambassador at Constantinople, nursed these hidden fires with skilful hands.

Enver.

Pan-Turkish schemes might have remained in dreamland but for the fact that in a fateful hour there stood almost at the head of Turkey a man of action. A would-be Turkish Napoleon, in whose veins surged warrior blood, by his individual will, vanity and fraud was destined to launch the Turkish Empire upon its most audacious adventure. Enver, the German-trained but Turkish-hearted subaltern, had " thrown his cap over the fence " (to quote himself) as the signal for the Young Turk Revolution in 1909. Together with his handful of Young Turk friends forming the Committee of Union and Progress, he had

[1] *Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideals*, by " Tekin Alp." First published in German, 1915.

faced all the gathering foes. When Italy had seized Tripoli, it was in the deserts of Tripoli that Enver had fought; when the armies of Balkan Allies were at the lines of Chatalja, it was Enver who had never despaired. "Adrianople," said Mr. Asquith, then Prime Minister in 1912, "will never be restored to Turkey." But Enver entered Adrianople within a month, and Adrianople is Turkish to-day. The outbreak of the Great War saw Enver with his associate, Talaat, and his skilful and incorruptible Finance Minister, Djavid, in control of Turkish affairs. Above them, an imposing façade, were the Sultan and the Grand Vizier: but these men and their adherents were the unquestioned governing power, and of them Enver in all action was the explosive force.[1]

German-Turkish Plans.

The Turkish leaders rated the might of Russia for the rough and tumble of a general war far lower than did the western allies of the Czar. They were convinced that the Germanic group would win the war on land, that Russia would be severely mauled and that a revolution would follow. Turkey would secure in the moment of a German victory gains in territory and population in the Caucasus which would at least ward off the Russian danger for several generations. In the long preliminary discussions Germany promised Turkey territorial satisfaction in the Caucasus in the event of a victory by the Central Powers. This promise was decisive upon Turkish policy.

The policy of the Pan-Turks in every sphere of Turkish life and their territorial ambitions were embodied in a definite war plan. This plan required as its foundation the Turkish command of the Black Sea. Whenever the Great War should come—as come they were sure it must—and Russia was at grips with Germany and Austria, the Pan-Turks intended to invade and conquer the Caucasus. The control of the sea route from Constantinople to Trebizond was indispensable to an advance from Trebizond to Erzeroum. Hence Turkey must have a navy.

Popular subscriptions opened in 1911 and 1912 throughout Anatolia, and even throughout Islam, provided the money for the building for Turkey in Great Britain of two dreadnoughts. The arrival of one at least of these battleships at Constantinople was the peg upon which the whole Turkish war plan hung. The supreme question in July, 1914, among the Turkish leaders was: Would the ships arrive in time? Obviously the margin was small. The first Turkish dreadnought, the *Reshadieh*, was due for completion in July; the second, a few weeks later. Already Turkish agents in Russian territory round Olti, Ardahan and Kars were busy arranging for the hoarding of corn crops by the Moslem Turkish peasantry who formed the bulk of the population, in order to make possible the advance of the Turkish columns down the valley of the Chorukh and against the Russian rear. On July 27 a secret defensive and offensive alliance between Germany and Turkey against Russia was proposed by Turkey, accepted forthwith by Germany, and signed on August 2. The mobilization of the Turkish Army was ordered on July 31.

The Requisition of the Turkish Battleships.

But now came a surprise. England suddenly assumed an attitude of definite resistance to Germany. The British fleets had put to sea in battle order. On July 28 I requisitioned both the Turkish dreadnoughts for the Royal Navy. A Turkish transport with five hundred Turkish sailors on board lay in the Tyne ready to take over the first. The Turkish Captain demanded delivery of the vessel, and threatened to board her and hoist the Turkish flag. In these tremendous days (July 31) I gave orders on my own responsibility that this was to be prevented, and that any attempt at seizure by the Turks should be resisted if necessary by armed force.

I took this action solely for British naval purposes. The addition of the two Turkish dreadnoughts to the British Fleet

[1] I happened to know all these men personally. I had met Enver at the German manœuvres in 1910. Talaat and Djavid had been our hosts when, with Lord Birkenhead, I visited Constantinople in 1909.

seemed vital to national safety. No one in the Admiralty, nor, so far as I know, in England, had any knowledge of the Turkish designs or of the part these ships were to play in them. We builded better than we knew. I was later in the year criticized in some quarters for having requisitioned the Turkish ships. The rage and disappointment excited thereby throughout Turkey was said to have turned the scale and provoked Turkey into war against us. We now know the inner explanation of this disappointment. The requisitioning of these ships, so far from making Turkey an enemy, nearly made her an Ally.

The *Goeben*.

But there still remained to the Turks one hope: the *Goeben*. This fast German battle-cruiser was in the western Mediterranean under peace time orders to refit at Pola in the Adriatic. She was in herself sufficient to dominate the Russian squadron in the Black Sea. Would the Germans send the *Goeben* back to Constantinople? Would she get there? It was at this moment that the news of the British ultimatum to Germany, carrying with it the certainty of a British declaration of war, reached Constantinople.

The Turkish realists had never counted on such an event. It transformed the naval situation in the Mediterranean. Could the *Goeben* escape the numerous British flotillas and cruiser squadrons and the three more powerful though less speedy British battle-cruisers which lay between her and the sea? When on the night of August 3 Enver learned that the *Goeben* was under orders to escape up the Adriatic to Pola, his anxiety knew no bounds. He immediately sought the Russian military attaché, General Leontev, and casting all previous schemes to the wind, including the agreement he had signed with Germany the day before, proposed to this astonished officer an alliance between Turkey and Russia on various conditions including Turkish compensations in western Thrace. Whether the Germans realized that they would never be forgiven by the Pan-Turks unless the *Goeben* made an effort to reach Constantinople, or whether it was already part of their war plan, fresh orders to go to Constantinople were at this moment (August 3) being sent by Admiral Tirpitz to the *Goeben* then about to coal at Messina; and after events which are well known she reached the Dardanelles on the 10th and was, after some parley, admitted to the Sea of Marmora.

Enver's *Coup d'État*: The Final Crash.

Enver's confidence was now restored, for the command of the Black Sea rested potentially with the Turks. But the certain hostility of Great Britain was serious, in view of her naval supremacy and the undefended condition of the Dardanelles. Moreover Italy had unexpectedly separated herself from the Triple Alliance. It might therefore perhaps be prudent for Turkey to see how the impending great battles on land, and especially those upon the Russian front, were decided. Meanwhile the mobilization of the Turkish Army could proceed unostentatiously and be justified as a precautionary measure. Thus there followed a period lasting for about three months of Turkish hesitation and delay, having the effect of consummate duplicity. I can recall no great sphere of policy about which the British Government was less completely informed than the Turkish. It is strange to read the telegrams we received through all channels from Constantinople during this period in the light of our present knowledge.

But all the Allies, now encouraged by the friendly assurances of the Grand Vizier and the respectable-effete section of the Cabinet, now indignant at the refusal to intern and disarm the *Goeben* and generally mystified by many contradictory voices, believed that Turkey had no policy and might still be won or lost. This period was ended when Enver in November, acting as the agent of all the Pan-Turk forces, delivered the unprovoked attack by the *Goeben* and the Turkish Fleet upon the Russian Black Sea ports, and thus plunged Turkey brutally into the war.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

NAVAL RATINGS ON THE GALATA TOWER.

Turkey's defeat upon the battlefields in 1918 resulted in the occupation of Constantinople by Great Britain, France and Italy. The Allies remained there until October, 1923. British sailors are seen here on duty in the signal station at the top of the Galata tower.

What followed has been to some extent recounted in this narrative.

Turkey was animated, guided, and upheld during the struggle for four years by the German military and intellectual power. She contended with varying success against Russia in the Caucasus, but the British Empire became her greatest foe. The main strength of the Turkish Army was broken on the Gallipoli Peninsula by British and Australasian forces. The British invasion of Mesopotamia, though marked by notable Turkish victories, advanced remorselessly up the Tigris. Lawrence raised and led the Arab revolt in the desert. Allenby, with an Anglo-Indian Army of a quarter of a million, conquered Palestine and entered Syria. Although the French had commanded on the Salonican Front, and a French General presided over the advance upon Constantinople from the west, the conviction of the Turks at the Armistice was that they had been destroyed by England. Certainly three-quarters of the Turks killed in the Great War had fallen to the bullets and bayonets of the British Empire, and well they knew the slaughter they had inflicted upon this old friend and misjudged antagonist without mitigating his hostile energy.

When the Hindenburg Line and Germany broke, all Turkish resistance fell flat on the ground. Turkey, prostrate, looked up and saw with relief that her conquerors were British. "We have made a great mistake; we have chosen the wrong side; we were forced into it by Enver and Talaat, but they have now fled. We sincerely regret what has occurred. How could we tell that the United States would go to war with Germany; or that Great Britain would become a first-class military Power? Such prodigies are beyond human foresight. No one ought to blame us for being so misled. Of course we must

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE ALLIED FLEET IN THE BOSPHORUS.

Earlier in this narrative is a full account of the many attempts made by ships of the British and French navies to force a passage through the Dardanelles. Submarines alone were successful in penetrating the defences of the Straits, although evidence since made available proves that on at least one occasion, in 1915 Admiral de Robeck, had he known how scanty was the Turkish ammunition, could have brushed aside the remaining obstacles and steamed into the Sea of Marmora. In the sad event thousands laid down their lives before the Allied ships, shown here firing a salute in the Bosphorus, were to drop anchor in view of the Turkish capital.

be punished, but let us be chastised by our old friend, England." Such was the mood of Turkey for two or three months after the armistice of Mudros on October 30, which ended the Great War in the east.

After the Armistice.

In Lord Curzon's words :—

"At the time the Peace Conference assembled, the Allied Powers were in possession of Constantinople, where the Turkish Government, if not cowed, was subservient. Our military power in the occupied Turkish regions of Asia was sufficient to enable us to enforce not merely the agreed terms of the Armistice but also any supplementary terms that were found necessary. The British were in secure possession of Mesopotamia up to and including Mosul. . . . The British position in Persia was, both in a military and political sense, extraordinarily strong. We were still in Trans-Caspia, but were contemplating an immediate retirement, since accomplished. The Caspian was in our hands and was being made the base of naval action against Bolshevik forces. British divisions occupied the entire Caucasus, from the Black Sea to the Caspian, and provided the only guarantees for peace . . . between the rival peoples: Georgians, Armenians, Tartars, Daghastanis, and Russians. . . .

"In Asia Minor (outside the region of British military occupation) no Allied forces had appeared. The fate of Armenia was undecided, the bulk of the Armenians being fugitives from their country. Apart from Armenia, and possibly Cilicia, the partition of Asia Minor was not even contemplated. In Syria a more critical condition existed, owing to the difficulty of reconciling the aspirations of the French with the hard facts of the Arab situation and the insistence of the French

on the letter of the unfortunate Sykes-Picot Agreement. In Palestine the interests of the Arab population and the Zionist immigrants appeared to be capable of reconciliation and everything pointed to an early mandate for Great Britain with the consent of both. Egypt was still quiet."

In a situation of this kind, broad, clear, and above all, swift decisions were needful. Every day's delay in these loosely knit but inflammable communities was loaded with danger. There had already been two months' delay; and all over this immense area, once the seat of ancient wealth and civilizations, and now filled with fierce and fanatical peoples largely armed, everyone was asking, "What has happened and what have we got to do?" But the victorious statesmen in Paris had for them no answer. They had to come to grips and understanding with each other. They had to explain to America what, as far as they knew, was happening in Europe. They had to face the vehement demands of France that once her armies had reached the Rhine, they should never have to give it up. They had to mete out what they considered justice and judgment to Germany, and stand on guard with their armies to enforce what they might prescribe. And around them welled and mounted the flood of confusion.

American Criticism.

President Wilson and the American Peace Delegation and Staffs were all under the impression of the Secret Treaties, and of their superior virtue in not being a party to any of them. In the Middle East they were indeed "the only disinterested Power." This fact was undoubtedly helpful, for much of the Secret Treaties made, as has been described, in the pangs of war, had to be swept out of the way. The influence of President Wilson and the United States, uncompromised and at the same time most weighty, was just the new element needed to make a good and practical review and settlement possible. It was a tragedy that President Wilson in action did not keep a closer grip upon the realities. He rendered valuable, he had it in his power to render invaluable services.

So President Wilson said that:—

"The point of view of the United States of America was indifferent to the claims both of Great Britain and of France over peoples unless those peoples wanted them. One of the fundamental principles to which the United States of America adhered was the consent of the

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

BRITISH MILITARY POLICEMAN IN CONSTANTINOPLE.

A familiar scene during the Allied occupation of Constantinople. A British soldier on police duty regulating the tramway service in one of the streets of the city.

governed. This was ingrained in the thought of the United States of America. Hence . . . the United States wanted to know whether France would be agreeable to the Syrians. The same applied as to whether Great Britain would be agreeable to the inhabitants of Mesopotamia. It might not be his business, but if the question was made his business owing to the fact that it was brought before the Conference, the only way to deal with it was to discover the desire of the population of these regions.

President Wilson's Commission.

He therefore suggested a Commission of Inquiry in Turkey and he gave his opinion of what they should do.[1]

"Their object should be to elucidate the state of opinion and the soil to be worked on by any mandatory. They should be asked to come back and tell the Conference what they found in this matter. . . . It would . . . convince the world that the Conference had tried to find the most scientific basis of settlement. . . . The Commission should be composed of an equal number of French, British, Italian and American representatives. They would be sent out with *carte blanche* to tell the facts as they found them."

"The President," says Mr. Baker, "was most enthusiastic and urgent in pressing this idea."

Now nothing could be more plausible than this request. In fact, we know in domestic politics that when matters are complicated and tempers are rising, the usual household remedy is to appoint a committee or a Royal Commission. And this remedy is very often efficacious. Although the problem is not solved by the Commission, although the Commission are probably less competent to solve it than the responsible Ministers, in a great many cases a long delay, the patient taking of evidence and the resulting ponderous Blue Book, make it probable that the problem will be presented in a different and peradventure a less acute form. It was natural that President Wilson should propose this device, and inevitable that the sharply divided Powers should acquiesce in it. Certainly no blame can attach to anyone.

But the nations concerned would not stand so long at the footstool of undecided power, and of all the processes likely to rouse their passion, none was more apt than the peripatetic Commission of Inquiry making a roving progress in search of truth through all the powder magazines of the Middle East with a notebook in one hand and a lighted cigarette in the other. Anyone could see how sensible and right President Wilson was, and how well his proposal would have suited a political difficulty in the United States or in Great Britain. But of course in the circumstances and the atmosphere it was simply a means of preparing explosions.

Statesmen in a crisis, like generals or admirals in war, have often to take fateful decisions without knowing a very large proportion of the essential facts. It is hard to do this, but anything is better than not taking decisions at all. To stroll around among masses of disorganized, infuriated, people, asking them what they think about it and what they would like, is the most sure and certain method of breeding strife. When one is helping in affairs which one does not understand and in which one is scarcely at all interested, a mood of elevated and airy detachment easily dominates the mind. "Let us have all the facts unfolded before we take our decision. Let us know where we are. Let us ascertain the wishes of the population." How prudent and correct it all sounds! But before the Commission, on which in the end only America was represented, had gone a third of the way through the sphere of their studies, almost all the peoples concerned were in armed revolt and almost all the Allied troops had gone home.

Insurgence and Paralysis.

However, from the date of the appointment of the Commission the whole of the Middle East was placed under an indefinite decree of hesitancy and investigation. When from day to day a dozen harsh local problems, all expressed in terms of people shooting one another, were presented to the British Public

[1] Stannard Baker, Vol. I, p. 76.

Departments concerned, the only Minute which could be written by any official was, " These matters must wait until the Inter-Allied Commission has completed its inquiry." So the friendly elements kept on marking time and asking questions, and the unfriendly elements loaded their rifles and made plans.

A Deadly Step.

But all this might have subsided and come back into hand but for one act, positive, aggressive, and by every standard of statecraft wrong. The claims and ambitions of Italy to lay hands upon the Turkish Empire outstripped the boldest imagination. And Italy lost no time in startling Paris with proof that she would back her aims with deeds. The decision to send a commission to the east to which Italy was a party had scarcely been taken, when the Italians, on the pretext of a local riot, seized Adalia and at the same time officially complained that the Greeks were making preparations for a descent upon Smyrna. The Greeks on their side cried out that the Italian action at Adalia was only a prelude to an encroachment upon the sphere of Greek aspirations.

Towards the end of April it was reported that the Italians had landed small parties of troops at Budrum, Makri and Alaya. At the same time the Triumvirate, attracted by the prestige and personality of Venizelos, was moving steadily towards assigning Smyrna with the Aidin Province to the Greeks. Smyrna and portions of its littoral had been populated extensively by Greeks for thousands of years. Its prosperity was largely attributable to their intelligence and to their industry and agriculture. As early as 1915 Mr. Asquith's Government had resolved that in any partition of Turkey, Greece if she took part in the war ought to have Smyrna. The Territorial Commission on Greece at the Peace Conference had by a majority, including British, French and American members, newly decided in favour of the Greek claim. President Wilson had definitely accepted that conclusion. The rumour of this intention had, however, roused the protests of the Smyrna European colony, and the American missionaries in Smyrna vied with the British High Commissioner at Constantinople in their separate simultaneous warnings against the perils of such a step.

The complete breach between President Wilson and the Italian delegation had at this moment led to the temporary withdrawal of Italy from the conference. In the ardour of his encounter with Signor Orlando it was natural that Wilson should lean to Greece. Here he found an only too eager sympathizer in the British Prime Minister. Clémenceau, preoccupied with the Rhine and the future of France, moved amicably with these two. Events now precipitated action. The reports that the Italians were going to seize Smyrna forcibly, combined with stories of Turkish maltreatment of the Greek population, provoked a deadly step. On May 5 the Triumvirate entertained the project that the Greeks should be allowed to occupy Smyrna forthwith for the purpose of protecting their compatriots there. Mr. Lloyd George asked for a decision that M. Venizelos might be authorized to send troops to be kept on board ship at Smyrna ready for landing in case of necessity. President Wilson asked why the troops should not be landed at once as the men did not keep in good condition on board ship. Mr. Lloyd George did not demur.

The Greek Descent on Smyrna.

The subject was dealt with again on May 10. The principle of the landing was, however, assumed to be settled and only practical details were discussed. Sir Henry Wilson was present on both occasions, but confined himself to the technical aspects. On the 12th a third meeting was held. Signor Orlando had now returned to the fold. He was assured that the future destination of Smyrna would not be prejudiced by a Greek occupation. It was an emergency measure for the protection of the Greek population. In accordance with Armistice conditions notice must be given to Turkey to surrender the Smyrna forts to British, French and Italian detachments. Signor Orlando, after consideration, made no objection in principle to the landing, but urged that the British,

Photo : Imperial War Museum.

GREEK TRANSPORT AT SMYRNA.

The occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks was a step destined to produce the most evil consequences. On May 15, 1919, the Greeks, with the consent of the Allies, descended upon Smyrna and disembarked from their transports some twenty thousand troops. As will be made clear in the text, this fatal excursion came near to plunging the Near East into widespread turmoil.

French and Italian detachments should not be withdrawn pending a final settlement. The decision of the Council of Four was that the Greek forces should start from Kavalla as soon as ready and that the Italian detachment should take part in the operations of the allied forces.

Venizelos is entitled to plead that in going to Smyrna he acted as mandatory for the four greatest Powers. But he went as readily as a duck will swim. Whatever the responsibilities of the Four or, rather, of the Triumvirate, for they were the moving force, his own are ineffaceable. He alone possessed the means of action. There could never have been any question of sending British, French or American troops except in symbolic detachments on such a mission. But Greek divisions were within swift and easy striking distance; and were straining at the leash. On May 15, in spite of serious warnings and protests from the British Foreign Office and War Office, twenty thousand Greek troops, covered by the fire of their warships, landed at Smyrna, killed a large number of Turks, occupied the city, advanced rapidly up the Smyrna-Aidin railway, had a bloody fight with Turkish troops and irregulars and the Turkish population of Aidin, and set up their standards of invasion and conquest in Asia Minor.

Turkey Alive.

I well remember the bewilderment and alarm with which I heard on a lovely afternoon in Paris of this fatal event. No doubt my personal views were affected by the consternation it produced upon the British General Staff. Making every allowance for the pro-Turk inclinations of the British military mind, it was impossible to excuse the imprudence of this violent act, which opened so many new perils when our resources were shrivelling. At the War Office we were not long in

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

SCENE DURING THE DISEMBARKATION.

The landing of Greek troops at Smyrna resulted immediately in the slaughter of a arge number of Turks, accompanied by an advance up the line of the Smyrna–Aidin railway. But worse was to follow. The Turks, always a warlike race, resented bitterly this intrusion, and the nation which but a week before was carrying out the obligations falling to the lot of a conquered people sprang to arms in a frenzy of resentment.

feeling its consequences. Our officers in twos and threes were all over Asia Minor supervising the surrender of armies and munitions as prescribed by the Armistice. They rode about freely and unarmed from place to place, and with their finger indicated what should be done. They were almost mechanically obeyed. Important "dumps" of rifles, machine guns, cannon and shells were being submissively piled up; Turkey was under the spell of defeat, and of deserved defeat. "Let us be punished by our old friend England." So the arms were stacked and the guns were parked and the shells were arranged in massive heaps as the accepted result of stricken fields and of conventions signed.

But from the moment that the Turkish nation—and, though Paris did not seem to know it, there was a nation—realized that it was not Britain and India and Allenby that they had to endure and for the time obey, but Greece, the hated and despised foe of generations—to their eyes a revolted province, certainly a frequently defeated opponent; from that moment, Turkey became uncontrollable. The British officers supervising the execution of the Armistice terms were first ignored, then insulted, then chased for their lives or flung into arduous captivity.[1] The "dumps" in which the equipment of considerable armies was already gathered passed in a week from British to Turkish control; and Mustapha Kemal, the Man of Destiny whom we have already met on the Gallipoli Peninsula in April and in

[1] Colonel Sir Alfred Rawlinson, brother of the renowned Commander of the Fourth Army, suffered the worst experiences. His personal account of a long bondage which shattered his health and nearly cost him his life is well worth reading.

August, 1915—till then almost a rebel against the Turkish Government at Constantinople,—was furnished with the power, as he already possessed the qualities, of a Warrior Prince.

Justice Changes Camps.

But more important than the recapture of arms and munitions were the moral advantages which flowed to his cause. We have explained how cold-blooded and malignant Turkish policy in the Great War had been, and how well founded were the grievances of the Allies against her. The ghastly fate of the Armenians has yet to be recorded. Nevertheless the whole attitude of the Peace Conference towards Turkey was so harsh that Right had now changed sides. Justice, that eternal fugitive from the councils of conquerors, had gone over to the opposite camp. Defeat, thought the Turks, must be accepted and its consequences must be borne: but the loosing of the Greek army into Asia Minor, at the very moment when Turkey was being disarmed, boded the destruction and death of the Turkish nation and their suppression and subjugation as a race among men.

On June 9, in the little town of Kharas near Amasia, Mustapha Kemal publicly expounded his plans for the salvation of Turkey. All the half raked-out fires of Pan-Turkism began to glow again. That Greeks should conquer Turks was not a decree of Fate which any Turk would recognize. Loaded with follies, stained with crimes, rotted with misgovernment, shattered by battle, worn down by long disastrous wars, his Empire falling to pieces around him, the

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

DUMP OF TURKISH WAR MATERIAL.

The closing months of 1918 saw Turkey beaten nto submission. The armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918, ended the war in the Near East. Henceforward in Turkey it remained but to gather in the spoils of war. Dumps of war material, one of which is seen here, were quickly formed as the Turks carried out the terms imposed upon them. The Greek adventure at Smyrna brought this orderly procedure to an end. Within a few days the dumps passed from British control, falling into the hands of Mustapha Kemal, and their few and scattered British custodians were driven off or thrown into prison.

Turk was still alive. In his breast was beating the heart of a race that had challenged the world, and for centuries had contended victoriously against all comers. In his hands was once again the equipment of a modern army, and at his head a Captain, who with all that is learned of him, ranks with the four or five outstanding figures of the cataclysm. In the tapestried and gilded chambers of Paris were assembled the law-givers of the world. In Constantinople, under the guns of the Allied Fleets there functioned a puppet Government of Turkey. But among the stern hills and valleys of "the Turkish Homelands" in Anatolia, there dwelt that company of poor men . . . who would not see it settled so; and at their bivouac fires at this moment sate in the rags of a refugee the august Spirit of Fair Play.

I cannot understand to this day how the eminent statesmen in Paris—Wilson, Lloyd George, Clémenceau and Venizelos—whose wisdom, prudence, and address had raised them under the severest tests so much above their fellows, could have been betrayed into so rash and fatal a step.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

TURKISH DOCKYARD: CONSTANTINOPLE.

A view, taken after the Armistice with Turkey, showing ships of the Turkish fleet interned. The Golden Horn is seen in the background.

Many will be surprised at the prominence which I give to the episode of the Greek invasion of Smyrna at the behest of the Allies. It has been my endeavour in this narrative to show the stepping-stones of fate. Out of an incomprehensible fecundity of violent and interesting facts and combinations of facts, I try to choose those that really mattered. Here then we have reached a new turning-point in the history of the peoples of the Middle East.

Headlines.

However, the meaning of Smyrna was obscured at the time from the public eye. There was so much to talk about, so many exciting and important things to do, so many rough and disagreeable episodes to record, so many high ideals to strive for, that the mere sending of a couple of Greek Divisions to Smyrna and the shooting of a few hundred Turks at the landing did not seem to make any impression upon public opinion in the principal Allied countries. The five hundred exceptionally able correspondents and writers who beset the purlieus of the Conference pumped out their eighty thousand words a night, and there were always plenty of headlines in all the leading newspapers with the largest circulations. No doubt among these headlines, "GREEK DIVISIONS LAND IN SMYRNA: *Turkish Resistance Overpowered,*" found its place. But next day there was something else. There

have to be headlines for every day. It was not the fault of the newspapers or of the public. Both were surfeited with sensation, and the public, though it read the newspapers, was busy building up its homes and businesses. They may well be granted "leave of absence on urgent private affairs."

Ferid.

We must now record chronologically a few events. The Young Turk leaders who had ruled Turkey from the revolution of 1910 to the end of the Great War were scattered and in exile. Enver, after desperate adventures and exploits in Turkestan, was to perish in the field. Talaat was to be shot dead in Berlin by an Armenian, who certainly had public cause for his revenge. Djavid was to be executed in 1926 by the triumphant Mustapha Kemal and to mount the scaffold "repeating the stanzas of an old Turkish poem."

A new figure, fleeting but recognizable, now appears in Turkish politics. Ferid Pasha had taken office on March 4, 1919, with a submissive policy and in close alliance with the Sultan. All around him in Constantinople were the warships and bayonets of the Allies. Out in the mountains of Asia Minor in sombre mood and half-mutinous attitude were the survivors and rank and file of the leaderless Committee of Union and Progress.

Between these two sets of compulsions Ferid held his balance precariously. He bowed and expostulated to the Allies and kept himself in friendly touch with the Nationalists. In protest against the occupation of Smyrna he resigned; he resumed office the same day. On June 7 he led a Peace Delegation to Paris to appeal for the lenient treatment of Turkey. He received a scathing reply from the Conference. On July 1 he appointed Mustapha Kemal Inspector-General to Northern Asia Minor. In August and September Mustapha Kemal convened congresses of eastern delegates at Erzeroum and Sivas. On September 11 the Sivas Congress published a manifesto of Turkish rights which subsequently formed the "National Pact," or solemn covenant of the new Turkey. By the end of September the authority of Constantinople did not extend beyond the shores of the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora. Even Brusa, an hour by rail from the Marmora shore, seceded to the Angora Government in October. Ferid resigned again to make way for a government half-way between the Sultan in the grip of the Allies, and Mustapha Kemal and his National Pact at Angora.

The Melting of the Armies.

Meanwhile our armies were melting fast. In January, 1919, the War Office had still nearly three million men abroad under its orders. In March it had two, and these in a rapid process of demobilization. By midsummer, 1919, apart from the forces on the Rhine, we had hardly any troops at all. The conscript and war-enrolled forces had to be sent home; the new permanent army was forming; and volunteers for professional military service were only gradually forthcoming. A year after the Armistice we counted in battalions of five or six hundred men, where we had previously disposed of divisions of fifteen or twenty thousand complete in every detail. It was very strange to watch the vast shrinkage of our military power, while at the same time the increase of danger and hostility in almost every quarter could be so plainly discerned. In December, 1919, I circulated to the Cabinet a general staff memorandum explaining how far our power had diminished and pointing out the disproportion between our policy and our strength.

Para. 3. (i) "It seems scarcely necessary to mention that the situation has changed considerably since the commencement of the Turkish Armistice on 31st October, 1918, both as regards the armed resources of His Majesty's Government and the political situation within the pre-war Turkish Empire. The British military contribution now available for enforcing peace terms, otherwise than in Palestine and Mesopotamia, is as follows:—

One division plus army troops (including garrison of Batum), comprising: British, 13,000; Indian, 18,000; a total of 31,000 combatants.

"The striking power of this force would

be practically limited to the railway system. And here the General Staff wish to observe that without resorting to the raising of fresh troops by conscription or other means no British reinforcements will be available for Turkey."

The General Staff proceed to express the hope that :—

"Only such terms will be seriously considered by His Majesty's Government, in the first place, as may be reasonably compatible with the resources which exist or which it may be intended to provide for their execution.

"Without going into detail or the political pros and cons of the various questions, the General Staff wish to record the following list of measures which may be advocated for various reasons, but the enforcement of which, according to their information, might call for reinforcement of the Army of the Black Sea, either by our Allies or further British levies :—

(i) The creation of a Greater Armenia, linking up Cilicia with the Erivan Republic.
(ii) The creation of an independent Kurdistan.
(iii) Acquisition by Greece of any portion of the Pontus (*sic*).
(iv) Permanent occupation by Greece of any part of the Aidin Vilayet.
(v) Permanent occupation of any part of Southern Anatolia or Konia by Italy, though it is doubtful whether this would cause such resentment to the Turks as any other of the above causes.

"In addition to the above measures, which would call for immediate reinforcements, the adoption of either of the following would call for the retention of a permanent garrison for a period which it is impossible to estimate :—

(vi) Acquisition by Greece of Eastern Thrace.
(vii) Expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople."

Restrictions and Illusions.

But so far from coming to any decision, the Allies were content in the presence of their differencies to let matters slide. While the American Commission roamed disturbingly around the Middle East, the most fantastic plans for the partition of Turkey were indulged in. There were to be no annexations, but "mandates" were to be granted to the principal powers which would give them the necessary excuses for control. France was to take Syria and Cilicia ; Italy blithely undertook to occupy the whole of the Caucasus as well as the province of Adalia in the Asia-Minor Promontory ; England seemed anxious to take over Mesopotamia and Palestine, which our armies already held ; and there was a lively expectation that the United States would accept a mandate for Armenia. In January, 1920, Greece, which was bearing the brunt of these protracted financial, military and political uncertainties, began to show signs of strain.

In these seductive delusions the year 1919 ebbed away. Slowly, fitfully, laboriously, with frequent disputes and exhausting argument, the future of the Middle East was mapped out in Paris and a draft of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey prepared. Several exciting questions awaited the decision of the various Governments. December, 1919, and January, 1920, saw the British Cabinet deeply moved upon whether the Sultan in his capacity as Caliph should, under innumerable restrictions, be allowed to remain at Constantinople ; or whether on the other hand the Turks should be expelled "bag and baggage" from Europe. A secondary issue was whether the mosque of San Sophia should be reconsecrated a Christian Church. In these controversies Lord Curzon, mounted upon the Foreign Office, rode full tilt against Mr. Edwin Montagu, whose chariot was drawn by the public opinion of India, the sensibilities of the Mohammedan world, the pro-Turkish propensities of the Conservative Party, and the voluminous memoranda of the India Office.

Talks About Constantinople.

The combat was well sustained. According to Mr. Montagu, the expulsion of the Turks and the Caliph from Constantinople with the assent or even with the connivance of England, would strike a

last fatal blow at the diminishing loyalties of the two or three hundred peoples and religious sects who inhabit the Indian Peninsula. According to Lord Curzon they would not mind at all. Some would rather like it ; most would be indifferent ; while the Mohammedans, who were alone concerned, had not hesitated to fight with vigour and courage in various theatres of war against the armies of the said Caliph. On the question of the reconsecration of San Sophia, Mr. Montagu urged that it had been a Mohammedan Mosque of great sanctity for upwards of 469 years. We were all much swayed by this, until Lord Curzon rejoined that it had been previously a Christian Church for 915 years. Then the argument seemed very nicely balanced ; a substantial modern title as against twice as lengthy an original prescription ! This was one of those questions the rights and wrongs of which might well be debated by the university students of almost any country.

On the main issue of Constantinople Mr. Lloyd George was whole-heartedly with Lord Curzon. Indeed, on this he was himself a prime mover. The War Office intervened with their dreary drone, voiced by Field-Marshal Wilson and me, that we had not got any soldiers, and how could you drive and keep the Turks out of Constantinople without soldiers ? We continued with the India Office to ingeminate a Turkish peace, real, final, and above all, prompt. As long as the Dardanelles could be kept open for the free passage of the ships, including the warships, of all nations, we were content. That would entail the permanent occupation of both sides of the Straits by international forces, for which, within our limited means, our quota could be provided. Such an arrangement might in a few years become only an unchallenged formality.

Cabinet Decision.

These issues as they were fought out in the British Cabinet have already been made public quite as far as is proper in the *Life of Lord Curzon*.[1] It is not necessary to elaborate them here. An Anglo-French Conference was held in London at the Foreign Office at Christmas [1919] to settle the many thorny difficulties between the two Governments upon the Turkish and Arab problems. Mr. Lloyd George, so patient and good-tempered a Chief, had a habit of picking his colleagues for any preliminary discussions so as to have a working majority of those who were favourable to his view. One set for one phase of a question and another for its complementary part ! This was perhaps evil constitutional practice ; but again it may have been the only way in these crowded times to get things done. When, however, the completed work came before the Cabinet on January 9, every Minister having a right to be present, an overwhelming majority decided, after a far more spirited debate than is usually heard in the House of Commons, that the Turks should stay at Constantinople. The Prime Minister accepted in good part the decision of his colleagues, and the next day announced it to Parliament in a speech of convincing power.

[1] By Lord Ronaldshay.

The Treaty of Sèvres.

The Treaty of Sèvres accordingly prescribed that Constantinople should remain the Turkish capital. For the rest the Bosphorus, the Marmora, and the Dardanelles were to be an open waterway under international guardianship for all vessels. Besides Western Thrace and Eastern Thrace almost up to the line of Chatalja, Greece should possess the Gallipoli Peninsula, the majority of the Ægean Islands, and should administer Smyrna and its hinterland until a plebiscite could be held there. Turkey must re-establish the capitulations and submit her armaments and finances to stringent Allied control. She should undertake to enforce the conventional safeguards for racial and religious minorities. The French were to have Syria, then in frantic ebullition ; England would shoulder the costly and troublesome mandate of Palestine and Mesopotamia ; and the Armenians were left to sit on the doorstep of the United States. Coincident with the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres and conditional upon its ratification Great Britain, France and

Italy put their names to a tripartite treaty which gave them as spheres of influence those territories which had been assigned to each of these Powers in the Sykes-Picot arrangement and at the conference of St. Jean de Maurienne.

The March of Facts.

While all these decrees were for the moment unannounced, we must observe the march of Facts. Over stony roads, through the defiles of thorny and rock-clad hills, across ochre deserts baking in the sun, the weary, sullen caravan of Facts kept pertinaciously jogging along. Let us return for a moment to them.

On January 12, 1920, the new Chamber of Turkish Deputies met in Constantinople. The Allies were loyal to the principle of representative government; accordingly the Turks had voted. Unhappily, they had almost all of them voted the wrong way. The new Chamber was preponderantly Nationalist, or, it might be said, Kemalist. So awkward was this that on January 21 the Allies required, as a measure of practical day-to-day security, the resignation of the Turkish Minister of War and of the Chief of the General Staff. On the 28th the new Chamber approved and signed the "National Pact." Confronted by imminent revolt in Constantinople itself and with shocking possibilities of massacre, the European Allies were forced to united action.

Attack on the Ismid Peninsula.

On March 16 Constantinople was occupied by British, French and Italian forces. Ferid was induced once again to brew the thinnest government he had yet attempted. At the end of April the Turkish National Assembly met at Angora far beyond the reach of Allied fleets and armies. On May 13—a bad date—Venizelos made public in Athens the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. In June the British outpost line across the Ismid Peninsula was attacked by Kemalist forces. The attack was not serious. The troops were ordered to fire without hesitation; the Navy hurled shells from the Sea of Marmora, and the assailants withdrew out of range. But there they remained, and we were once again, this time with scanty forces, "in the presence of the enemy." At the same time the French, who, after driving Emir Feisal from his throne at Damascus, had encountered heavy fighting in Cilicia (and on the same day that the forthcoming terms of the Treaty of Sèvres were announced in Athens), thought well to ask the local Turks for an armistice.

Venizelos now presented himself as the good fairy. The Greek Army would come to the rescue. Two divisions of the five already in Smyrna would march northward, and passing to the east of the Marmora through difficult country (which, however, they declared they understood) would fall upon the Turks menacing the Ismid Peninsula and drive them away. Marshal Foch, carrying with him the opinion of the British General Staff, declared that the operation was dangerous and would probably be unsuccessful. Mr. Lloyd George, however, accepted the offer, and the Greek advance began on June 22. It was immediately successful. The Greek columns trailed along the country roads passing safely through many ugly defiles, and at their approach the Turks, under strong and sagacious leadership, vanished into the recesses of Anatolia. At the beginning of July the Greeks entered Brusa. In the same month another Greek army swiftly overran Eastern Thrace, broke down a feeble Turkish resistance, and occupied Adrianople.

The remarkable and unexpected manifestations of Greek power were hailed by the Ally statesmen; the Ally generals rubbed their eyes; Mr. Lloyd George became enthusiastic. He was right again, it seemed, and the military men wrong as they so often had been—*vide* Armageddon.

The events sealed the Treaty of Sèvres. Ferid dutifully constructed a Ministry of marionettes, and on August 10, 1920, with due solemnity, the Treaty of Peace with Turkey was signed at Sèvres. This instrument, which had taken eighteen months to fashion, was obsolete before it was ready. All its main clauses depended for their effect upon one thing only: the Greek Army. If Venizelos and his soldiers would clear up the situation and reduce Mustapha Kemal to law and

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

TURKISH PRISONERS: SMYRNA, 1919.

The Greek troops took full advantage of the turn of events which had brought them to Smyrna with the backing of the four Great Powers. They dealt harshly with all who sought to impede them, and in so doing aroused in the Turkish nation a thirst for revenge which was to be quenched at no distant date.

order, all would be well. If not, some other form of words in closer conformity with the actual facts would have to be devised. At last peace with Turkey: and to ratify it, War with Turkey! However, so far as the Great Allies were concerned the war was to be fought by proxy. Wars when fought thus by great nations are often very dangerous for the proxy.

My Letter of March 24.

Although this chapter has dealt solely with Turkish affairs, it must be brought into relation with the general situation of Europe. I cannot do this better than by reprinting a letter which I wrote to Mr. Lloyd George on starting for a brief Easter holiday in France.

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

March 24, 1920.

I write this as I am crossing the Channel to tell you what is in my mind. Since the Armistice my policy would have been "Peace with the German people, war on the Bolshevik tyranny." Willingly or unavoidably, you have followed something very near the reverse. Knowing the difficulties, and also your great skill and personal force—so much greater than mine—I do not judge your policy and action as if I could have done better, or as if anyone could have done better. But we are now face to face with the results. They are terrible. We may well be within measurable distance of universal collapse and anarchy throughout Europe and Asia.

Russia has gone into ruin. What is left of her is in the power of these deadly snakes. But Germany may perhaps still be saved. I have felt with a great sense of relief that we may be able to think and act together in harmony about Germany: that you are inclined to make an effort to rescue Germany from her frightful fate—which if it overtakes her may well overtake others. If so, time is short and action must be simple. You ought to tell France that we will make a defensive alliance with her against Germany if, *and only if*, she entirely alters her treatment of Germany and loyally accepts a

British policy of help and friendship towards Germany. Next you should send a great man to Berlin to help consolidate the anti-Spartacist anti-Ludendorff elements into a strong left centre block. For this task you have two levers : first, food and credit, which must be generously accorded in spite of our own difficulties (which otherwise will worsen) ; secondly, early revision of the Peace Treaty by a Conference to which New Germany shall be invited as an equal partner in the rebuilding of Europe.[1] Using these levers it ought to be possible to rally all that is good and stable in the German nation to their own redemption and to the salvation of Europe. I pray that we may not be " too late."

Surely this is a matter far more worth while taking your political life in your hands for than our party combinations at home, important though they be. Surely also it is a matter which once on the move would dominate the whole world situation at home and abroad. My suggestion involves open resolute action by Britain under your guidance, and if necessary *independent* action. In such a course I would gladly at your side face political misfortune. But I believe there would be no misfortune, and that for a few months longer Britain still holds the title-deeds of Europe.

As a part of such a policy I should be

[1] This, of course, referred to the economic and financial clauses.—W. S. C.



Photo : Imperial War Museum.

GREEK DISPATCH RIDER.

A photograph taken at Smyrna, showing a Greek soldier typical of those who served in the expedition sent there in 1919. This man is a dispatch rider, and his Triumph motor bicycle is of British manufacture. The Greek army was an efficient fighting machine, containing a large proportion of war-hardened soldiers. Had it been found possible to employ it against the Turks in 1915, as at one time seemed likely, instead of in 1919, the war in the Near East might have been speedily ended.

prepared to make peace with Soviet Russia on the best terms available to appease the general situation, while safeguarding us from being poisoned by them.

I do not of course believe that any real harmony is possible between Bolshevism and present civilization. But in view of the existing facts a cessation of arms and a promotion of material prosperity are indispensable: and we must trust for better or for worse to peaceful influences to bring about the disappearance of this awful tyranny and peril.

Compared to Germany, Russia is minor: compared to Russia, Turkey is petty. But I am also very anxious about your policy towards Turkey. With military resources which the Cabinet have cut to the most weak and slender proportions, we are leading the Allies in an attempt to enforce a peace on Turkey which would require great and powerful armies and long, costly operations and occupations.

On this world so torn with strife I dread to see you let loose the Greek armies—for all sakes and certainly for their sakes. Yet the Greek armies are your only effective fighting force. How are you going to feed Constantinople if the railways in Asia Minor are cut and supplies do not arrive? Who is going to pay? From what denuded market is the food to come? I fear you will have this great city lolling helplessly on your hands, while all around will be guerrilla and blockade. Here again I counsel prudence and appeasement. Try to secure a really representative Turkish governing authority, and come to terms with it. As at present couched the Turkish Treaty means indefinite anarchy.

Photo: Central News.

MUSTAPHA KEMAL AND HIS STAFF.

A photograph of the leader of modern Turkey taken in 1920 during the operations in Asia Minor Turkey owes much to Kemal, who on more than one occasion during the war rendered to his country services beyond price, and in whom, when defeated and forlorn, she found a leader.

CHAPTER XCVI

GREEK TRAGEDY

A Retrospect—The Rise of Venizelos—Greece in the Great War—Constantine's Divine Right—The General Victory—Commitments in Thrace and Smyrna—The Young King—The Monkey's Bite—The Greek Election—Fall of Venizelos: Its Reactions—Return of Constantine—Isolation of Greece—Mr. Lloyd George's View—Curzon and Montagu—Unofficial Encouragement—My Own Position, February 22—June 11—June 25—The Greek Advance—The Battle of Eskishehr—The Battle of the Sakaria—A Further Opportunity—Armenia and the Pan-Turks—The 1915 Massacres—The Turkish Conquest—The Friends of Armenia—Obliteration Once More.

THIS story carries us back to classic times. It is true Greek tragedy with Chance as the ever-ready handmaid of Fate. However the Greek race might have altered in blood and quality, their characteristics were found unchanged since the days of Alcibiades. As of old, they preferred faction above all other interests, and as of old in their crisis they had at their head one of the greatest of men. The interplay between the Greek love of party politics and the influence exercised over them by Venizelos constitute the action of the piece. The scene and the lighting are the Great War; and the theme, "How Greece gained the Empire of her dreams in spite of herself, and threw it away when she awoke." A prologue must be provided in the form of a retrospect.

A Retrospect.

In 1908 the Greek Monarchy was in dire straits. Ever since the King and the Princes had commanded in the disastrous war against Turkey in 1897, their situation had been uncomfortable. They were bitterly attacked by the officers of the Greek army, and there was a strong anti-monarchical movement. It was proposed that they should not be allowed to hold any military command in case a war between the Balkan States and Turkey should break out. Many other similar humiliations were inflicted upon the reigning house. However, there arose in Crete a remarkable man moulded on classic scale and design. He effected the liberation of Crete from Turkey by a rebellion in which he gained the support of the Great Powers. By his energies and their aid Crete threw off the Turkish yoke, and as a stepping-stone to reunion with Greece, gained autonomy under a Greek Prince. In 1909 Venizelos passed from Crete to Greece; in 1910 he became Prime Minister. He purged and reformed the administration in all its branches. He reorganized the fleet under British, and the army under French guidance. He restored the King to the head of the army.

The Rise of Venizelos.

The Sovereign, having at his side this great Constable, swiftly regained popularity among the people. Greece enjoyed for some years the strongest of all political combinations for a small country, a constitutional monarch and a national leader, each working in his proper sphere, and rendering loyalty and honour to the other. Venizelos formed the Balkan League and prepared and inspired the war upon Turkey which followed in 1912. The Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians, helped greatly by the fighting quality of the last, defeated Turkey, took Adrianople and Salonica, and nearly took Constantinople itself. Great extensions of territory had already been gained by these allies. The Bulgarians, demanding too much and ever

forward in quarrels, were fallen upon by their confederates on the one hand and by Roumania on the other. They were speedily overwhelmed by this combination, and were not only cut out of all territorial gains, but actually despoiled of their native province of the Dobrudja. In two years the kingdom of Greece was nearly doubled in extent and population. Crete was reunited with the Motherland, and not only Salonica, but Kavalla, was added to the Greek domain. Thus Constantine saw himself and his kingdom carried by an enormous stride towards the Greek dream of empire. At this point Armageddon began.

Greece in the Great War.

Earlier in this account I have described the attitude of Greece during the Great War. We may, however, display the claims of Venizelos upon the loyalty of the Allies. Constantine, married to the Kaiser's sister, and under a profound impression of German military prestige and efficiency, believed throughout that Germany would win. His convictions were shared by the Greek General Staff. But Venizelos judged by other standards. He proclaimed that right lay with the Allies ; he discerned their future victory. " England in all her wars," he said in a dark hour, " has always gained one battle—the last ! " He acted upon these opinions. He so far persuaded and overpersuaded Constantine and his generals, that late in August, 1914, *after* the French had lost the Battles of the Frontiers and before the victory of the Marne, when it seemed that the Germans were marching on irresistibly to the capture of Paris—at this very moment he offered the naval and military forces of Greece to the Allies from the time when Great Britain should judge it expedient to call upon them. He took this step in the face of the implacable resentment of Bulgaria for the Balkan war, and before Turkey had attacked the Allies. Such a resolve, taken with sureness and deliberation in the teeth of such hazards by an experienced and established statesman, proves a prevision beyond compare.

Constantine's Divine Right.

The story of the Dardanelles shows that Venizelos would always have been ready to participate in a well-planned attack by land and sea upon the Gallipoli Peninsula. British diplomacy, influenced to some extent by Russian misgivings, had rejected the Greek offer of assistance in the preceding autumn, and unless Constantine had been irrevocably committed to war against Germany, it seemed impossible to make the Greek Government a party to our plans.

The melancholy course of events at the Dardanelles and the incapacity which they revealed did not weaken the fidelity of Venizelos to the Allies. When the peril of Serbia by Bulgarian invasion drew nearer in the summer of 1915, he invoked the Treaty binding Greece to come to the aid of Serbia and thus join in the general war. Constantine resisted. Venizelos resigned. As a result of a general election held in June he was returned to power on August 23. He obtained from the King authority for general mobilization. Further than this Constantine would not go ; he refused definitely to enter the war. According to Venizelos, he explained this overriding of his Prime Minister newly fortified by a national mandate as follows : " I recognize that I am bound to obey the popular verdict when it is a question of internal affairs ; but when it is a question of foreign affairs my view is that so long as I consider a thing right or wrong I must insist that it shall or shall not be done, because I feel responsible before God." This would seem strange Constitutional doctrine, and it is also doubtful whether the Almighty draws a distinction between domestic and external affairs as such.

Confronted with the Royal refusal Venizelos wished to resign, but he withdrew his resignation under pressure from the King, and at the same time invited the Allies to send troops to the rescue of Serbia through Salonica. Ever afterwards Venizelos swore that Constantine had consented to this, and ever afterwards Constantine swore to the contrary. The Allied troops arrived at Salonica, and Venizelos in his struggle with the King was forced to protest against their disembarkation. Simultaneously, however, he made a speech to the Chamber claiming publicly

for the first time that the Greco-Serbian Treaty imposed an absolute obligation upon Greece to make war on Bulgaria and Turkey. Though still supported by a majority in the Chamber, he was dismissed from office by the King.

The third phase of the dispute between King and Minister was armed revolt. Venizelos in September 1916 quitted Greece for Crete, where he set up a Provisional Government. Thence he descended upon Salonica, where a revolutionary government had already been instituted. Here he raised a Greek army in support of the Allies. The accession of the United States to the Allied cause produced a strong effect upon Greek public opinion. There was less dread even in Royalist circles of being left at the end of the war on the side of a beaten England in the face of a triumphant and remorseless Germany and revengeful Bulgaria.

The General Victory.

In June, 1917, everyone being desperate, and the Greek situation increasingly favourable, the French, with keen British approval, occupied Athens and drove Constantine into exile. From that moment Venizelos controlled again the fortunes of Greece, and from that moment Greece shared the fortunes of the Allies. Greek divisions fought on the Salonica front; Greek warships joined the Allied Fleet; Allied munitions and credits flowed into Greece during the war, and Venizelos carried his country to the Council Board of the victors after the Armistice. His personal qualities, his prestige, the famous services he had rendered the Allies, secured him a position almost of equality with the heads of the greatest victorious States; and with him, his country mounted to dizzy heights and surveyed dazzling horizons.

Meanwhile Constantine brooded in exile, and the Greek politicians, who, if they had had their way, would have kept their country out of all share in the victory or indeed involved it in defeat, awaited morosely the hour of revenge.

* * * *

Commitments in Thrace and Smyrna.

It had seemed in Paris that the policy of Britain, France and the United States would be to develop substantially the power and extent of Greece. They certainly showed themselves ready to use her. We have seen how Greek divisions were called upon to accompany the French in their ignominious incursion into the Ukraine; how they were authorized and encouraged to overrun and occupy Thrace; and, above all, how they were launched into the fatal descent upon Smyrna. Venizelos had shown himself more than apt to obey these high commands; and although the Greek armies had been mobilized almost continuously for ten years, they seemed at this time to be the only troops who would go anywhere or do anything. Thus by the summer of 1919 the Greek forces were widely spread and deeply committed on Turkish soil. Venizelos, returning to Athens in December, was received with enthusiasm; but signs of strain—social, military and economic—were already to be discerned in the structure of this small State and people.

When in 1920, in the advent of the Treaty of Sèvres, Sir Henry Wilson and I expressed the British military view upon the Greek situation, the Prime Minister asked us to see Venizelos ourselves and to lay before him our misgivings. This we did with candour, asking such questions as: How much is it costing you a day? How long have the soldiers been away from their families? What prospect is there of a real peace with Turkey? and so on. We pointed out that though, or even if, the Greek troops could beat the Turks in their present condition in battle, this would mean for him no extrication from his danger. The Kemalist Turks, a handful of ragged warriors fighting under barbaric conditions, could compel the maintenance of very large numbers of organized troops on a war footing overseas at heavy expense for an indefinite period. "It is costing *them* nothing, but how long can *you* keep it up?"

Venizelos rejoined that the Greek troops stood where they were in response to the requests of Lloyd George, Clémenceau and President Wilson. He admitted the inequality of the warfare, but professed his confidence

that with the support of the three greatest Powers he would reach a satisfactory and final conclusion. Almost immediately after this discussion he occupied Thrace, capturing or dispersing the two weak Turkish divisions which were still in the province, and entered Adrianople. We were agreeably surprised by these events, but by no means relieved from our general anxieties. There followed the Treaty of Sèvres.

A similar swift success had attended the northward advance of the Greek forces from the Smyrna Province to drive away the Turks who were molesting the French and British lines across the Ismid Peninsula. Although both Foch and Wilson had advised against it, this operation was executed by two Greek divisions with ease and celerity, and with results extremely gratifying to the British, French and American political chiefs. There is no doubt that these episodes aroused in Mr. Lloyd George's mind a confidence in Greek military power agreeable to his inclinations. The result, however, was only to spread the Greek forces over wider areas and burden them with heavier responsibilities. So long as Greece was acting as the capable and willing assistant and informal mandatory of the three greatest Powers, there was a solid and, if need be, an ample backing behind her far-spread lines. But now there occurred one of those apparitions of the unexpected without which no Greek tragedy could unfold itself.

Photo: E.N.A.

MLLE. MÂNOS.

The daughter of a minor Court official, Mlle. Mânos became in November, 1919, the morganatic wife of King Alexander, the second son of King Constantine of Greece, who succeeded to the throne on the abdication of his father. The marriage was, for a time, the cause of considerable embarrassment to Venizelos, but at the moment when adjustment of the constitutional difficulties arising out of this situation seemed likely, the whole position was altered by the untimely death of the young King.

The Treaty of Sèvres was signed on August 10, 1920. Venizelos arrived in Athens in September, bringing home with him for the fourth time in his career the immense gains of triumphant war and policy. The admiration of the welcoming crowds was stimulated by his narrow escape a few weeks before from murder in a Paris railway station. He had carried his country, largely in spite of herself, to the highest pinnacle she has ever scaled in modern times. Great stakes were still on the board, entangling commitments still gripped the armies and finances of Greece; but there seemed no reason why, sustained by the aid of the mightiest nations and their renowned leaders, the problems of the future should prove more formidable than those Venizelos had already successfully surmounted in the past.

The Young King.

When in June, 1917, King Constantine had been driven into exile by the imperious finger of M. Jonnart, the French High Commissioner, supported by French Marines and Allied naval power, his second son, Alexander, had been set up in his stead.

This amiable youth, the victim of fate as well as of policy, had reigned for more than three years. Before the world storm swept him to the throne he had fallen in love with an attractive young lady, Mlle. Mânos, the daughter of a small Court official whose family history was by regal standards not particularly impressive. King Alexander would never have hesitated for a moment in a choice between his love and his throne; and since his morganatic marriage with Mlle. Mânos in November, 1919, Venizelos had had to face a series of delicate and embarrassing political issues on this account. However, the statesman sympathized profoundly with the young couple, and amid the labours and excitements of treaty-making and the dark but distant clouds that lowered upon the Greek fronts, he made skilful exertions on their behalf. Constitutional niceties were in a fair way to adjustment, and at the time of Venizelos's homecoming it seemed that within the widened boundaries of the new Greek Empire there might well be room for a royal romance.

Photo: E.N.A.

KING ALEXANDER OF GREECE.

Alexander, the second son of King Constantine, was born on August 1, 1893. On the abdication of King Constantine in 1917 the Entente Powers felt unable to recognize the Crown Prince George, and Alexander accordingly succeeded to the throne. His reign unfortunately was of brief duration, and his death, due to the effects of a monkey's bite, resulted in the overthrow of Venizelos and the return of Constantine.

The Monkey's Bite.

On October 2, 1920, King Alexander, walking in the garden accompanied by his spaniel, paused to watch the antics of a pair of monkeys comprised among the less disciplined pets of the royal Palace. The spaniel attacked the female monkey, and the male in retaliation attacked the King. It bit him in the leg. The wound, though peculiarly painful, was not judged serious by the physicians. But the bite festered, inflammation became acute, more dangerous symptoms supervened, and after three weeks of agony King Alexander expired in the arms of his bride who might soon have become his Consort.

We have already seen how the escape of a single capital ship, the *Goeben*, spread measureless desolation through the south-east of Europe and through Asia Minor. It is perhaps no exaggeration to remark that a quarter of a million persons died of this monkey's bite.

The Greek Constitution did not specifically prescribe that a General Election should follow a demise of the Crown; but the question of a successor was embarrassing. Venizelos seems to have toyed with the idea of crowning the

infant son of Mlle. Mânos, with a consequential prolonged regency. It was, however, eventually decided to offer the throne to Prince Paul of Greece. Paul was living in Switzerland under the roof of his exiled father, and no doubt was inspired to reply that he could only accept after the Greek people had at an election definitely decided against both his father and his elder brother, Prince George. This forced a General Election.

The Greek Election.

Venizelos in no way shirked the issue. Buoyed by the evidences of his popularity and by the conviction that he had deserved well of the Greek people, he was willing that the issue should be put crudely to the electorate : Were they for the restoration of Constantine or not ? It followed from this that all the supporters of the ex-King were free to return from exile or retirement and take an active part in the election. It might well have seemed that there could not be much doubt about the public choice upon the issue " Constantine *versus* Venizelos " at a moment when the former was stultified and the latter vindicated by world events. But the imperious Cretan did not make sufficient allowances for the strain to which his small country had been put ; for the resentments which the Allied blockade to make Greece enter the war had deeply planted ; for the many discontents which arise under prolonged war conditions ; for the oppressive conduct of many of his agents ; for the complete absorption of his political opponents in party politics and for their intense desire for office and revenge. During his enforced and continuous absence in Paris and London, the Greek people had lacked his personal inspiration and had felt the heavy hands of his subordinates. No one of authority in Greece or out of it seemed to doubt that a substantial Venizelist majority would be returned.

But the election results which came in during the evening of November 14 were a staggering surprise for all. Venizelos himself was unseated, and his followers commanded only 114 seats against an opposition of 250. Greek party politics are conducted in a high-pitched key. Venizelos at once announced that he would resign and leave the country ; and he remained unmoved even by the poignant argument that he would be accused of running away and leaving his friends to be massacred. He declared that his presence could only be a cause of unrest and disorder. He placed his resignation in the hands of his old friend Admiral Condouriotis, indicated his successor, and quitted Greece for Italy on November 17 in a friend's yacht. Thus incontinently did the Greek people at the moment of their greatest hopes and fears deprive themselves of the commanding personality who had created the situation and by whom alone it might have been carried to success.

I happened to be with Mr. Lloyd George in the Cabinet Room at the time the telegram announcing the results of the Greek election and Venizelos's decision arrived. He was very much shocked, and still more puzzled. But with his natural buoyancy, and hardened by the experiences we had all passed through in the Great War, he contented himself with remarking, with a grin, " Now I am the only one left."[1]

Fall of Venizelos : Its Reactions.

The reactions of the fall of Venizelos must be closely studied by those who wish to follow the chain of events. Greece, though only a small State beset with difficulties and foes, indulged the dangerous luxury of a dual nature. There was the pro-Ally Greece of Venizelos and the pro-German Greece of Constantine. All the loyalties of the Allies began and ended with the Greece of Venizelos. All their resentments centred upon the Greece of Constantine. The ex-King was a bugbear second only to the Kaiser himself in the eyes of the British and French peoples, and he ranked in Allied estimation with the so-called " Foxy " Ferdinand of Bulgaria. Here was a potentate who, as we saw it, against the wishes and the interests of his people, had for personal and family reasons thrown his country, or tried to throw it, on the enemy side, which had also turned out to be the losing side. It

[1] President Wilson had been struck down by illness, Clémenceau had retired, and Orlando had been defeated.

would be absurd to ask the British or French democracy to make sacrifices or efforts for a people whose real spirit was shown by their choice of such a man. The return of Constantine therefore dissolved all Allied loyalties to Greece and cancelled all but legal obligations.

In England, the feeling was not resentment, but a total extinction of sympathy or even interest. In France, a stronger displeasure was reinforced by other practical considerations. We have seen how the French were involved in difficulties with the Arabs in Syria and with the Turks in Cilicia. For the sake of Venizelos much had to be endured, but for Constantine less than nothing. Indeed, after the first astonishment had worn off an air of relief became manifest in controlling circles. There was no need any more to pursue an anti-Turkish policy. On the contrary, good relations with Turkey would be most conducive to French interests. The situation in the Levant could be relieved, and other positive advantages presented themselves. If Greece was free, everyone was free. Greece had in fact become a liberator. Just at the moment when her needs were greatest and her commitments were becoming most embarrassing to herself and to others, she had of her own free will sponged the slate. It is not every day that moral creditors are so accommodating.

Lord Curzon, voicing the cool and dispassionate view of the Foreign Office, proposed a conditional support of Greece and even the recognition of Constantine ; but the Allied Conference which met in Paris on December 3 brushed such plans aside. The three Great Powers informed the Greek Government that " although they had not wished to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece, the restoration to the throne of a King whose disloyal attitude and conduct towards the Allies during the War caused them great embarrassment and loss, could only be regarded by them as a ratification by Greece of his hostile acts " ; that " this step would create a new and unfavourable situation in the relations between Greece and the Allies " ; and that " the three Governments reserved to themselves in that case complete liberty in dealing with the situation thus created." And on the next day they declared in a second note that "if Constantine returned to the throne, Greece would receive no further financial assistance of any kind from the Allies."

Return of Constantine.

In the teeth of this declaration, but much intimidated by the victorious monarchists, the Greeks by an almost unanimous plebiscite voted for the recall of Constantine. At the end of December King Constantine and Queen Sophie and their children re-entered Athens, amid the same demonstrative rejoicings of the populace as had recently saluted Venizelos. Meanwhile the new Government busied themselves in expelling from every form of public employment all Venizelist officials, from Bishops, judges, university professors, and schoolmasters, down even to the charwomen in the public offices. The Allied Ministers remained in Athens under instructions to carry on formal relations with the Government, but to ignore the King, the Royal Family, and the Court. Henceforward Greece, riven internally, was to face her perils alone.

The only rational object in expelling Venizelos and the only sane policy arising from it would have been to reduce promptly and ruthlessly the Greek commitments in Asia Minor. It was arguable that the great Cretan had ridden his small country too hard ; certainly it had thrown him during the triumphal procession. Now, stripped of British support and confronted by Italian rivalries, and by what was soon to become marked French antagonism, one course was open to Constantine and his Ministers. Peace with Turkey on the best terms obtainable ; the swift abandonment of every position in Asia Minor ; the repatriation and demobilization of the armies ; and the most drastic financial economies, were the logical and inevitable consequences of the decision which the Greek people had been invited to take and which they had taken.

But these were the very decisions which the new régime was least inclined to take. They were in temper more expansionist than Venizelos himself.

The military and political circles which rallied round the Court pulsated with ambition. They would now show Greece how little Venizelos had had to do with her successes. The idea that they should give up what had been so surprisingly gained was intolerable to their pride as it would have been fatal to their popularity. They proposed on the contrary to receive extensions of Greek territory in Asia Minor beyond anything Venizelos had deemed possible; they adopted the cry of "To Constantinople" to express their ultimate goal. Thus, when the Allies met in Paris on February 21, 1921, with timely if harsh resolve to revise the Treaty of Sèvres, particularly in respect of Smyrna and Thrace, the new Greek Government rejected their proposals and declared that Greece was herself capable of holding unaided the territories awarded her by the Treaty. At this moment, Greece was maintaining 200,000 troops in Asia Minor at a cost of at least a quarter of a million a week. The Turks, in friendly negotiation with the French and encouraged by a Treaty with Moscow, were growing constantly and rapidly in numbers and fighting power.

Isolation of Greece.

Only pity must be felt for the mass of the Greek people at this point in their history. They were set tasks beyond their strength; they were asked questions which they were not competent to answer; they had no knowledge of the consequences inherent in the decisions they were led to take. They had endured a longer strain of war, mobilization, and war government than almost any other people in a war-wearied world. They were torn and baffled by faction; there were two hostile nations in the bosom of one small harassed State; and even under these distracting conditions their armies maintained for a long period remarkable discipline and constancy. They were now to be launched upon an adventure at once more ambitious and more forlorn than any which we have yet described.

* * * *

Mr. Lloyd George's View.

The third act of the Greek Tragedy must begin with a description of the attitude of some personalities in British politics. Being in complete disagreement with Mr. Lloyd George on Turco-Greek affairs, but preserving always an intimate and free intercourse with him, I on more than one occasion during these years invited him to state the foundations of his policy. He declared them, with his usual good humour and tolerance of the opinion of a colleague, in these terms, and more or less in these words: "The Greeks are the people of the future in the Eastern Mediterranean. They are prolific and full of energy. They represent Christian civilization against Turkish barbarism. Their fighting power is grotesquely underrated by our generals. A greater Greece will be an invaluable advantage to the British Empire.

"The Greeks by tradition, inclination and interest are friendly to us; they are now a nation of five or six millions, and in fifty years, if they can hold the territories which have been assigned to them, they will be a nation of twenty millions. They are good sailors, they will develop a naval power, they will possess all the most important islands in the Eastern Mediterranean. These islands are the potential submarine bases of the future; they lie on the flank of our communications through the Suez Canal with India, the Far East, and Australasia. The Greeks have a strong sense of gratitude, and if we are the staunch friends of Greece at the period of her national expansion she will become one of the guarantees by which the main intercommunications of the British Empire can be preserved. One day the mouse may gnaw the cords that bind the lion." To which I replied in effect and at suitable intervals: "If this is so, what are you going to do about it? You have no armies which can be sent; you are always saying there is no money which can be spared; you have no public opinion which will support you. The Conservative Party is the traditional friend of Turkey. The bias of your majority is pro-Turk; the bias of your Cabinet is pro-Turk; the bias of your generals is pro-Turk.

"We are the greatest Mohammedan power in the world. Very deep oppositions

will arise to any prolonged anti-Turkish or pro-Greek policy. Moreover, the Turks are very dangerous, because they are both fierce and unget-at-able. If the Greeks try to conquer Turkey they will be ruined, and now that Constantine has come back you will never be allowed to help them effectively." I cannot pretend that this records the dialogue, but it is in my opinion a fair representation of two different points of view.

Curzon and Montagu.

Lord Curzon's line was broadly that a very cool, circumspect, but not unhelpful policy should be adopted towards the Greeks; that a friendly peace should be made with Turkey; but that at all costs the Turks should be expelled from Europe and Constantinople. Mr. Montagu, supported by all the forces which represent India, was for peace with Turkey on almost any terms; England should be the friend and head of the Moslem world; and, above all, Constantinople should be restored to the Turks. The Cabinet, as has been described, resolved against the Prime Minister and Lord Curzon upon Constantinople, and both these Ministers accepted the decision. But upon action, either to help the Greeks or to pacify the Turks, no coherent policy could be formulated, except the purely negative one of using neither British troops nor money and waiting upon events. This stagnation and arrest lasted for nearly two years, from the fall of Venizelos to the crisis of Chanak.

But we are here concerned with the fortunes of the Greeks. There is no doubt that under the restored Constantine they made an intense and persevering national effort. Had they enjoyed the support in credit, munitions and goodwill of the Great Powers, no one can say for certain that they could not have enforced a peace upon the Kemalist Turks, which would have secured them Thrace and a footing in Smyrna. Without any of these aids they now proceeded to seek this peace at Angora with the sword.

Unofficial Encouragement.

The question from which so many heartburnings and reproaches have arisen is whether the British Prime Minister gave them personal and unwarranted encouragement in this enterprise. It is quite certain that, according to all the canons of official diplomacy, they received no encouragement from His Majesty's Government. They assuredly were warned and discouraged on every opportunity and through every available channel by the British War Office and General Staff. But, of course, they knew that the Prime Minister's heart was with them and that he ardently desired their victory. Lloyd George was the only Englishman known in Greece, and he appeared to their eyes as the successor of Canning and Gladstone. His achievements in the Great War, his prestige in Europe, his unquestioned mastery at the time in England, his own resourcefulness and will power, his known and evident partisanship, created in Greek minds a sense of vague but potent confidence. Although, thought they, nothing definite has been said and no agreement has been made, the great man is with us, and in his own way and in his own time and by his own wizardry he will bring us the vital aid we need.

Now this was the worst of all possible situations. The Greeks deserved at the least either to be backed up through thick and thin with the moral, diplomatic and financial support of a united British Government, or to be chilled to the bone with repeated douches of cold water. But all sorts of other things, Ireland, for instance, and British party disturbances, were in progress at the same time. So much was going on in the world, and difficulties so abounded, that the affairs of one small country about which such differences of opinion arose were only considered spasmodically as events happened, and even then without any clear decision emerging. After all, Constantine and his Government had acted on their own responsibility. They were entitled to form their own view of what the eventual action of any of the Great Powers towards their enterprise would be; but they alone were the party who had to decide, and it was their skins in the first place that were at stake. The sentimental support of

Photo: W. & D. Downey.

KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE.

Constantine, King of Greece, belonged to that ill-fated group of European monarchs destined to fall as a direct result of the Great War. In the case of the Greek King, married to a sister of the Kaiser and with an implicit faith in the power of the German army, it was perhaps natural that he should have hesitated to jeopardise the fortunes of his country by adherence to the Allied cause. His attitude at that time led to disagreements with Venizelos, and ultimately to his deposition in 1917. On the eclipse of Venizelos in 1920 Constantine was restored, but in 1922, as a result of the Greek débâcle in Asia Minor, he was once more forced to abdicate, and a few months later, on January 11, 1923, he died.

an eminent man may be a powerful encouragement, but it is no substitute for treaties, agreements or formal diplomatic communications.

However, on June 11 King Constantine in person assumed the command in Smyrna, and in July the fourth Greek attack upon the Turks in Asia Minor began.

* * * *

I feel entitled at this point to set forth my own view and action. I have been freely represented as the advocate of violent policies in every quarter and on every occasion, and so far I have never attempted any detailed explanation of my course. Lord Curzon's able biographer, with the fullest knowledge of the official archives and much freedom in their use, has suggested not obscurely that the words "firebrand" and "warmonger" may be justly applied to me in this connexion. I shall, therefore, make the facts plain.

My Own Position, February 22.

I must begin by reminding the reader of the general statement of policy set forth by the General Staff upon my authority in December, 1919, which has been summarized in Chapter XCV; and, secondly, to my letter to the Prime Minister of March, 1920, printed on page 1550. The following are the views which I put on record on February 22, 1921, at the time of the Allied Conference upon the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, and again on June 11, 1921, before the Greeks started their march to Angora:

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

Feb. 22, 1921.

I did not want to renew the argument about policy this morning. You have the power to decide the British policy, and I can only wait anxiously for the results. The kind of people whose opinions on the questions at issue ought to weigh with you are the following: The Viceroy and Government of India; George Lloyd, the Governor of Bombay, the Viceroy-Designate of India; Lord Allenby and Sir Percy Cox; the officials of the new Middle-Eastern Department: Mr. Shuckburgh, Col. Lawrence, Major Young; the General Staff, in all its branches and representatives; the High Commissioner at Constantinople and Gen. Harington; Montagu, with his special position and knowledge; true and proved friends of Britain like the Aga Khan. I have yet to meet a British official personage who does not think that our Eastern and Middle-Eastern affairs would be enormously eased and helped by arriving at a peace with Turkey.

The alternative of the renewal of war causes me the deepest misgivings. I dare say the Greeks may scatter the Turkish Nationalists on their immediate front, and may penetrate some distance into Turkey; but the more country they hold, and the longer they remain in it, the more costly to them. The reactions from this state of affairs fall mainly upon us, and to a lesser extent on the French. They are all unfavourable. The Turks will be thrown into the arms of the Bolsheviks; Mesopotamia will be disturbed at the critical period of the reduction of the army there; it will probably be quite impossible to hold Mosul and Bagdad without a powerful and expensive army; the general alienation of Mohammedan sentiment from Great Britain will continue to work evil consequences in every direction. The French and Italians will make their own explanations; and we shall be everywhere represented as the chief enemy of Islam. Further misfortunes will fall upon the Armenians.

In these circumstances it seems to me a fearful responsibility to let loose the Greeks and to reopen the war. I am deeply grieved at the prospect, and at finding myself so utterly without power to influence your mind even in regard to matters with which my duties are specially concerned. All the more am I distressed because of my desire to aid you in any way open to me in the many matters in which we are agreed, and because of our long friendship and my admiration for your genius and work.

June 11.

In the early part of June the Prime Minister held a conference at Chequers, at which we agreed in principle upon

putting pressure equally upon both sides to come to a settlement.

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

June 11, 1921.

I have had a talk this morning with Venizelos. I explained to him the conclusions of our conference at Chequers, and he was in agreement with them. I agree with you that we should say to Constantine—" Here are the terms which we think should be offered to Kemal now. If you accept them we will put them before Kemal, if possible in conjunction with France. We should tell Kemal that if he refuses them, we shall help the Greeks in every possible way, and that if the Greeks gain a success the terms will have to be altered proportionately to Kemal's disadvantage."

We should further tell Constantine that he should delay his offensive until he has re-organized his army by the reinstatement of competent Venizelist Generals. If he agrees with all that we ask of him, both in the matter of the terms to the Turks and in the matter of reorganizing the army, and if Kemal continues obdurate so that the arrangements with Constantine actually come into effect, we should not hesitate to recognize him. If unhappily we are forced to work with this man and with the Greeks, there is no sense in not doing everything possible to secure success. Half-measures and half-hearted support have been the bane of all the policy we have pursued, whether towards Russia or Turkey, since the Armistice, and they have conducted us to our present disastrous position.

As to the terms, I think they must include the evacuation of Smyrna by the Greek Army. I do not think anything less than that gives a fair chance of winning French co-operation or of procuring Kemalist agreement. The question of the guarantees to be taken either by a local force or by an international force for the protection of the lives of the Christians need not be finally decided at this stage, but I agree with you that effective guarantees must be obtained to prevent massacre.

I do not think there is any time to lose. If the Greeks go off on another half-cock offensive, the last card will have been played and lost and we shall neither have a Turkish peace nor a Greek army.

In taking the line I am now doing on the Greco-Turkish problem, I am sure you will understand that my view as to the objective at which we are aiming has never altered. It has always been and it is still, the making of a peace with Turkey which shall be a real peace and one achieved at the earliest possible moment. I entirely disagree, as you know and as I have repeatedly placed on record, with the whole policy of the Treaty of Sèvres, and the results which have arisen from it have been those which I have again and again ventured to predict. But in the difficult situation in which we now stand I am doing my utmost to find a way out of our embarrassments which will not leave us absolutely defenceless before an exultant and unreasonable antagonist.

June 25.

And again by official minute of June 25, 1921 :—

Prime Minister.
Lord Curzon.

June 25, 1921.

If it be true, as seems probable from the newspapers, that the Greeks are going to refuse our offer of mediation, I do earnestly hope we shall not hesitate to make our policy effective. If they go on against the wishes of England and France and without any moral support, and get beaten or at the very best entangled, our affairs will suffer terribly, as we shall have an absolutely unreasonable Kemal to deal with. I am sure the path of courage is the path of safety. The Prime Minister said the other day at Cabinet that he would agree to any even-handed policy as regards the two sides. I think we should ask the French whether they will join with us in letting the Greeks know that unless they put themselves in our hands as we suggested, we shall definitely intervene to stop the war by blockading Smyrna to Greek ships. This threat is bound to be decisive, as what can they do ? Nor will it cost us anything, as the Mediterranean Fleet is overwhelmingly strong and is in the Mediterranean already. I think everybody here would approve of

our stopping the war. As the counterpart to this, we should make it clear to the Greeks that if they do put themselves in our hands and Kemal is unreasonable we will give them effective support, including the full use of the naval blockade weapon against the Turks.

I am deeply alarmed at the idea of the Greeks starting off in a disheartened manner on this new offensive. It may produce irretrievable disaster if it fails. It simply means that all the policy we agreed upon at Chequers comes to nought. I may add that if the French decline to participate in the naval blockade, either of Greece or Turkey as the case may be, I should still be in favour of our going on alone, as we are fully possessed of the means to do all that is necessary and to do it quite quickly.

The Greek Advance.

However, the Greek Army was already marching steadily forward through harsh and difficult country to engage in the greatest campaign undertaken by Greece since classic times. This episode deserves a more detailed description than it has usually received.

Before the initial movements the Greeks were assembled in two groups.[1] The right or southern, consisting of seven divisions and a cavalry brigade (32,000 rifles and 1,000 sabres), concentrated near Ushak on the railway; the left or northern, of four divisions (about 18,000 rifles) gathered at Brusa. The interval of about forty miles between these two important forces was covered by a line of posts which stretched from the coast of the Marmora to the south of Smyrna. The Turks were also arranged in two groups: the northern of six divisions and three cavalry divisions, comprising 23,000 rifles (the cavalry being mounted infantry) between Eskishehr on the railway and the Marmora; and the southern group of ten divisions and two cavalry divisions, comprising 25,000 rifles, the greater part around Kutaya on the railway, but extending as far as Afium Karahissar and beyond. The Greeks were slightly superior in numbers —51,000 against 48,000. They had also an advantage of three to two in guns and eight to three in machine guns, and were better provided with aeroplanes and technical stores. The Turks had however another three divisions (8,000 rifles) in reserve behind Angora, and two divisions (5,000 rifles) to the south-east in Cilicia, and three more divisions and two cavalry divisions (6,500 rifles) 170 miles east of Angora in the Amasia area.

The Greek object was to destroy the Turkish Army and to occupy Angora, but as the Smyrna-Angora railway, which was the only railway line available for the campaign, departing from its general east and west direction, ran roughly north and south behind the Turkish front between Afium Karahissar and Eskishehr, it was necessary as a first step to drive the Turks from this sector, annihilating them if possible, before the advance on Angora could be executed. The operations were begun by a feint.

The Battle of Eskishehr.

On July 9 the Greek left group moved two divisions eastward from Brusa to hold the Turkish northern group to its position, whilst the other two marched south-eastward towards Kutaya to co-operate with the right wing of the army. Three days later three divisions of the Greek right group attacked the Turks at Afium Karahissar and defeated them. The clearing of the railway to Eskishehr was now begun. Leaving one division at Afium Karahissar, the rest of the right group and the two divisions of the left which had come southward closed on Kutaya, drove off the Turks and entered it on the 17th. The Turks retreated on and beyond Eskishehr, which the Greeks occupied on the 20th. King Constantine reached the front on this day from Athens to take command in person. On the 21st the Turks made a general attack. They were counter-attacked and repulsed all along the line, and retired thirty miles on a position behind the Sakaria river, fifty miles from Angora and covering the approach to their capital.

The Greeks had gained a strategic and

[1] See Plan on page 1566 and the General Map of Turkey on p. 1577.



BATTLE OF ESKISHEHR: JULY 9 TO 20, 1921.

tactical success; they had gained possession of the railway for the further advance; but they had not destroyed the Turkish army or any part of it. The losses on both sides in killed and wounded were about the same, 7,000 to 8,000; but the Turks had in addition lost 4,000 prisoners.

A short pause followed during which both armies reorganized and prepared themselves for the next phase. The Greeks improved their rail and road communications. They repaired their rolling-stock and strengthened their road transport by collecting about 500 lorries, 2,000 camels and 3,000 ox-carts. Mustapha Kemal, poorer at all points than his opponents in transport and supply, called upon the wives and daughters of his soldiers to do the work of the camels and oxen which he lacked. During the lull files of Turkish women carried food and water and other supplies from innumerable villages, and concentrated them to the east of the great bend in the Sakaria river on which their national guide and ruler had resolved to stand.

The Battle of the Sakaria.

The Greeks resumed the advance on August 10, after detaching a second division to the Afium Karahissar front. They had now a total force of 73,000 rifles, of which 50,000 were available for the offensive. The Turks had 70,000

rifles, of which 44,000 were assembled on the Sakaria river, but 8,000 more from Cilicia were approaching by rail and march. Unmoved by the Greek success at Eskishehr, the Allies at Paris decided on the 14th to maintain neutrality.

Battle was joined on the 24th. The Greek plan had originally been to turn the Turkish position from the south, but at the last moment as the Turks were shifting men from their right to the left, a change was made and it was decided to break the Turkish centre in the direction of Yapan Hamman. Nevertheless it was on the southern flank that the first and most progress was made, and this enabled the centre and left to get forward.

In ten days of fighting, during which their line of communications was raided by the Turks, and they suffered from want of ammunition, food and even water, the Greeks gradually pressed the Turks back some ten miles, and but for the failure of the administrative arrangements would probably have inflicted on them the signal defeat which was confidently expected. But by September 4 their effort was exhausted; both sides indeed had fought practically to a standstill and had used up all their reserves. The fighting had been fierce and bloody. The Greeks had lost 18,000 men, the Turks not quite so many but again many prisoners. Both armies were in being, nearly equal in numbers, and after rest fit to continue the contest. But the Greeks had involved themselves in a politico-strategic situation where anything short of decisive victory was defeat: and the Turks were in a position where anything short of overwhelming defeat was victory. No aspect of this was hidden from the warrior-chief who led the Turks.

Until September 9 both sides were busy reorganizing; but on that day Kemal after being in doubt as to whether the Greeks were merely resting, preparing



BATTLE OF SAKARIA RIVER.

Sketch map showing the limits of the Greek advance at the Battle of Sakaria River. This action resulting as it did in a form of stalemate, marked the virtual failure of the Greek campaign.

for a fresh attack, or retiring, came to the conclusion their offensive had come to an end, and ordered a general counter-attack.

The Greeks resisted stubbornly with success, but the strategic situation was too perilous, and on the evening of September 11 King Constantine decided to retire to the west of the Sakaria river. The withdrawal was skilfully executed; but it proclaimed the failure of the Greek campaign. The armies remained in presence astride the railway on a line running south from Eskishehr.

* * * *

A Further Opportunity.

Now again there was a chance for intervention. I circulated the following printed Memorandum :—

GREECE AND TURKEY.

September 26, 1921.

The serious reverse which the Greeks have sustained in their attempt to take Angora should add another to the long series of opportunities which have occurred for making a good settlement in the East. It will indeed be disgraceful if we do not make a real effort now to secure such a settlement. The waste and ruin by which the whole of this part of the East is ravaged and its reaction upon the general impoverishment of the world is in itself a sufficient reason.

Is it not, therefore, the very moment now for decided intervention to secure a settlement, whether for the sake of Greece or for the sake of Turkey? It may well be that this further spell of bloody and disappointing fighting may have induced the wish for peace on both sides. Mustapha Kemal may no longer be in the unreasonable mood in which the Beki Samir negotiations were conducted, and the Greeks must be getting nearer and nearer to bankruptcy and revolution. Now is the time to address ourselves to both sides in the mood which we had reached before the Greek resumption of the offensive. No doubt the terms proposed would have to be remodelled. But having decided ourselves what we think is reasonable, we ought to press upon both sides to the utmost limit of our force, not excluding a blockade of the Piræus if Greece is unreasonable, or direct assistance in money and supplies to her if Turkey is unreasonable. We seem to have done absolutely nothing during the last three months but watch the progress of this disastrous conflict, and if we continue in this attitude we shall certainly find ourselves formidably disturbed in Mesopotamia.

Armenia and the Pan-Turks.

But nothing was done, and for a while nothing happened. We entered a period of false calm. There was a pause in the march of events; an interlude in discussion; a gap in policy. The next chapter will explain how the gap was filled: but before the final blows are struck, it will be convenient to outline, however briefly, the subsidiary Armenian Tragedy which accompanied the revival of the Turkish power.

* * * *

The events which have been described in Russia and in Turkey, and which were soon to be ratified by new disasters, were fatal to the Armenian people. The Great War had carried them through hideous slaughters to the fairest and broadest hope they had ever known; and then abruptly laid them—it may well be for ever—in the dust.

The age-long misfortunes of the Armenian race have arisen mainly from the physical structure of their home. Upon the lofty tableland of Armenia, stretching across the base of the Asia Minor Peninsula, are imposed a series of mountain ranges having a general direction east and west. The valleys between these mountains have from time immemorial been the pathways of every invasion or counter-attack between Asia Minor in the west and Persia and Central Asia in the east. In antiquity the Medes, the Persians, the Romans; in the early centuries of the Christian Era the Persian Sassanids and Eastern Roman Emperors; and in the Middle Ages successive waves of Mongols and Turks—Seljukli and Osmanli—invaded, conquered, partitioned, yielded and reconquered the rugged regions in which an ill-starred race strove ceaselessly for life and independence. And

after the rise of Russia to power the struggle for possession of the Armenian regions, as containing the natural frontiers of their own domains, was continued by Russia, Persia and the Ottoman Empire.

At the moment when the Great War began Armenia, divided between Russia and Turkey, repressed by force or actual massacre, had no defence but secret societies and no weapons but intrigue and assassination. The War drew upon them a new train of evils. After the Balkan Wars the Pan-Turks cast away both " Ottomanization " and " Turkification " as means for recreating the State. They attributed the disasters which the Turkish Empire had sustained in part to the opposition of the non-Turkish races in their midst. In blunt but significant language they concluded that these races " were not worth considering ; they were worse than encumbrances ; they could go to the devil." The re-created State for which patriotic Turks hoped must be formed by Turks alone. The goal, if attainable, could be reached only by a long road and a hard. The sooner therefore the Turkish people set out upon it in deadly earnest, the better.

The Turks took this road from 1912 onwards ; and the fact that they had done so went long unrecognized in Europe. The Armenians were, however, better informed. They saw that the incorporation of the Moslem areas of Caucasia in a great Turkish State would if carried to achievement, place the Armenian plateau, including Russian Armenia, under Turkish sovereignty and jeopardize the whole future of their race. The outbreak of the Great War brought these issues to a head. The Turkish Government in furtherance of their own aims tried to secure Armenian support against Russia, particularly the support of Russian Armenians. A grim alternative was presented to the Armenian leaders. Should they throw their national weight as far as it lay in their power on the side of Russia or of Turkey, or should they let their people be divided and driven into battle against each other ? They took the remarkable decision that if war should come, their people in Turkey and in Russia should do their duty to their respective Governments. They thought it better to face fratricidal strife in the quarrels of others than to stake their existence upon the victory of either side.

The 1915 Massacres.

When Turkey attacked Russian Armenia, the Czar's Government, fearing that a successful defence of Caucasia by Armenians would dangerously inflame the Nationalist aspirations of the race, conveyed a hundred and fifty thousand Armenian conscripts to the Polish and Galician fronts and brought other Russian troops to defend Armenian hearths and homes in Caucasia. Few of these hundred and fifty thousand Armenian soldiers survived the European battles or were able to return to Caucasia before the end of the war.

This was hard measure. But worse remained. The Turkish war plan failed. Their offensive against Caucasia in December, 1914, and January, 1915, was defeated. They recoiled in deep resentment. They accused the Armenians of the Turkish eastern districts of having acted as spies and agents on behalf of Russia, and of having assailed the Turkish lines of communication. These charges were probably true ; but true or false, they provoked a vengeance which was also in accord with deliberate policy.

In 1915 the Turkish Government began and ruthlessly carried out the infamous general massacre and deportation of Armenians in Asia Minor. Three or four hundred thousand men, women and children escaped into Russian territory and others into Persia or Mesopotamia ; but the clearance of the race from Asia Minor was about as complete as such an act, on a scale so great, could well be. It is supposed that about one and a quarter millions of Armenians were involved, of whom more than half perished. There is no reasonable doubt that this crime was planned and executed for political reasons. The opportunity presented itself for clearing Turkish soil of a Christian race opposed to all Turkish ambitions, cherishing national ambitions that could only be satisfied at the expense of Turkey, and planted geographically

between Turkish and Caucasian Moslems. It may well be that the British attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula stimulated the merciless fury of the Turkish Government. Even, thought the Pan-Turks, if Constantinople were to fall and Turkey lost the war, the clearance would have been effected and a permanent advantage for the future of the Turkish race would be gained.

The Turkish Conquest.

The arrival of the Grand Duke Nicholas in the Caucasus at the beginning of 1916, his masterly capture of Erzeroum in February, 1916, and his conquests of Turkish territory in North-Eastern Asia Minor revived Armenian hopes. The entry of the United States raised them higher. But the Russian Revolution quenched this flicker.

It is not possible here to follow the tangled conflicts of the Georgians, Armenians and Tartars which followed. Early in 1918 the Russian Army of the Caucasus abandoned the front in Asia Minor and dissolved into an armed rabble struggling to entrain for home. The Russians had gone. The Turks had not yet come. A desperate effort was made by the remaining Armenian manhood to defend their country. The Armenian elements of the Russian army therefore held together, and with the help of volunteers succeeded for a time in holding back the Turkish advance. Their hundred and fifty thousand soldiers were already dead or scattered, and they could never muster more than 35,000 men.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in February, 1918, was the signal for a general Turkish advance eastward. The Armenian line was overwhelmed, and by May not only had the Turks recovered the districts occupied by the Grand Duke, but they had taken the districts of Batum, Kars and Ardahan, and were preparing to advance to the Caspian. Meanwhile the great Allies strode forward. British, French and United States troops beat down the German armies in France. The Anglo-Indian armies conquered Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria. At the very moment when the Turks had reached the goal in Caucasia for which they had run such risks and to which they had waded through crime and slaughter, their whole State and structure fell prostrate. The Armenian people emerged from the Great War scattered, extirpated in many districts, and reduced through massacre, losses of war and enforced deportations adopted as an easy system of killing, by at least a third. Out of a community of about two and a half millions, three-quarters of a million men, women and children had perished. But surely this was the end.

The Friends of Armenia.

The earlier miseries and massacres of the Armenians have been made familiar to the British people and, indeed, to the Liberal world, by the fame and eloquence of Mr. Gladstone. Opinions about them differed, one school dwelling upon their sufferings and the other upon their failings. But at any rate in contrast to the general indifference with which the fortunes of Eastern and Middle-Eastern peoples were followed by the Western democracies, the Armenians and their tribulations were well known throughout England and the United States. This field of interest was lighted by the lamps of religion, philanthropy and politics. Atrocities perpetrated upon Armenians stirred the ire of simple and chivalrous men and women spread widely about the English-speaking world. Now was the moment when at last the Armenians would receive justice and the right to live in peace in their national home. Their persecutors and tyrants had been laid low by war or revolution. The greatest nations in the hour of their victory were their friends, and would see them righted.

It seemed inconceivable that the five great Allies would not be able to make their will effective. The reader of these pages will, however, be under no illusions. By the time the conquerors in Paris reached the Armenian question their unity was dissolved, their armies had disappeared, and their resolves commanded naught but empty words. No Power would take a mandate for Armenia. Britain, Italy, America, France looked at it and shook their

heads. On March 12, 1920, the Supreme Council offered the mandate to the League of Nations. But the League, unsupported by men or money, promptly and with prudence declined.

There remained the Treaty of Sèvres. On August 10 the Powers compelled the Constantinople Government to recognize an as yet undetermined Armenia as a free and independent State. Article 89 prescribed that Turkey must submit to "the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the *vilayets* of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulation he may prescribe as to access of Armenia to the sea." It was not until December, 1920, that President Wilson completed the discharge of this high function. The frontier he defined gave Armenia virtually all the Turkish territory which had been occupied by Russian troops until they disbanded themselves under the influence of the Revolution; an area which, added to the Republic of Erivan, made an Armenian national homeland of nearly sixty thousand square miles.

Obliteration Once More.

So generous was the recognition in theory of Armenian claims that the Armenian and Greek population of the new State was actually outnumbered by Moslem inhabitants. Here was justice and much more. It existed, however, upon paper only. Already nearly a year before, in January, 1920, the Turks had attacked the French in Cilicia, driven them out of the Marash district and massacred nearly fifty thousand Armenian inhabitants. In May Bolshevik troops invaded and subjugated the Republic of Erivan. In September, by collusion between the Bolsheviks and Turks, Erivan was delivered to the Turkish Nationalists; and as in Cilicia, another extensive massacre of Armenians accompanied the military operations. Even the hope that a small autonomous Armenian province might eventually be established in Cilicia under French protection was destroyed. In October France, by the Agreement of Angora, undertook to evacuate Cilicia completely. In the Treaty of Lausanne which registered the final peace between Turkey and the Great Powers, history will search in vain for the word "Armenia."

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

MEN OF A PERSECUTED RACE.

A photograph taken near Baku showing types of Armenian soldiers during a halt by the wayside.

CHAPTER XCVII

CHANAK

The Greek Soldier—The Silent Strain—British Indifference—French Antagonism—America Absent—The Appeals of Gounaris—An Exhausted Lloyd George—The Agreement with Russia—Turkish Atrocities—The Greek Design upon Constantinople—The Decisive Battle: Afium Karahissar—Destruction of the Greek Army—A Grave Situation—The Reckoning—The Neutral Zone—Alarm and Despondency—The British Fleet—The Telegram to the Dominions—The Official Communiqué: September 16—The Issue Explained—The Telegram Overtaken—Response of the Dominions—French and Italian Retirement—Military Measures—The Chanak Position—Strategic Reassurance—My Memorandum of September 30—Kemal's Alternative—Mudania—The Crisis Ended—The Treaty of Lausanne.

THE final act of the Greek Tragedy now begins. It lasted for nearly a year. The Greeks had failed to reach Angora or to crush Kemalist Turkey. Unsuccessful at the Sakaria River in September, 1921, their armies fell back on intermediate entrenched positions covering the Smyrna-Aidin Province. Here they remained disconsolately, but stubbornly, month after month.

The Greek Soldier.

Justice must be done to the Greek soldier, so often the butt of ignorance and prejudice. Imagine an army of two hundred thousand men, the product of a small State mobilized or at war for ten years, stranded in the centre of Asia Minor with a divided nation behind them; with party dissensions in every rank; far from home, and bereft of effectual political guidance; conscious that they were abandoned by the Great Powers of Europe and by the United States; with scanty food and decaying equipment; without tea, without sugar, without cigarettes, and without hope or even a plan of despair; while before them and around them and behind them preyed and prowled a sturdy, relentless and ever more confident foe. The tests of battle are hard, but the armies of all nations have withstood them. But here was the long gnawing strain of suffering much and talking more, of having little and doing nothing.

> "All's quiet along the Potomac to-night,
> Except now and then a stray picket
> Is shot, as he walks on his beat to and fro,
> By a rifleman hid in the thicket."

The army of the Potomac had a mighty nation behind it; had a clear world cause to light its bayonets; was fed and clothed and reinforced. The soldiers knew what they had come for and they were certain they would get what they sought. But over the Greek Army in Asia Minor there stole an ever-growing sense of isolation; of lines of communication in jeopardy, of a crumbling base, of a divided homeland, and of an indifferent world. Nevertheless they remained in martial posture for upwards of nine months.

The Silent Strain.

It is one of the proofs of Mustapha Kemal's military qualities that he also was able and indeed content to wait and capable of compelling others to wait with him. He saw that time and petty harassing would ripen the fruits he now felt sure of gathering. Nine months is a long time in this quick-moving age; but during nine months the Turks waited and the Greeks endured.

Meanwhile many efforts were made by the British Government to bring about a

Turkish settlement and a Greek withdrawal. But they were all made half-heartedly, and with a lack of collective vigour and conviction unworthy of a government whose leading men had been schooled in the greatest of wars. This feebleness can only be explained by the general mental exhaustion of war-worn Ministers, by divergencies of sentiment, and by growing domestic preoccupations. Of these last something will be said later. This was a period when the east seemed in a trance; nothing seemed to be happening there; and with an ever-roughening political breeze at home, it was soothing to the public to see at any rate one spot where the situation was at least stagnant. But all the time a bankrupt Greece was spending a quarter of a million pounds a week in Asia Minor alone, the Venizelists and monarchists of Greece were eyeing each other in deadly rivalry; and an army as large as Britain sent to the South African War was wilting and wasting across the sea.

Photo: E.N.A.

FRANCE'S ENVOY WITH KEMAL PASHA.

M. Franklin-Bouillon, the plausible envoy of France to the new Turkey, is seen here in Smyrna with Kemal Pasha after the Greek forces had been driven out of Asia Minor.

British Indifference—French Antagonism.

There are cases in which strong measures are the only form of prudence and mercy. Use firmly the power of Britain—it is still considerable; compel Greece to concede and Turkey to forbear; knock their heads together until they settle. Such was my counsel. "But," they said, "who is going to do the knocking? We have no troops to spare. We cannot embroil ourselves in foreign wars." But surely this might have been thought of earlier? And so the months sped by—drip, drip, drip; rot, rot, rot.

Meanwhile, Party politics began to crackle cheerfully on the hearth; and Liberals said, "Our turn will soon come"; and Labour said, "What about the unemployed?" and Conservatives said, "Isn't it time we had a government of our own?" and everybody said, "It seems to be settling down out there, and

anyhow it is none of our business. Haven't we had enough ? "

But the French took a different line. Once Venizelos had quitted Athens they wiped Greece off their ledger. A few months passed and their envoys were at Angora. The new Turkey had much to offer France. She could give France peace in Cilicia. She could mitigate the discontents of Syria. Then there were important commercial openings in Anatolia. A Turkish Government which had marched from Angora to Constantinople with the goodwill of France would have much to give. M. Franklin-Bouillon, voluble, plausible, ardent, ambitious, was already at Angora. On October 20, 1921, he signed a mutually profitable agreement between France and Nationalist Turkey. Mustapha Kemal needed munitions — France had plenty of munitions ; he lacked cannon—who makes better guns than Creusot ? As for aeroplanes, a few at any rate are necessary to any modern army. It would be a pity that he should not have them. Divergencies of policy and personal incompatibilities had produced at this time an astonishing separation between France and Britain. These days are over ; new and more comprehensive unities have been established ; but events must be recorded.

America Absent.

Where was America ? She was at the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. All the domestic stresses which stirred British politics and politicians reproduced themselves with far greater vehemence in the United States. The Presidential Election of 1920 had swept Wilson and the Democratic Party for the time completely off the stage. Their ill-used and infuriated opponents were in the saddle. Their policy was to find out exactly what President Wilson had wished or had promised and to do the opposite. So the Government of the United States, which had at one time seemed to play with the idea of becoming a mandatory for Constantinople and for Armenia, which had definitely undertaken to define the boundaries of Armenia, shrugged its shoulders and moralized upon the quarrels and muddles of the benighted Old World, and fervently thanked Providence that except for some useful souvenirs they were out of it, and back home.

These are not perhaps complimentary accounts of the attitude of the three Great Powers at whose request the Greeks had originally invaded Smyrna. But it would be wrong to impute weakness or turpitude or callousness to any of them. Modern forces are so ponderous and individual leaders relatively so small, so precariously balanced, so frequently changed ; the collective life moves forward so irresistibly, that too much vitality or perseverance or coherent policy should not be counted on from large communities. There are moments when each is grand and noble ; there are moments when all are expressionless slabs. King Constantine and his Prime Minister Gounaris ought to have thought of this before they broke the links of obligation.

The Appeals of Gounaris.

Our brief chronicle of military events ceased with the failure of the Greek Army in September, 1921, to reach Angora and with their retreat from the Sakaria River to winter positions east of the line Eskishehr and Afium-Karahissar. Here they remained for nearly a year. Meanwhile the ill-fated Gounaris flitted to and fro between Athens and London begging for money and arms to carry on the war and still more for help to get out of it. He was confronted by Lord Curzon, who soused him in sonorous correctitudes. At these interviews the main effort of Gounaris was to throw the agonized fortunes of Greece into the sole hands of Great Britain ; the main object of Lord Curzon was to avoid incurring in any form or sense this ugly responsibility, but at the same time to persuade Greece to accept Allied mediation. On the whole Lord Curzon was successful. Gounaris was made to feel that England would do nothing, and that his only chance lay in inter-Allied good offices. But even this chance was, it seemed, a poor one, because France was now ardently backing and re-arming the Turks, and England had no intention of becoming embroiled for the sake of pro-Constantine Greece. On the one hand, the cries of a

drowning man; on the other, good advice from one who had no intention of going into the water!

This attitude was justifiable in Lord Curzon, who had throughout, under the guidance of the Foreign Office, played an uncompromised, circumspect and ineffectual part, and who certainly felt no obligation and equally no desire to run any risks either personal or national for the Greeks.

It was Lord Curzon's failing, as his biographer has revealed, that he loved to state a case, and lost interest in it once it had flowed from his lips or his pen. He realized and deplored the plight of Greece; he hated the Turks, and feared their growing strength. He was scandalized by the suddenness with which the French had not only washed their hands of all Greek obligations, but had actually thrown their weight upon the Turkish side; but he was not often capable of producing real action in any sense. In deeds he rarely dinted the surface of events; but his diplomatic conversations were extremely well conducted, and there was no lack of lucid and eloquent State papers. He did not, for instance, say to Gounaris, "Evacuate Asia Minor at once or the British Fleet will blockade the Piræus." Or to the French, "Act with more comradeship in this matter or we will disinterest ourselves in Europe and withdraw our troops from the Rhine." He could not be reproached for not taking either or both of these courses or doing anything else, because he had never at any time done anything in this theatre either good or bad which deflected the march of events.

An Exhausted Lloyd George.

But with the Prime Minister it was different. Yearning as he did for Greek success and still more for Greek extrication; being himself an exemplar of audacious and resourceful action, it was surprising that he did not, having gone so far, on this issue take his own fate in his hands. After all, here again was the occasion he had so often sincerely sought to quit the dimming scene. The forces that sustained the Coalition were swiftly decomposing; he had been flouted and defied by officials of the Conservative organization; his own followers were cut from their party roots and lived politically like flowers in a vase.

In the fierce duress of the war and its consequences he had run through all the parties and many of the friendships. But he was still—and none could strip him of his fame—the "pilot who weathered the storm"; he was still the great Lloyd George, the best-known human being in the cottages of Britain; he was still armed with the decisive power of a Prime Minister to terminate the life of his Government by resignation. Surely he might have said, "Either there is a living policy about Greece and Turkey, or I go." But he was exhausted by all he had gone through, and, worse still, he was loaded with day-to-day affairs and the routine of high command. Actually he was negotiating with the Bolsheviks at Genoa, and being deceived by them. So nothing happened, and Gounaris, who had pulled down Venizelos, went back from his last London visit to reap where he had sown.

Mr. Churchill to Lord Curzon.

April 26, 1922.

Like you I am deeply concerned about this Genoa business.[1] I have long foreseen the danger of Germany and Russia making common cause and have frequently referred to it in public speeches. The policy which I had thought best calculated to prevent or at least modify and delay such an evil orientation was to secure the confidence of France, and armed with that to bring about a tripartite understanding between England, France and Germany for mutual help and security, thus making it plain to Germany that she had good hopes of a bright future with England and France and that she would lose these prospects by exclusive dealing with the Soviets. . . . The foundation of this policy was always the guarantee to France [of aid against aggression], on the basis of which I believed, and still believe, it is possible to secure so great a measure of French confidence as to enable better relations to be established with Germany both by

[1] The Russo-German Agreement had just been disclosed to the Genoa Conference.

Britain and by France. . . . However Utopian these aspirations may be, they appear to be capable of simple explanation and to be the lines along which we could have safely worked, not only for a month but for a year, and not only for a year but for several years.

The Agreement with Russia.

However, an entirely different course has been taken by the Prime Minister, in which the Foreign Office has, it seems to me, had very little chance of bringing its special aptitudes into play. The great objective of the Prime Minister's policy has been Moscow, to make Great Britain the nation in the closest possible relations with the Bolsheviks, and to be their protectors and sponsors before Europe.

I have been unable to discern any British interest, however slight, in this. . . . Of trade advantages there are none that will bear fruit for many years. However, we have been led, drawn or dragged steadily along this road. We have separated ourselves in our attitude towards Russia from both the great democracies with which we are most intimately connected, viz. the United States and France. In our anxiety to placate the Bolsheviks we have lost so much confidence and goodwill that very little influence is left to us now to restrain France from any harsh action against Germany. We ought, on the contrary, to have kept all our strength for this most important development. I am sure that if we had been good friends with them and had kept their goodwill, we should have been in a position very greatly to influence and modify their action. As it is, on what is largely a Russian issue we are being drawn into something perilously near a complete break with France. I am not prepared to contemplate this. I fear that the results would be bad in every sense, that France and the Little Entente will defend their position by strong and drastic action, that Germany and Russia will close their ranks, and that we shall be left a sort of universal marplot without a friend and without a policy.

Another set of misunderstandings has arisen with France about Turkey, and I can well understand the many reasons you have for complaint against them there. At the same time the policy which has been imposed upon us in regard to Turkey has been a policy contrary not only to the interests of France, but to those of Great Britain. Our continued bolstering up of the Greeks and hostility towards the Turks has been incomprehensible to the French, who have been unable in their minds to discern any British interest behind it, and consequently have continually suspected all sorts of extraordinary motives. This has added a long string of difficulties to the relations between the two countries. I greatly admired your efforts in Paris to retrieve a situation already fatally compromised.

To return to our tale; there followed a series



Map showing the fronti



THE CHANGING SCENE IN TURKEY.

key as altered or adjusted between the years 1914 and 1923, and the territories affected by the treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne.

of superficial diplomatic movements. Briand had fallen after the Cannes Conference and golf match of January, 1922, and Poincaré, in this phase a bristling partisan scarcely recognizable in the great figure which has since emerged, ruled in his stead. Marching in triumphantly from Opposition, he only thought of Reparations, of the Rhine and of the Ruhr. If the Turks could help France at the moment, so much the better for them. If King Constantine suffered, it served him right. If the Greeks suffered for having chosen King Constantine, that was their affair. "Vous l'avez voulu, George Dandin." The reader must understand that all this was expressed in the most seemly language, which would have brought no blush to the cheeks of the League of Nations, and our paraphrase is only intended to convey its consequential meaning.

Turkish Atrocities.

Very sluggishly England, France and Italy embarked on simultaneous negotiations with the Turks and Greeks. Technically war continued, but actually from the end of March to the end of May (1922) there was a suspension of arms in Asia Minor. The Allied Conference which eventually met in Paris on March 22–26 proposed an armistice together with peace terms which would have entailed the Greek evacuation of Asia Minor. Greece accepted the armistice and made no reply regarding the terms. Angora refused even the armistice unless it was preceded by the Greek evacuation.

For a space the deadlock continued. But in May the belated news of bloody events in Anatolia began to trickle into the subsidiary columns of the newspapers. Reports of massacres of the Christian population appeared daily. The details of the atrocities committed by the Turks in the Caucasus during the winter of 1920 when the fifty thousand Armenians had perished, and the appalling deportations of Greeks from the Trebizond and Samsun districts which had occurred in the autumn of 1921, were now for the first time reaching Europe. During June, 1922, the methodical extermination of Greeks in Western Anatolia was in full swing. In spite of French efforts to minimize these horrors and to prove similar atrocities on a minor scale against the Greeks, public opinion so far as it existed turned sternly against the Turks.

The Greek Design upon Constantinople.

In July Constantine and his Prime Minister Gounaris in their desperation played a shrewd stroke. Swiftly recalling two divisions from Asia Minor to join their army in Thrace, they demanded permission from the Allies to enter Constantinople. There was no reason to doubt their power to occupy the city, and the mere threat when it became known startled the Angora Turks.

It is quite possible that under cover of a temporary Greek occupation of Constantinople with Allied approval, the escape of the Greek armies from Asia Minor might have been honourably and comparatively painlessly merged in negotiations for peace. Certainly after the Greek army had failed on the Sakaria, nothing but the occupation of Constantinople could have restored the fortunes of the Royal Family and the Royalists in Greece. At least it could be argued against the Allies that if they would not help the Greeks in their military operations they ought not to hamper them; and if on general grounds they felt compelled to hamper, they ought at least loyally and actively to help them to their ships. However, here again all ended in futility. The Greeks were forbidden by the deployment of the armed forces of England, France and Italy to enter Constantinople, and the only lasting result of an exceedingly well-conceived means of covering their retirement from Anatolia was a weakening of their army on the threatened front. This was the final move before the catastrophe.

The Decisive Battle: Afium-Karahissar.

The moment for which Mustapha Kemal had waited so stolidly had now arrived. He knew that the Greeks had withdrawn the two divisions from his front to Thrace. He knew that this transference had equalized the Greek

and Turkish forces. He understood that the Greek troops before him were aware that anyhow they would have to leave Asia Minor. He was now fairly well equipped, thanks to the assistance of at least one Great Power, with arms and war material, and he also enjoyed on a small scale superiority in the air. His operations were complicated and masterly. By threatening the Ismid Peninsula and Brusa, he drew Greek forces to the north; by a cavalry sweep to the east of Aidin in the valley of the Meander, he lured half another Greek division to the south. He concentrated for his main battle on the Afium-Karahissar position about eighty thousand rifles and sabres and one hundred and eighty guns. The Greeks mustered about seventy-five thousand men with three hundred and fifty guns.

On the morning of August 26 the Turks attacked with three corps on a fifteen-mile front south-west of Afium-Karahissar. By the afternoon of the next day the Greek line had been decisively pierced by the First Turkish Corps and a Greek general retreat began. This soon became a rout. The main Greek army fled towards Smyrna. By August 31 their flight was so rapid that the pursuing Turks had lost all touch with them. General Tricoupis, the latest Commander-in-Chief, and his Staff were captured on September 2. They had endeavoured to lead a counter-attack, but not being followed by their men fell into the hands of a Turkish cavalry squadron. Although the Turkish main body marched one hundred miles in three days, they never caught up the Greeks until they reached Smyrna on September 9. Large numbers of refugees and forty thousand Greeks had already embarked when the Turks entered the city. But fifty thousand prisoners were taken by the Turks.

Destruction of the Greek Army.

The Third Greek Corps retreated to their base on the Sea of Marmora. As they approached Mudania, hotly pursued, a French officer informed them that they were in the neutral zone and must surrender. The Commanders of the two leading regiments, knowing that Mudania was not in the neutral zone, refused to surrender and led their regiments successfully by hill paths to Panderma. Part of the main body, however, surrendered to the French and were handed over to the Kemalists; the remainder found shipping at Panderma after abandoning their guns. Thus within a fortnight from August 26 the Greek army which had entered Anatolia at the request of Great Britain, the United States and France, which had been for three years the foundation of Allied policy against Turkey and the object of inter-Allied intrigues, was destroyed or driven into the sea. Turkey became once again the sole master of Asia Minor, and Mustapha Kemal's army, having celebrated their triumph by the burning of Smyrna to ashes and by a vast massacre of its Christian population, turned the heads of their columns hopefully towards Constantinople and the Straits.

A Grave Situation.

The catastrophe which Greek recklessness and Allied procrastination, division and intrigue had long prepared now broke upon Europe. The signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres had only been preserved in their world of illusion by the shield of Greece. That shield was now shattered. Nothing but a dozen battalions of disunited British, French and Italian troops stood between the returning war and Europe; the flames of Smyrna and its hideous massacres were a foretaste of what the fate of Constantinople might be.

The consequences of a new Turkish invasion of Europe were incalculable. A struggle of Kemal's armies, reinforced by the resources and man-power of Constantinople, with the Greeks in Thrace must raise every Balkan danger. The re-entry of the Turks into Europe, as conquerors untrammelled and untamed, reeking with the blood of helpless Christian populations must, after all that had happened in the war, signalize the worst humiliation of the Allies. Nowhere had their victory been more complete than over Turkey; nowhere had the conqueror's power been flaunted more arrogantly than in Turkey; and now, in the end, all the fruits of successful war, all the laurels for which so many

Photo : Central News.

REFUGEES OFF SMYRNA.

A few days before the Turkish army entered Smyrna refugees were leaving the city in large numbers. Boats of many types and sizes put out from the threatened port crowded with unfortunates, together with such of their belongings as they could gather together. Their sufferings, as it turned out, proved trifling when compared with those endured by many who remained.

scores of thousands had died on the Gallipoli Peninsula, in the deserts of Palestine and Mesopotamia, in the marshes of the Salonica front, in the ships which fed these vast expeditions ; all the diversions of allied resources in men, in arms, in treasure which they had required ; all was to end in shame.

Victory over Turkey absolute and unchallenged had been laid by the armies upon the council table of the Peace Conference. Four years had passed, and the talkers had turned it into defeat. Four years had passed, darkened by a purposeless carnage, not only on fields of battle, but even more of women and children, the old, the weak, the unarmed. All the fine pretensions of Europe and the United States, all the eloquence of their statesmen, all the hiving and burrowing committees and commissions, had led the erstwhile masters of overwhelming power to this bitter and ignominious finish.

But surely the last word had not yet been spoken ; surely there was still time, not indeed to retrieve the disaster, but at least to bring about a peace which would leave the Allies some vestiges of respect and would protect Europe from a new conflagration. And here obligation took a precise form. The area around Constantinople from the lines of Chatalja to those of Ismid, from the Black Sea to the Straits of the Dardanelles, had been declared a neutral zone. The Kemalists had agreed to respect it ; it had been delimited with their officers ; it was plainly marked.

We have seen how only a few months before when Greece sought to repair her desperate fortunes by entering Constantinople, these same allies had proclaimed the sanctity of the neutral zone and British, French and Italian troops had actually marched out in war array and displayed their standards in its defence. If it was right to deprive the Greeks by united allied action of what was perhaps their sole means of saving their armies in Asia Minor, was it not equally a duty to prevent the Turks from passing through this same neutral zone to attack and destroy the remnants of the Greek armies in Thrace ? If England, despite the Greek sympathies of her Prime Minister, had marched with France and Italy to arrest the Greek advance upon Constantinople, was it not an equal obligation upon these Powers to stand with us in defence of the limit which the three Powers had jointly prescribed and engaged themselves to maintain ?

The Reckoning.

Were we really going to be chased out

of Constantinople to our ships, leaving the Sultan, his Ministers, and every person who had followed our instructions in carrying out the conditions of the Armistice, to be punished as traitors to their country? Were three Great Nations, with the screams of Smyrna in their ears, really to scuttle at the approach of armed men? Would they abandon the city on which they had laid their hands, for which they had assumed so direct a responsibility, to a ruthless vengeance, and still worse to a blind anarchy? But if this was not to be, something more was needed than bluff and blather; unless everything was to clatter down, someone must stand firm.

Not much was to be expected from the Italians. They knew the Greeks had been sent to Asia Minor to forestall what they considered their rightful claims. Now the Greeks had been driven into the sea, and with the Greek dreams there fell also or at least subsided Italian ambitions. But France, the warrior nation, captain of the Allies in Armageddon, the France of Foch and Clémenceau—was France to be found unwilling to discharge her trust? Many allowances may be made for the peccadilloes of which Franklin-Bouillon was the agent. The breach of sentiment and understanding between Lloyd George and Poincaré was complete. Every form of mutual repulsion operated between them. The Lloyd-Georgian policy of building up a great Greek empire had little concern with the interests of France, and a standing quarrel with the Turks exposed France to peculiar difficulties in the Syrian territories she had so recently acquired by force. Indeed, this policy was deemed by dominant British opinion contrary to a long view of the interests of the British Empire. It was personal policy, pursued moreover by its author only with limited liability. The French could not understand what the British were after.

Other divergences had arisen about Reparations and the Peace Treaty; and the shadow of a French invasion of the Ruhr hung darkly over the feeble revival of Europe. Anglo-French relations were at their worst; it was hard to believe that two peoples who had gone through so much and achieved so much together and

Photo: E.N.A.

SMYRNA DESTROYED.

The occupation of Smyrna by the Kemalist forces was celebrated by the burning of the city and a wholesale massacre of the Christian population. Of the busy port entered by the Greeks three years previously, nothing remained in 1922 but a burnt-out shell. Smyrna, all save the poor Turkish quarters, ceased for the time being to exist.

buried so many dead in common and saved their souls alive from the fiery furnace in good comradeship, should so swiftly have fallen apart. But, after all, these had been only superficial difficulties, like bad manners between good friends. Suddenly the situation had become formidable. Fundamental issues rose like granite rocks above the froth and slime.

The Neutral Zone.

We had a right to expect that France would stand to her engagements to maintain the neutral zone; and it is always pleasing to remember that this was the spontaneous instinct of the French High Command in Constantinople. On September 11 Mustapha Kemal was notified by the High Commissioners of the Three Powers that he must not transgress the neutral zone. The slender British forces making a front on the Ismid Peninsula and at Chanak on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles were reinforced by detachments from the French and Italian armies. In order to avoid the firing of a shot, the three Great Powers had only to act together and thus convince Mustapha Kemal that while he could have a satisfactory peace if he halted beyond the boundary line, he would encounter unlimited resources by its violation. But if we were all three to shuffle off in a "devil take the hindmost" mood, then blood would flow and fire would burn, and none could tell how peace might be restored. In any quarrel among men, if one side proclaims its complete impotence of will and hand, there are no bounds to the evils that may ensue.

Alarm and Despondency.

I come down to the personal thread on which this narrative of large events is strung. The reader is perhaps convinced that I tried my best to prevent this hateful and fearful situation from coming into being. But here it was. The resuscitated Turk was marching upon the Dardanelles and Constantinople, and beyond them, upon Europe. I thought he ought to be stopped. If, indeed, unhappily he re-entered Europe it should be by Treaty, and not by violence. Defeat is a nauseating draught; and that the victors in the greatest of all wars should gulp it down, was not readily to be accepted. When one knew that a single gesture would immediately restore to them full control of the event, it was surely worth making an effort. So having done my utmost for three years to procure a friendly peace with Mustapha Kemal and the withdrawal of the Greeks from Asia Minor, and having consistently opposed my friend the Prime Minister upon this issue, I now found myself wholeheartedly upon his side in resisting the consequences of the policy which I had condemned.

I found myself in this business with a small group of resolute men: the Prime Minister, Lord Balfour, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Lord Birkenhead, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, with the technical assistance, willingly proffered, of the three Chiefs of Staff, Beatty, Cavan and Trenchard. We made common cause. The Government might break up and we might be relieved of our burden. The nation might not support us: they could find others to advise them. The Press might howl, the Allies might bolt. We intended to force the Turk to a negotiated peace before he should set foot in Europe. The aim was modest, but the forces were small; and events had been so much mismanaged during these last three years that public opinion at home and throughout the Empire was ill-prepared to support, and indeed prejudiced against, the necessary minor but rough measures which had to be taken.

How to stop the Turk, and how, after stopping him, bring the Turk to parley? That was the problem. The days were passing; the long columns of ragged, valiant Ottoman soldiery who, their cruelties apart, deserved the salutes due to those who do not despair of their country, were streaming northward towards Constantinople and the Dardanelles. Would they halt at the neutral zone?

It seemed to many people who woke up suddenly to find an exciting crisis that we had no means of resistance. The forces of the opponent were wildly

exaggerated. Mustapha Kemal, we were told, had one hundred and fifty thousand well-armed men, organized in as many divisions as would have held a million in the Great War; behind these were another one hundred and fifty thousand; and again, still further in the rear, all the Moslems in the world. Both the French and Italians had sold them arms and had sought their favours; so it was unlikely that these Powers would give much help. Still one hoped that they would at any rate preserve the decencies. But if it were left to England alone to stop the Turk re-entering Europe, was it a task "within the compass of her stride?"

The British Fleet.

Here it is worth while considering the peculiar strategic position which we enjoyed in virtue of our hold upon the Gallipoli Peninsula and of our undisputed command of the sea. The British Mediterranean Fleet lay in the Marmora, and its flotillas swept to and fro through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. No army could pass from Asia into Europe except piecemeal and clandestinely, at night. But, it was said, the Turks will bring cannon to the Asiatic shores of both these Straits and fire on the flotillas and supply-vessels. To which we said, what cannon? It was found that they had no cannon that could destroy even small warships, and ours were large ones. Still, they would fire at them. But Beatty said the Navy would put up with that; also that they would fire back. As long as the British Fleet held this line of deep salt water between Europe and Asia the war could not be carried into Thrace.

On September 15, the British Cabinet met in prolonged session. Sir Charles Harington commanded for the Allies at Constantinople. Lord Plumer, his old chief of Second Army days, had arrived there on a visit. He had telegraphed saying that he was sure General Harington's arrangements had been correct and sound. The situation was in his opinion serious and required firm and decided action without delay. It was quite clear to him that the Kemalists meant to try to impose their conditions on the Allies, preferably by threatening force, but actually by force if no result was produced by threats. If things were allowed to drift further, it was absolutely certain that we should be driven into a corner militarily and politically. Such was his view.

The Telegram to the Dominions.

On this and all other information the Cabinet came, without dissension if not unitedly, to serious resolves. I was instructed by minute to draft a telegram for the Prime Minister to send to the Dominions informing them of the critical situation and inviting their aid. I accordingly prepared a message stating that a decision had been taken by the Cabinet to resist aggression upon Europe by the Turks and to make exertions to prevent Mustapha Kemal driving the Allies out of Constantinople, and in particular and above all to secure firmly the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to maintain the freedom of the Straits. We had received a notification from the French Government that they were in agreement with us in informing Mustapha Kemal that he must not violate the neutral zone which protected Constantinople and the Straits. The Italians also were acting in concert with us. We hoped to secure the military participation of Greece, Roumania, and Serbia in defence of the deep-water line between Europe and Asia, and were addressing them accordingly. All the Powers were being notified of our intention to make exertions, and a British division was under orders to reinforce the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Harington. The Navy would co-operate to the fullest extent necessary.

The object of these arrangements, the message continued, was to cover the period which must elapse before it was possible to secure a stable peace with Turkey. Proposals were being made to hold a Conference for this purpose probably in Venice, or possibly in Paris. Meanwhile it was essential that we should have sufficient strength to maintain our position around the Straits and in Constantinople until this peace had been achieved. It seemed improbable that if a firm front was shown by a large number of Powers acting together, the forces of

Mustapha Kemal would attack. The Prime Minister's message ran :—" These armies, which have so far not had any serious resistance to encounter from disheartened Greeks, are estimated at between sixty and seventy thousand men, but timely precautions are imperative. Grave consequences in India and among other Mohammedan populations for which we are responsible might result from a defeat or from a humiliating exodus of the Allies from Constantinople. . . . I should be glad to know whether the Governments of the [various Dominions] are willing to associate themselves with our action and whether they desire to be represented by a contingent. . . . The announcement of an offer from all or any of the Dominions to send a contingent even of moderate size would undoubtedly exercise in itself a most favourable influence on the situation."

I also drafted the next morning (Saturday) at the request of the Prime Minister and his principal colleagues (except Lord Curzon, who was at his country seat), a communiqué for publication. We felt that the public ought not to be left longer in ignorance of the situation and its gravity. This statement has been censured for being alarmist and provocative in tone, and certainly it was ill-received in important quarters. I am content to reproduce it so that it can be judged here in retrospect.

The Official Communiqué : September 16.

" . . . The approach of the Kemalist forces to Constantinople and the Dardanelles and the demands put forward by the Angora Government . . . if assented to, involve nothing less than the loss of the whole results of the victory over Turkey in the late war. The channel of deep salt water that separates Europe from Asia and unites the Mediterranean and the Black Sea affects world interests, European interests, and British interests of the first order.

" The British Government regard the effective and permanent freedom of the Straits as a vital necessity for the sake of which they are prepared to make exertions. They have learnt with great satisfaction that in this respect their views are shared by France and Italy, the other two Great Powers principally concerned.

" The question of Constantinople stands somewhat differently. For more than two years it has been decided that the Turks should not be deprived of Constantinople, and in January of last year at the Conference in London the representatives of the Constantinople and Angora Turkish Governments were informed of the intention of the Allies to restore Constantinople to the Turks, subject to other matters being satisfactorily adjusted.

" The wish of the British Cabinet is that a Conference should be held as speedily as possible in any place generally acceptable to the other Powers involved, at which a resolute and sustained effort should be made to secure a stable peace with Turkey. But such a Conference cannot embark upon its labours, still less carry them through with the slightest prospect of success, while there is any question of the Kemalist forces attacking the neutral zones by which Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles are now protected.

" The British and French Governments have instructed their High Commissioners at Constantinople to notify Mustapha Kemal and the Angora Government that these neutral zones established under the flags of the three Great Powers must be respected.

" However, it would be futile and dangerous, in view of the excited mood and extravagant claims of the Kemalists, to trust simply to diplomatic action. Adequate force must be available to guard the freedom of the Straits and defend the deep-water line between Europe and Asia against a violent and hostile Turkish aggression. That the Allies should be driven out of Constantinople by the forces of Mustapha Kemal would be an event of the most disastrous character, producing, no doubt, far-reaching reactions throughout all Moslem countries, and not only through all Moslem countries but through all the States defeated in the late war, who would be profoundly encouraged by the spectacle of the undreamed-of successes that have attended the efforts of the comparatively weak Turkish forces.

The Issue Explained.

"Moreover, the reappearance of the victorious Turk on the European shore would provoke a situation of the gravest character throughout the Balkans, and very likely lead to bloodshed on a large scale in regions already cruelly devastated. It is the duty of the Allies of the late war to prevent this great danger, and to secure the orderly and peaceful conditions in and around the Straits which will allow a conference to conduct its deliberations with dignity and efficiency and so alone reach a permanent settlement.

"His Majesty's Government are prepared to bear their part in this matter and to make every possible effort for a satisfactory solution. They have addressed themselves in this sense to the other Great Powers with whom they have been acting, and who jointly with them are associated in the defence of Constantinople and the neutral zones.

"It is clear, however, that the other Ally Powers of the Balkan Peninsula are also deeply and vitally affected. Roumania was brought to her ruin in the Great War by the strangulation of the Straits. The union of Turkey and Bulgaria would be productive of deadly consequences to Serbia in particular and to Yugo-Slavia as a whole. The whole trade of the Danube flowing into the Black Sea is likewise subject to strangulation if the Straits are closed. The engagement of Greek interests in these issues is also self-evident.

"His Majesty's Government are therefore addressing themselves to all these three Balkan Powers with a view to their taking a part in the effective defence of the neutral zones. His Majesty's Government have also communicated with the Dominions, placing them in possession of the facts and inviting them to be represented by contingents in the defence of interests for which they have already made enormous sacrifices and of soil which is hallowed by immortal memories of the Anzacs.

"It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to reinforce immediately, and if necessary to a considerable extent, the troops at the disposal of Sir Charles Harington, the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople, and orders have also been given to the British Fleet in the Mediterranean to oppose by every means any infraction of the neutral zones by the Turks or any attempt by them to cross the European shore."

The Telegram Overtaken.

The Prime Minister approved his telegram to the Dominions before 7 p.m. on September 15 and it was ciphered and despatched by 11.30 p.m. It had then to be transmitted, deciphered, and delivered in the various Governments. This process was not completed until the afternoon of the 16th. By that time the communiqué had already been flashed *en clair* by the Press all over the world, and had actually reached Canadian and Australian newspaper offices before the responsible Ministers had received the Government despatch. These Ministers therefore found themselves beset by anxious inquirers and also by eager volunteers for service, before they themselves had received any official information. This was vexatious to all concerned. None of the British Ministers had foreseen that the official telegram approved seventeen hours earlier and with at least twelve hours' start, would be overtaken and forestalled by the newspaper messages. In any case, however, the issue of the communiqué was a separate decision taken in consequence of the growing seriousness of the situation and of the duty of the British Government to warn the public.

Response of the Dominions.

The Dominion Ministers were in consequence placed in a false position and were naturally incensed. They protested vigorously against the procedure. The doubts, and on the whole preponderating disapproval which had been felt in the Mother Country of Mr. Lloyd George's pro-Greek policy and the general dissatisfaction at inter-allied handling of the Eastern problem since the Armistice, were reflected in the Governments and peoples of Canada and Australia. Like the British public, they had not been conscious of the protective influence of the Greek armies behind which we had all lived in peaceful futility for three

years. Like the British public, they could not readily comprehend the vast change which the destruction of these armies had wrought in our affairs. Nevertheless, all the Dominions responded to the call and declared their readiness if a great emergency arose to bear their part, subject, of course, to the consent of their Parliaments.

By the night of September 16 the Government of New Zealand telegraphed that "they wished to associate themselves with the action which is being taken and will send a contingent"; and on the 20th, that "the House of Representatives had unanimously endorsed the action of their Government; and that over five thousand volunteers had already registered their names for active service." In a few days these numbers had grown to twelve thousand from a community of fourteen hundred thousand souls whose military manhood had already been more than decimated in the great struggle. Similar manifestations took place in Canada and in Australia, and both these Dominion Governments were embarrassed until long after the actual crisis had passed by the press of war-experienced men answering to the appeal. We attached, of course, special importance to the responses of Australia and New Zealand on account of the knowledge which the Turks, and above all others, Mustapha Kemal, had acquired during the Great War when in contact with the Anzacs. There could be no greater deterrent upon violent Turkish action than the possibility of again facing the formidable volunteers of the Antipodes. It is beyond question that this knowledge, which we took good care to convey, was a definite factor in the eventual avoidance of war.

Photo: Elliott & Fry.

GENERAL SIR CHARLES HARINGTON.

One of the most distinguished of the now dwindling company of officers who, during the war years and after, held appointments involving heavy responsibility, Sir Charles Harington was born at Chichester in 1872. Entering the Army twenty years later, he served on the Staff in the South African War, and during the Great War was Chief of Staff to Lord Plumer. In 1922, when in command of the Army of the Black Sea, General Harington, by his skilful handling of the delicate situation at Chanak, did much to avert a renewal of war in Eastern Europe.

French and Italian Retirement.

Meanwhile, the divergence between Britain and France had led to a lamentable episode. On September 18 orders from Paris withdrew the French detachments from the side of their British comrades at Chanak and on the Ismid Peninsula. The French troops were accompanied in their retirement by the Italians, and the British Empire was left alone to face the advancing Turkish armies. The advertised de-

Photo: Central News.

A STREET IN CHANAK.

The town of Chanak, familiar by name to all who served in the operations on Gallipoli, became in 1922 the chief danger-point in the Near East. General Sir Charles Harington considered it essential that Chanak, situated as it is on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, at the Narrows, should be held. Sanction having been obtained for the continued occupation of this vital point, General Harington, by pursuing a policy of tact combined with military firmness, was able to avoid collision with the Kemalist forces and, what was more important, laid the foundations upon which the Treaty of Lausanne was subsequently based.

parture of the soldiers of these two great Powers was likely to inflame the wildest ambitions of the Turks. What, they might ask, could Britain, herself by no means convinced of the issue at this time —Britain, the war-worn, the impoverished, the demobilized—achieve alone? Henceforth the Turks knew that only one Power stood in front of them. Luckily they had at their head a leader who understood a good many things.

We shall deliberately ignore and obliterate the scandalous recriminations which took place when Lord Curzon went to Paris on September 23. These were the worst years of Anglo-French relations which the twentieth century with all its stresses has seen; and this was the worst moment. We have run through this bad weather into better days. It is enough in epitome that the French said, "We will stop the Turk by diplomacy"; and the British replied, "Your diplomacy would be worth nothing without our bayonets. These are fixed."

Meanwhile matters had passed for a space into the military sphere. The control of the Straits would obviously be facilitated if the fateful narrows of the Dardanelles were occupied on both sides by our troops. This made it desirable to hold Chanak on the Asiatic shore. It was a valuable though, as I believe, not an indispensable outwork. Originally the War Office had not contemplated holding Chanak, and on the 11th General Harington had been told that he might evacuate at his discretion. He appealed against this decision on account of the importance of the place as an advanced defence of the Gallipoli peninsula. He was then told that he might hold it as if he were a rear-guard.

Availing himself of this permission, General Harington sent on the 19th the following order to the officer commanding Chanak, Major-General Marden: "You should hold Chanak as long as possible with the forces I have available. I am communicating the decision to the

Government. In my opinion in view of the French withdrawing from Chanak, Kemal will challenge British policy there. In all probability he will stop to reflect, if you stop him there with naval support. Your stand there may avert further trouble."

And on the 20th he telegraphed to the War Office: "If we continue to show our determination, I am of opinion that the British will be able to carry through the task without them [i.e. the French and Italians], so that I do not consider you need feel concern for their action. According to my information his [Kemal's] ministers are being summoned to Smyrna to-morrow for a conference. Evidently this is to decide whether he will take England on with her Dominions. My own opinion is they will not dare to do so."

Military Measures.

On the same day [September 20], the Cabinet faced the position created by the withdrawal of the French and Italians, and were advised upon the military aspect by the chiefs of the staffs. Sound decisions were taken. General Harington was informed that the defence of Chanak was his first duty; that the defence of Constantinople itself was secondary, and the defence of the Ismid Peninsula, minor. On September 22 General Harington apprised Mustapha Kemal through the Kemalist representative at Constantinople that he was instructed to defend the neutral zone. On the 23rd, eleven hundred Turkish cavalry entered the neutral zone and moved to Eren-Keui. The British general at Chanak warned the Turkish commander that in entering the neutral zone he had committed an act of war, and that he would be obliged to fire upon them if they failed to retire. The attitude of the Turkish officer was correct and reasonable, and the Turkish cavalry withdrew beyond the neutral zone on the morning of the 24th. On September 25 they returned to Eren-Keui two thousand strong, with machine guns. Here they remained, contumaciously and encroachingly, but with much politeness and parleying; and in undoubted violation of the neutral zone.

Both sides had an interest in gaining time, for the Turks had only horsemen without artillery, and we were hurrying reinforcements, artillery and aeroplanes to the scene as fast as ships could carry them. At the outset Chanak was defended on a four-mile front by only three-and-a-half battalions and two field batteries, supported, of course, by the almost measureless gun-power of the Fleet. Naval fire against land positions had made remarkable progress since 1915. The most powerful battleships of the Navy lay in the stream supported by numerous cruisers and flotillas. All objectives had been registered, and fire could be regulated by unchallenged air observation. The infantry was therefore supported throughout by an artillery certainly equal to that of a whole army corps and possibly far above it. By the 28th Chanak was defended by six battalions, and three new howitzer batteries were planted on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Thirty-six guns of medium calibre were on the way; sixteen 8-in. howitzers were embarking. The growth of the air force was also substantial. The *Pegasus* with her five seaplanes was joined on the 27th by the *Argus* with six seaplanes and four fighters, and on the 28th by thirteen machines of the 209th Squadron. Three additional squadrons with 36 machines were due on October 9 and 10.

The Chanak Position.

The Prime Minister asked me to preside over a Cabinet Committee for the proper concerting of naval, military and air force movements. The week from the 20th to the 28th was one of anxiety. Information about the Turks was cloudy. So far nothing but cavalry forces, quite incapable of attacking entrenched positions, had appeared. But we did not know where the heads of their infantry columns marching from Smyrna to Constantinople actually were; or whether they would turn aside to assault Chanak, and what artillery and ammunition they could provide for that purpose. We only knew that we had a rather restricted but well-entrenched and well-wired position, air ascendancy, and great artillery superiority, and that the Turks

had neither tanks nor poison gas. This was already a good deal. But from the 28th onward, when our air supremacy became marked and the howitzers came into line from Gallipoli, it was quite certain that the British force could be dislodged from Chanak only by a major operation of war. Certainly on the Western Front in 1917 and 1918 no one would have attempted to attack such a position without at least equal artillery and air power in the zone of action, and with probably two or three rifles to one on the actual fighting front engaged.

All experience shows that unless the artillery of the attack has mastered that of the defence, and further has pulverized their infantry positions, the mere pushing forward of masses of infantry against machine guns and well-trained riflemen and barbed wire means only a greater slaughter the longer it is persisted in. And even when the artillery has mastered the defence, it has been bloodily proved upon a large scale a hundred times that without tanks or gas the prospects of an assault are doubtful.

I had particularly in mind the repulse by the Anzacs of the Turks on May 19, 1915, after the first landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Here the Anzacs with far less powerful artillery and practically no air help had faced the best-trained troops of the Turkish regular army at odds of more than three to one. But the Turks, charging with the utmost bravery, withered before the fire, leaving so many thousands of corpses between the lines that the only truce of the Gallipoli campaign had to be arranged by mutual consent for sanitary purposes. After September 28, therefore, there seemed no reason to be uncomfortable about the tactical situation at Chanak.

Strategic Reassurance.

But it was the strategic situation which gave the real reassurance. Why should a skilful and experienced soldier and able man like Mustapha Kemal turn aside from his march towards Constantinople and lead his worn and sorely tried army against a British entrenched position? What would he gain in politics by driving the British Empire into war against him? What would he gain in tactics by squandering his men and scanty ammunition upon a local cock-fight of this kind? What would he gain in strategy by delaying his march to the Ismid Peninsula and close contact with his adherents in Constantinople? Every day's delay in arriving before Constantinople was perilous to him. He knew that there was a Greek army in Thrace almost the equal of his own. A military revolution in Athens had followed the disasters in Asia Minor. Constantine had been expelled, and the Greek military authorities had declared their resolve to defend Eastern Thrace. Every day they could gain for the reorganization of their forces and for taking up advanced positions before the Chatalja lines was injurious to Kemal. And there all the time lay Constantinople, full of Kemalist adherents, with very little but the blandishments and expostulations of M. Franklin-Bouillon to defend it.

In fact, Mustapha Kemal never diverted his march a yard from his road. Like a wise man, he hurried on as fast as he could towards the main and easy goal, and used his flank guard of cavalry to give an appearance of strength and aggressiveness towards the British at Chanak. His cavalry officers had the strictest orders to avoid conflict, and above all to get into friendly parley. Their unabashed good humour was proof against the severest and most formal frowns. They made every effort to fraternize, and even ventured requests for camp-equipment and the minor conveniences of campaigning. There never was any danger to the British forces at Chanak. The menace was to Constantinople; but the defence of Constantinople in the absence of the other two great Powers was not primarily a British responsibility.

I made a note for our small group on September 30 which may, so far as it is relevant, be reprinted.

My Memorandum of September 30.

CHANAK.

Sept. 30, 1922.

We have hitherto prudently considered our position at Chanak as if we were likely to be exposed to attack by

the whole of the Kemalist armies. It seems, however, unlikely that this will occur. The Kemalists are already at war with Greece, and their paramount object is to cross into Thrace and defeat the Greek armies there. It is no use their trying to get across the Dardanelles or the Sea of Marmora. Their only practicable road into Europe is across the Bosphorus or possibly across the Black Sea. It seems probable that they are at the present moment, and have been ever since the fall of Smyrna, steadily re-forming the main body of their troops towards the Ismid Peninsula with a view to crossing the Bosphorus, and that all they have done on the Chanak Peninsula is to send cavalry and minor forces to net in the British and to plant a certain number of guns on the unoccupied shores of the Dardanelles.

In any case it is clear that Kemal will have to choose between marching into Thrace by the Bosphorus and coming to grips with the Greek Army on the one hand, or trying to overwhelm the British at Chanak on the other. He would surely make a great mistake to adopt half-measures, namely, weak attacks on the British at Chanak and insufficient forces to defeat the Greeks in Thrace. Let us examine these two alternatives seriatim, taking the least probable first.

If Kemal attacks Chanak with the main strength of his army, of his artillery and limited ammunition, ample time will be afforded to the Greeks to get their army in Thrace thoroughly reorganized and reinforced to the utmost extent. . . .

Kemal's Alternative.

If, then, he takes the second alternative, as he is probably doing, he might in about three weeks be in contact with the Greeks beyond the Chatalja lines. In this case he would no doubt leave sufficient forces around Chanak to close us in, but would not make any serious or costly attack. Nor would he unduly use his ammunition from the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles upon ships passing the Straits. From about the end of October he will become deeply involved in Thrace. If we have taken the proper measures from the moment that hostilities have commenced, our position will then be a very strong one. The command of the Sea of Marmora and our naval strength will enable us to move our forces in many directions with the utmost rapidity. One cannot conceive a more wonderful system of interior lines and of water communication than will be at our disposal. . . . The position of the Kemalist army, heavily engaged with the Greeks in Thrace, with its line of communications stretching along the Ismid Peninsula, and a strong, compact British army crouched at Gallipoli and Chanak ready with the help of the Navy to cut those communications—such a position would, indeed, be forlorn. . . .

The more the situation is surveyed, the more the strategic advantages of the British position at Chanak and Gallipoli will become patent. The dilemma which faces Kemal will be painful in the extreme. He has either to break his teeth against the British at Chanak while the Greek armies grow stronger every day, or else to hurry into what is virtually a death-trap in Thrace. . . .

There remains, as there nearly always does, a third hypothesis, namely, that Kemal, if he recognizes the futility from his point of view of a serious and prolonged effort against the British at Chanak and the peril of becoming embroiled in Thrace with the hostile British on his communications, will recoil from both projects. In this case we shall have attained our present objects without serious hostilities. Negotiations will be resumed, but in a very different atmosphere from those undertaken in Paris. If as the result of these negotiations the Turks are allowed to come back to Constantinople and Thrace, it need only be upon such conditions as we may judge to be most likely to secure a lasting peace. I trust the strength of our position will be realized before we take any steps that would barter it away.

The climax at Chanak was reached on September 28, when General Harington reported that the Turks were collecting in considerable numbers round the British position, "grinning through the barbed wire," that they were clearly acting under orders, that everything possible had been done to avoid conflict,

Photo: Mme. Berthe Georges Gaulis.

MUSTAPHA KEMAL'S ENVOY AT MUDANIA.

The Conference of Mudania, at which envoys representing Great Britain, France, Italy and Turkey were present, assembled on October 3, 1922. Nothing resulted from this first meeting, largely owing to the fact that Turkey believed that Great Britain was unprepared or unwilling in the last resort to fight. The Turkish representative seen here with his staff was General Ismet Pasha, Commander of the Turkish Western Armies.

Photo: Ercole.

THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES AT MUDANIA.

The Allied representatives at Mudania, a photograph of whom is reproduced here, were (left to right): General Mombelli (Italy), General Sir Charles Harington (Great Britain), and General Charpy (France). On the occasion of the resumption of the Conference on October 10, 1922, the Turks, no longer under any delusion as to the attitude of Britain, were found ready to sign an armistice. Under the terms of this Convention the Turks agreed to recognize the neutral zone on condition that the Greeks should retire behind the Maritza and that Greek civil authorities should evacuate Eastern Thrace.

but that the position was becoming impossible. He also reported that the British position at Chanak was "strong, well wired, and well sited." The Cabinet thereupon instructed the General to present an ultimatum to the Turks to quit the neutral zone and sheer off Chanak within a brief time-limit, and authorized him to use all the forces at his disposal at its expiration.

The General was able, however, to tide over his difficulties without availing himself of the formidable warrant with which he had been armed. The tact, coolness and patience of General Harington were exemplary. It so chanced that from the moment the Cabinet sent the stern telegram, the Turkish provocation which had given rise to it began to subside. On the 30th the commander at Chanak (General Marden) reported that there were no signs of Kemalist guns or infantry being brought against him; and that his force was not in danger. And as every day's delay made the British position stronger, General Harington did not consider it necessary to send the Turks an ultimatum, nor did any incidents occur which required the opening of fire. The Cabinet, relieved by this favourable development, on October 1 approved their commander's forbearance.

Mudania.

Meanwhile, after difficult discussions with the French, a joint invitation had been sent to Mustapha Kemal on September 23 to a Conference on the shores of the Marmora at Mudania. The invitation was accompanied by far-reaching offers, mainly at the expense of Greece. The three Allied Governments promised to restore to Turkey Thrace as far as the Maritza and Adrianople, to withdraw from Constantinople as soon as peace was made, and to support the admission of Turkey to the League of Nations. Mustapha accepted the invitation and fixed October 3. To Mudania also proceeded the ineffable M. Franklin-Bouillon, whose efforts were directed towards leading the Turks to hope for more than they would ever get from Great Britain, and to believe that the British were unable or unwilling in the last resort to fight.

The Crisis Ended.

Largely as a result of his activities a deadlock was soon reached, and the Allied representatives returned to Constantinople on October 5. The French and Italian High Commissioners, appalled by the prospect of war, favoured unconditional surrender. Sir Horace Rumbold, however, stood firmly to the proposals of September 23; and General Harington was instructed from London to make no further concessions. The news that the British were preparing an ultimatum became known to the Turks through French or Italian sources. The continued arrival of British troops, artillery and aeroplanes in the Dardanelles was evident. When the Conference was resumed at Mudania on October 10, the Turks were found ready after protracted discussion to sign an armistice convention. This provided that the Greeks should retire behind the Maritza and that Greek civil authorities should evacuate Eastern Thrace. On the other hand, the Turks agreed to recognize the neutral zone and undertook not to raise an army in Eastern Thrace until the ratification of the Treaty.

The story of Chanak is instructive in several ways. It reflects high credit upon General Harington, who emphasized the value and significance of the Chanak position and tenaciously held to it, and who knew how to combine a cool and tactful diplomacy with military firmness. There is no doubt that the attitude of the British Government and of the Dominions, particularly Australia and New Zealand, prevented the renewal of the war in Europe and enabled all the Allies to escape without utter shame from the consequences of their lamentable and divided policies. Considering the limited resources available, the public fatigue, the precarious position of the Administration and its declining authority at home and abroad, the achievement of "Peace with Honour" was memorable. It formed the basis upon which a peace of mutual respect could subsequently be negotiated with the Turks at Lausanne. The

strong action taken by Britain, so far from drawing upon us the lasting enmity of the Turks, aroused a sentiment of admiration and even of goodwill, and will make easier rather than harder our future relationship with modern Turkey.

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The Treaty of Lausanne.

The Treaty of Lausanne followed in due course. It was a surprising contrast to the Treaty of Sèvres. The Great Powers who had been so ready to dictate terms, not only of peace but of national destruction, to the Turks now found themselves obliged to negotiate on far less than even terms.

The Turk was re-established at Constantinople. He regained a large portion of Eastern Thrace. Every form of foreign guidance and control was swept away. The capitulations which for so many hundred years had protected the traders and subjects of western nations in Turkey against Oriental misgovernment or injustice were abolished. The control of the fateful Straits reverted to the Turk under the thinnest of disguises. Mustapha Kemal with prudence resigned the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire to the various mandatory powers, the fate of Mosul being remitted to the decision of the League of Nations.

By an extraordinary series of provisions all the Greek inhabitants of Turkey, and a still large but smaller number of Turkish inhabitants of Greece, were reciprocally combed out and transported to their natural sovereignties. Turkey lost a great mass of citizens who had for centuries played a vital part in the economic life of every Turkish village and township. Greece, impoverished and downcast, received an accession of nearly one and a quarter million refugees who, under the pressure of misfortune and privation, have already become a new element of national strength.

Even these conditions were not obtained by Great Britain, France and Italy without prolonged parley. They would not have been obtained at all but for the skilful and persevering use made by Lord Curzon of the prestige which Great Britain had preserved through her stubborn attitude at Chanak.

The unhappy M. Gounaris, together with some other Ministers and defeated Generals, were shot in Athens as an expression of Greek disappointment at the results which had flowed from the decision of the Greek electorate in 1921.

Photo: E.N.A.

ANGORA: CAPITAL OF TURKEY.

At one time an important point on the old caravan route from Constantinople to Syria, Angora, in 1923, became the capital of the new Turkey. About 220 miles from Constantinople, Angora was a town of note in the days of the Persians and the Romans. To-day in the city are many fine modern buildings, with up-to-date systems of water supply, drainage and lighting.

CHAPTER XCVIII

THE END OF THE WORLD CRISIS

A General Survey—The Decisive Act—The German War-plan—Mobilization and War—The Emperor's Test—The Deadly Current—The Frontiers and the Marne—The Yser and the Deadlock—The *Goeben* and Turkey—The Dardanelles—Defensive *versus* Offensive—The Rhythms of History—President Wilson's Part—War without Glamour—Ancient Limitations—Modern Destructive Power—Only a Prelude—Universal Suicide—Is it the End ?—France and Germany—British Policy—Locarno—The Twin Pyramids—The Urgent Task.

IT may be well in conclusion to pass in review the story of the world crisis to which this narrative has made its contribution. Time has given its perspective and every year has brought a fuller knowledge. The proportion of events becomes apparent and it is easier to discern the hinges of Fate.

A General Survey— The Decisive Act.

There could have been no Great War if the rulers of Germany had not first declared war against Russia and immediately launched their armies upon the invasion and destruction of France, trampling through Belgium on the way. The attempt to gain the swift and decisive military triumph which then seemed sure, was a definite conscious act and impulse transcending all other events. The only test by which human beings can judge war responsibility is Aggression; and the supreme proof of Aggression is Invasion. Capacity to invade a neighbour implies superior capacity to defend the native soil. The past has many instances of invasions for the purpose of forestalling a counter-invasion. Disputes as to responsibility for bringing about conditions which led to various wars are endless. But mankind will be wise in the future to take as the paramount criterion of war guilt the sending of the main armies of any State across its frontier line, and to declare that whoever does this puts himself irretrievably in the wrong. The violation of Luxemburg and Belgium by the German armies marching upon France will stare through the centuries from the pages of History.

The German War-plan.

The execution of this vast, elaborate war-plan was believed by the German leaders to be necessary not only to the victory of Germany but to her safety, not only to her safety but to her life. They therefore conceived themselves bound to carry it out from the moment that the Russian mobilization and the terms of the Russian alliance with France compelled them to face the long-examined war on two fronts against superior but more slowly gathering forces. That this belief was sincerely held need not be questioned. It was not, however, well grounded. No one would have dared attack the Central Powers. The strength of the German armies was so enormous, and the conditions of modern war at that time so favourable to the defensive, that Germany could—as events have proved—have afforded to await with iron composure all attack upon her frontiers. Such an attack would never have taken place. If it had, it would have been dashed to pieces by the German armies, and the whole force of world opinion would have been turned against Russia and France. There was in fact no need of self-preservation for the awful plunge which Germany took in consequence of the Russian mobilization. Let it never be admitted that mobilization involves

war or justifies the other side in declaring war. Mobilization justifies only counter-mobilization and further parley.

Mobilization and War.

Was this too high a test for the moral fibre of any Government, of any General Staff, of any military nation? Would it not have required superhuman restraint for Germany not to have put her whole war-plan into operation after the Russian mobilization had been ordered? The answer is not in doubt. It ought not to have been beyond the virtue and courage of so strong a State and so great a people. But on the assumption—which we dispute—that mobilization meant war, and—which we also dispute—that war meant the execution of the German war-plan for invading France through Belgium, with all its terrible implications, was not this all the greater reason for prudence and patience while events still rested in the regions of diplomacy?

What can be said of the levity with which Germany gave Austria a free hand to take what action she wished against Serbia and promised German support without conditions, without even any warning of the danger to European peace? What can be said for the German rejection of Sir Edward Grey's proposal of July 26—before the Russian mobilization had begun—for a European Conference? If the next step led inexorably, as we are told, to Germany feeling herself forced in self-preservation to "hack her way through Belgium," was it not all the more important to prevent that step from being taken? And here in a European Conference was a simple and sure measure of preventing, or at the very least of delaying, the fatal exodus from the diplomatic field.

The German Emperor was surprised and alarmed, and his military advisers were fiercely excited, by the unyielding spirit which Germany encountered from the Triple Entente in the final ten days. This unyielding spirit had grown up over many years, during which the sense of German preponderance and the fear of German aggression upon land and sea had increasingly dominated the directing minds in France, Russia and Great Britain. The shadow had lain darkly over Europe since the beginning of the century. These three Powers did not mean to be separated and mastered one by one. France was bound by her treaty to Russia. Britain under the growth of the German Navy, though legally free, was morally committed to stand by France, if France were the victim of aggression. The Triple Entente could never have attacked the Central Powers. It would have fallen to pieces at the first aggressive move by any one of its members; but its resisting power in the face of attack was real and solidly founded. If Germany would come to conference, there was no doubt that the Austro-Serbian quarrel could be settled. If Germany did not attack, there would be no war. She had no right to attack. If she did, it would only show what sort of neighbour we had in the world and how wise we had been to stand together.

The Emperor's Test.

The convulsive forces surging around the German Emperor, rigidly departmentalized, awkwardly connected or even largely independent of one another, became in the crisis impersonal and uncontrollable. Rational processes departed and the machine took charge. Through the confusion marched the ordered phalanx of the General Staff bearing the Great Design. All was ready, and all would be well—provided there was no hesitation at the top. The deepening of the Kiel Canal was finished, and the Fleet could move freely between the Baltic and the North Sea. The fifty million pound capital levy of 1913-14 had filled the arsenals with ammunition. The supplies of explosives were assured by the new process of extracting nitrogen from the air. The German armies were incomparable, and the Schlieffen war-plan sure. By a coincidence the *Goeben* too was in the Mediterranean.

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William the Second was not the man to stand against this assault. Those who have wished to judge him should

first of all thank God they were not placed in his position.

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The question arises whether apart from the European conference proposed by Sir Edward Grey on July 26, there was any means of averting the war? We frequently read statements to the effect that if he had only shown courage and decision and had told Germany plainly at the end of July that to attack France would mean war with England, there would have been no war. Lord Morley's posthumous revelations of the Cabinet situation should be convincing on this point. Such a declaration by Sir Edward Grey at that date would have resulted only in his complete disavowal by four-fifths of the Cabinet and three-quarters of the House of Commons. Mr. Asquith would have resigned, his Government split into fragments, and the four or five tremendous days that remained, in every hour of which indispensable precautions were being taken, would instead, have been filled by utter chaos from which no doubt a war decision would have emerged too late for every purpose. A British threat to intervene, if unwarranted by national authority, could only have convinced Germany that we were impotent and out of it.

The Deadly Current.

To divert the deadly current it was necessary to go back along the stream for months and years. If, for instance, Germany had accepted the British proposals of 1911 for a naval holiday, much might have been possible. A European conference on land armaments and the maintenance of peace would in such circumstances have found England a sympathetic listener to all that Germany might have urged about the growth of the Russian army and the perfecting of Russian strategic railways with French money. The marshalling of Europe into two armed leagues might have given place, temporarily at any rate, to a much more relaxed and easy attitude. But at the end, in the final crisis, the British Foreign Secretary could do nothing but what he did. To abandon France and Russia diplomatically in the face of the German threat would have been to break up for years all counterpoise against the ever more assertive German power. To threaten war upon Germany would have been repudiated by Cabinet, Parliament and People.

But no words of English Ministers were required to plead the policy of Sir Edward Grey. Hour by hour, as the German armies marched through treaties and across frontiers upon defenceless Belgium towards an agonized and cornered France, arguments resounded far above the feeble voice of man. The cannon gained by its first salvo on Belgian soil a verdict for which all the statesmen and soldiers of the British Empire would have pleaded in vain.

When we consider the character of the German Government before the War, as now so fully revealed in all the published records and descriptions of the Emperor's Court, we almost feel that we may leave the issue to the long justice of the German people. Let them never overlook that if France, deserting Russia and false to her Treaty obligations, had declared neutrality, the German Ambassador in Paris had instructions to demand the surrender to German garrisons of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, as guarantee that that neutrality would be observed.

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The Frontiers and the Marne.

Carnage and cannonade! All Europe on the march! Fifteen million bayonets seeking the breasts of an equal number of faithful, valiant, pitiful, puzzled mortals! We have passed into the military sphere. Where are the stepping-stones? The incomprehension by the French General Staff of the conditions of modern war; the mad rush forward in blue and red uniforms against the fire of machine guns and magazine rifles; the German invader advancing, yet accorded all the advantages of the defence! The flower of the French Army and its best regimental officers shorn away in the Battles of the Frontier! The worst of all cases on the largest scale—defending your own country by charging the invading bullets! Purblindness to conditions already made bloodily plain

among the kopjes of Natal and in the millet fields of Manchuria! No general in all history ever had the chance of Joffre. He had only to say "Let the attackers attack; let them learn that bullets kill men, and that earth stops bullets." In martial quality, in every attribute that preserves an iron race, the French soldier of 1914 was at least the equal of the best troops who marched against him.

And then the noble constancy of the French Army, rising superior to defeat and misdirection, fighting as if they were following Napoleon in his greatest days. Bloody defeats all along the line, eight marches to the rear; obvious complete miscalculation! Never a reproach, never a murmur, never a "Nous sommes trahis!" Determination to conquer or die; conviction that one or the other would be accorded.

So we come to the Marne. This will ever remain the Mystery Battle of all time. We can see more clearly across the mists of Time how Hannibal conquered at Cannae than why Joffre won at the Marne. No great acquisition of strength to either side—except that usually invaders outrun their supplies and defenders fall back upon their reserves—important, but not decisive. Not much real fighting, comparatively few casualties, no decisive episode in any part of the immense field; fifty explanations, all well documented, five hundred volumes of narrative and comment—but the mystery remains.

What was the cause which turned retreat into victory and gave the world time to come to the succour of France? Where vast issues are so nicely balanced every single fact or factor may be called decisive. Some say it was the generous onslaught of Russia and the withdrawal by an inadequate German Staff decision of two army corps from their wheeling flank; some say Galliéni and his leopard-spring from Paris, or Joffre with his phlegm and steadfast spirit. We British naturally dwell on the part played by Sir John French and his five divisions; and there are several other important claims. But if under all reserve I am to choose the agate point on which the balance turned, I select the visits of Colonel Hentsch, of the German General Staff, on the night of the 8th and the morning of September 9 to the Army Headquarters of von Bülow and Kluck, either ordering by an excess of authority, or lending the sanction of supreme authority to, the retirement of these armies. There was no need for such a retreat. Speaking broadly, the Germans could have dug themselves in where they stood, or even in places continued to advance. It was only a continued effort of will that was needed then and a readiness to risk all, where all had been already risked.

The Yser and the Deadlock.

The desperate battle of the Yser lies on a lower level of crisis and decision. Both sides were exhausted, but both were reinforced. A long grapple of weakened antagonists, five times as bloody as the Marne, but never presenting the supreme issue. And by this time the defenders have learned to dig, they have learned that even a few hundred resolute well-armed, well-trained infantry or dismounted cavalry may stop ten thousand and kill half of them with bullets. This trick of infantry on the defensive of digging holes in the ground and firing rifles, a curious, newly discovered plan, is going to become a habit in this all-probing war, and as yet, in 1914, there are no technical means by artillery, gas or tanks of overcoming it. Thus we reach trench warfare, and Christmas, and a breathing space.

Here was the time for Peace. The explosion was over. The invaders of France had been brought to a standstill, the defenders were not strong enough to attack them. Deadlock along the fighting lines, bankruptcy of ideas in the general staffs. Far away on the Eastern Front the Germans had destroyed the Russian offensive, and farther south the Russians had beaten the Austrians. Peace now, before the world is ruined, before its capital is consumed, before the whole life force of nations is melted down! Peace now at Christmas, 1914! Here was the first and best American opportunity. But no one would hear of it. The Press and public opinion advanced together. The cup must be drained.

Break away, then, Allies. Seek new theatres. Use the sea power of Britain. Find the flanks of your enemy even if you have to travel a thousand miles. . . . Use Surprise, use Mobility, attack where none is ready to resist. Vain to sit glowering at each other in ditches; mad to crawl out of them only to be shot down!

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The *Goeben* and Turkey.

But meanwhile, in another part of the world, at present apparently lapped in peace, a momentous event has occurred. The German battle-cruiser *Goeben* has arrived at Constantinople. We need not retell by what chances she got there. There she is; and the Turks in consequence have against the Russians the naval command of the Black Sea. They are therefore able to join the Central Powers and to carry out their long-prepared plan of invading the Caucasus and wresting it from Russia. Collision, therefore, of Turkey against Russia and entry of Turkey into the general war.

But the arrival of this new enemy brings with it opportunities as well as dangers. It opens a vulnerable flank. The opportunities are greater than the burdens. Swift, then, the Allies. Leave the great armies scowling at each other in the trenches and the great navies hating each other in strict routine from widely separated harbours. Break in upon this new weak opponent before he is on his feet, beat him down by land and sea; force the Dardanelles by fleets and armies, seize Constantinople, join hands with Russia, rally the Balkans, draw Italy to your cause; and then all together hew your way into the naked belly of Austria. Again very simple; again very difficult.

The politicians are attracted, the generals and admirals mutter "To break away from a first-class war, the sort of war that only comes once in a hundred years, for an amphibious strategic-political manœuvre of this kind is nothing less than unprofessional." Divided councils, half-hearted measures, grudged resources, makeshift plans, no real control or guidance.

The Dardanelles.

However, events move forward. On March 18, 1915, Admiral de Robeck engages the forts of the Dardanelles, seeking to force the passage. And here again we reach an agate point. The Turks have very few mines, they have sown all they have; if these are swept up they have none left—not a dozen. But luckily for them twenty of these mines have been laid in an unexpected quarter. The sweeping flotillas newly and feebly organized have overlooked them. Two or three ships are blown up. The Admiral sustains a sinister impression, he breaks off the attack; he will never renew it. Nothing will induce him to re-enter this area of mysterious danger. Although a fortnight later he is equipped with mine-sweeping flotillas which in a few hours could have cleared with certainty the whole area from which he could engage the forts decisively, he will never allow these flotillas to act. They remain courageous, efficient and useless, and so does his fleet and so does he. They all remain the spectators of a military tragedy. We were condemned to the army attack upon the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Now we know that not only were there no more mines, but that the big guns of the forts, the only ones that could stop armoured ships, had only a few score shells remaining. A night's sweeping by the flotillas, a morning's bombardment, must have revealed the bankruptcy of the defence. However, it was otherwise decreed. The Fleet recoils from all idea of forcing the passage of the Dardanelles; the Army, after heroic efforts fails to capture the key points of the Gallipoli Peninsula. So the flank attack is over; it has failed, and we all return heavily to the battle-front in France where nothing but useless slaughter has in the meanwhile occurred.

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We have seen how important and possibly decisive was the opportunity open to Germany at the beginning of 1916. If Falkenhayn had left the Allies to break their teeth on the German entrenchments in the west, selling where necessary the conquered territory for a

sufficient price in blood, and had marched against Russia in full strength, he might well have compelled Roumania to join the Central Powers and have gained the vast food and fuel regions which stretched from Galicia to the Caspian Sea. He would thus have broken the naval blockade by Continental conquest, and gained from the land much that the British Navy denied upon the sea. Instead, in approved professional spirit he chose to gnaw the iron hills of Verdun and their steel defenders. Thus were the Allies delivered from the penalties which their strategic follies in 1915 had deserved, and the equipoise of the war preserved for another bloody year.

Defensive *versus* Offensive.

During the whole of 1915 and 1916 the defence maintained an immense advantage over the attack, and the losses of the assailants nearly always exceeded threefold those of the defenders. But gradually the methods and resources of the offensive improved. The whole front became so heavily packed with guns and so laced by railways and lateral communications that an increasing number of alternative offensives were simultaneously open.

The art of camouflage made great progress; almost unlimited ammunition became available. The artillery discovered first the creeping barrage system, and secondly the power of opening a correct fire without previously disclosing their concentration by trial shots. The use of artificial fog, and above everything the invention of the Tanks and their employment in great numbers, all restored to the attacking armies the vital element of surprise. Already in 1917 the sudden "set-piece" attack began to achieve profitable results in its first stages and the gradual diminution of the advantages of the defence was increasingly apparent. 1918 witnessed the definite recovery by the stronger armies of their prerogative to advance at the cost of superior losses. The war of movement was resumed by both sides in cumbrous fashion on a gigantic scale.

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The third great climax of the war, successor to the Marne and the failure at the Dardanelles, came at the beginning of 1917. Russia collapsed in revolution. But while this awful event was still among the secrets of the future, the German General and Naval Staffs had forced their Civil Government to sanction the unlimited submarine campaign, and thus dragged the United States into the combination against them.

We have seen by what strange fortune the struggling Allies gained in the nick of time a new giant in the west to replace the dying Titan of the east. Three months' less resistance by Russia, three months' more patience by the German General Staff, three months' delay in launching the submarine campaign, and that fateful challenge would never have been flung. Russia would have been out without America being in. There are few conjunctures in history more worthy than this of the attention of the strategist, the statesman, the moralist or the philosopher.

The Rhythms of History.

But what should inspire the British people with wonder and awe, is that this fortunate double event had occurred in a different combination almost exactly one hundred years before.

In 1811 the supreme question was whether the pressure of the British blockade would force Napoleon's allies and especially Russia to break away from him and his continental system, before it provoked the United States to enter the war upon his side. Here also by a few months events followed a favourable sequence. Russia fell out of the hostile combination before America entered it. Napoleon was already marching all his armies upon Moscow before the war of 1812 was declared between England and the United States. Thus twice, and in two successive centuries, England was not confronted with the worst possible situation. Such mysterious rhythms of history will dim to the eyes of future generations the hazards and drama of the Punic wars.

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THE BATTLEFIELD OF YPRES. *Photo: Imperial War Museum.*

Sir D. Y. Cameron, the distinguished painter and etcher, conveys admirably, in the example of his work reproduced here, the appalling scene of desolation which was the Ypres Salient. The dreary network of waterlogged shell-holes, the tree-stumps marking what was once a fine road, the ruined houses, dilapidated dugouts and shelters, all combine to present a scene more likely to exist in some Inferno than within the boundaries of a once prosperous European country.

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

GREVILLERS: THE RETURN OF THE PEASANTS.

A poignant picture by Sir William Orpen, R.A., dealing with a spectacle all too common during the months of November and December, 1918, in France and Belgium. The village of Grevillers, on the Albert-Bapaume Road, changed hands three times between March 1917, and August, 1918. As in hundreds of similar cases, the former inhabitants returning to their homes found little but ruin and devastation.

President Wilson's Part.

It is not necessary here to examine the important moral and material contribution of the United States to the general victory. But in the Peace Conference—to European eyes—President Wilson sought to play a part out of all proportion to any stake which his country had contributed or intended to contribute to European affairs. Actuated by the noblest motives he went far beyond any commission which the American Senate or people were willing to accord him, and armed with this inflation of his own constitutional power he sought to bend the world—no doubt for its own good—to his personal views. This was a grave misfortune ; for his opportunity, though narrower than his ambition, was nevertheless as great as has ever been given to a statesman.

The influence of mighty, detached and well-meaning America upon the European settlement was a precious agency of hope. It was largely squandered in sterile conflicts and half-instructed and half-pursued interferences. If President Wilson had set himself from the beginning to make common cause with Lloyd George and Clémenceau, the whole force of these three great men, the heads of the dominant nations, might have played with plenary and beneficent power over the wide scene of European tragedy. He consumed his own strength and theirs in conflicts in which he was always worsted. He gained as an antagonist and corrector results which were pitifully poor compared to those which would have rewarded comradeship. He might have made everything swift and easy. He made everything slower and more difficult. He might have carried a settlement at the time when leadership was strong. He acquiesced in second-rate solutions when the phase of exhaustion and dispersion had supervened.

However, as Captain he went down with his ship.

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War without Glamour—Ancient Limitations.

But all this lies in the past. It is a tale that is told, from which we may draw the knowledge and comprehension needed for the future. The disproportion between the quarrels of nations and the suffering which fighting out those quarrels involves ; the poor and barren prizes which reward sublime endeavour on the battlefield ; the fleeting triumphs of war ; the long, slow rebuilding ; the awful risks so hardily run ; the doom missed by a hair's-breadth, by the spin of a coin, by the accident of an accident —all this should make the prevention of another great war the main preoccupation of mankind. It has at least been stripped of glitter and glamour.

No more may Alexander, Cæsar and Napoleon lead armies to victory, ride their horses on the field of battle sharing the perils of their soldiers and deciding the fate of empires by the resolves and gestures of a few intense hours. For the future they will sit surrounded by clerks in offices, as safe, as quiet and as dreary as Government departments, while the fighting men in scores of thousands are slaughtered or stifled over the telephone by machinery. We have seen the last of the great Commanders. Perhaps they were extinct before Armageddon began. Next time the competition may be to kill women and children, and the civil population generally, and victory will give herself in sorry nuptials to the diligent hero who organizes it on the largest scale.

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The story of the human race is War. Except for brief and precarious interludes there has never been peace in the world ; and before history began murderous strife was universal and unending. But the modern developments surely require severe and active attention.

Up to the present time the means of destruction at the disposal of man have not kept pace with his ferocity. Reciprocal extermination was impossible in the Stone Age. One cannot do much with a clumsy club. Besides, men were so scarce and hid so well that they were hard to find. They fled so fast that they were hard to catch. Human legs could only cover a certain distance each day. With the best will in the world to destroy his species, each man was restricted to a very limited area of activity. It was

impossible to make any effective progress on these lines. Meanwhile one had to live and hunt and sleep. So on the balance the life-forces kept a steady lead over the forces of death, and gradually tribes, villages and governments were evolved.

Modern Destructive Power.

The effort at destruction then entered upon a new phase. War became a collective enterprise. Roads were made which facilitated the movement of large numbers of men. Armies were organized. Many improvements in the apparatus of slaughter were devised. In particular the use of metal, and above all, steel, for piercing and cutting human flesh, opened out a promising field. Bows and arrows, slings, chariots, horses and elephants lent a valuable assistance. But here again, another set of checks began to operate. The governments were not sufficiently secure. The armies were liable to violent internal disagreements. It was extremely difficult to feed large numbers of men once they were concentrated, and consequently the efficiency of the efforts at destruction became fitful and was tremendously hampered by defective organization. Thus again there was a balance on the credit side of life. The world rolled forward, and human society entered upon a vaster and more complex age.

It was not until the dawn of the twentieth century of the Christian era that War really began to enter into its kingdom as the potential destroyer of the human race. The organization of mankind into great States and Empires and the rise of nations to full collective consciousness enabled enterprises of slaughter to be planned and executed upon a scale, with a perseverance, never before imagined. All the noblest virtues of individuals were gathered together to strengthen the destructive capacity of the mass. Good finances, the resources of world-wide credit and trade, the accumulation of large capital reserves, made it possible to divert for considerable periods the energies of whole peoples to the task of Devastation. Democratic institutions gave expression to the will-power of millions. Education not only brought the course of the conflict within the comprehension of every one, but rendered each person serviceable in a high degree for the purpose in hand. The Press afforded a means of unification and of mutual encouragement ; Religion, having discreetly avoided conflict on the fundamental issues, offered its encouragements and consolations, through all its forms, impartially to all the combatants. Lastly, Science unfolded her treasures and her secrets to the desperate demands of men and placed in their hands agencies and apparatus almost decisive in their character.

Only a Prelude.

In consequence many novel features presented themselves. Instead of merely starving fortified towns, whole nations were methodically subjected, or sought to be subjected, to the process of reduction by famine. The entire population in one capacity or another took part in the War ; all were equally the object of attack. The Air opened paths along which death and terror could be carried far behind the lines of the actual armies, to women, children, the aged, the sick, who in earlier struggles would perforce have been left untouched. Marvellous organizations of railroads, steamships, and motor vehicles placed and maintained tens of millions of men continuously in action. Healing and surgery in their exquisite developments returned them again and again to the shambles. Nothing was wasted that could contribute to the process of waste. The last dying kick was brought into military utility.

But all that happened in the four years of the Great War was only a prelude to what was preparing for the fifth year. The campaign of the year 1919 would have witnessed an immense accession to the power of destruction. Had the Germans retained the morale to make good their retreat to the Rhine, they would have been assaulted in the summer of 1919 with forces and by methods incomparably more prodigious than any yet employed. Thousands of aeroplanes would have shattered their cities. Scores of thousands of cannon would have blasted their front. Arrangements were being made to carry simultaneously a

Photo: Imperial War Museum.

THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER.

One of the most interesting of all the pictures relating to the Great War, this work was commissioned by the Imperial War Museum as one of a set of three pictures dealing with the signing of the Peace. In the beginning Sir William Orpen intended to introduce into the picture a group of the great soldiers, sailors and statesmen of the War. After having worked in about thirty-six of the figures he became dissatisfied with his work, painted the figures out and in their place painted in the two soldiers, the coffin and the cherubs. The picture was exhibited in the Royal Academy of 1923 under the title of "The Unknown Soldier" and aroused a storm of criticism and comment. The general opinion formed was that the picture was an attempt to belittle the work accomplished at Versailles. Actually Sir William Orpen meant to draw attention to the plight of thousands of ex-soldiers who, he felt, had been forgotten and neglected in the years following upon the Armistice. In 1928 the artist offered the picture, out of which he had again painted the figures, to the Imperial War Museum as a memorial to Sir Douglas Haig. This offer was accepted, and the picture was renamed "To the Unknown British Soldier in France."

quarter of a million men, together with all their requirements, continuously forward across country in mechanical vehicles moving ten or fifteen miles each day. Poison gases of incredible malignity, against which only a secret mask (which the Germans could not obtain in time) was proof, would have stifled all resistance and paralysed all life on the hostile front subjected to attack. No doubt the Germans, too, had their plans. But the hour of wrath had passed. The signal of relief was given, and the horrors of 1919 remained buried in the archives of the great antagonists.

Universal Suicide.

The War stopped as suddenly and as universally as it had begun. The world lifted its head, surveyed the scene of ruin, and victors and vanquished alike drew breath. In a hundred laboratories, in a thousand arsenals, factories and bureaux, men pulled themselves up with a jerk, turned from the task in which they had been absorbed. Their projects were put aside unfinished, unexecuted; but their knowledge was preserved; their data, calculations and discoveries were hastily bundled together and docketed "for future reference" by the War Offices in every country. The campaign of 1919 was never fought; but its ideas go marching along. In every army they are being explored, elaborated, refined under the surface of peace, and should war come again to the world it is not with the weapons and agencies prepared for 1919 that it will be fought, but with developments and extensions of these which will be incomparably more formidable and fatal.

It is in these circumstances that we entered upon that period of Exhaustion which has been described as Peace. It gives us at any rate an opportunity to consider the general situation. Certain sombre facts emerge solid, inexorable, like the shapes of mountains from drifting mist. It is established that henceforward whole populations will take part in war, all doing their utmost, all subjected to the fury of the enemy. It is established that nations who believe their life is at stake will not be restrained from using any means to secure their existence. It is probable—nay, certain—that among the means which will next time be at their disposal will be agencies and processes of destruction wholesale, unlimited, and perhaps, once launched, uncontrollable.

Mankind has never been in this position before. Without having improved appreciably in virtue or enjoying wiser guidance, it has got into its hands for the first time the tools by which it can unfailingly accomplish its own extermination. That is the point in human destinies to which all the glories and toils of men have at last led them. They would do well to pause and ponder upon their new responsibilities. Death stands at attention, obedient, expectant, ready to serve, ready to shear away the peoples *en masse*; ready, if called on, to pulverize, without hope of repair, what is left of civilization. He awaits only the word of command. He awaits it from a frail, bewildered being, long his victim, now—for one occasion only—his Master.

* * * *

Is it the End ?

It is not without self-questioning and cherishing of hope that I have chosen the title of this chapter: The End of the World Crisis. Certainly the story ended with 1922 in universal gloom. No peace had been made acceptable to Germany or giving security to France. Central and Southern Europe had broken into intensely nationalistic fragments sundered from each other by enmities and jealousies, by particularist tariffs and local armaments. Russia was beyond the pale. Her people lay prostrate under the hardest tyranny seen in Asia up to that time. Her rulers, mocked by natural and economic facts, seemed condemned by their creed to an indefinite process of self-impoverishment and self-torture.

The United States in 1922 had shaken the dust of the Old World off her feet and dwelt in opulent, exacting and strongly arming seclusion beyond the ocean. Turkey, resuscitated in a new fierce form, re-established in Constantinople and Europe, freed from her capitulations and foreign guidance, reigns henceforth with untrammelled sway over

such Christian and non-Moslem inhabitants as have not been destroyed or expelled. The League of Nations, not yet reinforced by Germany, under the derision of Soviet Russia, abandoned by her mighty trans-Atlantic parent, raised a frail and unsure bulwark against stormy seas and sullen clouds. The Parliaments erected so hopefully by the nineteenth century were already, over a large part of Europe, being demolished in the twentieth. Democracy, for which the world was to be made safe by the greatest of struggles, incontinently lets slip or casts aside the instruments of freedom and progress fashioned for its protection by rugged ancestors. England, bowed by debt and taxation, could only plod forward under her load. And at this dark moment new misfortunes approached. China dissolved into a sanguinary confusion. France sundered from England stood mobilized upon the threshold of the Ruhr. No end to the World Crisis in 1922 !

Mercifully our knowledge extends beyond the limits of our tale, and the years that have followed have been lighted by a series of efforts to consolidate world peace. Although these efforts are partial and at present disconnected, each has made a contribution to the supreme cause, and all have aided the process of appeasement.

France and Germany.

The Peace Conference had proposed to solve the problem of French security in the face of a united and preponderant Germany lying on both banks of the Rhine, by the joint promise of the British Empire and the United States to come to the aid of France if she were the victim of unprovoked aggression. The French assent to the Peace Treaty had been obtained upon this basis. A tripartite agreement between the three Powers concerned had accordingly been signed by their plenipotentiaries, subject to Parliamentary confirmations. The Imperial Parliament in due course accepted the undertaking entered into by its representative on its behalf. The Senate of the United States repudiated President Wilson's signature. The joint agreement therefore lapsed. The balance of the arrangement to which France had consented was upset, and a situation tense with fear and danger arose.

The Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, at the Imperial Conference of 1921, declared that they would advise their Parliaments to stand, together with the Imperial Government, to their engagement to come to the aid of France, although the United States had dropped out. The growing divergencies between French and British policy and sentiment at this time left the issue in suspense. Meanwhile, France, sundered from England, abandoned by the United States, isolated and in the deepest alarm, yielded herself to military influences and trusted to her unquestionable armed superiority. We may take the entry of France into the Ruhr in 1923, and the consequent arrest of German economic revival, as the darkest moment for Europe since the fighting stopped.

British Policy.

The central problem was therefore at this time quite untouched. First and foremost stood the overpowering issue between France and Germany. Deep in the soul of France, and the mainspring of her policy and of almost her every action, lay the fear of German revenge. Sombre and intense in the heart of the powerful classes in Germany brooded the resolve that their national history should not be finally determined in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles ; and in the pulses of her multiplying and abounding youth throbbed the hope that they might live to see, or die in advancing, a day when victory should once again light the standards of the Fatherland.

On the one hand was displayed the armed and organized strength of France, her overflowing arsenals, her mechanical and technical apparatus, her African reserves, her innate undying military qualities—all based upon a dwindling population and the surprises of an ever-changing science of destruction. On the other rose the mighty German nation, sixty millions against forty, with its lusty generations, its sense of injury, its laboratories, its industry and its highly disciplined orderly intelligence. Cruel had been the experiences which Germany

Photo: Sport & General.

BEFORE SIGNING THE TREATY OF LOCARNO.

The scene in the Golden Room at the Foreign Office shortly before the Treaty of Locarno was signed. Among the delegates seated at the table are distinguished statesmen, including Mr. Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Baldwin. Third from the left, Herr Stresemann is seen listening intently to the speaker of the moment, M. Briand.

had tasted in the Great War. But among all its lessons no facts could be found which would justify despair of future military successes.

Almost single-handed the German armies had fought the world, sustaining or driving into battle her allies whose weakness or inefficiency were from the outset patent; and before France could be saved from the ruin which was prepared for her, all the life energy of Russia, of the British Empire, of Italy, and much of the power of the United States had had to be consumed or exerted in an intense degree. But would those conditions ever return? Need Germany contemplate a situation in which once again all the greatest nations and empires of the world would march successively to the aid of her ancient adversary? There then, on both sides of the Rhine, was the root of the matter; and in 1923 no one could feel assured that a future generation would not see Europe laid in dust and ashes as it had been in this same quarrel more than once before.

The policy of Britain in the face of such potentialities was fortunately understood by all parties in the State. Great Britain could have no other object but to use her whole influence and resources consistently over a long period of years to weave France and Germany so closely together economically, socially and morally, as to prevent the occasion of quarrels and make their causes die in a realization of mutual prosperity and interdependence. The supreme interest of the British people lay in the assuagement of the great feud; and they had no other interest comparable or contrary to that.

Locarno.

The Labour Government under Mr. Ramsay Macdonald in 1924, by the London Convention and the Dawes Agreement, paved the way for the memorable event of 1925. Mr. Baldwin's

administration enjoyed, not only unquestioned power, but the assurance of a prolonged period for its exercise. In these conditions of national strength and stability, a Foreign Secretary was found with the vision and the courage to run greater risks for peace than the Ministers of any other nation had yet dared. Discarding all ideas of a dual arrangement between Great Britain and France to counteract the power of Germany, Mr. Austen Chamberlain embarked resolutely upon the policy, suggested by Herr Stresemann, of a threefold pact of mutual security between France, Germany and Great Britain, in which Great Britain would be solemnly pledged to come to the aid of whichever of the other two States was the object of unprovoked aggression.

The histories may be searched for a parallel for such an undertaking. Nevertheless, it was from the outset steadfastly endorsed by all classes and parties in Great Britain. The great enterprise was pressed forward by the experience and skill of M. Briand, and by the astonishing civic courage of Herr Stresemann and other leaders. It received at the culminating point the reinforcement of the whole strength of Italy, wielded by the far-seeing realism of Mussolini. Innumerable difficulties were overcome. Processes of agreement which might well have required a decade of perseverance were accomplished in the negotiations of a few months. The co-operation of the smaller Powers was procured; and on October 16, 1925, by the waters of a calm lake, the four great western democracies plighted their solemn troth to keep the peace among themselves in all circumstances, and to stand united against any one of their number who broke the compact and marched in aggression upon a brother land.

The eventual Treaty of Locarno was signed, as was fitting, in London, where the main impulse of the policy had originated, and was duly ratified by all the Parliaments concerned. It had been throughout conceived in harmonious accord with the Covenant of the League of Nations, to the Council of which Germany as a consequence now brought her mighty power. Thus was achieved the greatest measure of self-preservation yet taken by Europeans.

The Twin Pyramids.

The Treaty of Locarno may be regarded as the Old World counterpart of the Treaty of Washington between the United States, Great Britain and Japan, which in 1921 had regulated and ensured the peace of the Pacific. These two august instruments give assurance to civilization. They are the twin pyramids of peace rising solid and unshakable on either side of the Atlantic, commanding the allegiance of the leading nations of the world and of all their fleets and armies. They form the cores around which the wider conceptions of the League of Nations and the idealism of the Kellogg Pact can rear the more spacious and more unified structures of the future.

The Urgent Task.

The task is not done. The greatest exertions must continue to be made over a long period of years. The danger of war has by no means passed from the world. Old antagonisms are sleeping, and the drum-beat of new antagonisms is already heard. The anxieties of France and the resentments of Germany are only partly removed. Over the broad plains of Eastern and Central Europe, with their numerous new and highly nationalistic States, brood the offended shades of Peter and Frederick the Great and the memories of the wars they waged. But since Locarno, Hope rests on a surer foundation. The period of repulsion from the horrors of war will be long-lasting; and in this blessed interval the great nations may take their forward steps to world organization with the conviction that the difficulties they have yet to master will not be greater than those they have already overcome.

APPENDICES

ERRATA

It is desired to draw attention to the following errors which, due to inadvertence, have found their way into the text of this work.

Page 62, col. 1, line 51. *For* " Archduke Charles " *read* " Archduke Franz Ferdinand."

Page 117, col. 1, lines 4–5. " He sent me the following written assurance." The word " following " was not in accordance with the text of Mr. Churchill's revised edition, and its insertion here was due to a printer's error. For the information of readers, however, the written assurance referred to was as follows :—

MR. F. E. SMITH TO MR. CHURCHILL.

July 31, 1914.

I have spoken to my friends of whom you know and I have no doubt that on the facts as we understand them—and more particularly on the assumption (which we understand to be certain) that Germany contemplates a violation of Belgian neutrality—the Government can rely upon the support of the Unionist Party in whatever manner that support can be most effectively given.

Page 222. Wording on sketch map. At the bottom right-hand corner of this map the word " Austrian " adjoining the black sign should read " German."

Page 506. Illustration. The description applied to the Ammunition Pouches here as " right " and " left " should read " left " and " right."

Page 521, col. 2, side heading. *For* " Tanks in Jeopardy, June, 1914 " *read* " Tanks in Jeopardy, June, 1915."

Page 587. Some doubt appears to exist as to whether the photograph on this page is accurately described. It is believed to be of a later period than that ascribed to it in the caption.

Page 657, col. 2, line 28 *et seq.* The reference here to the troops landed at " Y " Beach is incorrect. According to the Official History the landing at this point was carried out by the 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers, one Company 2nd South Wales Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion, R.M.L.I.

Page 692, col 2, line 32. *For* " walking " *read* " waking."

Page 850, col. 2, lines 31–32. The name of the officer referred to here was " Harvey," and not " Hervey " as stated. Major Harvey belonged to the Royal Marine Light Infantry and not to the Royal Marine Artillery.

Page 886, col. 2, line 52. *For* " six weeks " *read* " twelve weeks."

Page 1258, last line. *For* " See Appendix I, Table III " *read* " See Appendix."

Page 1279, top illustration. The picture reproduced here, which was obtained from a source usually reliable, would appear to be misleading. From evidence offered by several naval officers, and confirmed by the Admiralty, the ships in this picture described as captive battle-cruisers, were in fact British ships, the largest of which, seen at the top left hand corner, was H.M.S. *Lion*. This picture, believed for many years to be authentic, has now proved to be a photograph of a portion of the British Fleet, and is therefore quite misleading and out of place.

GUIDE TO APPENDICES

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APPENDIX I

THE HAPSBURG DYNASTY

APPENDIX II

MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD ON TRADE PROTECTION ON AND AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Written August 23, 1913, Revised April, 1914.

1. The first security for British merchant ships must be the superiority of the British Navy which should enable us to cover in peace, and hunt down and bring to battle in war, every enemy's warship which attempts to keep the seas. A policy of vigorous offence against the enemy's warships, wherever stationed, will give immediately far greater protection to British traders than large numbers of vessels scattered sparsely about in an attitude of weak and defensive expectancy. This should be enjoined as the first duty of all British warships. Enemy's cruisers cannot live in the oceans for any length of time. They cannot coal at sea with any certainty. They cannot make many prizes without much steaming; and in these days of W.T. their whereabouts will be constantly reported. If British cruisers of superior speed are hunting them, they cannot do much harm before they are brought to action. Very few German Town Class cruisers are assigned to foreign stations for this work. If others are detached from the North Sea, and get out safely, we shall be able to detach a larger proportion of the similar British cruisers which have been hitherto opposing them there. They cannot afford to send away many without crippling their battle fleet.

2. As for enemy's armed merchantmen or merchantmen converted into cruisers for commerce destruction, the only answer to that is to have an equal number of British merchant vessels plying on the trade routes armed and commissioned to engage them when met with. The whole of this threat is very shadowy. Whether the German vessels have their guns on board is extremely doubtful. Not a scrap of evidence has been forthcoming during the last year and a half in spite of every effort to procure it. How are they to be converted on the high seas? Where are they to get rid of their passengers? Are they to take hundreds of non-combatants with them on what the stronger naval Power may well treat as a piratical enterprise? Where are they to coal? To say that we have to maintain a large cruiser fleet to deal with this danger appears extravagant in the highest degree. All that is needed is to arm a similar number of British merchant vessels of the right speed and make arrangements to commission these for their own defence and that of other British ships in their neighbourhood and on their route. The presence of these vessels plying always in considerable numbers along the regular trade routes will from the very outset of the war, and however suddenly it may begin, provide a constant and immediate counter to enemy armed merchantmen, and probably deter them from any injurious action.

3. But the best safeguard for the maintenance of British trade in war is the large number of merchant ships engaged in trading, and the immense number of harbours in the United Kingdom they can approach by ocean routes. This makes any serious interruption by enemy's commerce destroyers impossible. We must rely on numbers and averages. Provided that we can induce all these ships to put to sea and carry on their business boldly, and provided that they are warned in time and encouraged to leave the regular trade routes and travel wide of them, very few captures will be made even in the early days of the war.

4. It is no use distributing isolated cruisers about the vast ocean spaces. To produce any result from such a method would require hundreds of cruisers. The ocean is itself the best protection. We must recognize that we cannot specifically protect trade routes; we can only protect confluences. The only safe trade routes in war are those which the enemy has not discovered and those upon which he has been exterminated. There are areas where the trade necessarily converges and narrow channels through which it must pass; and these defiles or terminals of the trade routes should be made too dangerous for enemy's commerce destroyers to approach, by employing our older cruisers in adequate force so as to create an effective sanctuary, control or catchment for our trading ships. These areas should be judiciously selected so as to husband our resources, and not with a view to finding employment for as many old cruisers as possible. It may be taken for certain that no enemy's armed merchantman unless possessed of exceptional speed will dare to approach the area where he may encounter a British cruiser. Many of our old cruisers steam 19 knots. The number of German merchantmen which steam more is not large. As for the enemy's warships and his few exceptionally fast vessels, they must be marked down and hunted by fast modern vessels which are concerned with nothing else but to bring them to action.

5. British attacks on the German trade are a comparatively unimportant feature in our operations, and British cruisers should not engage in them to the prejudice of other duties. Economic pressure will be put on Germany by the distant blockade of her shores which will cut off her trade, both export and import, as a whole. If this is effectively done it is of very little consequence to us whether individual German vessels are captured as prizes, or whether they take refuge in neutral harbours till the end of the war. It is reasonable to suppose that German merchant ships, other than those armed and commissioned for warlike purposes, will run for neutral harbours as soon as war breaks out, and that very few will attempt under the German flag to return home

running the gauntlet of the numerous British fleets operating in the North Sea.

6. Protection will be afforded to British seaborne trade in time of war by the following measures :—

A.—Hunting down of enemy's warships and armed vessels.

Every German cruiser stationed abroad should be covered in peace and brought to action in war by a superior vessel of superior speed, or alternatively by two equal vessels having speed advantage.

B.—Organized warning of British merchant vessels.

All British armed merchantmen plying on the routes will, on receiving the warning telegram by wireless, open their secret instructions which direct them to steam along their regular route warning all unarmed British vessels met with to leave the trade route, and steam without lights at night, keeping well away from their usual course, avoiding company, and making their own way to their port of destination.

7. Similar warnings and directions adapted to each case and each route will be issued by British Consuls at all ports. These should be prepared beforehand in the fullest detail and according to a general scheme. For instance, the British Consul at Buenos Ayres should have separate instructions all ready prepared for every British ship leaving the port for the United Kingdom. These instructions will be regularly kept up to date by the Trade Division of the Admiralty War Staff. They will prescribe for each ship the general course she is to follow, the portions of the voyage she should endeavour to cover in darkness, and the areas within which she will find safety. A good wireless organization can, of course, deal at once with all vessels so fitted. Thus the unarmed trade will, in the first week of the war, be effectively scattered over immense areas of ocean.

The control and guidance of merchant traffic must, of course, vary with circumstances. There are two quite different situations to consider. The first is that which occurs at the moment of a sudden outbreak of war. We must assume that hostilities begin by surprise, and that the enemy's commerce destroyers, whether warships or armed merchantmen, will begin their attacks within a very few hours of the first warning being given. None of our Third Fleet cruisers will be on their stations. The only vessels available will be the ordinary foreign squadrons and the fast cruisers shadowing individual German warships, and these will probably not be in positions which have any special relation to the trade routes. None of the British converted auxiliary merchant cruisers will be on the routes : the only thing that will be there and that can be there are the defensive armed merchantmen. In these circumstances it seems probable that the best course would be to scatter the trade ; and it is in any case essential that we should have the power to do so, and that all arrangements should be made to that end.

8. When, however, the war has been in progress for some time, and in proportion as our available force increases and we pass from a peace to a war organization, it may well be that the scattering of the trade will no longer be necessary or even desirable, except perhaps locally between special points. Trading vessels would then be told to return to their regular trade routes ; and this might easily lead to drawing such commerce destroyers as then remain into areas where they could be reported, located, and destroyed, by the British cruisers.

9. The organization for the control and guidance of the trade should therefore be of so complete a character that the trade may be either dispersed about the ocean or concentrated along particular routes ; or in some places dispersed and in others concentrated ; and that changes from one policy to the other can be made when necessary at any time.

10. The British armed merchantmen will only be employed on a strictly limited service, namely, that of carrying food supplies to the United Kingdom. They will be forbidden to engage enemy's warships and are to surrender if overtaken by them. They will not molest or pursue unarmed ships of the enemy. They will only fire on enemy's armed merchantmen if they are themselves attacked or pursued by them.

The result of these arrangements will be that the enemy's armed merchantmen will either have to scatter in haphazard search for prizes, or run into a succession of armed British vessels plying the usual route, finding prizes few and far between on the first course, and nothing but kicks on the other.

11. C. As soon as possible after the outbreak of war a sufficient number of British merchant ships or liners of high speed, selected and prepared beforehand, will be converted into auxiliary cruisers and commissioned for the further policing of the trade routes, and incidentally or if desired to prey on enemy's commerce. These vessels will be taken over on the same or similar basis as the Cunarders. They will differ from the armed merchantmen in "B," in that their duties will not be limited to self-defence and warning ; they will be directly employed in hunting down enemy's armed merchantmen ; they may be used offensively against enemy's trade ; they will not carry on their ordinary business ; they will be wholly taken over by and maintained by the Admiralty ; they will be officered and manned by the Royal Navy, will fly the White Ensign, and execute the orders of the Admiralty.

12. D. While we have a large supply of older cruisers, they may be employed in protecting the approaches to the principal trade terminals, and at certain special points. These cruisers will be additional to any fast modern British vessels employed on the general service of hunting down individual German cruisers. They will neglect no opportunity of engaging enemy's warships or armed merchantmen. They may be at any time withdrawn from their areas by the Admiralty for such a purpose. Only the older ships will be employed on this service ; and as they wear out, control will be maintained by a smaller number of new, fast vessels employed on the general and primary service of hunting down the enemy's warships.

13. E. The last but indispensable condition of maintaining British food supplies and British trade in time of war, is that British traders should send their ships to sea, and from the very beginning of the war press forward boldly on their regular business. The

question of encouraging them to do this by means of a system of State Insurance under certain restrictions to guard against fraud, is now being considered by a Sub-Committee of the C.I.D. We have expressed on behalf of the Board of Admiralty the strongest opinion in favour of the adoption of such a system, it being essential to all our arrangements that very large numbers of British vessels, undeterred by a small proportion of captures, should continue to traverse the seas under the British flag.

In exceptional cases convoys will, if necessary, be organized under escort of Third Fleet vessels. It is hoped, however, that this cumbrous and inconvenient measure will not be required.

April, 1914. W. S. C.

APPENDIX III

FIRST LORD'S MINUTES

Formation of the Royal Naval Division.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Second Sea Lord.

In order to make the best possible use of the surplus naval reservists of different classes, it is proposed to constitute permanent cadres of one marine and two naval brigades. The marine brigade has already been partially formed in four battalions, aggregating 1,880 active service men. To this will be added an approximately equal number of reservists, making the total strength of the brigade 3,900, organized in four battalions of four double companies of approximately 250 men. The two naval brigades will also consist of four battalions each, if possible, of 880 men, organized in sixteen double companies of 220. The composition of each battalion should be as follows :—

R.N.V.R.	375
R.F.R. (picked, under 30 years of age)	313
R.N.R.	190

The total numbers required for the two naval brigades would therefore be :—

R.N.V.R.	3,000
R.F.R.	2,500
R.N.R.	1,500

The marine brigade will be commanded by a Colonel, and each battalion by a Lieutenant-Colonel ; each company by a Major and a Captain. The means of remedying the shortage of junior officers will be dealt with separately. About 50 new subalterns, R.M., must be entered either permanently or on a three years' or till the war stops, engagement.

Each naval brigade will be commanded by a Captain, R.N. ; five of the battalions by a Commander or naval officer promoted to that rank, and three by R.N.V.R. Commanders ; each company will be commanded by a Lieutenant-Commander, R.N. or R.N.V.R., or, if these are not forthcoming, by a Major, R.M. The question of making good deficiencies in these and in the marine brigade will be dealt with separately. There are, however, available 50 R.N.V.R. Lieutenants, 66 Sub-Lieutenants and 12 Midshipmen ; total 128. About 50 more officers would be required.

The use of these brigades need not be considered until the organization has advanced sufficiently to allow of their military value to be judged.

The formation of these brigades should be completed so far as resources allow in the present week. The officers commanding the companies and battalions must be appointed forthwith. The first essential is to get the men drilling together in brigades ; and the deficiencies of various ranks in the battalions can be filled up later. It may ultimately be found possible in the course of the war to build up all battalions of the marine and naval brigades to the army strength of 1,070, and the organization will readily adapt itself to this. All the men, whether sailors or marines, while training in the three brigades will be available if required for service afloat, and it must be distinctly understood that this is the paramount claim upon them ; but in the meanwhile they will be left to be organized for land service.

August, 16, 1914. W. S. C.

Action of August 28.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.
Director of Naval Ordnance.

1. Let me have an estimate of how long it will take to refit for service in every particular the vessels damaged in the recent action Careful attention should be paid to the wishes and suggestions of the officers who fought them, in order that everything possible can be done to increase their fighting efficiency.

2. The failure of the 4-inch guns in the *Arethusa* is most serious, and must be thoroughly investigated. I am informed that it arose both from the breaking of the ejector catches, of which there were no spares, and secondly, from the coating of the cartridge cases, which gradually fouled the gun. At one critical moment only one 4-inch gun could fire, and but for her 6-inch guns the *Arethusa* would have been destroyed. I wish to receive a statement showing that an effective remedy has been provided.

3. Every effort should be made while the ships are refitting to give the officers and men

a few days' leave. The nervous strain of a modern action is considerable, and a change of scene is required to restore poise and resiliency.

August 30, 1914. W. S. C.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.

1. Selections might be made from all the reports of this action, beginning with some of the submarine reconnaissance reports, which the Prime Minister has repeatedly urged me to publish. All interesting matter which can be made public without detriment to the future should be collected, circulated to the Fleet, and published in the newspapers.

2. The criticism in the Commander-in-Chief's report and various references to discrepancies in the arrangements which occur in Commodore S.'s and other statements must all be kept absolutely secret. Mistakes are always made in war, but there is no need to weaken confidence by dwelling on them after success has been obtained. The Senior Officers concerned in the manœuvre should, however, all have the opportunity of studying the full reports in order that every effort may be made to improve arrangements in the future. Beyond this profoundly secret circle no whisper must go.

3. I am awaiting your recommendations for honours, promotions, and rewards to be accorded to the officers and men who distinguished themselves in this fortunate and skilful enterprise.

September 6, 1914. W. S. C.

Separation Allowances for the Navy.

Financial Secretary.

I have to-day obtained the assent of the Cabinet in principle to the granting of a separation allowance to the whole Navy at once. The scale should be the full Army scale less any deductions which should be made on account of higher pay and allowances the sailor may receive as compared with the soldier. These details are to be settled between the Admiralty and the Treasury. I regard the matter as one of prime importance and urgency.

It is, of course, understood that the present decision only authorizes the payment of a separation allowance during the period of active service, and that the question of what is to happen in time of peace is not prejudiced.

I wish you to take up this question in conjunction with the Accountant-General and the Naval Branch and make me your proposals in the course of to-morrow. It will be a great fillip to our sailors when this boon to them is announced to the Fleet, as I hope it may be, in the next few days. Pray press it forward by every means in your power, acting with the Treasury and calling me in where there is a hitch or difficulty.

September 4, 1914. W. S. C.

Financial Secretary.

The Cabinet decided that evidence of allotment regularly made, should decide whether the Separation Allowance should be paid or not, and that legal marriage is not indispensable. Where it is clear that the woman has been dependent on the man, and the man has recognized this tie by a regular allotment, the legality of the marriage will be assumed.

September 19, 1914. W. S. C.

Enemy Reservists.

Secretary.

Please inquire who was responsible for allowing a merchant ship from Buenos Aires with 400 German reservists on board, to pass Gibraltar and to convey them to Italian ports, whence they left to join their units. How was it that these men were not arrested and made prisoners of war when passing the Straits?

September 5, 1914. W. S. C.

Life-Belts.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Fourth Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.

The sinking of the *Pathfinder* shows how important it is that there should be more life-belts or life-buoys available on our ships. Many lives would have been saved in this case if such steps had been taken. I don't like the German system of going into action with life-belts on, but there certainly ought to be in the boats and on the decks of British ships something like 100 life-belts or life-buoys which could be seized and would float overboard if the vessel foundered.

Pray let me have a proposal.

September 10, 1914. W. S. C.

Submarine Honours.

Secretary.
Naval Secretary.
First Sea Lord.

Since it is difficult to choose which man in a submarine has done specially well, it is necessary that the decoration should be given to the boat, and that the men should ballot among themselves to decide who is to have it.

September 17, 1914. W. S. C.

Blockade.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Additional Civil Lord (A.C.L.).
Chief of the Staff and others.

A standing Admiralty Committee will be formed under the presidency of the Additional Civil Lord, to be called "The Restriction of Enemies' Supplies Committee," composed as follows:—

One representative of the Trade Division of the War Staff.
One representative of the Foreign Office.
One representative of the Board of Trade.
Mr. Alan Burgoyne, M.P.
Mr. C. Money, M.P.

The duties of this Committee will be to examine and watch continually all means or routes by which supplies of food or raw material may reach Germany and Austria; to report weekly all importations or exportations to and from these countries coming to their knowledge; and to recommend by what methods, financial, commercial, diplomatic and military, they may be hampered, restricted and, if possible, stopped. Measures should, in

the first instance, be recommended to secure full and accurate information from day to day of all vessels unloading cargoes which may ultimately reach Germany or Austria at neutral ports, and the port of Rotterdam especially, as well as the possibility of supplies coming through a northern part of Sweden or from Sweden itself across the Baltic, or through Norway and Denmark. Holland must be the subject of the closest study, it being clearly impossible for the British Government to allow the neutral port of Rotterdam to serve as a base of supplies to the enemy. Trustworthy agents in Holland must be obtained or dispatched thither for this purpose. Any possible importation overland through Italy or up the Adriatic must be included in the survey.

Funds will be forthcoming for any special action required.

The Committee should hold its first meeting on Friday, the 14th, using a committee room at the Admiralty.

A.C.L. to nominate his own Secretary, and make all further arrangements to carry this minute into effect.

August 13, 1914. W. S. C.

MUNITIONS.

Lord Kitchener.

Captain Hankey, of the Committee of Imperial Defence, has been to me with what seems rather a good idea. He suggests that Girouard should be put at the head of an emergency armament multiplication committee or department, to set on foot and develop the maximum possible output of guns, rifles, ammunition, etc. I am sure, myself, that more could be done by the firms than is being done at present. For instance, after you told me of the pressure you had put upon them and that their complete limits had been reached, our people went round and obtained undertakings from the trade to produce 700 rifles a week more, additional to all that had been ordered by you.

This is only a half-formed idea, and I pass it on to you not as a recommendation, but simply for what it is worth.

September 3, 1914. W. S. C.

UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY.

Sir Edward Grey.

Please see attached. [*Not printed.*]

I should be so glad if you could see your way to making a strong stand against this. Even if we ultimately have to give way, the fact that they will have overruled our protest will, in the existing balance of public opinion in the United States, make them desirous of being helpful, or at any rate not unfriendly, on other points at issue.

Our case is clear. The Germans have announced their intention, have endeavoured on a large scale, and have partially begun, to arm merchant ships as commerce destroyers, and they even claim to carry out this process of arming and equipping in neutral harbours or on the high seas. We have been forced in consequence of this to arm a number of our ships in self-defence. In doing this we follow the undoubted law of the seas as it was practised in all the great wars of the past. We claim that by international law a merchant ship armed in her own defence, so long as she takes no aggressive action, is entitled to the full status of a peaceful trading ship. We ask that our ships so armed for this purpose shall be accorded that status in the neutral ports of the world. We are quite willing to agree that German merchant ships similarly armed in self-defence shall be similarly treated. It is only when merchant ships are armed and commissioned as auxiliary cruisers, not for purposes of self-defence, but for those of commerce destruction, that we claim they should be treated as ships of war. And here again we ask no better treatment for ourselves than for the enemy.

We recognize the natural difficulty to a neutral State anxious to preserve a strict impartiality, of discerning whether ships carrying the same armament are intended for offensive or defensive action. We offer that this question should be decided by a simple and practical test. If the armed merchant ship is engaged in ordinary commerce, discharging and taking a regular cargo, and embarking passengers in the usual way, she should be counted as a trader in spite of her armament. If, on the other hand, she is not engaged in commerce, is not doing the ordinary things she would do and has done in times of peace, but is either carrying special cargoes of coal and stores to belligerent cruisers on the high seas, or is travelling in ballast, or is not trafficking in her cargo in the natural way, then we say she should be treated as a ship of war, even if the Government of the State whose flag she flies declares that she is only armed and will only fight in self-defence. We must, therefore, hold a neutral Government impeccable if she allows a German armed merchantman, which takes a regular cargo in the ordinary way, to arm in her ports or leave them for the high seas, even if subsequently that vessel engages not merely in self-defence, but in actual aggressive attack. Neutrals who deal with ships according to the " Cargo Test " must be held blameless by us whatever the subsequent careers of the vessels may be. The issues which remain open after these ships have put to sea can only be decided between the belligerents.

The second point that I hope you will be able to fight is: no transference after the declaration of war of enemy's ships to a neutral flag, as agreed upon in the Declaration of London. We cannot recognize such transferences, which are plainly, in the nature of things, designed to enable the transferred ship to obtain under the neutral flag an immunity from the conditions created by the war.

I would earnestly ask that both these points should be pressed now in the most direct and formal manner on Powers concerned, and particularly upon the United States, and that very great pressure should be exerted.

In this connection it may be pointed out that the United States have already allowed one or more ships, including the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, to leave their ports armed, denuded of cargo, and cleared for action, and that to stop British ships of a self-defensive character is showing a partiality to one of the belligerents incompatible with fair and loyal neutrality. If to this is to be added the attempt which Mr. Bryan has made, by his personal intervention,

to take over the Hamburg-American liners from Germany and run them under the American flag, it seems to me clear that a situation has arisen which, in the ultimate issues, ought, in some form or other, to be brought publicly before the people of the United States. I am under no illusions as to their attitude, but the forces at work there in the present circumstances are such as to make it impossible for any Government to load the dice against England, or go openly one inch beyond an even neutrality.

I venture to suggest to you that this position ought to be fought up to the point of full publicity, and by every means and influence at our disposal, before we are forced to consider the various inferior alternatives which no doubt exist.

August 19, 1914. W. S. C.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Admiral Slade.
Chief of Staff.
Captain Webb.

The Cabinet decided this morning that we must abandon, under protest and as an exception, the running of defensively-armed merchantmen to American ports. We do this on the assumption that we in no way waive the principle, but in consideration of the fact that the United States are preventing a large number of German ships suitable for armament from fitting out. We must also stipulate that the guns, having been landed from these ships, shall be returned without their mountings in some other non-military vessel on which and from which they clearly cannot be used during the voyage.

Pray draft a note to the Foreign Office accordingly.

September 3, 1914. W. S. C.

The British Patrol off New York.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
Admiral Slade.

I have felt uncomfortable about this for some time. Although it is strictly legal, it must be very galling to the Americans to see their capital port picketed in this way. Instructions should be given that the patrolling cruisers should usually keep eight or ten miles away, or even farther if possible, and should only close in occasionally when there is some special need. They should, above all, be careful never to infringe the three-mile limit, and should discharge their duties with tact, remembering how greatly British interests are concerned in the maintenance of good relations with the United States. On the other hand, the closest watch should be kept on shore upon the Hamburg-American liners, and our cruisers should be given the earliest warning if these are seen to be getting up steam. It ought to be quite easy to give our cruisers full warning of any movement. The prevention of these Hamburg-American liners leaving armed and fuelled is practically the whole duty of our vessels off New York; and as long as they are in a position to discharge this they need not be too obtrusive in their other duties.

October 26, 1914. W. S. C.

Anti-Submarine Measures.

Dover.

First Sea Lord and others.

It is intolerable that we should be told that Dover is not safe against submarine attack. It is the only military harbour we have except Portland. We *must* be able to keep ships there safely. Measures are being taken to close one of the entrances by sinking two ships. This is urgent and vital, and should be pressed forward from hour to hour without a moment's pause. The other entrance should have an anti-submarine net and gate arranged. If the boom defence has carried away it must be repaired and replaced by night-and-day exertions. Meanwhile the long barges fitted with nets which have been prepared at Dunkirk should be brought over as soon as the weather allows, and used either to block the entrance or to give net protection to ships lying inside.

November 1, 1914. W. S. C.

High-Explosive Production.

A.C.L.

You must act in this matter and refer to me only when special need arises. The points to be held in view are clear and simple:—

1. We must have effective Government control of all the explosive works, so as to attain the maximum output, and ensure our not being hampered by German influences, which are powerful and subtle in the Explosive Trust.

2. Naval interests must be properly safeguarded, and this can only be either by the Navy taking Nobels and the other two companies, or by an absolutely equal representation and control as between the two departments [*i.e.*, Admiralty and War Office] over the whole of the explosive factories combined. We cannot be placed in the position of being overborne by the military authorities, and having our necessary demands set aside.

3. It is, however, our duty to do everything in our power to aid in the expansion of the Army and the production of war material for the conduct of the campaign, and at a certain point only State policy can decide whether naval or military interests are to claim priority.

4. We must make a good bargain for the country; and if these people are financed by Government money to set up great new works and broaden the scale of their business, good arrangements should be made to transfer these works to the Government at the end of the war.

November 9, 1914. W. S. C.

The Dummy Fleet.

(*Most Secret.*)
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.
Director of Naval Construction.
Naval Secretary.

It is necessary to construct without delay a dummy fleet: ten merchant vessels, either

German prizes or British ships, should be selected at once. They should be distributed among various private yards not specially burdened with warship building at the present time. They are then to be mocked up to represent particular battleships of the 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons. The actual size need not correspond exactly, as it is notoriously difficult to judge the size of vessels at sea, and frequently even destroyers are mistaken for cruisers. We are bearing in mind particularly aerial and periscope observations, where deception is much more easy. It is not necessary that the structures should be strong enough to stand rough weather. Very little metal would be required, and practically the whole work should be executed in wood or canvas. The ships would move under their own power under favourable conditions of weather from one base to another, and even when the enemy knows that we have such a fleet its presence will tend to mystify and confuse his plans and baffle and distract the enterprise of his submarines. He will always be in doubt as to which is the real and which is the dummy fleet. An attack upon the dummy fleet can be made not less dangerous than an attack upon the real fleet by the proper use of our own submarines and destroyers with towing charges, and possibly by traps of nets and mines.

The matter is urgent. Three years ago I formed this idea, and deeply regret that I have been so long deterred from putting it into execution. The Third Sea Lord, Fourth Sea Lord and Naval Secretary will meet to-day under the Third Sea Lord and formulate detailed proposals for immediate action. The utmost secrecy must be observed, and special measures taken to banish all foreigners from the districts where the mocking-up is being done. I should hope to receive the list of ships which are selected for conversion to-morrow morning, and the list of firms among whom the work will be parcelled out during the course of that day. Estimates of cost and time should also be made, but paint, canvas and woodwork can be quickly done, and I should expect in a fortnight, or at the outside in three weeks, that ten vessels will be actually at our tactical disposal.

October 21, 1914. W. S. C.

THE COASTAL PATROL.

Secret.

First Sea Lord.

If the system of working the patrol flotillas, explained in the enclosed memorandum, has actually been enforced, it is in complete violation not only of the obvious principles of war, but of all the orders and directions issued on this subject during the last three years. The word "distribution" applied to armed force implies the most vicious ideas. To proceed by dividing the front to be watched by the number of destroyers available for watching and working out the number of miles to the destroyers is the negation of good sense and military principle.

Ever since the Manœuvres of 1912 I have repeatedly explained the principles which should govern the working of the patrol flotillas (*see* attached papers), and these have been expounded to the C.I.D. and issued to the War Staff with the full concurrence of the First Sea Lord and the C.O.S. If there has been a departure from these principles and an adoption of the barbarous method of "distributing" the destroyers along the whole coast in a single row like toy soldiers on the kitchen table, this shows a total lack of comprehension.

It must again be repeated :—

1. That the coast, with its cyclists, signal stations and watchers, is the line of observation, and the only line of observation, which can certainly report the arrival of an enemy ;

2. That the patrol flotillas, both of submarines and destroyers, instead of being frittered away on useless cordon and patrolling duties, should be kept concentrated and ready for action at selected sallyports along the coast, ready to proceed in force to any point where shore information shows that an enemy is attempting to land ;

3. That there is to be nothing like routine or sentry-go patrolling, except at the mouths of harbours, and that from time to time occasional good bold reconnaissances 60, 70 and 80 miles out to seaward should be pushed from each sallyport by the whole of the boats available, varied occasionally by the prying scouting of a single destroyer ;

4. That the prevention of mine-laying can only be done by trawlers, who must summon help from the nearest patrol centre if necessary.

It must be recognized that nothing in our dispositions prevents an enemy from approaching the British coasts with transports, and beginning a landing there, but that if the flotillas are properly handled he should be attacked within a few hours by submarines and destroyers, and that the numbers and strength of the forces against him should continually increase until long before any considerable force can be landed the enemy's transports and escort would be overwhelmed, and those who are landed hopelessly cut off. The only alternative to this policy of letting the enemy begin to land and then attacking him while his landing is in progress, is the close blockade of the Heligoland Bight. There is much to be said for and against both courses, but the intermediate course of "distributing" a weak and thin cordon of patrols at a short distance from the coast in the hopes of putting up some defensive shield or screen is utterly futile.

The policy at present approved is to concentrate the flotillas at fixed points and keep them strong and fresh and fit for action, while relying upon the coast watch to give early and accurate information of any attack by the enemy. If this policy be adhered to strictly and simply, it will not be found impossible to spare the twelve destroyers which the Commander-in-Chief needs. It is, however, to be considered whether they could not better be taken from the two 1st Fleet Flotillas at Harwich.

November 7, 1914. W. S. C.

THE RIFLE SHORTAGE.

The following course is to be adopted :—

1. As soon as the War Office are ready to hand over the 50,000 Japanese rifles, the whole of the rifles, long and short, whether used by

sailors or marines, on board H.M. ships at home or abroad, will be collected and brought on shore to the Royal Naval Ordnance Depôts. The Japanese rifles will be issued to all ships in their place; there will be no rifles of any sort on board H.M. ships other than Japanese.

2. From the British rifles surrendered by the Fleet, 15,000 short ·303 charger loading rifles will be set aside for the Royal Naval Division, i.e. one rifle for each of 12,000 men, plus 25 per cent. for reserve and training. All the rifles now possessed by the Royal Naval Division will then be surrendered to the Ordnance Depôts in exchange for the 15,000 short ·303 British rifles aforesaid. Therefore the Royal Naval Division will have 15,000 short British ·303, and no more.

3. There will then be handed over to the Army 57,800 rifles, of which 9,000 will be short charger loading.

4. The 50,000 Japanese rifles will be issued to the Fleet in the following proportion:—

One rifle for each marine, and one rifle for every five sailors, ships on foreign service receiving one rifle for every three sailors. The rest of the rifles will be issued as required to trawlers and auxiliaries, and kept in the Royal Marine and Royal Naval Ordnance Depôts.

The Fleet will thus be completely re-armed with the 50,000 Japanese rifles, and the Royal Naval Division with ·303 short rifles ready for field service.

Let me now have calculations worked out on this basis; and draft a letter accordingly to the War Office.

November 25, 1914. W. S. C.

APPENDIX IV

MINING

In order to combat the many unwise proposals which were pressed upon me at this time to squander our small stock of mines, I drew up the following paper with which I endeavoured to repel the demands from the Cabinet, the Admiralty, and the Fleet. I am aware that these views will be disputed, and I shall no doubt be told that the experience of the later stages of the war has disproved them. I still believe, however, that they were sound and truly applicable to the circumstances of 1914. But I go further and declare that the reasoning held good all through 1915 and 1916. If I am reminded that as part of the life and death struggle against the German submarines in 1917 we were led into a mining policy on a scale so gigantic as dwarfed every previous scheme, and if, as the result of this huge diversion of our resources a certain number of German submarines were destroyed, still I assert that these conditions would never have arisen if a proper offensive had been developed by the Royal Navy, as would have been possible at far less cost. All being said, I take my stand, as I wrote to Lord Fisher, on the *dictum*, "Mine in Haste and Sweep at Leisure."

NOTES BY THE FIRST LORD

Mining is mainly of two kinds, ambush mining and blockade mining.

Ambush Mining.

Ambush mining depends on the whereabouts of the field remaining unknown. These mines may be scattered about in patches, or short lines in the neighbourhood of the enemy's ports or of the approaches to your own ports or landing places on the chance of enemy ships running into them. This chance is not great. The seas are very large; the area mined, even if on a great scale, very small. The chances of preserving secrecy long are not great, and most ambush minefields are soon discovered by merchant ships, or other craft of no military value, being blown up by them. On the other hand, every patch of mines soon hampers the movement of the stronger fleet. The position of the minefields cannot be accurately known. There is very often a tendency for them to drag with their anchors in tide and sea. Also ships cannot always be sure of their positions, and very often, when out of sight of land, in weather unsuited to taking observations of the sun, 15, 20, or 30 miles' error in position may easily arise. The fact that you know generally where your own mines are, and when you are getting near their area, but do not exactly know where they are, or exactly where you are, tends to paralyse your own movements, and might easily prevent effective action against or the interception of the enemy's fleet should it put to sea. The conclusion to be drawn is that ambush mines should be very sparingly used, chiefly in sight of land, and that not very much is to be expected from them. The general failure, so far as our present experience goes, of the German policy of ambush mining with which they opened the war, illustrates the truth of these conclusions. The only British warship, apart from the gunboat *Speedy* (which was actually engaged in fishing up mines), lost by this agency has been the *Amphion*, and she was drifted out of her course on to the very minefield whose position she knew and which she was endeavouring to avoid.

This is not by any means to decry the use of ambush mines as an immediate part of a concerted tactical combination. It is for this purpose mainly that the British Fleet mine-layers are organized. To lay mines in the course of an enemy before or during a battle, or across his homeward path if he has

put to sea, may be operations of the greatest consequence and value, and it would be most unwise to deplete them of their not too extensive store of mines, which should be reserved for this purpose, and not squandered on promiscuous and haphazard use.

One more class of ambush mines deserves to be noted. A few scattered about on trade routes and off enemy ports if well advertised and enforced by a few ships actually blown up, may exercise a very effective deterrent on neutral commerce which may be of use to the enemy.

Blockade Mining.

It is not possible to blockade a modern fleet by mining, even on a very large scale, unless superior force is maintained in the neighbourhood of the minefield to prevent or oppose the mines being removed. In the days when Admiral Togo mined the debouches from Port Arthur the submarine did not exist, and it was possible to maintain a close and constant watch on the minefields, so that even if he was unable to stop the enemy removing the mines he knew when they were doing so, and this, perhaps, gave some clue to their future intentions. Even so, the Russian Fleet put to sea whenever they wanted to. It would not be possible to keep such a watch now without exposing the vessels so engaged to almost certain destruction from the enemy's submarines. Further, blockade mining is more effective the closer in it is to the enemy's ports, and therefore the watching vessels would be continually exposed not only to the attacks of the submarines, but to a greatly superior force of enemy destroyers and light cruisers. In order to maintain them against this, appropriate supports would have to be kept close at hand in proper tactical relation and brought up as the need arose, with the result that more and more ships of greater value would be drawn into the most dangerous area of the enemy's submarine activities, and considerable operations would develop in waters less suited to us and most favourable to the enemy.

But if the minefield is not watched, the enemy has no difficulty in proceeding to sea at any time he chooses. He will soon learn the existence of the minefield, because one or two small craft will be blown up on it. In the British Fleet the regular mine-sweepers can sweep a clear channel ahead of the Fleet at a rate of 12 knots an hour through any minefield. The Germans have not used, as we have, old gunboats converted as mine-sweepers, but have built a special class of good, fast vessels. It must, therefore, be assumed that they could sweep a channel at least as quickly as, and probably quicker than, we could. They could, therefore, proceed to sea at any time if they wished to do so, and with scarcely any delay. Also, if they did not wish immediately to proceed to sea, they could sweep a channel through the minefield of which they would know the existence, and which, being in close contact with land where actual bearings could be obtained, they could follow exactly, and so have continued means of ingress and egress. We, on the other hand, would not know where this channel was, and would be prevented from approaching by the known existence of our own field. The conclusion is that it is not possible by blockade mines to stop a fleet from putting to sea, even if that were what we wanted to do.

Still less is it possible to stop the enemy's submarines from putting to sea, either by ambush mines or blockade mines. The rise and fall of the tide between high and low water makes a minefield ineffective against shallow-draft craft for half the 24 hours. The distance of 50 yards, which is the usual interval between mines, is five times the breadth of a submarine. By diving to 50 feet the chance of contact with the mine is removed, and only the lesser danger of fouling the moorings remains. It is perfectly easy to sweep a channel for submarines, as for other vessels, at any time. Where there is any uncertainty about the whereabouts of a minefield, trawlers, or small merchant ships with a very few people on board, can go ahead of the submarines and pilot them out. If necessary, vessels could be specially prepared as mine-bumpers, with a kind of cow-catcher apparatus in front of them. We are experimenting with five different methods of fitting ships for mine-bumping, and shall very soon have a number of vessels which can go almost with impunity into a minefield. British submarines have frequently traversed, wittingly and unwittingly, the German minefields around Heligoland, and German submarines are probably traversing our southern mined area with indifference, and impunity, at the present time.

On the other hand, it is a curious truth that your own minefield is a greater deterrent to your own operations than to those of the enemy. You have put it down yourself, so you do not want to sweep it up. You know where it is, though not very accurately. You instinctively try to avoid the waters you have yourself fouled. Nothing has been more valuable than the searching and relentless watching maintained in the Heligoland Bight by our submarines since the beginning of the war. Its vigilance and efficiency have defeated themselves by forcing the Germans to retire actually inside their basins and canal, and thus depriving our submarines of any targets. It would be a great pity to hamper them in their work and expose them to additional dangers for the sake of such vain and illusory precautions. The weak passive defence of mines cannot for a moment be compared as a military measure with the enterprising offensive of submarines.

The above considerations also apply to suggested schemes for shutting submarines in by a network of mines fastened together by wire. Mine-sweepers or mine-bumpers would force a channel through this as easily as through ordinary lines of mines, the only difference being that several being dragged along by the string would be exploded at the same time. Also it is evident that the limitations of this form of defence cannot be carried very far on account of the enormous quantities of material and explosives required. It would be very difficult and dangerous to lay in close proximity to the enemy's ports and fleets. The process would be slow, the losses certain, and it could in any case block only a very small portion of the 100-mile broad mouth of the Heligoland Bight. Devices of this character may, however, be useful in defending

one's own harbours, and making anchorages submarine proof, where we can, by our superior strength, prevent our arrangements from being interfered with. A variety of these methods are at present in use, and are being rapidly extended and developed. The following seven principal expedients are being applied :—

(1) Sinking ships with cement or stone in such a way as to form an absolute breakwater and barrier like the mole of a harbour.

(2) Electrical contact mines strung very closely together, and capable of being made dangerous or safe by the current being switched on or off.

(3) Barges or piles, with torpedo nets attached to them.

(4) Loose wire nets of very large mesh, not fastened at either end, which clog round a submarine and entangle it.

(5) Network arrangement, with explosives attached.

(6) Network arrangements, with upright floating spars, which also entangle the sub marine.

(7) Long lengths of fishing nets, particularly Portuguese tunny nets, which operate in the same way.

As the war progresses, we shall gradually improvise the torpedo-proof harbours of which, except on our southern coast, we are now entirely destitute.

I explained to the Cabinet the quantities of mines which we had in store, and which were available in the future. The experience of the last three months seems to justify the partial and limited reliance put by the Admiralty upon mining as a method of warfare.

October, 1914. W. S. C.

APPENDIX V

FIRST LORD'S MINUTES

Dover Defences.

January 2, 1915.

I have asked on other papers that a précis should be made of the past history since the War began of the Dover Harbour defences. Every anticipation with regard to progress has been falsified. The extent of the preparations of the ships to be sunk has been extended, and work has been pushed on very leisurely with them. Delays have been continual, and now, finally, when the *Montrose* was prepared for sinking, the opportunity of a good day was missed, and the vessel has been allowed to remain in a position where she has broken adrift and is probably on the Goodwins.[1] I cannot think that this is a creditable performance. I wish also to receive a full report of the circumstances under which the *Montrose* was allowed to remain in a dangerous position when the weather was getting continually worse, and who is responsible for it.

W. S. C.

Fleet Strength and the Manning Policy.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of the Staff. *January* 13, 1915.

A decision is required in regard to the strength of the War Fleet we should aim at for January 1, 1916, in order that manning arrangements may be adjusted. So far we have simply commissioned every ship we could lay our hands on, and only laid up the *Edgars*. But the great numbers of fine ships completing during the present year make it necessary that we should set a limit to the number of ships maintained in full commission, and lay up a certain number of old ships as new ones join. It is not desirable, if it can be avoided, that officers and men should be sent to sea in vessels of such low fighting quality that they are an easy prey.

The accession of 20 new cruisers between the declaration of war and the end of this year should make it possible to lay up a certain number of the oldest cruisers, particularly the "P" class and the *Didos*. Other ships that deserve scrutiny from this point of view are, for instance :—

Sutlej, Amphitrite, Europa, Argonaut, Euryalus, Charybdis, Bacchante, Eclipse, Highflyer, Challenger, Dwarf, Hyacinth, Astræ and *Fox*.

These vessels carry a great number of men in the highest state of efficiency. A good many of them are, no doubt, required for particular operations in connection with colonial expeditions and against the Turks. But we must recognize that none of them is any use against the only kind of light cruiser which the Germans would break out with, and every one of them would be an easy prey to a battle-cruiser.

The sound principle promulgated by Lord Fisher of using the fewest number of good ships to do the work on foreign stations, and of resisting a tendency to take comfort from the mere possession of numbers of unsuitable vessels, is applicable in war no less than in peace. We have also in commission 42 armed merchant cruisers, which are much better suited to producing numerical strength than these old light cruisers. It is not suggested that any of these old ships when laid up should be dismantled. On the contrary, they should be kept with reduced nucleus crews ready for special service if required, or to replace casualties. But each should be the subject of careful examination, and a roster of withdrawals from active commission should be prepared and fitted in so as to make trained and seasoned complements, who have worked

[1] She was.

together as ships' companies, available for the splendid new vessels coming forward.

With regard to the old battleships of the *Majestic* and *Canopus* classes, of which, including the *Revenge*, there are sixteen, these are required for special bombarding purposes, but they will not all be required at once, and in May or June, when the monitors arrive, at least half should be placed in reduced nucleus crews (Third Fleet scale), and kept in the highest state of readiness so as to take the places of sister ships damaged or lost in action; twelve or fifteen old ships thus placed in reserve will give us, with other increases of our personnel resources, the means of manning the new ships which are coming forward with crews of the highest efficiency.

W. S. C.

The Trench-Roller.

Director of the Air Division.
Director of Contracts.
Third Sea Lord. *January* 18, 1915.

I wish the following experiment made at once :—

Two ordinary steam-rollers are to be fastened together side by side by very strong steel connections, so that they are to all intents and purposes one roller covering a breadth of at least 12 to 14 feet. If convenient, one of the back inside wheels might be removed and the other axle joined up to it. Some trenches are to be dug on the latest principles somewhere handy near London in lengths of at least 100 yards, the earth taken out of the trenches being thrown on each side, as is done in France. The roller is to be driven along these trenches, one outer rolling wheel on each side, and the inner rolling wheel just clear of the trench itself. The object is to ascertain what amount of weight is necessary in the roller to smash the trench in. For this purpose as much weight as they can possibly draw should be piled on to the steam-rollers and on the framework buckling them together. The ultimate object is to run along a line of trenches, crushing them all flat and burying the people in them.

If the experiment is successful with the steam-rollers fastened together on this improvised system, stronger and larger machines can be made with bigger driving wheels and proper protection for the complements, and the rollers of these machines will be furnished with wedge-shaped ribs or studs, which can be advanced beyond the ordinary surface of the wheel when required, in order to break the soil on each side of the trench and accentuate the rolling process.

The matter is extremely urgent, and should be pressed to the utmost. Really the only difficulty you have got to surmount is to prevent the steam-rollers from breaking apart. The simplicity of the device, if it succeeds, is its virtue. All that is required is a roller of sufficient breadth and with wheels properly fitted, and an unscaleable bullet-proof house for the crew. Three or four men would be quite enough, and as the machine is only worked by night it would not be required to stand against artillery.

In a fortnight I wish to see these trials.

W. S. C.

The Manning Policy.

February 6, 1915.

Director of the Mobilization Department.

The procedure which should be adopted in regard to manning ships like *Warspite*, *Canada* and other new ships of the highest power, should be as follows :—

A new crew should be prepared at the depôts for the oldest First Fleet battleship convenient, say, *King Edward VII*, instead of, as now, for the new ship. When the training of this crew is complete, they should relieve the old crew of the *King Edward VII*, and this relieved crew should go on board the new ship, plus any additions that may be required, which additions must have been carefully considered beforehand. In this way a first-class complement of active service ratings will be provided for a ship of the greatest power, with good and highly trained officers acquainted with Grand Fleet work, who know each other and have been accustomed to work together.[1]

W. S. C.

Airships and Aeroplanes.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Fourth Sea Lord.
Director of the Air Division.

January 18, 1915.

The general condition of our airship service, and the fact that so little progress has been made by Vickers in the construction of the rigid airship now due, makes it necessary to suspend the purely experimental work in connection with airships during the war, and to concentrate our attention on the more practical aeroplane, in which we have been so successful.

1. The Director of Contracts should, in conjunction with the Director of the Air Division, make proposals for suspending altogether the construction of the Vickers rigid airship. The material which has been accumulated should be stored, and the shed in which it is being constructed should be thus set free.

2. The repairing staff of the airships, which is now at Farnborough, should be moved with the utmost despatch to Barrow, and should be accommodated in the neighbourhood of the new rigid airship shed and make the shed their repairing shop. Arrangements should be made to this effect with Vickers, so that we take over this shed completely from them during the war.

3. The Farnborough sheds are to be handed back to the Army as soon as possible, thus meeting their urgent demands.

4. Messrs. Vickers are to be urged to expedite as much as possible the two non-rigid airships they are building in the old Admiralty shed at Barrow. These, when completed, will give us five airships—three Parsevals and two Astra Torres, besides the small military ones. These five airships will be accommodated, three in the wooden shed at Kingsnorth and two in the old Admiralty shed at Barrow. The iron shed at Kingsnorth will thus become available for the large numbers of aeroplanes which are now being delivered. All necessary steps must be taken to enable aeroplanes in

[1] It was a great pity this system was not adopted.

skilful hands to alight or ascend from the neighbourhood of Kingsnorth.

5. Temporary housing accommodation for the aeroplane staff is to be at once provided near Kingsnorth, which is to become an aeroplane as well as an airship base.

* * * *

7. The personnel of the Royal Naval Airship Service is to be reduced to the minimum required to man and handle the five airships. The balance, including especially the younger naval officers, are to be transferred to the aeroplane section. The military officers are to remain with the airships. I am not at all convinced of the utility of keeping this detachment at Dunkirk, and unless they are able to show some good reason for their existence they should be withdrawn.

W. S. C.

Aeroplane Policy.

Director of the Air Division. *April* 3, 1915.

1. The paper handed in by Commander Longmore should be approved in principle, and should guide us in the types of machines to be developed. The Curtiss machine should be fully tested and worked up here, being replaced by other machines at Dunkirk. In particular, the following two types should be developed :—

(*a*) The heavy bomb-dropping type, capable of carrying upwards of 500lb. of explosives for a 150-mile journey there and back ; and

(*b*) The superlative small fighting machine with great rising power and speed, single-seater, and with a Lewis gun firing through a deflector propeller.

2. I attach great importance to the development of photography. It is certain to be required for important reconnaissances from May onwards. You must take steps to make sure that in this and in artillery spotting we are kept fully abreast of the latest Army progress. They have had more experience, and we should take every opportunity of learning from them.

3. The torpedo seaplane must be strenuously pressed forward, the object being to use at least ten machines carrying torpedoes for a night attack on German ships-of-war at anchor.[1]

4. Whenever possible all machines should be constructed so as to use their weight-carrying powers in different ways, so that, according to the service required, fuel, arms, a gun, explosives, or a passenger can be carried.

5. The object now to be aimed at from June will not be reconnaissance and patrolling, but the attacking with bombs on the largest possible scale of military points on enemy territory. For this, weight of explosives and numbers of machines are more necessary than skill of pilots or special fighting qualities in the machines. We shall by then have passed the stage of daring exploits, and must acquire the power to strike heavy blows which will produce decisive effects on the enemy's fighting strength. The carrying of two to three tons of explosives to a particular point of attack in a single night or day is the least we should aim at as an operation in the future. All possible objectives should be studied and special reports made upon them. The capacities of machines should be considered in relation to these definite tasks.

6. Every effort should be made to reach 1,000 aeroplanes and 300 seaplanes as early as possible before the end of the present year ; 400 pilots will be required and all arrangements should be made to procure and train them.

7. The progress made so far, and the great expansion of the Air Service which is in progress, is considered very satisfactory, and reflects great credit on all concerned.

W. S. C.

[1] The neglect and maltreatment of this scheme was one of the great crimes of the war.

A Mining Project.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of the Staff. *January* 20, 1915.

This is a proposal to lay 57 miles of mines in two or three rows at the southern end of the existing minefields, with a view to blocking the entrance to the English Channel. This would, no doubt, be an effective barrier against enemy heavy ships, but are they likely to come there ? and would it not be very satisfactory to us if they did ? What would they do when they got there ? How would they get back ? Is not the existing minefield a sufficient deterrent, having regard to the military unwisdom of the enterprise ?

Against submarines, on the other hand, the minefield would be no barrier at all. Zeebrugge has already been encircled with French and British mines without preventing the submarines from going in and out with impunity. Our submarines have repeatedly traversed German minefields in the Heligoland Bight. Two of them went in through the Libau minefield. If there were good grounds for thinking that mines laid at 50 yards' interval would stop submarines the case would be made out. But these are the only craft we are likely to want to stop, and these are the very craft we cannot stop. It is a delusion to suppose we can.

2,500 mines, approximately, would be required at 50 yards' interval. It is therefore 4 or 5 to 1 in favour of the submarine—even if the field is quite intact—passing any particular line. Experience shows that the minefield will not remain intact, and that great gaps will soon be made by mines exploding in rough water or breaking adrift. Moreover, the 20-feet rise and fall of the tide renders the minefield harmless to small craft like submarines at each high water. It is no barrier—it is no deterrent. If the mines are to be placed at intervals of 25 yards the protection would be greater, but 5,000 mines would be required. That would exhaust our whole stock. To get over the tide difficulty, two, if not three, mines should be fastened on one string —i.e. 15,000 mines would be required, or three times what we have.

The objection taken by the Chief of the Staff as to danger to our own ships from drifting mines and hampering our operations also seems to me very serious.

W. S. C.

Cordite.

Secretary and others. *January* 25, 1915.

The position set forth in these papers is serious and calls for prompt action.

I understand that, since the Director of Contracts' minute of the 9th January was written the War Office have written officially to say that, after careful consideration by their experts, American gun-cotton cannot be used for the manufacture of cordite, and that this affects the estimated output from Nobel's during 1915. Consequently there is very little chance of our obtaining for the Navy this year from Nobel's any part of the 1,800 tons included in the 4,000 tons that the proposals put forward in these papers were intended to provide. The net result is that of the additional 10,000 tons of cordite required for the Navy by the end of this year we are not likely to get more than 2,200 tons from three firms (Curtis & Harvey, National Explosives Company, and the Cotton and Powder Company), and then only with the assistance of Government subsidies to the extent of £275,000.

If it is the case that it is impossible for Nobel's to deliver any part of these additional requirements for the Navy during 1915, it is clearly a waste of money to subsidize the firm to the extent of the £850,000 proposed. This money could be put to better use by starting a naval factory of our own; and I wish to have proposals worked out and submitted to me with the least possible delay. The object to be attained is the establishment of an independent naval factory that will begin to produce cordite at the rate of 400 or 500 tons a month from June or July onwards.

In the meantime the proposals put forward in these papers (excepting that relating to Nobel's) are approved, and every effort should be made to enable the three remaining firms to increase their estimated output.

W. S. C.

Secretary.
Third Sea Lord.
Director of Naval Ordnance.
Director of Contracts. *February* 12, 1915.

The cordite question must be grappled with more vigour and on a larger scale. If the establishment of a factory to produce 500 tons a month is not sufficient, why is the factory not established on double or treble the scale? Whatever delays there may be in bringing deliveries into effect can certainly be overcome by the autumn of the present year. We have very large reserves of propellant at hand to last us through the earlier parts of the year, and what you are responsible for is to make sure that we are in a position to cope with all emergencies that may arise in the latter part. Do not, therefore, hesitate to make proposals to meet the deficiency which you have shown on the current paper. Very large quantities of ammunition of all kinds and propellant will certainly be required during the closing months of this year.

Please report further.

W. S. C.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord. *February* 12, 1915.

In view of the apprehended shortage of cordite towards the end of the year, the expenditure of no less than 2,000 tons of practice ammunition should be reconsidered. It does not appear to me to be equally important that all ships should fire their full allowance. The best ships should be given the preference, and of these ships, those which have had opportunities of firing in action, whether at land or sea targets, do not surely require to repeat all their practices.

W. S. C.

Financial Procedure.

Secretary. *February* 12, 1915.

This minute of the Treasury should be circulated to all departments concerned, and initialled by all Admiralty officers involved. It is of the highest importance that Admiralty contracts made during the war should, after a fair allowance for the exceptional conditions prevailing, stand the severe subsequent parliamentary scrutiny to which they will certainly be subjected.

W. S. C.

Exchange of Prisoners.

Secretary. *February* 13, 1915.

The Admiralty are of opinion that an exchange of military prisoners of war, man for man, particularly officers, would be beneficial to this country.

First, because, owing to the size of our Regular Army before the war, an exchange of equal numbers secures us a return of a larger proportion of our trained fighting strength.

Secondly, as the enemy will receive an equal number of mouths to feed in exchange, the difficulties of his food problem are not lessened.

Thirdly, when a belligerent is being reduced by process of famine, it is undesirable that large bodies of prisoners of war should be in his hands, as the temptation to expose these to undue suffering is obvious.

Finally, we have more German prisoners of military age than they have of our men, and therefore when the exchanges were completed there would still remain a balance in our hands in case of exceptional action on the part of the enemy, and we should not be leaving a balance of prisoners in his hands for the treatment of whom we should have no security.

But if the principle of exchange of prisoners is to be adopted, it should be upon a regular system and on a large scale, and the pairing off of individual Admirals and Generals or of persons of distinction on either side is to be strongly deprecated as affording no real diminution of human suffering while involving unnecessary and undesirable parleyings with the enemy. These should always be kept at the minimum.

W. S. C.

Anti-Mine and Anti-Torpedo Devices.

March 22, 1915.

I am sure it is perfectly easy to fit temporary wooden mine-fenders on to ships of war, and there must be many ways of doing this. All proposals, however, are always derided and broken down by the naval constructors and naval officers because it is said that they will

not stand the stresses which arise in a seaway. The consequence is that, though for seven or eight months this clear remedy has been staring us in the face, very little progress has been made and no real result achieved. Here, in the Dardanelles, the operations will take place in landlocked waters, where no violent motion can be expected, and it is to my mind most deplorable that invaluable makeshifts adapted to smooth water should have been ruled out just because perfection for ocean purposes has not been obtained. I have tried my best time after time during the last six months, and have made numbers of suggestions, and so has Sir Arthur Wilson; but the only result is that things are brought to a standstill by the sterile criticisms of persons who make no positive proposals themselves, and by general inertia. If the deep-keeled caissons which I proposed two years ago, and which were assented to six months ago, had been carried through, we should now have a certain means of passing the torpedo-tubes of the Narrows, and also a means of mooring two of them into a V-shaped shield in front of the bows of a battleship while engaged with the forts.

It is too late to do anything for the Dardanelles now. Can we not turn over a new leaf, however, in regard to the future, and make proper temporary attachments for ships which will have to work in submarine- and mine-infested areas? Never mind if this reduces the speed of the ships, or if it spoils the look of the ships, or if it cannot be used except in fine weather. It is better to have a ship which will do what you want safely in fine weather than a ship which you dare not use in any weather for necessary purposes for fear that she should be sent to the bottom. Let us now resolve that the Director of Naval Construction's proposal to fit sections of bulges around the sides of ships shall be applied without delay to at least a dozen of the older battleships, and that all the new battleships shall be fitted with the necessary rail and rack to take them, and let orders be given to prepare the necessary caissons in large numbers. Let the deep-keeled detached caissons, approved by the Treasury in November, be now proceeded with, so that they can be moored alongside bombarding ships.

Has any report been received from the *Conqueror* about the S.C.W.'s proposals? How you can be content to let these great ships, which are your pride and on which so many millions are spent, be ruled off the warpath by mine and torpedo without regarding the remedy against these dangers as the first charge on naval inventiveness, beats my civilian mind.

W. S. C.

Barrier-Breakers.

Secretary and others. *March* 22, 1915.

It appears to me that a number of tramps and old steamers should be collected at Malta without delay and filled up with barrels and wood offal, so as to render them as far as possible unsinkable, and that fourteen or fifteen of these vessels should be held in readiness to act as "barrier-breakers" when the fire of the forts at the Dardanelles has been quelled. If anything like a rush is required at the critical moment, the whole fleet of these vessels, manned by small crews of volunteers, driven on in front of the fleet and in front of the fleet sweepers, may be an indispensable precaution. Numbers will count both as offering distracting targets for the enemy and exploding more mines in the channel.

W. S. C.

Intercepting Ammunition.

March 23, 1915.

Director of the Intelligence Division.

It now becomes of the utmost importance to stop the passage of war material for Turkey through Roumania and Bulgaria. The Governments of both these countries have declared their intention of stopping it, but no doubt there is a lot of corruption among the smaller people, and smuggling under one form or another of ammunition and arms must be going on. It is essential that this should be stopped. Discuss the matter with the Foreign Office this morning, and make me proposals which commend themselves to them. Numbers of suitable Roumanian and Bulgarian agents should be engaged by us to watch the railways and canals ceaselessly, and money should be freely spent to make it worth while for Roumanians and Bulgarians employed on the railways to give us timely information of any wagonloads of ammunition passing. With this information our Ministers can put the Governments in motion. Not a day should be lost in instituting this most necessary service.

W. S. C.

The Smoke Flotilla.

April 5, 1915.

1. The attached telegram should be sent to the Admiral-Superintendent, Malta. The Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance will insert full description of the method and appliances. Director of Transports will provide the vessel. Director of Stores will provide the benzol. Malta Yard will make all preparations meanwhile.

Let me have dates of sailing and arrival at Mudros, where the prepared cone-bearing ships will await her. The whole matter is most urgent.

2. A telegram should be drafted by the Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance to the Russian Admiralty cancelling our last recommendation, and giving the details of the improved method. Let me see draft.

3. Another complete outfit of eight small vessels with three cones apiece is to be prepared for home service and for experiments, and all the necessary stores are to be purchased. Meanwhile further experiments are to continue with a view to improvements. A smoke flotilla is to be definitely constituted; an intelligent young officer to be put in charge, with the smoke vessels manned like the trawlers; the whole to be well organized and to practise making smoke. This flotilla will be stationed on the West Coast of Scotland, where it can practise in smooth waters without attracting undue attention.

4. Proposals should be also put forward for four fast motor-boats to burn one cone each, it being essential to have the power to throw

smoke quickly from a particular point under fire under cover of this smoke before the slower vessels arrive to complete the obscurity.

5. Proposals are to be put forward showing what alterations would be required in four ex-coastal destroyers taken from the Nore defence to enable them to burn two cones for eight hours. The Director of Naval Construction will report on this and what time it would take to fit these vessels when the order is given.

These proposals supersede the previous proposal.

All proposals, whether for the organization of personnel or *matériel*, to be put forward immediately. Naval Secretary to co-ordinate. Action to proceed in anticipation of further sanction.

W. S. C.

The Armament of the Latest German Battleships.

March 27, 1915.

This is a very alarmist letter, and twists all the facts into the most unfavourable position. The Commander-in-Chief assumes that six new Dreadnoughts, all armed with 15-inch guns, will have joined the German Fleet before a single British Dreadnought so armed has joined it. This is absurd. *Warspite* joins (us) in the next few days. *Lützow* has not yet joined (them). The question of the "König" class having 15-inch guns was searchingly investigated by the Admiralty Committee in October last. I have seen no evidence of these ships having been laid up since the war began for any period long enough to admit of such a change. They have been doing their practices and moving about quite regularly. The calculations of the Committee were made on the basis of 14-inch guns. If 15-inch guns were employed the weights would be much more seriously affected and the argument against their employment would become even more formidable. I do not believe there are any solid grounds for assuming that either the "Lützow" or the "König" class are armed with 15-inch guns,[1] but in view of the evidence and this letter of the Commander-in-Chief, the Director of Naval Ordnance's Committee of October should reassemble and make a further report on the subject.

With regard to the Third Sea Lord's minute, I wish to receive a report from him and the Director of the Intelligence Division as to what is known of the possibility of completion of the *Ersatz Hertha* and Nos. 25, 26 and 28. Our own experience of the completion of ships should teach us that battleships cannot be fitted for war service, however great are the efforts made, irrespective of a certain minimum period of time. The new battleship *Kron Prinz* may be approaching completion, but Nos. 26 and 28 cannot be in the line for many months to come.

Queen Elizabeth must sail for home the moment she can be spared. Meanwhile, no time is being lost, as until her turbine is repaired she could not in any case join the Grand Fleet. *Warspite* can join as soon as is convenient. I agree fully that *Barham*, *Valiant*, and *Malaya* should be brought forward with the utmost rapidity. It is to the gun-mountings that the delay is due. I cannot understand why a small point like this cannot be overcome. If men are taken off the turrets of later ships and set to work in three reliefs on the turrets of these ships, or if by taking special pains and care the turrets could be erected in the first instance on board the ship and not erected, taken to pieces, and re-erected, a couple of months could easily be saved. *Canada* also is a vessel very near completion, and the most strenuous efforts should be made to bring her into the line.

W. S. C.

[1] Of course they were not.

The Search for Guns.

April 3, 1915.

1. The Director of Naval Ordnance has been instructed to make proposals for increasing the number of small guns available for trawlers, drifters, and merchant ships. He is to have regard to the following sources :—

(*a*) All the guns now assigned to monitors, fleet sweepers, and river gunboats, other than the six accelerated monitors which are to be ready in May, can be appropriated. Other ships will be laid up before these latter vessels are commissioned and a further supply of 12-pdrs. will be released.

(*b*) Ships on the North American Station, which are not exposed to torpedo attack, should surrender a part of their anti-torpedo armament.

(*c*) Ships undergoing a long refit (*Drake*, *King Alfred*, *Sutlej*) should surrender on loan their suitable small guns.

(*d*) The sixteen 12-pdrs. now in the possession of the Royal Marines and formerly used by Colonel Osmaston's batteries, should be supplied with ship's mountings at the earliest possible moment and made available.

(*e*) Sixteen armed trawlers attached to the Commander-in-Chief have two guns apiece. One of these should be surrendered at once.

(*f*) The proposals in regard to the 1-inch aiming rifle put forward by the Naval Secretary at the conference on the 2nd instant should be studied and immediately developed.

(*g*) A ship mounting should be designed forthwith for six and three sub-calibre guns, and trial mountings put in hand.

(*h*) The despatch of the American guns purchased at Bethlehem Works should be hastened by every means, and Sir Trevor Dawson should be instructed to search for any other guns in other American works.

(*i*) A careful scrutiny should be made of the 6- and 3-pdr. anti-aircraft guns with a view to seeing if they can be dispensed with. Some of these guns are very ineffective against aircraft, and a few 3-inch high-angle guns would be found much more effective at certain points. This, however, is the last resource.

2. Guns from the existing reserve and any

obtained from the above sources will be distributed as follows :—

Fifty 12-pdrs. should go to Captain Webb for the arming of merchant steamers plying in home waters.

Half the 4·7's in reserve, together with any that can be obtained by taking one from the existing Self-Defence merchant ships, should be made available for arming ships coming home from distant voyages. The best arrangements possible should be made at London and Liverpool in regard to the 12-pdrs. at Port Said and Gibraltar, and with regard to the 4·7's, to secure, by transferring the guns to ships entering the submarine area, the greatest possible usefulness of the weapons.

All the rest of the guns are to be handed over to the Fourth Sea Lord for arming yachts, trawlers, and drifters.

Detailed proposals on both heads are to be submitted.

3. The Straits of Dover must be regarded as the main area of anti-submarine operations, and every effort must be made to render its passage by submarines difficult and dangerous. To this end, the number of armed trawlers and drifters available in the Dover patrol should be raised as speedily as possible to 100. A weekly report on the strength available should be furnished to the Board.

The indicator net defence should be carried forward on both sides to the shore, as proposed by Sir Arthur Wilson.

4. Every effort must be made to complete the cross-channel anti-submarine net. This work is of very great importance and, even if it is not wholly successful, it will be found to be a great check. The material will always be available for use elsewhere, should the tactical situation admit.

5. I am awaiting proposals for a watch being kept by our submarines on the exits from Ostend and Zeebrugge, and the proposals for laying Sir Arthur Wilson's nets in the Channel should go forward as arranged.

6. I wish to receive a report on the working of our submarine decoy and trap vessels, including the trawlers. What have they done ? Where have they been working ?

W. S. C.

Sunday Labour.

Third Sea Lord.
Additional Civil Lord.
Financial Secretary.
Director of Works Department.

April 8, 1915.

Proposals should be submitted to me as soon as possible for the abolition of Sunday labour on Admiralty work in private shipbuilding yards throughout the country. The only exception should be urgent fleet repairs or work on vessels being specially accelerated ; and with regard to these Board authority should be obtained.

Although the contractors will be thus precluded from Sunday labour, we shall not agree to the extension of the contract time for delivery, experience having shown that more work will be done without Sunday labour than with it. I do not exclude the possibility of work beginning with the night shift on Sunday night, if that is thought to be more desirable.

This matter should be settled with the utmost speed.

W. S. C.

Wireless for Submarines.

April 23, 1915.

I await a special report on the fitting of oversea submarines and selected destroyers with special long-distance wireless. It is indispensable that a submarine should be able to communicate with our receiving stations when operating in the Heligoland Bight. It is also necessary that a certain number of destroyers should have the special faculty of long-distance communication in order that they may be used in connection with submarines.

The matter is urgent.

W. S. C.

Mine Fenders.

April 24, 1915.

This paper shows that there are now fifteen different types of bow mine-catching gear which are being experimented with in addition to the timber nose-caps and the net wings ; total, seventeen. Side by side with these numerous suggestions, and after very many months' work, there is an almost total absence of definite results. I consider that concentration upon the three or four best types is now necessary. A small committee of four (consisting of the Third Sea Lord, Admiral Charlton, the Director of Naval Construction, and the Naval Secretary) should sit to review the whole subject, and should make proposals for concentration on the most promising results in the shortest possible time.

W. S. C.

Sound Signalling.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Sir Arthur Wilson.
Assistant Director of Torpedoes.

April 24, 1915.

. . . The system of sound signalling, enabling one submarine to communicate with another, has been toyed with for a long time, and it is necessary now to produce practical results, even if of a crude and imperfect character, which can be made rapidly effective. A report should be furnished within three days, stating what is possible and making proposals for action.

W. S. C.

Aerial Photography.

Director of the Air Division.

April 24, 1915.

What are you doing about photography from aeroplanes ? I am informed that you have only got one officer actively engaged in this, and that no satisfactory photographs have yet been taken by the Naval Wing. This matter is of great importance and urgency. After the assistance which we have given to the Army in the matter of aeroplanes, we may expect from them every possible aid in repairing our deficiencies in this branch of aerial work.

Pray see General Henderson yourself without delay, and make sure that we are in a position, either by borrowing a couple of cameras or photographers from the Army or by any other method which is effective, to take the photographs required any day after the 1st May. Report to me that this will be done.

W. S. C.

APPENDIX VI

THE MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS COUNCIL, 1917–18

The Composition of the Munitions Council and the Distribution of Business.

THE MINISTER.

THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY.

THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY.

Groups of Departments under Members of Council.

F. *Finance.*—Sir Herbert Hambling.

Finance — Munitions Works Board—Controlled Establishments Finance—Munitions Contracts — Lands — Central Stores —Salvage.

D. *Design.*—Major-General the Hon. F. R. Bingham, C.B.

Design — Inspection — Trench Warfare Design—Munitions Inventions.

S. *Steel and Iron.*—John Hunter, Esq.

Iron and Steel Production—Factory Construction.

M. *Materials, etc.*—Sir Ernest Moir, Bart.

Non-Ferrous Metals — Scrap Metals—Development of Mineral Resources—Government Rolling Mills—Transport: Railways, Overseas, Trench Warfare—Forwarding and Receiving — Railway Materials — Cranes — Optical Munitions—Potash.

X. *Explosives.*—Sir Keith Price.

Explosives Supply — Trench Warfare Chemical Supplies — Mineral Oil Production — Royal Gunpowder Factory, Waltham Abbey.

P. *Projectiles, etc.*—Sir James Stevenson, Bart.

Area Organization — Gun Ammunition —Gun Ammunition Filling — Trench Warfare Ammunition, filling and supply other than Trench guns and howitzers—Small Arms Ammunition — Munitions Gauges—Central Clearing Bureau—Timber.

G. *Guns.*—Sir Glynn West.

Guns and Carriages (Supply and Repair)—Trench Guns and Howitzers—Machine Guns, Revolvers, Pistols, etc.—Rifles, Bayonets, etc.—Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield Lock—Royal Ordnance Factories, Woolwich.

E. *Engines.*—Sir Arthur Duckham, K.C.B.

Aeronautical Supplies — Petrol Engines Supply — Mechanical Transport — Mechanical Warfare — Agricultural Machinery—Electric Power Supply—Machine Tools—Stampings and Castings.

A. *Allies.*—Sir Frederick Black, K.C.B.

(Temporarily, Sir Charles Ellis, K.C.B.)

L. *Labour.*—Sir Stephenson Kent, K.C.B.

Labour Regulations — Labour Supply—Housing—Welfare.

Secretariat.

Council Secretariat — Parliamentary and General—Legal—Requirements and Statistics — Establishment — Special Intelligence —Priority.

Very shortly afterwards an additional group was constituted for Requirements and Statistics, Mr. W. T. Layton being appointed Member of Council "R." In October, 1917, the Master-General of the Ordnance, Major-Gen. Sir W. T. Furse, K.C.B., D.S.O., was invited to become an honorary Member of Council, representing the War Office.

In February, 1918, the Engines Group was sub-divided, and Sir William Weir became Member of Council "A," in charge of an Air Group. In July, 1918, the remainder of the Engines Group was replaced by the newly organized Warfare Group, including Trench Warfare and Inventions, under Major-Gen. the Rt. Hon. J. E. B. Seely, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.P., who was appointed Member of Council "W."

APPENDIX VII

MUNITIONS MINUTES AND LETTERS

To Sir Douglas Haig.

July 26, 1917.

I take this early opportunity of writing to you to tell you how earnestly I shall endeavour to study your wishes and sustain the efforts of the Army by every means which falls within the scope of the Ministry of Munitions. I hope you will rely upon me to do this, and will let me know at once if there is any way in which I can serve you.

There are many difficulties here, both with labour and materials, especially steel, and at this stage of the War it will often become necessary to choose between desirable things and to throw special emphasis on this or on that branch of production.

If you have any suggestions which will improve the *liaison* which should be maintained between certain branches of this Department and the Army you will, I hope, let me know them.

Later on, when I am better informed and you are less busy, it would be a good thing for us to have a talk in order that I may carry out the general directions with regard to supply which I receive from the War Office with a complete and sympathetic understanding of your needs and wishes.

I was tempted to tell you when we met what was in store for me, but I thought on the whole it was better to wait for the *fait accompli*.

Admiralty Steel Requirements.

To Lord Carson.

July 26, 1917.

I send you herewith an early copy of the Memorandum which has been prepared on the Steel question in this Department.

I am sorry that I shall not be able to be with you on Friday afternoon; but I feel I ought to go to Dundee to-night and give personal attention to the contest on Friday and Saturday.

I think you will feel that the position disclosed in the Steel papers is fairly conclusive against the possibility of giving full and immediate effect to the new Admiralty demand. On my return I will make a further effort to overcome the difficulties and see if better proposals can be put forward. But, broadly speaking, I hope you will decide to remit the general question of principle to the further consideration of the War Cabinet having regard to the facts which are now disclosed. It is worth noting by the way that the July import of Ore is now estimated at 550,000 tons, or nearly 200,000 tons drop on the corresponding month of last year.

Do you not think also that the Admiralty use of steel for other purposes than merchant shipbuilding requires to be reviewed: for instance, we started the War with a fairly good supply of ammunition for every class of gun having regard to the character of sea battles. During the three years that have followed, we have been enormously increasing our stocks, and apart from practice ammunition have been firing very little away. In my time the advance was very great, and standing orders were given as to production, which I know Balfour long kept in operation. The reserves now accumulated will be found to be out of all proportion to what would be necessary to sink the German Fleet even under the most unfavourable circumstances. The American Navy has come in, etc., yet you will see that the Admiralty demands for shell steel are increasing month by month.

Again, an important proportion of the steel involved in the enlarged Admiralty demand is no doubt for the construction of destroyers for anti-submarine warfare. Here it is important to ask what kind of destroyer is being built for this purpose. The 1912–13 destroyer, for which I was responsible, lifted six or seven knots on its predecessor, attaining the immense speed of thirty-six or thirty-seven knots without sacrifice either of gun-power or sea-keeping capacity. These boats, which are almost miniature cruisers, were designed to catch and hunt down the best destroyers of the German Navy in their own waters across the broad distances of the North Sea. It is obvious that quite a different class of destroyer, much smaller and more humdrum, is required for submarine hunting far out of reach of all German surface ships. Twenty-five knots, for instance, with all the economies in money and material that follow from a sacrifice of speed would be quite sufficient for such a purpose. Yet, if I am rightly informed, we continue to reproduce the highest type, although the War object for which it was created has been largely rejected.

It would be easy to add to these examples, but I only mention these two in the hope that this aspect of our Steel expenditure will not be lost sight of when it comes to adjudicating with inevitable severity between the competing claims of various services.

Munitions Communications with the United States.

To Mr. Balfour (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).

August 2, 1917.

During the last few days I have been thinking about the proper organization of our non-diplomatic communications with America, which as you know are being considered in several aspects at the present time.

There seem to me to be three distinct stages:—

(1) The Inter-Allied Council called for by Mr. McAdoo to settle a united demand on America on the basis of shipping and credit, and to divide up

the total agreed upon between the respective Allies. This is already well on the road.

(2) The organization within each British Department for the detailed formulation of their needs and for the day to day conduct of their business with America. At present a variety of persons communicate through various channels with their Agents and opposite numbers in America. This cannot be a good way of carrying on business, and must lead to gaps, contradictions and overlapping. I am arranging that all communications for America from this Office are collated and despatched by one man with a proper Staff.

(3) The inter-departmental organization on this side of the business communications with America from the various Departments. This is also *en train*, and I attach the proposals which have been prepared here by my directions in response to the request of the Prime Minister for the creation of what is called an "American Board." It is undoubtedly necessary that such co-ordinating machinery should exist, and it ought to be possible to create it and set it in motion without either interfering with the departmental responsibility and initiative, or introducing a new element of delay. You will see that we proposed in the beginning that the "American Board" should only have copies of the cables which are passing, but that as they get into their stride they should take over the whole business of their despatch.

If this threefold organization is established all our business communications with the United States will pass through one transmission point on this side, and will be received at the same point for distribution to the various Departments. But do you not think that there should also be one transmission point and addressee on the other side? Ought not the Northcliffe Mission to be organized as a regular department, and all communications, for whomsoever intended, be addressed to the Secretary of that department for distribution under the authority of the Head of the Mission to the various Agents and persons affected and for collateral information? I should be quite prepared to place all our business agents in America directly under Lord Northcliffe in exactly the same way as departmental officers are under a Minister here.

Although this system looks a little cumbrous I do not see how any of the stages can be omitted. A strict routine may here and there cause some inconveniences, but these are not comparable to those which arise when a considerable number of persons push ahead cheerily on their own affairs without knowledge of what others are doing or concert with them.

The Advisory Committee.
Mr. Hunter. *August* 9, 1917.

Monsieur Thomas, in his interview with me yesterday, informed me that there were no less than 700,000 tons of steel which had been paid for by the French lying stranded for want of shipment in America. Surely the lifting of this steel, whether to France or to this country, should be a first charge on our shipping resources. I presume the ships which carry ore from Northern Spain would not be capable of carrying steel across the Atlantic, but it seems the poorest economy of tonnage, labour and dollars not to transport this vital commodity to Europe. If you are in agreement with this you should state a strong case for the Shipping Controller and for the information of the Admiralty and the War Office.

It also seems very probable to me that the best plan we could make for the utilization of our resources in the new Programme of 1918 would include the carrying of all this steel to France and Great Britain as one of its fundamental features.

Reserves of Guns.

Secretary: (*Mr. Layton—for action.*)
Advisory Committee } (*For information.*)
Sir Glynn West } *August* 15, 1917.

Pray consider the following in regard to the reserve of guns:—

In a small army engaged in what is believed to be a short period of intense war, as was our original expeditionary force, a reserve of guns was rightly provided and kept idle on the communications in order to replace gun casualties and losses in batteries. But now that the war is maintained on the front of very large armies only fractions of which are heavily engaged at any given time, and when it is carried on continually year after year as a regular business, no reserve of idle guns is needed. The ultimate gun reserve of the army should be a repairing organization in the highest state of activity and on the greatest scale. The emergency reserve of guns consists in putting a greater strain upon the lives of the existing guns through keeping them in the line for short periods after they should normally be withdrawn. From this it would appear that the reserve of guns to be provided in the programme of 1918 should not be taken as an arbitrary figure like 25 per cent., but should be that figure which is required to flush and feed the repairing organization to its utmost capacity. Let me see calculations worked out on this latter basis. The experience of the present offensive should yield the data and the programme of guns in the field, and their ammunition provided at present for 1918 should give the scale.

The New Programme.

Secretary:
Advisory Committee on New Programme.
Mr. Layton.

We must now be asking ourselves the question, "In what direction are great expansions of our war-making machinery possible in 1918?" Artillery will remain a fairly constant factor, and the steel situation must exercise its limiting power. Ought we not then to look to a gigantic expansion of trench mortars and their organization to a pitch as high as that now attained by our Artillery? Would it not be possible for the trench mortars properly concerted to take the whole trench-pounding business off the hands of the Artillery and leave them free for attacking lines in rear, for counter-battery

work and all services of manœuvre ? Could we not greatly increase our supply of explosives ? Have we not already got large surplus and expansive power in this field ? Could we not use cast-iron carcases to pass these explosives over to the enemy ? I am imagining an expansion in "short range artillery" ten or even twenty times as great as anything yet witnessed, and the whole organized by telephones, etc., to the same high standard of action as our present artillery. You should look into this field from the point of view of materials available.

Side by side with this "short range artillery" we must explore the provision of very long range guns, and long range howitzers. I have asked Sir Glynn West to report upon the possibilities of utilizing old naval guns which may be placed at our disposal. There must be at least eighty 12-inch, and perhaps twenty 9·2-inch guns available from ships which have been or will be laid up almost immediately. To make these guns effective for land service, railway mountings or other carriages will be necessary. Which are the best patterns ? How long would they take ? What would be saved in time by adapting naval guns to land service as against building guns specially ? Secondly, assuming there were a saving of time in utilizing existing naval guns, could the ammunition for these guns be got ready so as to make the saving of time effective ? Thirdly, what can be done to prolong the life of these guns, (*a*) by reducing the charges and working out new range tables accordingly ; (*b*) by providing new "A" tubes ? Is it not possible to devise and organize rapid relining plants ? Would it not be possible to put a tube like a "Morris" tube in a 12-inch gun and make it fire a 9-inch or 10-inch shell and to arrange for the rapid replacement of such tubes ? This after all is only applying the sub-calibre principle to actual service. We ought not to be prepared to take "No" for an answer on this question of extending the firing capacity of long range guns. The reason that their lives are short is that the inner tube wears out. That is the difficulty which has to be got over, and is not the obvious solution to have light rapidly replaceable inner tubes ? It is for invention to solve this difficulty.

The above is without prejudice to the development of long range 6-inch gun fire.

The development of aeroplanes is now clearly before us as a great expansive feature of the campaign of 1918, and preparations to that end are far advanced. Are we sure they are thoroughly concerted between all departments concerned ? Is the bombing programme keeping pace with aeroplane construction and projectile construction ? Can our explosive supply stand at once the double increased demand (*a*) of an enormous trench mortar expansion and (*b*) of an enormous aerial bombing programme ? In my opinion the manufacture of explosives should be pushed to the extreme limit, this being the governing factor. When this governing factor is ascertained it will then become incumbent upon us to find means of delivering the explosives to the enemy, and if the existing methods of distribution do not suffice to get rid of the explosives, new methods of conveying them must be developed. Do not let us be worried about having too much explosives on our hands. There is plenty of storage room behind the German lines.

I will deal with the Tank programme—i.e. mechanical infantry, on separate papers shortly.

The above is only to assist you in your survey of the resources and possibilities, and, of course, I am very imperfectly informed as to what these may be.

The Strike of the Cumberland Miners.

Mr. Layton. *August* 23, 1917.

I want the following facts for my meeting with the Cumberland miners to-morrow :—

50,000 tons of iron ore have been lost in consequence of the fortnight's strike and holidays. This 50,000 tons of ore would have made 50,000 tons of steel. How many ships of the Board of Trade standard pattern could have been made from 50,000 tons of steel ? How many tons of wheat could those ships have brought to this country in the year 1918 ?

Again, during the last few months the German submarines have been devoting every effort to sinking iron ore cargo upon the seas, and in the last two, three, or four months they have succeeded in sinking—how many tons ? I believe I am right in supposing that the fortnight's cessation of work on the Cumberland field has inflicted more injury on our shipping and food supply next year than all the efforts of the German submarines have been able to inflict in one, two, or three months as the case may be.

Pray have these figures checked for me by to-night.

Man Power and Materials.

To the War Cabinet.

August 26, 1917.

The Ministry of Munitions is affected at every step by the treatment of the man-power problem.

The distribution of man power between the different services can only be settled by the War Cabinet. The War Cabinet cannot decide unless they know the effect of any particular distribution on munitions, agriculture, shipbuilding, etc. It would be easy for me, in conjunction with Sir A. C. Geddes, to afford the Cabinet all the necessary data ; and after they had decided it would be easy for me to agree with Sir A. C. Geddes upon the best way, or the least injurious way, to carry out the decision.

But to do this it is indispensable that I should only have to deal with one authority. If the man-power question is split up among a variety of Departments out of touch or at variance with each other, and each cutting in on the labour market and on labour sentiment at numerous points, a continuance of the present friction, confusion, and inefficiency is certain. The greatest cause of irritation in the labour world at the present time is, in my opinion, the recruiting muddle. The questions which are arising every day among munition workers can easily be settled between two closely allied Departments. They are insoluble under present conditions.

I trust that in this war emergency a simple, clear-cut policy will be followed, viz. that all material should be supplied by one Department and all men by another, and that these two Departments shall work in the closest concert. Every divergence from this, however tempting or persuasively argued, can only weaken our war-making capacity.

The Aeroplane Programme.

To the War Cabinet.

September 25, 1917.

1. There is no reason to suppose that the immense programme of Aeroplane Construction which has been sanctioned cannot be achieved. The estimates of progress have so far been substantially confirmed by results.

2. The Aeroplane Programme will of course be frustrated if its requirements in skilled labour and materials are not met, as they certainly can be met. Still more is this true, if the claims of the Admiralty or of the War Office involve large withdrawals of skilled labour from munition supplies. If, for instance, Admiralty requirements are to be accorded super-priority or "Admiralty Priority" without regard either to the effect upon munitions programmes or to the possibilities of internal economics in the Admiralty use of their present appropriation, the obvious consequences will follow. The matter is one entirely for the Cabinet, and any decision they may take can be easily given effect to. It must, however, be remembered that a decision to give priority to one class of supply is *ipso facto* cancelled by a subsequent decision to give priority to another class of supply. It will be no use complaining afterwards when the inevitable consequences of such decisions mature.

The Zeppelin Programme for the Navy is a case in point.

It is suggested that all Departments engaged in the prosecution of the war should receive an equally searching investigation in order to ascertain the use they are making for effective war purposes of the labour and material at their disposal. It is impossible for any one Department to judge the relative importance of its own claims. That can only be done by the War Cabinet as a consequence of their General War Plan for 1918, which is not known to individual Departments.

Memorandum on Protection from Air Raids.

October 5, 1917.

1. I have given directions that dug-outs and shelters are to be immediately provided under approved schemes in the whole of the munition factories in the bombing areas. Many private firms have already taken these measures with great advantage. The labour will be found from the people employed in the factories. The work should not take long. The loss on output must be accepted; it will certainly be much less than the loss caused by the people scattering to their homes whenever an air-raid alarm is given. There will also be a great gain in the feeling of confidence imparted to the workers. I hope these arrangements will be complete within ten days.

2. I consider that generally speaking people are entitled to a safe shelter within reasonable distance of their homes or their work. I consider that in or near each street a house or houses should be prepared affording reasonable security to the residents, and that in the vicinity of all large works, whether munitions or other, an adequate provision should be made for everyone. This, of course, would vary in each case with the facilities and materials available. I am impressed by the rapidity by which shelters have been provided in some of the munitions areas already, and I do not believe the task will be found a very formidable one. I expect the Germans are already hard at work providing proper shelters in the cities likely to be attacked. It is especially important to the confidence of the population that in working-class areas consisting almost entirely of frail two-storey dwellings there should be sufficient shelters prepared. Where there are larger houses an issue of sand-bags and of leaflets containing clear printed directions as to the parts of the house which are safe, the dangers to be avoided, etc., should meet the case. I do not see why the work should not be done by volunteers working under the local authorities, assisted by the military forces in the country. There are scores of ways of giving efficient protection. There are thousands of officers and others in this country thoroughly acquainted with the methods. As long as people have a safe place to go to when firing begins and are compensated for the damage done to their houses, they will stand a great deal of hammering and get back to their work promptly when it stops. All the defences can be improved gradually.

Chemical Warfare Supplies.

Secretary. *October* 16, 1917.

What are the factors which impose limits on the chemical supply? How much labour —and of what classes—is now engaged in the existing chemical supply? How quickly and to what extent could it be increased. I am anxious to consider the possibility of a supply on the largest possible scale of cast-iron chemical shells to all or almost all natures of guns to be fired with reduced charges so as not to affect the lives of the guns and so to be a definite addition to the offensive power of our artillery. At present we are limited by steel and the lives of guns. If we can devise a type of ammunition which affects the lives of guns to a far less degree than ordinary shell and does not require steel, we shall have entered a new field of expansion, which expansion should only be limited by the labour involved and by the special materials required in chemical manufacture. Both in the case of high explosives and lethal chemicals we must push our production to the maximum and devise methods of conveying it to the enemy. I have derived the impression that we are so far only trifling with chemical warfare, and that we have got to prepare ourselves for action on an entirely different scale. I look to General Thuillier in the first instance to make proposals for very great increases, and it will then be possible to see how far these plans can be reconciled with other needs. Chemical warfare must be one of the three or four leading features of our campaign of 1918.

" Higher Ceilings."

Sir William Weir. *October* 24, 1917.

A dangerous feature in the last Zeppelin raid has been masked by the disaster which overcame the raiders on their way back. It is clear that the Germans counted on the height at which the Zeppelins of the newest pattern can now fly as a means of resisting all forms of existing aeroplane attack. Apparently this calculation is at present well founded. If that is so, we ought to find without delay a means of sending aeroplanes up to even greater heights at night. I presume this point is being studied. Evidently they thought they could fly here with safety and certainty at altitudes where they could not be touched. It appears to be very important that experimental work to secure greater height records in aeroplanes should be pressed on.

APPENDIX VIII

WAR MEMORANDA

MECHANICAL POWER IN THE OFFENSIVE

Mr. MONTAGU having requested me to express my views on the question of the greater application of mechanical power to the prosecution of an offensive on land, I have prepared the following rough notes :—

1. The conditions of this war deny to the stronger power, whether on sea or land, its legitimate offensive scope. In all previous wars the stronger army was able to force matters to a final decision. The great developments of defensive power now prevent this.

2. We shall never have a superiority in numbers sufficient to triumph by itself. At present the fighting forces are much too evenly balanced. We have, perhaps, a superiority of five to four in fighting formations on all fronts, but the enemy's advantage of being on interior lines more than covers this. Even if we have a superiority of six to four, that will be insufficient, and we are not likely to see a greater superiority than this for a very long time.

3. Frontal attacks were abandoned forty years ago on account of the severity of fire. Now that the severity of fire has enormously increased and is constantly increasing, they are forced upon us in the absence of flanks.

4. Two methods of frontal attack have been tried. First, the unlimited, like at Loos and Champagne, where the troops were given a distant objective behind the enemy's lines and told to march on that ; and, second, the limited form as tried by the Germans at Verdun, and by ourselves and the French on the Somme. Neither produces decisive results. The unlimited simply leads to the troops being brought up against uncut wire and undamaged machine guns. The limited always enables the enemy to move his artillery away, and to sell a very little ground at a heavy price in life, gaining time all the while to construct new defences in the rear. It is true the limited attack has achieved a great deal in wearing down the enemy, but it is a disputed question whether the attacker does not wear himself down more, and certainly it was so in the case of the German attack on Verdun. Nothing in the great operations on the Somme affords any promise of finality or of a definite decision.

5. We must, therefore, either find another theatre or another method.

6. Leaving out the strategic question of other theatres and looking solely to method, it is clear that to achieve decisive results we must be able to make an advance in one bound of 7,000 or 8,000 yards, thus capturing the whole line of the enemy's guns. If this were done from two converging points on the well-known pincer principle, the enemy in front of our attack and in between both attacks would equally be destroyed, and an irreparable gap opened.

7. Therefore the problem is to advance a large army in one bound 7,000 or 8,000 yards. Is that problem insoluble ? Let us see first of all exactly what it is that stops us.

8. An attack depends on two processes.

(*a*) Blasting power and
(*b*) Moving power ;

blasting power is very well provided for in the constantly improving supplies of guns and shells, but moving power is in its infancy.

9. Two things stop the offensive movement of armies—

(*a*) Bullets and fragments of shell which destroy the motive power of men, and
(*b*) The confusion of the conflict.

10. Bullets would be much less well directed at night, but on the other hand confusion would be much greater.

11. If there were any means therefore by which confusion at night could be overcome, it would be a gigantic advantage. Under present conditions movement at night is almost impossible. The labyrinths of trenches, wire, craters, and natural accidents of ground impose insuperable obstacles to the movement of large forces. Everybody loses his way, and everything miscarries.

Yet it is at night that the offensive would have, if it could only act, all the advantages. It knows what it wants to do. The defensive has to wait on it, and cannot move, even when

it knows, until daylight comes. Therefore if there were an army able to develop the faculty of being able to carry out a sustained, concerted, continuous attack on the greatest scale, with the utmost precision and lack of confusion, throughout the dark hours, that army would have an inestimable advantage. It would move directly and surely to its goal; and morning would reveal an arrangement of forces arising wholly out of the preconceived decisions of the attackers.

12. If to this advantage you can add a comparative immunity from bullets and fragments, you are a long way on the road to decisive victory.

13. Here note that the object of fire is to scatter as many small missiles as possible. If steel protection against these small missiles can be afforded, the enemy is thrown back on the direct hit of a shell. By day it has been proved this is extremely rare on a moving target. By night it is practically impossible. A moderate multiplication of targets will baffle the direct hit. Darkness will prevent it except as a pure fluke.

14. If it should be found that the self-same methods which enable you to overcome the difficulties of confusion at night also impart this comparative immunity from missiles, we should be in presence of a military fact of the first order.

15. Such a method exists. It may be shortly described as "the attack by armoured vehicles." I cannot pretend to do more than outline it and suggest it. I am not an inventor or designer. I have no means of testing and elaborating these ideas. Evidently they require study, experiment, and at least six months' preparation.

But now is the time in the winter to organize and perfect this method of attack. The "Tanks" have shown the way. But they are only a beginning.

A hiatus exists between inventors who know what they could invent, if they only knew what was wanted, and the soldiers who know, or ought to know, what they want, and would ask for it if they only knew how much science could do for them. You have never really bridged that gap yet.

Parenthetically, let me point out the need of establishing without delay an Anti-Tank Committee to study the methods by which tanks can be defeated. This body should work in the closest harmony with those concerned in the production and design of tanks, each striving to defeat the other, exchanging information and perfecting their methods. It is not to be supposed that the Germans will not develop tanks in their turn. We have the enormous advantage of being able to experiment on ourselves with them, and to find out the best ways by which they may be defeated. We ought to have a complete anti-tank outfit by the spring. This is only what the Admiralty did before the war in keeping continually at work submarine and anti-submarine committees.

16. Subject to what I have said of the tentative and suggestive character of these observations, I will try to indicate the kind of attack I have in mind.

Broken ground, which forbids movement of bodies of troops by night, is passable to armoured vehicles.

If you look at the films lately exhibited you see that men moving over the broken or pock-marked ground, now rising on the crest of a crater, now descending into its trough, seem as much out of their element as a man overboard in a rough sea, while a tank forges along like a ship. You must master the physical difficulties of this broken terrain. You don't expect to accomplish your blasting process with human hands. You use several thousand guns and several million shells. Why should you suppose the moving process can be achieved simply through the agency of human legs? You must use the proper machinery in both cases.

Observe, the obstacles remain a constant, but the size and power of the machine to overcome them is capable of considerable expansion.

17. The passage of suitable machines will roll paths or grooves, smooth and flat, across the terrain. Everyone will be able to follow them. In fact, by night they cannot do anything else. Instead of labyrinths of trenches and unknown terrain, you will have a pattern of smooth rectilineal tracks, cut more or less deeply into the surface and traversing trenches, etc. These tracks will supersede or superimpose themselves upon all other communications and accidents of ground during the night. The deeper they can be cut or squashed down the better. Along these smooth, unmistakable tracks movement will be possible for the attackers.

Observe, incidentally, that the enemy's guns will be laid on the old communication trenches and regular night lines. They will not fire on these new tracks except by chance. Anyhow, it is proved artillery barrages alone will not stop good troops.

18. It will be possible to direct the movement of these track-making machines with accuracy and certitude. A good helmsman steering on a compass bearing will make the exact point required surely and punctually, and the assaulting infantry and all their appurtenances can follow, and *can only follow*, where he has led.

(I omit details like shaded lights of various colours pointing backward along each path; every brigade its own particular series of coloured lights.)

19. Not only is the advance in a straight line possible; any portion of the attack can be turned to any fresh direction simply by the helmsman altering course according to chart and plan.

Therefore you can make your great plans with the utmost detail beforehand, and can be sure of having ten hours of darkness in which you will be able to unfold them stage by stage; while the enemy cannot make any important movement until morning, and can only fire his artillery on fixed points which you are mainly avoiding, and before dawn you will have been able with certainty to place your troops and their necessary supplies wherever you have designed.

This then is the foundation:—

The advance of a large number of track-making machines and the stamping through this agency of a pattern upon the ground which will guide and govern the development of the attack.

20. But there are a great number of details

and accessories with which I am ill-equipped to deal. Please, therefore, take my numbers only as tokens.

Let us assume two converging pincer attacks, each on a 15,000 yard front with (say) an equal distance in between.

Assume ten divisions for each attack with five more in reserve.

Total assaulting divisions = 30.

Brigades attack on 500 yard frontages. Each brigade requires a track of its own.

10 by 3 = 30 tracks in each attack.

Two machines to each track (in case of accidents).

Total 60.

Two attacks = 120.

Add 30 for margin = 150 trackmakers.

(*Note.*—A trackmaker may also be a fighting-machine of a very powerful character.)

Minimum rate of advance—1 to 2 miles per hour.

21. Cover and clear the advance of the trackmakers by 300 fighting-tanks in each attack.

Total 600.

Two trackmakers and five tanks line ahead on each track, five tanks manœuvring in the intervals.

On every alternative track one armoured trench-cutter for lateral communication and consolidation purposes.

On every other track one tramway-laying or duckboard-laying mechanical unit. These last follow the assaulting infantry.

22. Formation of assaulting infantry.

First and second waves of assaulting infantry advance sheltered by the Tanks and trackmakers, and guided accurately by them, probably in platoon columns of fours, with shield-carriers at the head and on the flanks.

Note.—Infantry should carry nothing but rifles, grenades, cartridges, food, water, and steel protection. They approach shielded but fight naked. The shield, which must be small and partial, leads you at once to the phalanx. A number of men, each partially protected by metal, will reciprocally protect each other.

All this must be ascertained by experiment, and may break down under experiment.

Every infantry battalion will have *two caterpillar tenders*: Total, 240 in each attack; 480 in the whole.

These are lightly protected motor-lorries mounted on caterpillars. They follow along the tracks and carry everything the infantry requires—grenades, ammunition, smoke apparatus, food, etc.

23. Caterpillar batteries—

Twenty-five 4 gun 18-pr. batteries in each attack; 200 vehicles total.
Fifty heavy gun caterpillar trailers.

24. Total armoured vehicles—

Trackmakers	150
Fighting tanks	600
Trench cutters	50
Caterpillar tenders	480
Caterpillar artillery (light and heavy)	250
Total	1,530

25. The foregoing must be taken as a mere sketch. The central conception is that a successful attack of this kind must be viewed as a whole, and all the different kinds of tools and tackle required made in concert like an outfit or a plant: everything should be foreseen and fitted into a general plan, like the large volume which contains a battleship design. It is not a case of merely building a lot of things on the chance that they will be useful, but of assembling the exact tools that you require for a particular, well-understood mechanical job.

26. Don't familiarize the enemy by degrees with these methods of attack. Apply them when all is ready on the largest possible scale, and with the priceless advantage of surprise.

November 9, 1916. W. S. C.

Paragraphs of my Memorandum of October 21, 1917, omitted from Text.

II.[1]

8. During the Somme offensive the British artillery fired an average of 26,000 tons of shell a week. During the twenty-two weeks of the present offensive the average has been 47,000. If the programmes on which we are now working are executed, the average weight of shell per week available during the whole of the 1918 offensive should rise to approximately 66,000 tons. Both the guns and ammunition on that scale are being provided. This figure, however, constitutes our maximum. The magnitude of the effort should not be underrated. Steel is the limiting factor and, having regard to increased shipbuilding demands and declining tonnage of imported ore, no further expansion can be expected. . . .

9. On the other hand, we have not yet reached the limits of our High Explosive supply. Many of our factories have been working short time, and others are almost closed down. Our capacity for manufacturing High Explosives considerably exceeds our present means of discharging it upon the enemy through the agency of steel guns and shells. If, therefore, we are to realize our full potentiality, we should develop other additional methods of discharging High Explosive upon the enemy.

10. Two methods readily suggest themselves. The first is by aeroplane bomb. This will be dealt with in its place. But the second, and far the most important method, can be found in an extensive development of trench mortars. This would be possible, within limits which are being accurately ascertained, without making inroads upon our limited supplies of steel, or competing seriously with other important supplies. Thus a new and additional method of making war on the enemy would be created.

11. In order that this proposition may be fairly judged, it is necessary to consider it in its true tactical relation. Trench mortars have not hitherto played an important part in our operations. Except in the opening stages of a great offensive, it has been found impossible to use them. Once the ground has been torn up by the bombardment and the troops have advanced on to the battlefield, it is not physically possible to carry up into close proximity to the firing-line the masses of ammunition they require, especially when the enemy is firing ceaselessly upon the com-

[1] For paragraphs 1–7 of this Memorandum, see p. 1020.

munications with his concentrated artillery. On the main battle-front therefore, or on ground where the rival artilleries are concentrated, trench mortars are relegated to a subsidiary part.

12. But none of these difficulties hamper the employment of trench mortars on a scale many times greater than has yet been practised, provided they are used not on the main battlefield, but on other and quieter parts of the front. One or more sectors of the front, each fifteen or twenty miles long, can be chosen in advance and loaded up with large stores of trench-mortar ammunition which can be carried up during quiet periods for those sectors and safely stored without imposing undue labour on the troops holding the line, and without—and this is the important point—revealing any trace to the aeroplane photograph. The mortars themselves are very easy to make and to establish, and owing to their extreme rapidity of fire the numbers required are not excessive. The manufacture of the mortars and of the ammunition sufficient for a series of very considerable operations could be prepared without encroaching upon our steel or sensibly affecting artillery or other programmes. In this way the Ministry of Munitions would be able to utilize the full limit of their explosive capacity, and the trench-mortar armament would come as a clear addition to the offensive power of the army.

13. The range of the mortar is already more than 1,000 and will, it is believed, soon be raised to about 1,500 yards. Even greater ranges are confidently hoped for. Thus if 40 to 50 miles of our front were systematically prepared with this trench-mortar installation, it would be possible during the culminating period, and at the true psychological moment in relation to the main battle, to pulverize and rip away the whole of the enemy's first system of trenches simultaneously or successively over very considerable stretches of the front. On these quiet sectors of the Front the enemy has few troops and no concentration of artillery. It is possible even that because he is weak he maintains in the first system a larger proportion of such troops as he has on the ground than is now his habit on the actual battle-front. Such troops as he has there are resting and recovering from the ordeal of the main battle. The well-recognized symptoms which indicate the preparation of an offensive, viz. the massing of guns, the development of railways, the digging of assembly trenches, etc., would all be lacking. The priceless element of surprise might, therefore, be secured. No great superiority of infantry would be required to yield the moderate and limited results which are to be expected from this subsidiary method of attack. On the other hand, the bombardment on a great scale by trench mortars firing heavy bombs is certainly not less formidable so far as the range allows than even the most severe artillery attacks. If it is thought worth while to cultivate this addition to our offensive power, estimates will be furnished by the Ministry of Munitions showing the full scale on which trench mortars and ammunition could be provided. It would, however, be indispensable to the efficient execution of any of these schemes that the trench-mortar service should be organized as a special branch, and that it should receive its due proportion of the best officers and men.

14. We have in fact to contemplate the simultaneous or successive concerted fighting of two different kinds of battles involving in their aggregate all the practicable portions of the front. There is the main battle or battle of Exhaustion, and the subsidiary battle or battle of Surprise. They mutually aid each other, and it might well be that the results of the battle of Exhaustion would be reaped on the battlefield of Surprise. The battle of exhaustion is appropriate to ground which the enemy cannot afford to give up, of which he has to contest every yard. The battles of surprise are appropriate to the less strategically significant portions of the front. The battle of exhaustion should proceed as at present by regular steps from the earliest period of the campaigning season until the culminating period is reached. The battles of surprise should then be successively released until the whole front, now at one point, now at another, is involved. The methods of the battles of surprise should be wholly different from those of the battle of exhaustion. The material required should as far as possible not compete with the needs of the main battle. Above all the preparation should not reveal the conventional symptoms of an offensive to a hostile aeroplane photograph. It is believed that both these conditions can be satisfied.

III.

15. There are other means besides trench mortars for delivering the battle or battles of surprise. The original conception of the Tanks was to use them (*a*) by night; (*b*) by surprise; (*c*) as a novelty; (*d*) as an independent arm; (*e*) in an operation specially planned for them under the most favourable weather conditions; and (*f*) on ground not torn up by artillery. The comparatively small numbers that have been so far available, the imperfections of their design, the urgent needs of the army, have led to an almost complete reversal of all these conditions. Tanks have been condemned to wallow in twos and threes in broad daylight in the most astounding crater fields, confronted by the enemy's massed artillery, and where every special preparation has been made to receive them. Even so they have played their part. But the resources of next year will for the first time make available numbers of Tanks with trained personnel, sufficient not only to act as auxiliaries to the infantry in the main battle, but to provide the forces necessary for attacks of their own under the most favourable conditions and on a very large scale. While the existing pattern of Tanks will be available in considerable numbers to support the main operations of the army during the spring and early summer, it should be possible by July to provide an ample force of a greatly improved pattern, lighter, faster, and with far greater radius of action. It will not be necessary, as with the present types, to bring these Tanks up in close proximity to the battlefield some days before the attack. They can be held back along an arc 15 to 20 miles from the centre of attack, and concentrated for battle

by complete surprise. There is no need to elaborate these possibilities. At present, however, only 18,000 men are assigned for the Tank Corps. This imposes severe limitations on this method of multiplying infantry men.

16. The third factor which could be made to play its part in the battles of surprise is Railway Artillery. The French have made a very great development of this, using for the purpose all kinds of long-range guns, old and modern, taken from their Navy and their fortresses, and mounted on many kinds of carriages, from the most complex to the most primitive. The total number of guns of all kinds employed by the French in this special service amounts to not fewer than 1,100, and next year it is contemplated to raise the number to 1,800. Approximately two-thirds of these guns fire from railway mountings, and the rest are moved by tractors. The method in contemplation is to construct in four or five or even more selected sectors of the front the necessary sidings from which the railway guns can be brought into action. Thus, even if the enemy notices these preparations beforehand, he has no means of knowing at any given moment which of the four or five points of attack is going to be used. He could be further mystified by a camouflage preparation of additional points of attack. It should thus be possible to secure for the heavy artillery, or at least an important portion of it, that mobility from one part of the front to another which is essential to surprise. The French general who commands this service[1] ("Artillerie lourde a grande puissance") states that with good arrangements, well thought out and prepared during the winter, it should be possible to bring into action in a single night 300 or 400 powerful long-range guns in a sector where previously the enemy had no reason to expect an attack.

17. The relation of this method to the other factors available for surprise battles is obvious. If preparations were begun now and continued throughout the winter, the British Front might be equipped not only with trench-mortar installations covering wide sectors, but also with the railway facilities and railway artillery necessary to enable a heavy artillery to intervene in battles of surprise at several alternative or successive points of attack. The possibilities so far as materials are concerned are being thoroughly examined in the Ministry of Munitions. Simplified forms of mountings of various kinds, including a new "semi-mobile" pattern, are being designed. If, as we have been led to believe, the manning requirements of the Navy for their new programme for anti-submarine craft of all kinds should necessitate during next year the laying up of large numbers of older battleships, it is possible that a considerable supply of guns might be obtained from this source. Many of our fortresses at home and abroad also contain guns which are not likely to be required and could now be safely spared for a more urgent service. It ought to be possible without an undue strain on either our labour or material to develop by next summer a very considerable force of mobile and semi-mobile (i.e. requiring a concrete bed) heavy artillery together with a series of "jumping-off grounds" from which it could act as required.

18. Thus our front might during the winter be systematically prepared both with the properly protected stores of trench-mortar ammunition and the railway facilities for the long-range artillery which would enable the Commander-in-Chief to move powerful trench-mortar and heavy artillery organizations from sector to sector with great rapidity and ease and open up a series of surprise battles all along the front at the psychological moment of, or in the necessary interludes between, the great attacks on the main battle-front. There are, of course, many other factors in connection with the swift movement of troops laterally or from points in rear to particular sectors of attack; but these fall outside the scope of a paper written solely from the point of view of munitions. It may, however, be mentioned that a very large reserve of mechanical transport manufactured for Russia, but not now required for that purpose, is available and idle.

If, however, our Army next year found itself endowed with the power at four or five different points (*a*) to pulverize the enemy's front system up to a depth of 1,500 yards with trench mortars, and (*b*) simultaneously to bring a greatly superior heavy long-range artillery into action both by complete surprise and at periods accurately related to the main operation, it would possess the means of sensibly extending the scope and enhancing the intensity of its offensive action.

IV.

19. Most important of all the mechanical factors which are available, comes the Air Offensive. So much progress in thought has been made on this subject, even since this paper was under preparation, that it is not necessary to dwell upon it at any length. But there are certain general principles which may be stated or re-stated.

War proceeds by slaughter and manœuvre. Manœuvre consists either in operations of surprise or in operations against the flanks and communications of the enemy. Owing to the lines now stretching continuously from the Alps to the sea, there are no flanks. But the Germans, striking under the sea at our vital communications, have threatened us with a decisive peril, which we are warding off only by an immense diversion of our resources. If we take on the one hand the amount of national life-energy which the Germans have put into their submarine attack, and compare it with the amount of national life-energy we are compelled to devote to meeting and overcoming that attack, it will be apparent what a fearfully profitable operation this attack on our communications has been to the enemy.[1] Would it be an exaggeration to say that for one war-power unit Germany has applied to the submarine attack we have been forced to assign fifteen or twenty?

Even better than an operation against communications is an operation against bases. Air predominance affords the possibility of

[1] General Buat.

[1] This referred of course to the material sphere, and took no account of other reactions.

striking at both. It can either paralyse the enemy's military action, or compel him to devote to the defence of his bases and communications a share of his straitened resources far greater than what we need in the attack.

20. All attacks on communications or bases should have their relation to the main battle. It is not reasonable to speak of an air offensive as if it were going to finish the war by itself. It is improbable that any terrorization of the civil population which could be achieved by air attack would compel the Government of a great nation to surrender. Familiarity with bombardment, a good system of dug-outs or shelters, a strong control by police and military authorities, should be sufficient to preserve the national fighting power unimpaired. In our own case we have seen the combative spirit of the people roused, and not quelled, by the German air raids. Nothing that we have learned of the capacity of the German population to endure suffering justifies us in assuming that they could be cowed into submission by such methods, or indeed that they would not be rendered more desperately resolved by them. Therefore our air offensive should consistently be directed at striking at the bases and communications upon whose structure the fighting power of the enemy's armies and his fleets of the sea and of the air depends. Any injury which comes to the civil population from this process of attack must be regarded as incidental and inevitable.

21. The supreme and direct object of an air offensive is to deprive the German armies on the Western Front of their capacity for resistance. It must therefore be applied and reach its maximum development in proper relation to the main battles both of Exhaustion and Surprise during the culminating period of our general offensive. German armies whose communications were continually impeded and interrupted and whose bases were unceasingly harried might still, in spite of all that could be done from the air, be able to maintain themselves in the field and keep the front. But if at the same time that this great difficulty and menace to their services in rear had reached its maximum, they were also subjected to the intense strain of a great offensive on the ground proceeding by battles both of Exhaustion and Surprise, the complete defeat and breaking up of their armies in the west as a whole might not perhaps be beyond the bounds of possibility. There is an immense difference between merely keeping an army fed and supplied on a comparatively quiescent front in spite of air attacks, and resisting the kind of offensive which the British are delivering at the present time. It is imperative that the defending army should be able to move hundreds of thousands of tons of stores and ammunition within very limited times to the battle-front, and to maintain a most rapid circulation of hundreds of thousands of troops; and the double strain of doing this under a really overwhelming air attack might well prove fatal. More especially might this be hoped for if the form of our offensive were not confined simply to the main battle-front, but if it were so varied in locality and direction as to require from the enemy *an exceptional degree of lateral mobility*. For our air offensive to attain its full effect, it is necessary that our ground offensive should be of a character to throw the greatest possible strain upon the enemy's communications.

22. We have greatly suffered and are still suffering in the progress of our means of air warfare from the absence of a proper General Staff studying the possibilities of air warfare, not merely as an ancillary service to the special operations of the Army or the Navy, but also as an independent arm co-operating in the general plan. Material developments must necessarily be misguided so long as they do not relate to a definite War Plan for the Air, whch again is combined with the general War Plan.

23. In consequence of this, many very important points are still in doubt or in dispute on which systematized Staff study could have by now given clear pronouncements. The dominating and immediate interests of the army and the navy have overlaid air warfare, and prevented many promising lines of investigation from being pursued with the necessary science and authority. Extreme diversities of opinion prevail as to the degree of effectiveness which can be expected from aerial attack. It is disputed whether air attack can ever really shatter communications, bases, or aerodromes. It is contended that aerodromes are difficult to discover and still more difficult to hit; that tons of bombs have been discharged on particular aerodromes without denying their use to the enemy; that railway junctions and communications have been repeatedly bombed without preventing appreciably the immense and continuous movement of men and material necessary to the fighting armies; that no bombardment from the air, especially at great distances from our own lines, can compare in intensity with the kind of bombardment from artillery, in spite of which, nevertheless, operations of a military and even semi-military character are continuously carried on.

On the other hand, it is claimed that aerial warfare has never yet been practised except in miniature; that bombing in particular has never been studied as a science; that the hitting of objectives from great heights by day or night is worthy of as intense a volume of scientific study as, for instance, is brought to bear upon perfecting the gunnery of the Fleet; that much of the unfavourable data accumulated showing the comparative ineffectiveness of bombing consists of results of unscientific action—for instance, dropping bombs singly without proper sighting apparatus or specially trained "bomb droppers" (the equivalent of "gun layers"), instead of dropping them in regulated salvos by specially trained men, so as to "straddle" the targets properly. It is believed by the sanguine school that a very high degree of accuracy, similar to that which has been attained at sea under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, could be achieved if something like the same scientific knowledge and intense determination were brought to bear.

Secondly, it is pointed out that an air offensive has never been considered on the same scale or with the same ruthlessness in regard to losses for adequate objects as prevail in the operations of armies. Aeroplanes have never been used to attack vital objectives in the same spirit as infantry have been used, viz. regardless of loss, the attack being repeated again

and again until the objective is secured. It is pointed out that in 1918 numbers will for the first time become available for operations, not merely on the larger scale, but of a totally different character.

24. On the assumption that these more sanguine views are justly founded, the primary objective of our air forces becomes plainly apparent, viz. the air bases of the enemy and the consequent destruction of his air fighting forces. All other objectives, however tempting, however necessary it may be to make provision for attacking some of them, must be regarded as subordinate to this primary purpose. If, for instance, our numerical superiority in the air were sufficient at a certain period next year to enable us in the space of two or three weeks to locate and destroy by bomb and fire, either from a great height or if necessary from quite low down, all or nearly all the enemy's hangars, and make unusable all or nearly all his landing grounds and starting grounds within 50 or 60 miles of his front line, his air forces might be definitely beaten, and once beaten could be kept beaten.

Once this result was achieved and real mastery of the air obtained, all sorts of enterprises which are now not possible would become easy. All kinds of aeroplanes which it is not now possible to use on the fighting fronts could come into play. Considerable parties of soldiers could be conveyed by air to the neighbourhood of bridges or other important points, and, having overwhelmed the local guard, could *from the ground* effect a regular and permanent demolition. The destruction of particular important factories could also be achieved by carefully organized expeditions of this kind. " Flying columns " (literally) of this character could be organized to operate far and wide in the enemy's territory, thus forcing him to disperse in an indefinite defensive good troops urgently needed at the front. All his camps, depôts, etc., could be made the object of constant organized machine-gun attack from low-flying squadrons. But the indispensable preliminary to all results in the air, as in every other sphere of war, is to defeat the armed forces of the enemy.

27. It was therefore proposed in November last year that every infantry battalion engaged in an offensive should be provided with two caterpillar tenders[1] which would undoubtedly carry over the battlefields during the day of battle, and the night following, all the supplies necessary for the immediate continued action of the infantry. The Army have now asked us since July of this year for 450 of these supply tanks by March 1, 1918. A serious delay in meeting this requirement is now inevitable, but that it can be met, and met on a very large scale, during the course of next year is certain. A satisfactory universal carrying-machine has been designed and will be reproduced as rapidly as possible. This machine will carry over the " cratered " battlefield 10 tons, which by making certain fittings can either be expressed in guns, men, ammunition, or supplies. Other methods of utilizing the existing tanks to draw sledges of supplies are also being developed.

28. Another method which is now being pursued promisingly, and may be found to be capable of application on a very large scale, is " rope railways " or " cableways." Various systems of this have recently been experimented with and constructed by the army and by the Ministry of Munitions, working simultaneously and independently. This work has now been combined, and it may be found possible within a reasonable time to support the forward movement of an army by a network of cableways, which will grow up as fast as the troops can move across the battlefield, and can with sufficient loss and effort be maintained in working order during the battle and in the night following.

The relative merits of the " caterpillar tender " or " supply tank " compared to the cableway have yet to be determined. It seems not at all improbable that both will be needed, and that the supply of the fighting infantry in the most advanced positions could be maintained by the caterpillars, while the supply of the advancing batteries would be secured by the cableways.

[1] Otherwise " Supply Tanks."

APPENDIX IX



DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING THE INCIDENCE OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM ON BRITISH MERCANTILE SINKINGS.

Gross tonnage of British Merchant Ships sunk per month by submarines from January, 1917, onwards, shown thus ————
Number of ships in ocean convoys sailing from and arriving in Great Britain per month (Cross Channel, Scandinavian, and direct convoys between France and the U.S.A. not included), shown thus ....



COMPARISON BETWEEN LOSSES AND OUTPUT OF MERCHANT SHIPBUILDING.

British Merchant tonnage lost through enemy action and marine risks in gross tons, shown thus ----------
World " " " " " " ——————
Output of Merchant Shipbuilding from United Kingdom in gross tons, shown thus ..... ═══
" " " World, " " " " ....

APPENDIX X

BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN OFFICIAL CASUALTY RETURNS

Total British Casualties on the Western Front Month by month

Taken from "The Military Effort," page 253 et seq.

1914	August	14,409
	September	15,189
	October	30,192
	November	24,785
	December	11,079
1915	January	6,542
	February	9,195
	March	24,483
	April	31,264
	May	65,730
	June	22,563
	July	16,315
	August	14,587
	September	59,615
	October	25,909
	November	9,263
	December	11,117
1916	January	10,975
	February	13,014
	March	18,949
	April	22,409
	May	24,661
	June	39,959
	July	196,081
	August	75,249
	September	115,056
	October	66,852
	November	46,238
	December	13,803
1917	January	15,289
	February	26,140
	March	25,788
	April	120,070
	May	76,040
	June	75,123
	July	84,695
	August	81,080
	September	81,249
	October	119,808
	November	73,888
	December	38,620
1918	January	13,042
	February	9,809
	March	173,721
	April	143,168
	May	69,049
	June	32,436
	July	32,562
	August	122,272
	September	114,831
	October	121,046
	November	20,925
	Total	2,706,134

PERTES DES ARMEES FRANÇAISES (NORD-EST ET ORIENT) REPARTIES PAR PERIODES

Journal Officiel, Documents parlementaires, Session Extraordinaire 1920, *Annexe* 633, *Séance du* 29 *Mars*, 1920, *proposition de résolution Marin.*

(Ces chiffres ne comprennent pas les officiers.)

Dates.	Designation.	Morts sur le Terrain disparus et prisonniers.	Mort dans le formations sanitaires et hôpitaux de la zone des armées.	Morts dans les hôpitaux de la zone l'intérieur.	Evacués sur l'intérieur.
Août–Septembre, 1914	Bataille des frontières (Août 6–Septembre 5) et Bataille de la Marne (Septembre 6–13)	313,000	7,000	9,000	400,000
Octobre–Novembre, 1914	La course à la mer, 1 Bataille d'Artois, l'Yser	104,000	11,000	10,000	
Décembre, 1914–Jan., 1915	Stabilisation	62,000	5,000	7,000	180,000
Février–Mars, 1915	1 Offensive de 1915 (1 Bataille de Champagne)	55,000	7,000	7,000	171,000
Avril–Mai–Juin, 1915	2 Bataille d'Artois.	121,000	13,000	9,000	306,000
Juillet–Août, 1915	Stabilisation	39,000	6,000	3,000	145,000
Sept.–Novembre, 1915.	2 Offensive 1915 (2 Bataille Champagne, 2 Bataille d'Artois)	115,000	10,000	9,000	279,000
Décembre, 1915–Jan., 1916	Stabilisation	15,000	5,000	2,000	56,000
Février–Juin, 1916	Bataille défensive de Verdun	156,000	15,000	8,000	263,000
Juillet–Oct., 1916	Bataille de la Somme.	114,000	16,000	6,000	205,000
Novembre–Décembre, 1916	1 Bataille offensive de Verdun	30,000	5,000	3,000	55,000
Janvier–Mars., 1917	Repli Allemand	20,000	4,000	6,000	78,000
Avril–Juillet, 1917	Offensive de l'Aisne (Chemin des Dames et Bataille des Monts)	87,000	15,000	8,000	169,000
Août–Décembre, 1917	Opérations à objectifs limités (Flandres, rive droite de la Meuse, la Malmaison)	38,000	9,000	7,000	128,000
Janvier–Février, 1918	Stabilisation	4,000	3,000	3,000	41,000
Mars–Juin, 1918	Campagne défensive de 1918.	145,000	13,000	9,000	266,000
Juillet–Novembre, 1918	Campagne offensive de 1918	110,000	35,000	18,000	368,000
		1,528,000[1]	179,000	124,000	3,110,000
		Total, 4,941,000[2]			

[1] Dont: 477,800 prisonniers vivants en pays ennemi ou en Suisse, au Novembre 11, 1918, et 30,000 prisonniers rapatriés ou evadés depuis Juillet, 1916.

[2] Add Officers killed 36,000.

LOSSES ON THE WESTERN FRONT BY MAIN OPERATION PERIODS

(From the Statistics of the Reichsarchiv.)

THE GERMAN LOSSES OPPOSITE THE FRANCO-BELGIAN AND BRITISH FRONTS.

Period.	Opposite the Franco-Belgian Front.			Opposite the British Front.[1]			Opposite the Combined Franco-Belgian-British Fronts.[2]		
	Dead.[3]	Missing and Prisoner.[4]	Wounded.	Dead.[3]	Missing and Prisoner.[4]	Wounded.	Dead.[3]	Missing and Prisoner.[4]	Wounded.
August–November, 1914	—[5]	—[5]	—[5]	—[5]	—[5]	—[5]	116,750[5]	107,640[5]	453,050[5]
December, 1914–January, 1915	—[5]	—[5]	—[5]	—[5]	—[5]	—[5]	54,825[5]	11,100[5]	104,100[5]
February–March, 1915	20,446	9,457	66,079	2,927	4,394	11,169	23,373	13,851	77,248
April–June, 1915	37,020	23,283	130,117	8,233	4,937	29,916	45,253	28,220	160,033
July–August, 1915	13,427	4,805	48,553	2,225	708	8,684	15,652	5,513	57,237
September–November, 1915	24,551	31,164	98,424	6,165	5,363	20,521	30,716	36,527	118,945
December, 1915–January, 1916	5,623	2,312	20,998	2,279	82	8,408	7,902	2,394	29,406
February–June, 1916	46,973	25,316	206,450	10,845	2,531	42,131	57,818	27,847	248,581
July-October, 1916	49,510	72,935	215,566	32,338	36,288	131,332	81,848	109,223	346,898
November–December, 1916	8,455	14,395	33,187	6,135	7,207	22,894	14,590	21,602	56,081
January–March, 1917	5,826	1,241	23,116	6,878	5,226	23,094	12,704	6,467	46,210
April–July, 1917	38,122	48,285	151,903	29,642	40,806	105,323	67,764	89,091	257,226
August–December, 1917	25,728	33,548	108,105	37,630	51,848	147,658	63,358	85,396	255,763
January–February, 1918	2,049	1,441	8,740	2,351	545	8,938	4,400	1,986	17,678
March–June, 1918	41,121	26,424	185,659	73,130	47,049	314,958	114,251	73,473	500,617
July–November, 1918[6]	45,169	154,313	215,135	33,027	193,554	144,535	78,196	347,867	359,670
							789,400[7]	968,197	3,088,743

[1] Including the German losses opposite the Portuguese troops, for a time interpolated in the British line.

[2] The losses opposite the American front are estimated at about 25,000; there are no data available on which to base an exact figure.*

[3] "Dead" here only means fallen on the field of battle, and does not include those who died in hospital, etc., from wounds or sickness.

[4] Taken from the figures reported every ten days to the Supreme Command by the troops. The totals of missing include both men only temporarily absent from their units, and those first reported dead or wounded later.

[5] For the losses from August, 1914, to January, 1915 (inclusive), only general totals are available, which are partly based on estimates.

[6] The figures for October, 1918, are not quite complete; and those for November, 1918, are entirely lacking.

[7] The total of German War Deaths on the Western Front in Table A, viz. 1,493,000, is obtained from these tables as follows: Killed 789,000 (approx.) (*Reichsarchiv*) + died in hospital 300,000 (i.e. the same proportion as the French) + missing now believed dead in *Reichsarchiv* return 194,000 + ⅓ths additional dead in *Nachweiseamt's* final return 170,000 + Estimate of Germans killed by Americans 40,000 = 1,493,000.

* This figure is now stated by the German *Reichsarchiv* to be incorrect. An unofficial German estimate places the total between 100,000 and 140,000. I have adopted the higher total—W. S. C.

LOSSES OF MEN IN THE GERMAN LAND FORCES

(From Information supplied by the Central Enquiry Office (Zentral Nachweiseamt) for War Casualties and War Graves.)

On the Authority of the Official Casualty List.	Dead (Killed in Action and Died of Wounds or Sickness).			Number of Woundings[1] so far as they were not mortal (not number of wounded men).			Prisoner and Missing, not including those known to have died in captivity (included in col. 2).[3]		
	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Total.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Total.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Total.
Up to 31.12.14	5,847	136,655	142,502	11,519	529,199	540,718	908	153,682	154,590
,, 31.12.15	16,921	611,524	628,445	29,030	1,566,376	1,595,406	3,191	316,963	320,154
,, 31.12.16	24,910	938,591	963,501	45,587	2,425,568	2,471,155	6,245	495,012	501,257
,, 31.12.17	33,272	1,238,301	1,271,573	61,093	3,117,743	3,178,836	9,659	656,745	666,404
,, 31.12.18	46,946	1,574,088	1,621,034	88,888	4,014,931	4,103,819	14,698	846,692	861,390
,, 31.12.19	50,555	1,668,053	1,718,608	92,310	4,123,285	4,215,595	18,607	1,061,648	1,080,255
,, 31.12.20	52,024	1,711,955	1.763,979	92,358	4,122,221	4,214,579[2]	18,143	1,047,089	1,065,232
,, 30. 9.21	52,673	1,740,160	1,792,833	92,384	4,122,435	4,214,819	17,985	1,031,436	1,049,421
,, 31.10.22	53,229	1,768,693	1,821,922	92,441	4,123,057	4,215,498	18,103	1,019,809	1,037,912
,, 30. 6.23	53,386	1,781,138	1,834,524	92,458	4,123,315	4,215,773	18,042	1,012,032	1,030,074[4]

[1] The number of individuals wounded and the number of wound cases cannot be given separately.

[2] The number of wound cases is smaller than before because the number of individuals who were reported as died of wounds was greater than the fresh cases of wounds in the period.

[3] The total of those who died in captivity has not been finally settled. Up to the present, 55,066 deaths of German prisoners have been reported by the States with which we were at war. Of these 40,300 are included in the casualty lists, the rest are still left in the total of Prisoner and Missing.

[4] It must be assumed that the greater number of the German nationals still missing (170,000) are dead. The total of dead will, therefore, be increased to approximately 2,000,000.

APPENDIX XI

THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE.

Map showing the alterations to international boundaries in Europe arising out of the Great War of 1914–1918, and the Treaties that followed in its train. The pre-war boundaries are outlined in black; the revised frontiers are indicated by hatched lines.

APPENDIX XII

A MEMORANDUM UPON THE PACIFICATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST

The situation that confronted His Majesty's Government in Iraq at the beginning of 1921 was a most unsatisfactory one. The system of direct British administration, which had been maintained since the Armistice, had broken down in the previous summer when a local rising on the Euphrates developed into a serious rebellion, which was suppressed with much difficulty and with the aid of reinforcements sent from India. A large and costly military garrison still remained in the country. Order had been restored but the future was dubious in the extreme. The events of 1920 had brought the Iraq question strongly into the limelight and a violent agitation had been started in the Press and elsewhere against the whole policy of the British Government. Criticism was directed mainly against the heavy expenditure entailed upon the British taxpayer, already staggering under the financial burden left by the war; but in some quarters it took another line and represented that our troubles were due to our failure to give effect to war-time promises of independence for the Arabs.

After the rising of 1920 it became evident that there must be some change of policy. In the autumn of that year, Sir Percy Cox had been sent out to Baghdad as the first British High Commissioner, and had lost no time in setting up a provisional Arab Government under the presidency of the Naqib of Baghdad, a venerable figure, who commanded great respect not only in Iraq itself but in the Mohammedan world outside its borders.

Prior to 1921 different departments of His Majesty's Government had dealt with the different Middle Eastern areas conquered during the war. The affairs of Palestine and Trans-Jordan were in the charge of the Foreign Office; those of Iraq in that of the India Office. Early in 1921 the Government decided to place these matters under a single Department, viz. the Colonial Office, to which I had recently been appointed as Secretary of State. A new Middle East Department was accordingly established at the Colonial Office and came formally into existence on March 1, 1921.

My first step was to summon a conference at Cairo, over which I presided personally and which was attended by all the principal officers concerned in the administration of Middle Eastern affairs. The main upshot, so far as Iraq was concerned, was that the Emir Feisal was invited to proceed to Baghdad as a candidate for the throne of Iraq. Though not of Iraqi origin, he had very special qualifications for the post. He came of the Sherifian family which, as guardians of the Holy Places at Mecca, commanded wide veneration throughout the Islamic world. His father, Sherif Hussein (afterwards for a time King of the Hejaz), had organized the Arab revolt against the Turks during the war. He himself had fought gallantly on our side and had taken part in the various exploits of desert warfare with which the name of Colonel Lawrence will always be associated.

The Emir Feisal set out for Iraq in June, 1921. At the same time I announced in the House of Commons that his candidature had the approval of the British Government. On the Emir's arrival it was decided, on a resolution by the existing Council of Ministers, that a referendum should be held throughout the country on the question of his election to the throne. The referendum was duly carried out throughout Iraq, with the exception of one purely Kurdish area, which preferred to hold aloof. The result was that 96 per cent. of the votes cast were in Feisal's favour, and he was crowned King at Baghdad on August 23, 1921. He at once entrusted the Naqib with the formation of his first Cabinet.

In this way direct British administration in Iraq definitely ceased. It was replaced by an Arab Government, acting indeed on British advice, but acting on its own responsibility and not under external dictaton. A large number of British officers were retained in the country, but they were retained either in an advisory capacity or as technical officers subordinate to the Iraq Government.

The next task that lay before the British Government was to regularize the whole position. We had agreed, at the San Remo Conference of April, 1920, to assume the position of Mandatory for Iraq under the League of Nations. The draft of a formal "mandate" was submitted to the League in December, 1920, but owing to various difficulties this draft had never been formally approved. In October, 1921, we obtained a kind of *ad interim* authority from the League in the shape of a letter from the President of the Council inviting us to continue to carry on the administration of Iraq in the spirit of the draft mandate until such time as the position should have been regularized. But while the League hesitated, the local situation did not. Iraq advanced rapidly under our guidance. The term "mandate" acquired an unpopular significance in the country. It was held to imply a degree of tutelage which the new State considered that it did not require. It was a case of the "protectorate" in Egypt over again. As a way out of the difficulty, it was decided to conclude a treaty with the King of Iraq, ostensibly as between equals, which would (1) define in detail the relations between the two countries and (2) place the British Government in a position to discharge towards the League of Nations those obligations which

it would have incurred under a formal " mandate." This treaty was duly signed at Baghdad on October 10, 1922. Shortly after its signature the Coalition Government in England went out of office and I ceased to be Secretary of State for the Colonies. The treaty of October, 1922, left various matters of detail to be dealt with subsequently in a number of subsidiary Agreements. These subsidiary Agreements (Military, Financial, Judicial, etc.) were eventually concluded in March, 1924. In September, 1924, the Treaty and Agreements were laid before the Council of the League of Nations and were accepted by them, with the addition of certain other assurances given by the British Government, as giving adequate effect in respect of Iraq to the mandatory principle as defined in the Covenant of the League. By this means the whole position was eventually placed on a regular juridical basis.

Internally, the progress of the Iraq State has been marked by successive constitutional steps. The first step was the election of a Constituent Assembly, whose business was to frame a constitution for the country. This was done in the form of an Organic Law passed by the Assembly on July 10, 1924. Having discharged its functions the Assembly was dissolved and was replaced in due course by the first Iraq Parliament which came into being in 1926.

A question which long caused much trouble both externally and internally was that of the Turco-Iraq frontier. The Turks claimed the retrocession of the whole of the Mosul vilayet, i.e. about one-third of the whole country, including the most fertile areas. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) left the question open. Much controversy raged over the matter and at one time there was serious danger of hostilities with the Turks. Ultimately the matter was referred to the League of Nations and a frontier was laid down which maintained the rights of Iraq over practically the whole vilayet. The Turks accepted the *fait accompli*. The frontier was delimited by a mixed Commission without serious friction and friendly relations have not since been impaired.

Of the other matters dealt with by the Cairo Conference it is not perhaps necessary to say much. As regards Palestine, the Conference did little more than confirm the policy previously adopted and still maintained. In Trans-Jordan there have been developments. The Amir Abdullah, a brother of King Feisal of Iraq, was permitted to establish himself as ruler of the country. The experiment has on the whole been a success. The Amir's Government, though it left a good deal to be desired in its early stages, has shown marked improvement of recent years. Public security and public contentment have definitely improved. We have during the past year concluded a Treaty with the Amir very much on the lines of that with King Feisal, providing for a constitutional régime in Trans-Jordan. This Treaty awaits ratification.

Turning again to Iraq, it is necessary to mention one further change of the highest importance that was introduced in 1922. In October of that year military control in the country was transferred from the War Office to the Air Ministry. It may safely be claimed that the change has proved an immense success. It has resulted in a progressive reduction in the cost of the garrison and consequently in the burden imposed on the British taxpayer. At the beginning of 1921 the strength of the British garrison in Iraq stood at 32 battalions plus Artillery, Engineers, etc. By July, 1921, the number had been reduced to 23 battalions, and a further reduction to 12 battalions was started in October of that year. In the year 1922–23 provision was made for 9 battalions (plus other services) for the first half of the year and for 6 battalions during the second half. The process of reduction was continued until in the year 1928 provision was made for no more than one Indian battalion and one Sapper and Miner Company, both of which were withdrawn on November 1st last. There are now (apart from the R.A.F.) no regular military units, British or Indian, in the whole country. In order to accelerate the programme for relieving Imperial troops a force of native Levies, under British command, and paid for by the British Treasury, was raised in 1921–22. These Levies at one time reached a strength of 4 Infantry Battalions, 3 Cavalry Regiments, 1 Pack Battery and ancillaries. The force has now been reduced to 2 battalions.

The cost of the British Garrison in Iraq during the past seven years has been as follows :

1921–2	£20,097,684
1922–3	£6,610,554
1923–4	£5,033,790
1924–5	£3,847,224
1925–6	£3,314,813
1926–7	£2,753,775
1927–8	£1,648,038

In 1928 it was decided to show the normal cost of defence, exclusive of the cost of the Levies and of the " extra " cost of the British garrison, in the War Office and Air Ministry Estimates, with the exception of Indian troops ; consequently, figures are not available beyond 1927–8.

The Air Force in Iraq in 1921 consisted of 6 squadrons which, in the following year, were raised to 8 squadrons plus armoured car companies. By April, 1928, the strength had been reduced to 5 squadrons plus 6 sections of Armoured Cars.

It is worth recording that this striking reduction of military strength (with corresponding financial retrenchment) has been carried through without a hitch and without any resultant disturbance in Iraq. When the nature of the country is considered, its vast distances, the unsettled nature of many of its inhabitants, and its huge desert frontier, over which really effective control is impossible, it may fairly be claimed that the results achieved have been astonishing. It must be remembered, moreover, that the difficulty with the Turks was not finally resolved until the end of 1925. All the plans made in the earlier stages were based on the assumption that there would be an early settlement with Turkey. This assumption was falsified for nearly five years. Yet the plans were duly carried out and no disorder or mishap resulted. There has, in fact, been nothing in the nature of serious disturbance since the rising of 1920. There have been difficulties from time to time in outlying Kurdish areas, and there have been serious raids (particularly last winter) by

the Wahabi tribesmen who owe allegiance to Ibn Sa'ud. But these are conditions that have always to be reckoned with and must be taken as they come. There is no reason to suppose that they cannot be dealt with in future as effectively as in the past.

To sum up, the policy inaugurated in 1921 has been continued up to the present time. Like other policies, it has had its ups and downs. There have been moments of difficulty and of danger. In spite of these, however, it has been steadily pursued, often in face of fierce and unscrupulous press criticism at home, and has achieved a measure of success which few of us thought at all probable eight years ago.

APPENDIX XIII

ADMIRALTY WAR STAFF ORDERS FOR THE ATTACK UPON THE DARDANELLES, FEBRUARY, 1915

OPERATION ORDERS FOR ATTACK ON DARDANELLES.

(Prepared by Admiralty War Staff and approved by the First Sea Lord.)

(Most Secret.)

The British force will consist of the following ships :—

Queen Elizabeth	15-inch guns.
Inflexible	12-inch guns.
Swiftsure, *Triumph*	10-inch and 7·5-inch guns.
Cornwallis, *Irresistible*	12-inch, 40 calibre guns.
Ocean, *Albion*, *Canopus*, *Vengeance*	12-inch, 35 calibre guns.
Majestic, *Prince George*	12-inch, 35 calibre guns, 6-inch howitzers.
Doris, *Amethyst*, *Sapphire*, *Dublin*, *Blenheim*, *Swanley*	Destroyer depôts.

Ark Royal, seaplane ship.
8 destroyers ("Beagle" class).
8 ,, ("River" class), including *Wear*.
1 yacht (in charge of trawlers).
21 mine-sweeping trawlers.
6 submarines, viz. : AE 2 and 2 B class from Gibraltar, B 9, B 10, B 11.

Use of *Queen Elizabeth*.

Queen Elizabeth has been detailed on account of her long-range 15-inch guns.

It is particularly important that her guns should not be unduly worn, nor a large quantity of her valuable ammunition expended.

She should not be risked in positions which have not been thoroughly swept free from mines.

With seamanlike precaution it is quite possible to anchor vessels in any depths which obtain, in or about the Dardanelles. Given fine weather and good conditions of visibility, and the ship anchored in view of, but out of range from, the fort she is to attack, the destruction of the fort will be entailed if from five to ten of *Queen Elizabeth's* heavy shells can be dropped in it.

Very careful arrangements will be required to mark the fall of shot by means of anchored marking ships and sea-planes.

To reduce the expenditure of ammunition and wear of the 15-inch guns and obtain the greatest percentage of hits to rounds fired, salvoes should not be fired, and reduced charges should be used whenever the range of the fort's guns permits the ships to be anchored within a distance which permits of the use of reduced charges.

The problem of destroying a fort from a ship at a fixed range, at which she cannot be hit, is a different one from that of ships under way engaging each other, because time does not enter into the calculation, and the range is a fixed quantity.

If, say, five-gun salvoes are fired from the *Queen Elizabeth*, it is hardly possible that more than one hit per salvo will be made (after a straddle is obtained), owing to the guns not shooting together at long range, due to the spread in elevation. Four rounds will be wasted for every hit made in addition to the rounds used before the straddle is obtained. The shell smoke and dust from the misses will render marking difficult, and more time will be required for the smoke to clear and the target to become visible.

If a single gun is used hitting should be established in four or five rounds, and a very high percentage of the subsequent rounds should be hits. Personal and other errors will also be reduced proportionately.

The 38-cm. howitzers which destroyed the Antwerp forts by indirect fire used about five rounds to establish hitting and five further rounds to destroy the fort. It is to be expected that *Queen Elizabeth*, using direct fire at older forts, will equal this performance at a fixed range if accurate marking is ensured and the greatest care and deliberation is used.

When the same conditions apply, similar methods should be followed in using the fire of the 12-inch guns in other vessels. Their

ammunition is limited, though not to the same extent, and wasteful expenditure of ammunition may result in the operations having to be abandoned before a successful conclusion is arrived at.

In the case of indirect fire having to be used from ships, it is recognised that the expenditure will be considerable. For indirect fire the older ships should be preferred, if possible, to the *Queen Elizabeth*.

A base should be seized and garrisoned. Any convenient Turkish island should be selected.

The entrance forts at Cape Helles and Kum Kale should be deliberately bombarded at long range from an anchored vessel or vessels. After this, some of the older battleships should approach nearer to draw the fire of the forts and silence any remaining guns. If the fire is found to be still considerable they should withdraw, and the fort should be subjected to further deliberate long-range fire from anchored ships.

Sweeping to approach the entrance will then be necessary, and it is to be expected that the sweeping vessels will be fired at by guns placed in other positions than the forts. These will require to be dealt with by vessels covering the sweeping vessels, and, as probably no very large guns will be in other positions than the forts, 6-inch and 7·5-inch guns should be sufficient to deal with them.

As the sweeping vessels close the entrance, it is to be expected that they will come under machine-gun and infantry fire, and air reconnaissance will be advisable to locate the trenches.

The trenches and the positions of the torpedo tubes will require to be well searched with fire.

Should it not be possible to locate the torpedo tubes and destroy them by gunfire it may be necessary to land men, if the enemy's infantry can be kept at a sufficient distance by shell and machine-gun fire.

If there is any doubt as to the torpedo tubes being destroyed, it may be possible to take ships past them by securing colliers or other merchant vessels alongside.

Vessels covering the mine-sweepers will be exposed to attack by drifting mines, especially when at anchor. Torpedo nets will be some protection against pairs of mines, connected by lines, coming alongside when the connecting rope takes across the stem.

It may be advisable to prepare buoys to be laid ahead of vessels anchoring in the Dardanelles to catch the drifting mines, and also to make use of fishing-nets between buoys to intercept mines. Concrete blocks could be used as moorings for the buoys.

Drift nets have been found efficacious in the North Sea as a means of clearing away moored mines. They are allowed to drift with the tide, and foul the mines and break them adrift.

Nets might be laid at night by shallow-draught vessels or picket boats above the minefields to drift down with the current.

There may be considerable difficulty in dealing with observation mines owing to the depths at which they may be moored.

The cables will probably have to be swept for with explosive grapnels, but it may be possible also to sweep with mine-sweeping vessels to a sufficient depth.

When the defences at the entrance are put out of action the operations will probably develop into a slow methodical progress of perhaps a mile a day, silencing fire of concealed guns and keeping down fire from trenches or machine-gun pits which will inconvenience the mine-sweepers.

It is not expected or desired that the operations should be hurried to the extent of taking large risks and courting heavy losses. The slow, relentless creeping forward of the attacking force mile by mile will tend to shake the *moral* of the garrisons of the forts at Kephez Point, Chanak, and Kilid Bahr, and will have an effect on Constantinople.

The forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr appear to be open to bombardment by long-range direct fire from ships anchored on the European and Asiatic shores respectively, but the difficulty of ensuring accurate marking will be considerable.

Indirect fire from an anchorage off Gaba Tepe should be effective against the works on the Asiatic side, but it would appear difficult to ensure its effect against the works at Kilid Bahr. This will be apparent if the trajectory curve is plotted in relation to a vertical section of the intervening hills. But there is no reason it should not be tried, and anchorage positions may be found where the trajectory curves will have the best clearance over the intervening ridges.

The possibility of increasing the effective range of the older ships by listing them should be borne in mind. This was practised at Tsingtau recently.

H.M.S. *Triumph* took part in the reduction of Tsing Tau, and the experience gained by her captain and officers should be made use of.

Two battalions of Royal Marines are being sent out to Malta under Brigadier-General Trotman. Their transports should be retained so that they can at any time be removed to the Dardanelles. They will be of service as garrison for the base or for any small landing operation of a temporary nature in circumstances where they can be efficiently protected by the guns of the Fleet against superior Turkish forces.

They should not be landed against superior forces or entrenched positions in circumstances where they cannot be efficiently supported by the ships' guns without first obtaining Admiralty sanction.

Twenty additional Maxim guns are being sent with the Royal Marine force, either for use when landed or for use in small craft to keep down rifle fire.

So far as can be ascertained, no submarines have as yet been put together at Constantinople, but, when operations against the Dardanelles commence, it is to be expected that Germany will endeavour either to send submarines to the Mediterranean or to influence the Austrians to send them out of the Adriatic.

As a measure of precaution, submarine indicator nets are being sent out. They can be either moored or used as drift nets, and will betray the presence of a submarine to the boats watching the nets, and possibly

permit of explosive charges being used to destroy her.

An arrangement is being made to establish agents in the Greek islands to watch for and report submarines or vessels supplying them, and prevent them establishing secret bases.

A number of merchant vessels have been altered to represent "Dreadnought" battleships and cruisers, and are indistinguishable from them at three or four miles distance.

A squadron of these vessels will be sent out to Tenedos Island. They should be used with due precaution to prevent their character being discovered, and should be shown as part of the fleet off the entrance to the Dardanelles, as if held in reserve. They may mislead the Germans as to the margin of British strength in Home Waters.

The mine-sweeping trawlers will require a depôt ship for provisions, pay, and medical attendance, and, as *Blenheim* will suffice for the destroyers, the *Swanley*, or one of the supply ships, should be used for them, unless it is preferred to attach them to the battleships as tenders.

The bombardment of the forts at the entrance need not be delayed until the arrival of all the ships, and can be commenced as ships become available.

The French Minister of Marine has been requested to provide two battleships with as many long-range guns as possible and as many small cruisers, destroyers, seaplanes and submarines as possible, as the proportion of small ships to large ships in the British Fleet is not as large as is thought desirable.

APPENDIX XIV

LORD FISHER'S RESIGNATION

Since the first edition of this work has appeared I have received a letter from Captain Thomas Crease, Lord Fisher's Naval Assistant, which throws a different light on some of the minor aspects of Lord Fisher's resignation. From this I print the relevant extracts.

Captain Crease to Mr. Churchill.

The definite and immediate reason for Lord Fisher's resignation in the early morning hours of May 15th, was not the telegram concerning the despatch of our cruisers to the Adriatic, sent by you on the 14th and marked "1st Sea Lord to see after action." The copy of this telegram was opened by me on the night of the 14th, in the course of my duties as Naval Assistant to the First Sea Lord, at which time Lord Fisher had already gone to bed, and it was not seen by him till late next day as he did not come to the Admiralty during the morning. The telegram was certainly not the spark that fired the train, though undoubtedly it fed the flames.

The real reason for Lord Fisher's resignation at that moment was the minute which you wrote to him somewhere about 11 p.m. on the 14th May, and which he read probably about 5 a.m. on 15th May. I think it is necessary, therefore, for the sake of Lord Fisher's reputation and for historical accuracy, now to draw special attention to this minute and to the circumstances in which it was written. All the reasons you have suggested in your account for Lord Fisher's resignation on that early morning, except the telegram, were equally as valid on the night of the 14th when you parted so amicably, as the morning of the 15th, and as I have stated, the telegram had nothing to do with the matter. Without the powerful reason of this particular minute Lord Fisher's action in resigning would appear to be due to vacillation and indecision, if nothing worse, and a most undeserved slur is cast on his memory.

In Chapter XLIX of your account you describe the events of 14th May, leading up to your long discussion with Lord Fisher in the evening. At the end of that interview I could see that you yourself were obviously much relieved in your mind, and Lord Fisher also parted from you on quite amicable terms. He told me at once that he had had a very satisfactory discussion with you, and that he had peaceably settled with you what ships and reinforcements should go to the Dardanelles, and that I "need not pack up just yet"—earlier in the afternoon, after his return from the War Council, he had informed me that he felt he could not stop much longer as First Sea Lord. He told me exactly what ships it had been arranged to send to the Dardanelles, and gave me some minor instructions in regard to this matter, and he then signed his papers and went home and to bed. The arrangements made, as I then understood from him, so far as ships were concerned, embraced only six large Monitors and four "Edgar" Class fitted with bulges.

Late that night about midnight, I was working in my room when your Principal Private Secretary, Mr. Masterton-Smith, brought me a minute from you to Lord Fisher, with the direction that Lord Fisher was to receive it first thing in the morning. I read this minute, which I understood had just been prepared and then told Mr. Masterton-Smith that in my opinion Lord Fisher would resign immediately if he received it.

I have been given a copy of the minute by Mr. George Lambert, with a view to its

publication, and therefore I now reproduce it, as follows :—

May 14, 1915.

" My Dear Fisher,

I send this to you before marking it to others, in order that if any point arises we can discuss it.

I hope you will agree.

Yours ever,

(Initd.) W."

(*Enclosure.*)

First Sea Lord.

1. The fifth 15-inch howitzer with 50 rounds of ammunition should go to the Dardanelles with the least possible delay, being sent by special train across France and re-embarked at Marseilles. Let me have a time-table showing by what date it can arrive at the Dardanelles.

The two 9·2-inch guns will go to the Dardanelles, either in the two monitors prepared for them or separately for mounting on shore. This will be decided as soon as we hear from Vice-Admiral de Robeck.

2. The following 9 heavy monitors should go in succession to the Dardanelles as soon as they are ready :—*Admiral Farragut, General Grant, Stonewall Jackson, Robert E. Lee, Lord Clive, Prince Rupert, Sir John Moore, General Crauford* and *Marshal Ney.*

The first 6 of the 9·2-inch monitors should also go unless the Admiral chooses to have two of their guns for work on shore, in which case the first 4 only will go.

A time-table should be prepared showing the dates on which they can be despatched and will arrive. They can calibrate on the Turks. All necessary steps for their seaworthiness on the voyage should be taken.

In the case of the 9·2-inch monitors it may be found better to send the actual guns out to Malta separately.

It is clear that when this large accession of force reaches the Vice-Admiral, he should be able to spare a portion of his battleships for service in Home Waters, but it may be better to see how the monitors work and what use they are to him before raising this point.

3. Four of the " Edgars " with special bulge protection against the mine and torpedo are now ready. They carry ten 6-inch guns each and supply the medium armament which the monitors lack. They should be specially useful for supporting the Army at night without risk from torpedo attack. They would also be useful at a later stage in passing a shore torpedo tube or escorting other ships that were passing.

We have not found any satisfactory employment for them here.

It is not necessary to provide crews for them : working parties which can take them out will be sufficient. The Admiral can man them from his large Fleet for any special service that may be required. They should start as soon as possible.

Let me have a report on the manning possibilities as defined above and times by which they can arrive.

It will be for consideration when these vessels are on the spot whether a valuable ship like the *Chatham* should not be released for other duties.

4. The Third Sea Lord will make proposals for providing anti-mine protection for a proportion of the battleships employed on the lines proposed at our discussion.

5. The following increased provision will be made for the Air Service.

(D.A.D. will supply on verbal instructions.)

6. During this month 5 new Submarines are delivered, viz., S2, E18, V2, V3, and S3. In June the Montreal boats come in. Therefore, in view of the request of the Vice-Admiral, I consider that two more E boats should be sent to Dardanelles.

(Initd.) W. S. C.

May 14, 1915.

It was obvious to me that this minute went beyond the agreement regarding reinforcements of ships and materials for the Dardanelles, which Lord Fisher told me himself he reached with you earlier in the evening, and which he considered to be the ultimate lengths to which he was prepared to go in order to meet your views. Knowing Lord Fisher's frame of mind, I felt sure that this, coming at that moment and within a few hours of the previous agreement which he considered final, would be the last straw.

I discussed the matter at some length with Mr. Masterton-Smith, and finally he took the minute back to you, to report what I had said before definitely handing it to me for despatch. After some delay, Mr. Masterton-Smith handed me back the minute and said it must be sent on, as you felt certain that Lord Fisher would not object to the dispositions proposed and in any case it was necessary that they should be made.

Lord Fisher probably read the minute about 5 o'clock next morning, 15th May, and as I had anticipated, soon after wrote and sent you his resignation.

I now have no doubt whatever in my mind as to what occurred in connexion with this fateful minute. You had prepared it during the course of the afternoon, and addressed it to " Secretary," " First Sea Lord " and " Chief of Staff " in that rotation. Before despatching it, however, you decided to discuss the matter personally with the First Sea Lord at your interview during the evening, and after doing this you took away the minute. This would account for me not having seen it in the original form. Late at night you altered the minute and added to it, and then sent it on, directed to Lord Fisher only, and with the covering letter, when I saw it for the first time. Apart from the points already referred to, there is the correction from your original version regarding the ten guns of the " Edgar " Class and a change in the wording about the shore torpedo-tubes, which demonstrate that the minute was revised.

The additional paragraphs relate to the despatch of Aircraft (which did not especially concern Lord Fisher) and also to the despatch of two more E class submarines, which concerned him vitally. I believe, also, that the final minute included more monitors than had been agreed during the evening, but I cannot be certain on this point. Lord Fisher's letter of resignation of 15th May refers to " the increasing *daily* requirements of the Dardanelles to meet your views," and his further letter of 16th May says " until the series of fresh naval arrangements for the Dardanelles you sent me yesterday morning convinced me that the time had arrived to take a final decision—there being

much more in these proposals than had occurred to me the previous evening when you suggested *some of them.*" Lord Fisher, correctly or incorrectly, had conceived that he had reached a final and binding agreement with you on the evening of the 14th, and he was not prepared to have further reinforcements proposed within a few hours of this agreement being made, and therefore he resigned.

I understand that you have no complete copy of this minute amongst your records and that you have no recollection of preparing and sending it, which of course explains the omission of the document in your narrative of these events. . . . I think that in the rest of the narrative you have been quite fair and just to Lord Fisher.

To this letter I made the following reply :—

Mr. Churchill to Captain Crease.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter, and am deeply interested to learn your view of the reasons which actuated Lord Fisher in his final decision to resign. I am glad to think that my surmise that he was offended by the terms of my minute about the cruisers that were sent to Italy, and by the fact that they were despatched in anticipation of his formal sanction, was incorrect. I shall certainly not dispute your view that the real reason was the minute which you quote in your letter in its final and amplified form. As Lord Fisher carried this minute off with him when he resigned, it was not filed with my other papers and it had passed completely from my mind. An exhaustive search among my papers has failed to produce a copy of it. Otherwise I should certainly have printed it, and I will willingly now secure for it the fullest publicity.

It is only necessary for me to make the briefest observations upon it.

In my conversation with Lord Fisher in the evening of May 14 to which you refer, we reached, as you say, a general agreement on the immediate reinforcements to be despatched at that juncture to the Dardanelles. But this could not be regarded in the nature of a final bargain or treaty between separate or hostile powers. Obviously a duty lay upon the First Sea Lord no less than upon me to sustain the Fleet and Army at the Dardanelles by every means possible without endangering our main position in the North Sea, and any reasonable and practicable succour that was available must at least be open to discussion between us. I can only suppose that further reflection and heart-searching on the problem between the time when Lord Fisher retired to rest and I, late in the night, completed the final edition of my minute, led me to feel that the two submarines were an essential part of the proper treatment of the problem. The Admiral on the spot was evidently asking for them, and Mr. Balfour's Board, which succeeded mine, sent them and a good many more and by this agency alone nearly paralysed the Turkish communications across the Marmora. I cannot therefore feel that I was wrong in wishing to include them among the proposals sent to the First Sea Lord, not as matters decided upon, but for consideration and discussion as I was careful to make plain in my covering note to the minute. I do not recollect, nor does Sir James Masterton-Smith, that the addition of these two submarines to the reinforcements was ever represented to me at your instance as being likely to cause a fatal disagreement. If something of this sort was said to me, it certainly made no impression on my mind either at the time or afterwards. The addition of the two submarines must have appeared to me as not raising any new question of principle between me and the First Sea Lord, and at the same time most necessary in itself. That being so, it was clearly my duty to make the proposal. That this item, the dimensions of which can be fully judged and which until you visited me had passed entirely from my mind, should have precipitated the disastrous events which followed, only invests with deeper melancholy the tragedy of the Dardanelles.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES.

THE Great War of 1914–18, as was perhaps inevitable in the case of so overwhelming a catastrophe, has become the subject of a very comprehensive literature. In addition to the Official Histories, many of which are not yet complete, books have been published by the majority of the great statesmen, soldiers and sailors who took an active part in the conduct of the War, and by a large company of officers and other ranks with particular knowledge of notable actions, of various sectors on the Western Front or of conditions in the more distant theatres.

To the many who seek a list of books published dealing with this campaign, the following work, published in 1930, will be of service :—

1914–1918 WAR BOOKS : A Critical Guide. By Cyril Falls. Published by Peter Davies, Ltd. 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

Since the publication of this useful volume, which contains a comprehensive catalogue of British and foreign works dealing with the Great War, classified under History, Reminiscence and Fiction, with notes upon each work together with publishers' names and prices, certain other books have made their appearance, some of them of first-rate importance.

Of these the following should be noted :—

WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE. Ivor Nicholson and Watson. 4 Vols. 21*s.* each net.

LORD RIDDELL'S WAR DIARY. Ivor Nicholson and Watson. 21*s.* net.

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